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PREFACE
This study deals with three poets from three dif­
ferent countries—Germany, France, and England—and there­
fore may be considered a dissertation in comparative liter­
ature. It examines the reflection of a complex philosoph­
ical concept in an aesthetic form—literature—and thereby 
involves the two distinct disciplines of philosophy and 
literature. The interdisciplinary emphasis of this dis­
sertation represents a distinguishing aspect of the Inter­
collegiate Program.
The dissertation falls into two parts: 1) an
examination of existential thought in some of its lead­
ing philosophers, and 2) an examination of three impor­
tant poetical works by each of three important modern
The first part aims at producing a clear, coherent, 
and valid conception of the basic nature of existential
The second
poets.
thought and the themes which characterize it. 
part examines the poems to see to what extent the basic 
aspects of Existentialism may be perceived in them.
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Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School for help in
selecting this subject; Dr. William E. Urabach for help in
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on Baudelaire; Dr. Frederick Sontag, Department of Phi­
losophy, Pomona College, for valuable suggestions and 
criticisms of the first half of the dissertation; Mrs. 
Louis Schaefer for proofreading the whole of the manu­
script; and Mrs. Gertrude Gurule for her assistance with 
the typing.
I also wish to express my appreciation to my dis­
sertation committee, who read the rough draft and gave 
valuable criticism and needed direction:
Main (chairman), Assistant Professor of English, University 
of Redlands; Dr. Basil Busacca, Associate Professor of 
English and Comparative Literature, Occidental College; 
and Dr. Kenneth A. Oliver, Chairman, Educational Council, 
Intercollegiate Program of Graduate Studies, and Chairman, 
Department of English and Comparative Literature, Occidental 
College.
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I gratefully acknowledge a grant from the Inter­
collegiate Program which freed me to bring the dissertation 
to early completion.
Finally, my deepest thanks go. to Dr. Lawrence E.
Nelson, Dean of Graduate Studies, University of Redlands, 
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EXISTENTIALISM:
THE PRESENT DEFINITIONAL CONFUSION
Existentialism has, since World War II, been the 
object of extravagant praise and shrill denunciation. It 
has been embraced with enthusiasm by frustrated adolescents 
as well as by serious theologians. One critic has deplored 
Existentialism as the last gasp of decadence, a form of so­
cial and ethical anarchy, and even suggested it as a factor 
in the rise of Hitler.^ On the other hand, Existentialism 
has been hailed as a foundation for a more genuine and ade­
quate ethics, as a revolutionary new beginning in philo­
sophical thought after centuries of essentialistic approaches 
to man. Herr Martin Heidegger even goes so far as to sug­
gest that Being holds "the spiritual destiny of the West."^ 
Several leading theologians have been profoundly 
influenced by Existentialism—to the consternation of many 
of their more conservative colleagues. A recent paperback 
anthology makes the views of four of these "existentialist" 
theologians available to a wide reading audience.^
Vorberto Bobbio, The Philosophy of Decadentism: A 
Study in Existentialism, trans. David Moore (Oxford, 1948).
2John Wild, "Existentialist Ethics: Integrity and 
Decision," ch. 5 in his The Challenge of Existentialism 
(Bloomington, Indiana, 1955), pp. I10-T5O.
^Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik (Tiibingen, 1953)» P» 29.
Vi.ll Herberg, ed., Four Existentialist Theologia 
A Reader from the Works of jacoues Maritain, Nicolas I -dyaev, 
Martin Suber. and Eaul Tillich (Uarden City, N.X., 1958J.
2
The profound importance of the impact of Existentialism 
in theology is attested to by the collection of sympathetic 
essays edited by Carl Michalson.^ Of course, Existentialism 
is hardly without opposition in theological quarters, as 
the furious letters to the editor of Time magazine in reac­
tion to an extended article on Tillich illustrate only too 
clearly.^
out opposition. On the contrary, it recognized distinguished 
opposition in noting that Karl Barth has referred to Tillich's 
"Unconditional” (a term for God) as "a frigid monstrosity" 
and that in the United States the distinguished theologian, 
Nels F. S. Ferre, has characterized Tillich as "the most 
dangerous theological leader alive.A more thoughtful 
and comprehensive theological attack is made by Arthur C.
The article did not assert that Tillich was with-
^Christianitv and the Existentialists (New York, 
1956). Among the contributors to this collection of essays 
were Carl Michalson, Professor of Systematic Theology,
Drew University; H. Richard Niebuhr, Sterling Professor of 
Theology and Christian Ethics, Yale Divinity School; John 
A. Mackay, President, Princeton Theological Seminary; Mat­
thew Spinka, Waldo Professor of Church History, The Hartford 
Seminary Foundation; J. V. Langmead Casserley, Mary Crook 
Hoffman Professor of Dogmatic Theology, The General Theo­
logical Seminary; Erich Dinkier, Professor of New Testa­
ment Literature, Yale Divinity School; Paul Tillich, Uni­
versity Professor, Harvard University; and Stanley Romaine 
Hopper, Dean of the Graduate School, Drew University.
6"To Be or Not to Be," Time LXXIII,No. 11 (March 16, 
1959) 46-52. See also the ^Letters to the Editor" section 
in succeeding issues: March 30, April 6, April 13, and 
April 20, 1959.
7Same, 51«
3
Cochrane in his book, The Existentialists and God, which 
treats of the concepts of Being and the Being of God in the 
thought of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Tillich, 
Gilson, and Barth, 
concerning Existentialism continues on levels both high and 
low.
6 And so the battle among theologians
Yet in all the controversy for and against Existen­
tialism there seems to be little agreement as to an adequate 
definition of the term "Existentialism.” This fact is equally 
a* true outside as inside theological circles. Even among 
the sympathetic non-theological commentary on the thought of 
Existentialists there seems to be little agreement on this 
matter. Professor F. W. Heinemann characterizes the movement
as primarily a reaction against technology, and after figura­
tively taking the pulse of the movement at the present time,
opronounces it dead.17 
his valuable but scantily documented Irrational Man, asserts
Barrett views
On the other hand, William Barrett, in
that the movement is still very much alive.
Existentialism as a twentieth century analogue of the roman­
tic protest against the omnipotence of reason.^ John Wild’s
The Challenge of Existentialism relates existential thought
6 (Philadelphia, 1956).
^Existentialism and the Modern Predicament. 1st 
Torchbook ed. (New York, 1958)> P* 16l.
10(Garden City, N.Y., 1956).
4
to realism and presents a systematic apology for the move­
ment as a philosophical reaction against essentialism.
[Work cited] Professor Arland Ussher emphasizes the impor­
tance of anxiety in his characterization of the thought of
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre as embodying a "shudder"
11 Mar-before God, death, and the "Other," respectively, 
jorie Grene’s interpretation of the existential philosophers 
in her book, Dreadful Freedom, leans heavily toward Sartre’s 
values on self-centeredness and freedom.^ 
mines one commentary after another,^ there emerges little 
unity as to any adequate idea of the basic nature of Exis­
tentialism.
Tet as one exa-
Another factor adding to the confusion surrounding 
the term "Existentialism" has been the vogue of French 
Existentialism centering around Jean-Paul Sartre. The
•^•Journey through Dread (London, 1955)*
^(Chicago, 1948).
^Notable among book-length commentary in addition 
to those volumes already cited are the following: E. L. 
Allen, Existentialism from Within (New York, 1953); H. J. 
Blackham. Six Existentialist thinkers (New York, 1952); 
Ralph Harper, Existentialism: A Theory of Man (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1948); Kurt Hoffman,Existential Philosophy: A 
Study of its Past and Present Forms," (unpubl. diss., 
Harvard, 1949); Hinrich Knittermeyer, Die Philosophie 
der Existenz von der Renaissance bis zur Gegenwart Iwien, 
1952J; rielmut Kuhn, Encounter with Nothingness 1Chicago, 
1949); K. F. Reinhardt. The Existentialist Revolt, (Mil­
waukee, 1952); J. A. Wahl, A~~Suort History of/Existen- 
tialism [trans. from the French] (New York, 1949/•
5
enormous popularity of Professor Sartre’s novels and plays 
has not only brought their author fame and wealth■, it has 
brought Existentialism to the attention of the world and 
made the term (but not its definition) familiar to a vast 
number of people. Shortly after World War II was over, New 
York and Paris were, in certain quarters, buzzing with the 
new fad; Vogue carried an article by Sartre and Mademoiselle 
(a magazine for seventeen-yearrold young ladies) was devoting 
an article to "existential’’ literature.^* With the popur;: 
larity of Existentialism as a fad came the widespread use 
(or misuse) of the term by individuals neither acquainted 
nor concerned with the content of the term prior to Sartre. 
Indeed, some did not even trouble themselves to understand 
Sartre in any serious, philosophical sense. By 1954, Sartre 
was protesting that Existentialism was a humanism, not a 
scandalous nihilism. He asserted that most of those ltetised 
the term could not define it, that it now meant nothing at all:
La plupart des gens qui utilisent ce mot seraient 
bien embarasses pour le justifier, puisque aujourd’hui, 
que c'est devenu une mode, on declare volontiers qu'un 
musicien ou qu’un peintre est existentialiste. Un 
echotier des ClartSs signs 1’Existentialiste; et au 
fond le mot a pris aujourd'hui une telle largeur et
signifie plus rien duune telle extension qu’il ne 
tout.1^
^See Jean Wahl. Petite Histoire de "1’Existen­
tialisms’* (Paris, 1947), PP» 11-12.
^1 ’Existentialisme 
15-16.
Humanisms (Paris, 1954)»est un
pp.
6
Small wonder, then, that Maurice Natanson, in his 
study of Sartre’s ontology, asserts that Existentialism 
can no longer be defined:
"Existentialism" today refers to faddism, decaden- 
tism, morbidity, the "philosophy of the graveyard"; to 
words like fear, dread, anxiety, anguish, suffering, 
aloneness, death; to novelists such as Jean-Paul Sartre^ 
Dostoievski, Camus, Kafka; to philosophers like Kierke­
gaard, Heidegger, Marcel, Jaspers, and Sartre—and 
because it refers to, and is concerned with, all of 
these ideas and persons, existentialism has lost any 
clearer meaning it may have originally possessed. 
Because it has so many definitions, it can no longer 
be defined.1®
Existentialism has come to mean so many things to so many 
different people that it no longer means anything at all.
This situation poses a grave problem to a study of
Indeed, it tends to block 
any effort at a serious study of Existentialism in poetry,
Unless the
the nature of this dissertation.
the novel, or anywhere else in literature, 
conception of Existentialism is clear and distinct, the
study of Existentialism in poetry or elsewhere will be as 
confused as the definition.
Clarity and distinctness are necessities, then.
The basic validity of theBut these alone are not enough, 
study will also hinge on the validity of the definition
It is of paramount importance, therefore,which is used.
16 , Uni- 
p. 1*
°A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ontology, 
oF Nebraska "Studies, No. 6 (Lincoln, 1951)»versity
7
that this dissertation document with care the definition 
it submits. To this end, the first half of the dissertation 
will attempt to establish a clear and at the same time valid
conception of Existentialism.
t
How can this be done with the welter of novels, plays, 
paintings, and so forth, that are called "existential"?
The approach of this dissertation will be to seek a defi­
nition of Existentialism from its major philosophers—and 
from them only. An attempt will be made to present a well- 
rounded characterization of the thought of each of the 
following: Kierkegaard, Marcel, Jaspers, Heidegger, and 
Sartre. In each case dominant and characteristic themes 
will be sought. A concluding section will attempt to weld 
these characterizations and themes into a valid and adequate 
conception of the nature of Existentialism.
The second half of the dissertation will turn to 
certain important modem poems and examine them in an effort 
to determine whether or to what extent they express aspects 
of Existentialism. Preliminarily, one may note that Paul 
Tillich has already asserted the presence of Existentialism 
in modern painting [see his irf Modem
Art," in Michalson, pp. 12S-147] and other areas as indicated 
in a statement with profoundest implications for this study:
> *
It [Existentialism] is a cultural movement which 
is manifest in dance as well as in sculpture, in painting
....Its concep-as well as in music, poetry, and drama 
tualization is the Existentialist philosophy its• • •
6
ground is a unique encounter of man with reality in 
all functions of man’s spiritual life.17
This dissertation will attempt to give a definite content 
to what Tillich calls the ’’conceptualization” of Existen­
tialism. Then it will examine some important modern poems. 
If what is conceptualized in existential philosophy is 
fundamentally similar to what is poetically expressed in 
the works examined, then this dissertation will have fur* 
nished concrete evidence in support of Tillich’s conten­
tion quoted above that Existentialism may be found in some 
modern poetry.
^”The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist 
Thought.” Journal of Philosophy. LII (November 6, 1956), 
740. ........
9
KIERKEGAARD
Kierkegaardra Anti-Academicism. One may well 
hesitate before any effort to "systematize" or treat sys­
tematically the thought of Kierkegaard. This is one of 
the fate* that he feared most—that his thought should 
revert to the professors. He feared that his thought 
would be considered of merely academic relevance. He did 
not want professors summarizing him in a paragraph or out­
lining his thought for students to transfer into their 
notebooks. Kierkegaard desired no disciples (he even 
schemed at how to avoid making disciples); he only wanted 
to move menTs hearts to a consciousness of their own sub­
jectivities and to a desire to serve subjective truth.
Truth as Subjectivity. A primary reason for this
that he consideredanti-academicism mentioned above was
that intellectualization destroyed truth. Important truth 
is not objective, but subjective. In his Concluding Un­
scientific Postscript, he asserts that truth is inwardness:
[Here is] a definition of truth: An objective un­
certainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the 
most passionate inwarcfness is the trutK. the highest 
truth attainable for an existing individual.1
The terms "appropriation-process" and "existing" individual
^•Kierkegaardf s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,trans« 
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, » P» 182.
Hereinafter abbreviated to "CUP."
10
are used in a special Kierkegaardian sense. Because of 
the nature of truth, as stated above, it is not acquired 
through an intellectual grasp, or logically, but is appro­
priated by the willed suspension of disbelief which inevi** 
tably accompanies something which is not objectively 
provable. An existing individual, by the nature of his 
being, is in a relationship to all other being, and the 
proper apprehension of this relationship is not achieved 
through abstraction and objectivity about life, but by 
recognizing that existence is experienced subjectively and 
that the truth about it must be derived from the nature 
of this subjective experience—the nature of which is 
destroyed by objectivity.
Why is truth destroyed by objectivity? Because ob-
In thisjectivity involves abstracting from experience, 
process, the experience loses its uniqueness and takes on
universality; it loses its flux and becomes static, for 
logic cannot accommodate motion or change;also, in a num­
ber of ways upon which this dissertation will elaborate 
shortly, logic loses the experiential validity so necessary 
to truth.
Indeed, effort towardObjectivism and Aestheticism.
objectivism in thought is actually a movement toward de-
It corresponds
Professor Ulrich Sonnemann, in
personalizing and universalizing reality. 
to "aestheticism1* in art.
11
his Existence and Therapy, asserts that Kierkegaard was 
one of the first thinkers in the nineteenth century to 
point out the aesthetic character of all-out objectivism.^ 
Kierkegaard, one might add, also treated of the weaknesses 
of aestheticism in a way that is hardly rivalled in the 
nineteenth century At one point in Either/Or. the 
lysis sounds strikingly as if Kierkegaard had the aes­
theticism of Baudelairean melancholy in mind:
I can imagine nothing more excruciating than an 
intriguing mind, which has lost the thread of its con­
tinuity and now turns its whole , acumen against itself, 
when conscience awakens and compels the schemer to ex­
tricate himself from this confusion. It is in vain 
that he has many exits from his foxhole; at the moment 
his anxious soul believes that it already sees daylight 
breaking through, it turns out to be a new entrance, 
and like a startled deer, pursued by despair, he con­
stantly seeks a way out, and finds only a way in, 
through which he goes back into himself. Such a man 
is not always what we might call a criminal, he is 
even frequently disappointed by his intrigues, and 
yet a more terrible punishment overtakes him than 
befalls a criminal. [EO, I, 255]
Conscience and the norms of what Kierkegaard would call
the ethical and religious stages of existence do not have
a normative power over such a man, but are apprehended
objectively—are distanced from him and aestheticized.
Certainly, conscience irritates him, but as to yielding to
ana-
2(New York, 1954), p. 99.
3See especially Either/Or. trans. Walter Lowrie,
D. F. Swenson, and L. M. Swenson (Princeton, 1944), 2 vols. 
Also see Stages on Life’s Way, trans. W. Lowrie (Princetoi 
1940). The former wort will hereinafter be abbreviated 
and the latter work nSLW.w
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its power, this does not take place, for this would mark 
a transition from the aesthetic sphere of existence to the 
ethical. When conscience is objective, impersonal, abstract, 
then it no longer has normative power.
Conscience exists for him [the individual described 
above] only as a higher degree of consciousness, which 
expresses itself in a disquietude that does not, in a 
more profound sense, accuse him, but which keeps him 
awake, and gives him no rest in his barren activity.
[EO, 1,255]
“ I 0
The nature of the aesthetic sphere of existence 
will be dealt with subsequently. The connection to be noted 
here is its correlation with objectivism, and the mani­
fold weaknesses of objectivism as compared with the unrecog­
nized importance of subjective, existential reality. Let us 
turn now, however, to a consideration of Kierkegaard’s criti­
cisms of the weaknesses of the intellectualization of reality 
as a consequence of the use of logic.
The Weaknesses of Logic. Professor David F. Swenson 
has given a valuable summary of Kierkegaard’s four major 
criticisms of the adequacy of logic:
1) Logic cannot, from its own resources, provide 
for transitions from one quality to another; in the 
world of fact, such transitions take place by a leap.
2) Logic cannot acknowledge, within its own sphere, 
the contingent, but the contingent is an essential con­
stituent of the actual.
3) Logic deals only with universals; the particular, 
however, is absolutely inseparable from the actual.
4) Logic deals only with essences, whose being con­
sists in their conceivability; factual existence is not 
an essence, and it involves a kind of being which cannot
13
be logically conceived.^
In order to establish clearly the basic validity of Kierke­
gaard's argument, we must give each of these weaknesses the 
clarification it deserves.
Elaborating upon the first of the weaknesses, one 
may note Kierkegaard's assertion that there is a distinc­
tion between logical and actual transition. He asserts 
that the changes from one concept to another which are in­
volved in the revision of judgments or in the course of his­
tory are not the consequence of the working of logic, but " 
rather involve a leap in which something which does not be­
long in the logical system and which cannot be fitted into 
it suddenly appears for perhaps no apparent reason. A sys­
tem is self-contained and self-perpetuating:
In a logical system of concepts, every movement is 
immanent, since the relations by which the system is con­
stituted are, by the existence of the system, rendered 
internal relations; the whole is therefore presupposed 
in every part, and that which emerges from the logical 
development of such a system is exactly the same as that 
which was there at the beginning. Movement, transition, 
mediation, are all transcendent concepts, and have no 
legitimate place in logic.5
Logic, then, is antithetical to existence, for the realm 
of existence is the realm of the actual; its salient charac-
Kierkegaard asserts thatteristic is change and striving.
"actual" transition always involves a breach of continuity—
^•Something about Kierkegaard, rev. ed. (Minneapolis,
1945), p. 146.
^Same, pp. 147-$.
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exactly what a logical system cannot tolerate and still
Every breach of continuity, that is, every 
leap, is logically incomprehensible and requires another 
system in which it is part of the "given” before . 
the system is constructed, and that system, by accommodating
re­
main logical.
it, tends to remove the leap which is the very quality of 
its actuality. In accommodating actual transition to a sys­
tem the very qualities which comprise the nature of transi­
tion are lost, for a logical system is essentially static 
and antithetical to motion and change—indeed, there can be 
no true change in a system, for every movement is in con­
sequence of a logical ground and takes place by virtue of 
a pre-existing cause.
The first weakness suggests the second, that is, the 
inability of logic to assimilate or acknowledge the contin­
gent aspect of the actual, within its own realm of truth.
As was said above, in a logical system all relations are 
necessary, the result of causes within the system; but in 
the realm of actual existence, all change is contingent and 
thus transcends the realm of logic.
The third weakness is that logic must be abstract,
Logic deals with universals,
Precisely what
must deal with general rules, 
but real existence deals with particulars, 
makes an immediate actuality particular and unique 
is what is lost in accommodating that actuality to a system.
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This fact points to the impotence of logic to deal with 
particulars* In this sense, logic is unreal, and cannot 
deal with immediate reality; it has its own reality and its 
own truth, but this is the truth of consistency and coherence^ 
not a truth of correspondence to actuality. Kierkegaard, 
then, did not say that logic had no place, nor did he attack 
natural science as a futile and meaningless pursuit. What 
he did protest against most passionately, however, was the 
assumption that logical systems and natural science could 
account for, or even meaningfully deal with, the ultimate 
nature of human being-in-the-world. World history, logic, 
science—these could not deal meaningfully with the real
problems of spiritual moment to existing human beings.
The fourth weakness of logic is that it deals only
Its object is demonstration.with essences or qualities.
Factual existence is not a quality, however, nor an essence; 
it is the "given" from which the quality or essence is taken.
The given accounts for the essence, and it is the most ironic 
reversal to expect the quality or essence to account for the
Indeed, it is absolutely impossible to reach exis-
A demonstration, for
given.
tence by means of a demonstration.
instance, of the existence of God would be, according to 
Kierkegaard, not only impossible but insulting—as if one 
were to attempt to demonstrate in the presence of someone
This is ridiculous because existence isthat he exists.
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higher than demonstration. The proper acknowledgment of 
the existence of God is worship, for the attempt to demon­
strate His existence is consciously or unconsciously to ig­
nore His presence. One reasons from existence; no reasoning 
is toward existence.
Communication difficulties: Indirection. Language,
like logic, is an abstraction from existence. All communi­
cation, therefore, is necessarily abstract; but life is 
experienced directly and immediately. Life, ‘ 
very nature resists language; life is essentially a secret. 
Words cannot reproduce an experience except in the aspects 
of it which are universal. But the uniqueness, the full 
frequency range of its immediacy, is inevitably lost in com­
munication. Thus Kierkegaard asserts the radical incommuni-
then, by its
Perhaps the closest one can come
But any
cability of experience.
is through art, and, in language, through parable, 
effort to systematize life is to impose a logical order on
Any effort toa phenomenon which is antithetical to logic, 
systematize life is only to further abstract and remove the
very traits which make it real.
Kierkegaard as Hegelian and Anti-Hegelian, 
cussion above of Kierkegaard’s opposition to logic and to
The dis-
systems suggests a treatment of Kierkegaard’s famous oppo-
This opposition tosition to Hegelian absolute idealism.
Hegel is generally interpreted as the genesis of the
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existential revolt. John Wild sees Kierkegaard’s thought, 
and Existentialism as a whole, as a revolt against four
major weaknesses of idealism:
[The weaknesses are] inattention to the immediate 
data of concrete experience; neglect of existence and 
first philosophy; a physicalist approach to the prob­
lem of human awareness, leading to subjectivism; and 
a radical separation of theory from practice, leading 
to the de-rationalization of ethics. [Wild, p. 25-6]
Professor Wild goes on to define Existentialism in terms
of Kierkegaard's revolt against Hegel:
[Kierkegaard] laid the foundations of that 
of thought which now goes by the name of existentialism. 
This philosophy is best understood as a rebellion against 
the abstract objectivism or essentialism of modern thought, 
with an intensive emphasis on the concrete subjective ex­
istence which it has consistently ignored. Kierkegaard 
attacked the four major phases of this essentialism as 
they are expressed in the idealism of Hegel. Thus in 
one of its most influential manifestations, he criticized 
the non-descriptive, speculative method of modern philos­
ophy, its essentialist metaphysics, its neglect of prac­
tical awareness, and its repudiation of personal ethics. 
[Wild, p. 28]
Here in short compass is a definition of the existential pro­
test against some of the major weaknesses of modern thought.
What were Kierkegaard's reasons for these objections, 
and what was the nature of his alternative? Kierkegaard 
did not concern himself with Hegelian philosophy for its 
own sake, but rather opposed it because he held that this 
type of thought was watering down innerness, individuality, 
personal ethics, and Christian belief. Kierkegaard’s avowed 
aim in all his writing was, as he put it in The Point of
way• • •
id
View and elsewhere in his writings,
He felt that Christianity was not practiced by 
Christendom and any belief that it was commonly practiced 
was "a prodigious illusion." [PV, p. 22-7] Kierkegaard 
looked upon Hegel’s endeavor to integrate Christianity into 
his system as a monstrous distortion of Christianity. Hegel 
did not see that Christianity was personal; idealism was not. 
Christianity was not a consistent logical system, but rid­
dled with paradox and ambiguities; moreover it was not a 
system but a way of being in the world. Indeed, the act 
of finite existing cannot, by its nature, be subsumed within 
an abstract system of finite thought, no matter how broad 
and inclusive its principles and method.
Christianity deals with becoming, with how to become 
a Christian} but because a system cannot accommodate becoming 
and change, Hegelian idealism (despite his creditable efforts 
to incorporate motion and becoming into his idea of synthesis)
"becoming a Chris-
„6tian.
tends to deal with being rather than becoming, with what
For Kierkegaard, the tworather than how Christianity is. 
genuinely real modes of being are that of God and that of 
an existing individual; Hegel fails to deal adequately with 
either of these modes of being.?
^Point of View. Etc.. trans. Walter Lowrie (London,
^See esp. James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard. 
Ch. 4: "The Attack upon Hegelianism,1' (Chicago, 1953)* 
pp. 93-136.
1939).
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Kierkegaard believed that the historical may be a 
system—for God, but not for any man. Furthermore, the 
effort to see man from the vantage point of world history
tends to undermine ethics, for then the criteria invoked 
are not the purpose and rectitude of the individual will, 
but the interplay of large forces, of the cosmic wave of 
past becoming future. Man, in this view, is a helpless 
creature caught in the web of destiny. Morality vanishes 
because the abstract categories of world history do not 
lend themselves to valid application to individual cases. 
Soon a crime committed for the State (or for the ’'Party") 
is "objectively moral" even if subjectively revolting, and 
morality has become impersonal, abstract, intellectualized, 
History and the Destiny of the State seem to
Thus, one may say that 
Kierkegaard's objection to historicism in Hegel is in terms 
of what historicism does to personal ethics.
objective, 
become more real than human beings.
Hegelian historicism was pernicious, Kierkegaard 
believed, for another reason which bears on ethics: it tends 
to establish a fallacious conception of God and of man's
Historicism tends to externalize God,relationship to Him. 
to turn him into a spectator who does not see the guilt of
the individual as it makes itself evident in his intentions, 
but sees the external action swallowed up in the totality.
As Kierkegaard puts it,
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He [God] sees, therefore, what is wholly confusing 
and nonsensical, that the well-meant, quite as often 
the ill-meant, deed brings the same consequence in its 
train; the best of kings and a tyrant bring about the 
same misfortune.... He sees what is ethically scan­
dalous, namely, that he is compelled world-historically 
to ignore the true distinction between goad and evil, as 
this exists only in the individual, and in the last 
analysis only in each individual in his God-relation- 
ship. [CUP, p. 139]
as •:
World-historical orientations see things as if they were 
dead and past, and therefore destroy "the possibility re-
r.
lationship which every individual has to God." [Same] Only 
in the relationship of direct sovereignty over man i3 God 
a living, acting, ethical force in the life of an individual. 
With characteristic humor Kierkegaard concludes,
In the world-historical process, God is metaphysi­
cally imprisoned in a conventional strait-jacket, half 
metaphysical and half aestheticrdramatic, that is, the 
immanential system. It must be the very devil to be 
God in that manner. [CUP, p. li»0]
Human existence, then, must remain unfettered by a 
system, must remain contingent, in order to offer the fullest 
opportunity for the growth of human freedom and responsibility 
and for the working of divine Providence. Hegel's system is 
a travesty on the traits of true human existence as well as 
on the nature of the Eternal. Only through the restoration 
of the proper "possibility-relationship” of God and man 
there be brought about a genuine deepening of human existence.
Ironically, however, Kierkegaard was more Hegelian 
than he knew. As Professor Paul Ramsey has pointed out, 
both Hegel and Kierkegaard believed in God; both criticized
can
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the use of proofs of the existence of God; and "both Hegel 
and Kierkegaard are more interested in how the finite world 
or self stands in relation to God, than in what 0od is." 
Ramsey makes Hegel more "existential" than he knew, too, 
calling him an "existential idealist." [Ramsey, p. 170] 
Ramsey asserts that Hegel*s "mediation with self" is an 
existential principle, involving subjectivity and concerned 
truth. Indeed, Ramsey almost succeeds in transforming 
Kierkegaard’s arch-enemy, Hegel, into an Existentialist:
Hegel’s logical process of "mediation" can 
regarded as transforming "speculative philosophy*in the 
abstract into something in which individual human beings 
are existentially involved. [Ramsey, p. I63]
Kierkegaard's use of the dialectic, however, is the 
factor which more than anything else marks him with an un­
deniable sort of Hegelianism. Professor Arland Ussher, in 
his Journey through Dread, even goes so far as to say that
8
be• • •
[Kierkegaard] remained entirely Hegelian in his way 
of thought. With him, as he once said, all is dialec­
tical; guilt, despair, remorse, anguish—everything in 
his burdened and stricken life goes like a ballet. 
[Ussher, pp. 42-3. (Cited in Ch. I)]
Thus, in this predilection for the dialectic, Kierkegaard
Indeed,links himself to Hegel even when in opposition, 
the impact of Hegel on Kierkegaard must have been profound.
As Ussher has put it,
^Paul Ramsey, "Existenz and the Existence of God: A 
Study of Kierkegaard and Hegel," The Journal of Religion. 
XXVIII (July, 194S), 163.
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Kierkegaard said that if Hegel had proposed the 
Logic as a hypothesis merely, he would be remembered 
as the greatest of human minds; and though this 
of course a boutade. it makes us realise a little of 
Hegel’s impact upon another, and not sympathetic, 
great mind. [Ussher, p. 40]
For all his opposition, the influence of Hegel is still 
felt in the thought of Kierkegaard. Since the dialectic 
figures so largely in Kierkegaard’s thought, his use of an 
existential dialectic will be considered next.
Kierkegaard’s Existential Dialectic, 
dialectic may/described as a 1) personal, practical, par­
ticular, and paradoxical dialectic; 2) an "either-or" dia­
lectic; 3) a finite-infinite dialectic; 4) a leap-dialectic; 
and 5) a dialectic of freedom and becoming.
1) A personal, practical, particular, and paradoxical 
dialectic. Kierkegaard's dialectic, in this respect, may be 
said to be the antithesis of the Hegelian dialectic, which 
tends to be impersonal, theoretical, general or universal, 
and does not admit of any absolute paradoxes or irresolvable 
antitheses. Kierkegaard's existential dialectic is personal
was
Kierkegaard’s
because it deals with matters which are of deep personal
It is practical because itconcern to individual people.
answers questions that might really be asked and because it
It deals and can dealis usable in particular situations, 
only with existence, that is, with an individual situation. 
It is often paradoxical and absurd; it deals with opposites
which cannot be mediated, with the "either-or"'s of existence.
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2) An "either-or" dialectic. The Hegelian dialectic 
is relevant to an observer contemplating the world-process; 
the existential dialectic is relevant to an individual who
confronts the future as an active participant in life. A 
merely contemplative consciousness sees nowhere any absolute 
opposition, but rather attempts to synthesize opposites.
This synthesis presumes to preserve the essence of both, 
while at the same time annihilating their separateness.
This is the nboth-andn approach, as Kierkegaard calls it. 
Kierkegaard's existential dialectic operates with qualita­
tive distinctions (which are, as previously noted, impossible 
in a logical system) and discovers absolute disjunctions 
which cannot be mediated. When the individual takes himself 
out of existence and contemplates himself as he is, statically, 
he perceives that he is, admittedly, both good and bad. But 
when he plunges into actual existence and confronts the fu­
ture ethically, he cannot become (and man is always becoming)
both good and bad at the same time) he must move either in
This makes life not a matter of 
With characteristic inci-
one direction or another.
"both-and" but of "either-or.n 
siveness, Kierkegaard asserts: "Either-or is the key to 
heaven; "both-and" is the road to hell." [See Swenson, p. 120]
Characteristically, then, the "either-or" dialectic 
is related to ethics, and forms some of the basis for later 
Existentialists' opposition to the externality of ethical
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relativism. Ethics must never become impersonal, Kierkegaard 
believed. The ethical relativist occupies either the ir­
relevant standpoint of a disinterested observer, in which 
case he cannot truly see and understand the issue, or else 
he is bankrupt of subjective ethical enthusiasm. Without 
the passion of subjectivity there are nowhere any decisive 
distinctions in life. But when the individual has once 
chosen to exist in ethical categories, the distinction be­
tween good and evil comes into being for him in all its ab­
soluteness, being essentially the distinction between real­
izing and failing his own deeper self.
3) A finite-infinite dialectic. For human beings, 
the dialectic of existing involves the interaction of finite 
and infinite, temporal and eternal, being and becoming.
Man must operate in and with time; yet time alone does not 
determine and describe man’s existence, but rather to the 
dimension of time must be added the infinite dimension of 
For Kierkegaard, each moment in finite time can
This kind of moment, 
Kierkegaard asserts, ought to have a distinctive name; he 
suggests "the Fullness of Time.” [PF, p. 13] When the eternal 
is perceived, the temporal becomes a mere point of departure:
The temporal point of departure is nothing; for as 
soon as I discover that I have known the Truth from eter-
eternity.
be decisive,"filled with the eternal.
^Philosophical Fragments. David F. Swenson, trans. 
(Princeton, 193b), p. I3.
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nity without being aware of it, the same instant this 
moment of occasion is hidden in the eternal.... Now if 
things are to be otherwise, the moment in time must have 
a decisive significance, so that I will never be able to 
forget it either in time or eternity; because the eternal, 
which hitherto did not exist, came into being in this 
moment. [PF, p. 8]
Suddenly the finitude of time is filled with the infinity 
of the eternal.
4) A "leap" dialectic. In terms of being and non- 
being, the all-important moment described above deals with 
or involves the radical change in a human life from non-being
to being. This transition from non-being to its opposite is 
not a matter of synthesis, but of a radical disjunction, a 
leap. It is a change like that of being born:
In so far as the learner was in Error, and now re­
ceives the Truth and with it the condition for under­
standing it, a change takes place within him like the 
change from non-being to being. But this transition 
from non-being to being is the transition we call birth.
[The Moment, then, has decisive significance, for] 
the breach is made, and man cannot return. He will take 
no pleasure in remembering what Recollection brings to 
his mind....[PF, pp. 13*14]
This decisive temporal moment has come to be commonly re­
ferred to as the "leap of faith," and involves a complex 
of the factors with which we have been dealing in connection 
with the existential dialectic: the transition from non-being 
to being (in moral terras^ from sin to purity of heart), the 
action of the eternal in time through a decisive moment, the 
consciousness of eternity (that is, of being "before God"), 
and consequently the consciousness of being "in sin." A
• • •
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passage from the "moral" which concludes the Philosophical 
Fragments gives Kierkegaard’s own statement of the relation­
ship of these factors:
The projected hypothesis [of this work] indisputably 
makes an advance upon Socrates, which is apparent at 
every point. Whether it is therefore more true than the 
Socratic doctrine is an entirely different question, 
which cannot be decided in the same breath, since we have 
here assumed a new organ: Faith; a new presupposition: 
the consciousness of Sin; a new decision: the Moment; 
and a new Teacher: God in Time. [PF, p. 93]
The organ is faith; the presupposition, consciousness of 
Sin; the instrument, the moment of decision; the all-im­
portant factor, God acting in time.
5) A dialectic of freedom and becoming. In addition 
to the aspects of the existential dialectic which have been 
treated above, two other factors are important: creative 
freedom and the nature of becoming. .Freedom and becoming 
are interdependent factors and a proper understanding of 
the existential interpretation of them is vital to any ade­
quate conception of Existentialism.
What is the nature of becoming? If something comes 
into being (becomes), it wither was there before or was not.
But if it was there before, nothing has become, since it was
If, on the other hand, nothing was there, then 
there was nothing to actually do the becoming. Kierkegaard 
faces this problem by positing a being which is at the same
In a passage which illustrates his typically
already there.
time a non-being, 
tortuous prose, he states:
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But this non-being which the subject of becoming 
leaves behind must have some sort of being; for other­
wise we could not say, as we said above, that the "sub­
ject of becoming remains unchanged in the process of 
becoming"; unless we propose to say that it has no being 
of any kind, whereby the change we call becoming would 
again for another reason be absolutely different from 
every other kind of change, in that it would not be a 
change at all; for every change presupposes a something.
But a being of this kind, which is nevertheless a non- 
being, is what we know as possibility; and a being which 
is being is actual being, or actuality; so that the 
change involved in becoming is the transition from pos­
sibility to actuality* [PF, p, 60]
In this passage one can see the genesis of conception of 
man as Being and nothingness which is so prominent in the 
thought of Sartre and Heidegger. The dialectical relation­
ship and importance of potentiality and actuality in exis­
tential thought can hardly be uDverestiraated.
The beingrnon-being and actuality-potentiality problems 
relate themselves to the problem of freedom and necessity*
A system is a set of necessary relationships; it cannot ac­
commodate becoming (or freedom).
the necessary cannot come into existence, cannot become!
Kierkegaard asserts that
"Becoming is a change; but the necessary cannot undergo any
in the samechange, since it is always related to itself
[PF, p. 60] Indeed, necessity is a form of actuality 
which is antithetical to possibility, to potentiality in the
• • •
manner
existential sense:
Everything that comes into being proves precisely 
by coming into being that it is not necessary; for the 
necessary is the only thing that cannot come into being, 
because the necessary is. [PF, p. 61]
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Nothing necessary can come into being because it is already 
in existence; therefore what comes into being does so not 
by necessity bofc in freedom:
The change involved in becoming is an actual change; 
the transition takes place with freedom. Becoming is 
never necessary. It was not necessary before it came 
into being, for then it could not come into being; nor 
after it came into being, for then it has not come into 
being. All becoming takes place with freedom, not by 
necessity. Nothing that comes into being does so by 
virtue of a logical ground, but only through the opera­
tion of a cause. CPF, p. 61]
Freedom, then, is intimately related to becoming, and becoming 
is absolutely outside the realm of the necessary.
Existential freedom, then, is qualitatively dif­
ferent from freedom as it is ordinarily conceived. Freedom, 
as often conceived, is usually a determinant that enters a 
situation in which the factors are already given, 
remains is the exercise of freedom with regard to them.
Thus, it is not the presence of freedom that gives being to 
the possibilities in the situation; the possibilities that 
can be chosen pre-exist, and all freedom does is to allow 
a choice of one or another of these possibilities, 
with Kierkegaard. For him freedom is truly creative, 
dom as part of becoming tends to create ontologically what 
it chooses. For Kierkegaard freedom is a matter of inward 
transformation, of the appropriation of truth and being.
All that
Not so
Free-
^Concerning Kierkegaard's freedom, becoming, and on­
tology see the excellent study by Michael Wyschogrod, Kie^ 
gaard and Heidegger: The Ontology of Existence (London, 1>, 
esp. p. 33.
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Existential freedom, then, is not a mere freedom of choice, 
but a much more complete freedom, a creative freedom. It 
is not a matter of objective choice among pre-existing pos­
sibilities, but a matter of subjective change.
The Concept of Existenz. Because Existenzphilosophie 
began with Kierkegaard, it is vital that one know how Kierke­
gaard defined Existenz. Existenz is used in a special sense 
among Existentialist philosophers and is not synonymous with 
the English word "existence.n Existence may refer to the 
existence of God, the existence of things, the existence of 
human beings, the existence of animals. It carries with it 
the idea of the being-in-actuality of those things which are 
said to possess it. But Existenz is completely different. 
Existenz refers to the consciousness of an individual man of 
his own being. It can never be other than a subjective ap­
prehension, and it cannot accurately be applied to God, things,
Existenz implies man’s sense of hisor animals—only man. 
finitude and at the same time of his potentialities to par­
tially transcend this finitude.
Man can never lose his Existenz. but he may suppress 
it. This forms the existential dichotomy between authen­
ticity and inauthenticity. In the former the subject is 
striving to realize his Existenz: in the latter he is denying 
it. In the former the subject is realizing being; in the 
latter he is resisting transformation to higher levels of be
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Authenticity involves becoming, and therefore also transcen­
dence, for what animates true becoming is the consciousness 
of the potential self and action of the infinite. As Kierke­
gaard puts it, nThe more awareness of God, the more self; the 
more self, the more awareness of God."^- 
God is the realization of the self.
The awareness of 
Conversely, inauthen­
ticity is the refusal to be transparent "before God."^ In­
authenticity is a willing to be only a finite self; it is a 
denial of infinity and refusal to recognize that one is 
grounded in infinity—that is, in God~and that God is sov­
ereign. [FTSD, p. 20S]
Existenz is, in all the Existentialists which the first 
half of this dissertation treats of, intimately related to 
the instinctive understanding which the self has of its own 
being, its own potential being. Authenticity is generally 
associated with it, and is generally understood to represent the 
process of the realization of Existenz.
Man as a Fallen Creature. Kierkegaard calls man's 
attention to the fact that he is a finite, a limited, being.
Man's knowledge is imperfect and there are some things that
There are some decisions that only faithcan never be known.
•^Kurt Hoffman, "Existential Philosophy: A Study of 
its Past and Present Forms," unpubl. diss. (Harvard, 1949)» 
p. 67.
See "Fear and Trembling* and "Sickness unto Pr~"h," 
trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City,^N.I., 1953)» P* 213. 
Hereinafter abbreviated TTSD."
31
can prompt. Indeed, Kierkegaard goes so far as to say that 
what seems to the intellect "absurd" may be highest wisdom, 
the wisdom of subjectivity and faith.
Kierkegaard, then, may be said to be a believer in 
original sin. Indeed, Leon Chestov’s book, Kierkegaard et 
la Philosophie Existentielle (Vox clamantis in deserto): 
limits itself to the question of original sin:
Je me limiterai a l’examen d’une seule question: 
comment Kierkegaard et Dostoievsky concevaient-ils le 
peche originel? Autrement dit—car c'est la meme chose— 
je parlerai de la verite speculative et de la verite 
revelee.13
The question of original sin, then, involves whether know­
ledge is, in itself, evil and whether the way to salvation 
is through knowledge or faith. Chestov asserts, regarding 
the fall of Adam, that ’’Hegel affirme sans la moindre hesi­
tation: le serpent n’a pas trompe l’homme, les fruits de 
l’arbre de la science sont devenus la source de la philo­
sophie pour tous les temps." [Chestov, p. 13] Further, 
he states that through the history of the Church, the for­
bidden fruit has consistently been reinstated:
Les philosophes, no seulement les paiens, complfete- 
ment etranger a l’ecriture, mais les juifs et les 
Chretiens que consideraient la Bible comme un livre 
inspire, tous les philosophes etaient scientes et ne 
voulaient pas renoncer aux fruits de l'arbre interdit. 
[Chestov, pp. 13-14]
^traduit du Russe par Rageot et B. de Schloezer 
(Paris, n.d.), p. 13*
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Kierkegaard, in an age when the idea of original sin 
unpopular and in an age which regarded reason as man’s greatest 
blessing, asserted the fallenness and fallibility of 
and believed that subjective faith rather than objective 
knowledge was the only way to authentic existence, or in 
religious terms, to salvation.
was
man,
In Kierkegaard's opinion, 
man was not naturally good and getting better and better,
but rather was hopelessly in sin and in despair.
Anguish. When man realizes that he is a fallen 
creature, that he can hope for no perfect knowledge, that 
he is hopelessly in sin, his reaction is Angst (dread or 
anguish) and despair. The thread of a tortured sensibility 
runs through most of Kierkegaard's works. Anguish, dread, 
fear, trembling, guilt, despair—these are the characteristic 
attitudes found time after time. Indeed, the personal con­
sciousness of sin and the obsession with the need for faith 
seem to dominate much of his thought. This is the reason 
for the mastery of his two works which treat of the psycho­
logical aspects of sin: The Concept of Dread and The Sick­
ness unto Death. A basic kinship with Dostoevsky can be 
felt as these works examine the dynamics of tortured souls 
and repeatedly stress the importance of suffering.
Anguish seems to be a characteristic of all existen­
tial thought. The concept of Angst in Heidegger is not 
given the religious name of sin as a generating factor, but
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is said to be the reaction of the self to non-being, 
change of terminology, however, does not involve a basic 
change in concept, since sin is related to snlrit.nal non- 
being, to the failure to realize being.
The
Basically, even
Kierkegaard's dread of being "in sin" was essentially dread
at spiritual non-being. For Kierkegaard, however, having to 
be always "before God" made him even more vividly aware of
his finitude and imperfection, his being "in sin."
Individualism and anti-collectivism. Kierkegaard's 
concept of subjectivity and his consciousness of being alone 
"before God" could not but tend to give him an individualistic 
point of view. It is well known that Kierkegaard wanted his 
grave marked merely "That Individual," and that he repeatedly 
identified the feeling of being merely part of a larger 
group with inauthenticity. This, he believed, was only an 
effort to escape being an individual existing human beings
The more the collective idea comes to dominate even 
the ordinary consciousness, the more forbidding seems 
the transition to becoming a particular existing human 
being instead of losing oneself in the race, and saying 
"we," "our age," "the nineteenth century." ... Each 
age has its own characteristic depravity.- Ours is per­
haps not pleasure or indulgence or sensuality, but ra-
antheistic contempt for the individualther a dissolute p 
man. [CUP, p. 317J
Kierkegaard goes on with an indictment of his age, an in­
dictment equally as applicable to the twentieth century:
In the midst of all our exultation over the achieve­
ments of the age and the nineteenth century, there sounds 
a note of poorly conceived contempt for the individual
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man; in the midst of the self-importance of the con­
temporary generation there is revealed a sense of des­
pair over being human. Everything must attach itself 
so as to be a part of some movement; men are determined 
to lose themselves in the totality of things, in world- 
history, fascinated and deceived by magic witchery; no 
one wants to be an individual man. [CUP, p. 317]
Precisely the fact that becoming an individual brings on
an isolation and opprobrium is a condemnation of the age.
To be an individual is to be doomed and isolated:
As particular human beings they fear that they will 
be doomed to a more isolated and forgotten existence 
than that of a man in the country; for if a man lets go 
of Hegel he will not even be in a position to have a 
letter addressed to him. [That is, apart from history, 
the individual has no identity.] 
travellers combine into great caravans from fear of 
robbers and wild beasts, so the individuals of the con­
temporary generation are fearful of existence, because 
it is God-forsaken; only in great masses do they dare 
to live, and they cluster together en masse in order 
to feel that they amount to something. LclJP, pp. 317-S]
The "mass man," as he may be called, becomes in the twentieth
century even more fearful and conformist, and continues to
be a favorite target of Existentialist analysis and invective.
The Three Spheres of Existence. Kierkegaard pro-
Just as desert• • •
pounded three spheres or stages of human existence, the aes»
One might definethetic, the ethical, and the religious, 
these spheres as "value-orientations," for each sphere in­
volves a prevailing value—system which is either aesthetically,
These spheres do notethically, or religiously determined, 
appear in a work or two only, but run through the whole corpus 
of his work, providing a conceptual framework for his thought.
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Either/Or is a study in contrasting aesthetic and ethical 
valuations; Stages on Life's Wav resumes this study and 
adds a specific religious system of valuation in the "Story 
of Suffering." Concluding Unscientific Postscript explores 
still further subjectivity in the ethical and religious 
spheres. Even one of the last products of his pen, the 
theological essay on the difference between a genius and 
an apostle, makes a contrast between the aesthetic and the 
religious orientation in order to point the moral of a modern 
confusion in theological thought.
The three spheres are not to be construed as mutually:; 
exclusive, but as ascending levels of existence. The man 
who passes from the aesthetic stage to the ethical does not 
lose all aesthetic passion; the ethical individual has the 
aesthetic passion precisely as the non-ethical individual, 
but the higher passion subordinates the lower. Thus, the 
ethical and religious individuals have a higher passion which 
dominates and sets limits and determines the expression of 
the lower.
1) The Aesthetic Sphere. The person whose values are
aesthetically oriented finds significance in the realization
Human happinessof the maximum amount of pleasure from life, 
is, for this individual, synonymous with enjoyment, 
ethically oriented individual, on the other hand, conceives 
of human happiness as the performance of an obligatory task,
The
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a task so essentially related to the personality as to be
immanent within it, being nothing more nor less than the
realization in this performance of one’s time and given
self. This self is given in the form of a task and the
is
possibility of performing it/dependent upon the individual’s
own free co-operation for its realization.
The aesthetic orientation is static; the ethical is
dynamic. This is because the aesthetically oriented person
(and this does not refer to an "aesthete"only, but to all
who do not belong to the other categories—all who see plea-
sure as the highest goal in life, in other words a large
fraction of the population) lives in and by that in his per­
is
sonality which already/given and completed; that is, he lives 
on the basis of that which he is, taken immediately; he is 
a natural man. The aesthetic man does not become, for the
nature of enjoyment is that it accompanies a functioning
On the otherwhose organ is already adequate to its task, 
hand, the ethically oriented person lives in and by the ef­
fort and strain of an essential and profound becoming. 
Ethical categories are ideal; they place an obligation on 
one to become something more than one is. 
gories leave one right where one is; consequently they are 
self-defeating, not really,satisfying, and often bring a 
hang-over of melancholy in the wake of short-lived hap­
piness.
Aesthetic cate-
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The contrast between the aesthetic and the other 
two spheres might be characterized as the difference between
what David Riesman has recently called "other-directedness" 
and "inner-directedness.nl3 The aesthetically oriented per­
son is bound to postulate an external or uncertain condition, 
as for example prosperity or good fortune, success, and so on, 
as determining his happiness. This external condition is, 
whatever may be the appearance, created by the accidental
facts and is always somewhat beyond his control. Even when 
he seems to be seeking the meaning of life in something 
within the personality, as in the unfolding of a talent, 
then he still posits a condition which is relatively external, 
since the condition is not given in and through his own will 
merely, but is in the personality without having been placed 
there by the personality.
This other-directedness of the aesthetic man stands 
in contrast to the ethical man who concentrates the meaning 
of life on that which he himself is able to give to life, 
for he postulates no external condition for happiness, no 
condition over which he does not himself have full control. 
Thus the ethical man has his essential happiness always in
his own control, and is not, like the aesthetical man, al­
ways dependent on externalities and elements beyond his control. 
When one examines the aesthetic sphere, one sees that
It includesit is the most inclusive of the three categories.
^•3The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, 1950).
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those who live for their health, or in the conscious en­
joyment of beauty and the distinction of fine physical ap- 
pearancef those who seek the meaning of life in the success­
ful development of a business talent, a poetic talent, a 
philosophical talent, etc. It includes the reflective 
talent who succeeds in enjoying himself in the pleasures, 
rather than the pleasures directly. It includes the epi­
curean, who chooses the plain and simple pleasure of the 
plain and simple life as offering the greatest promise of 
security. And it includes the highly complicated person­
ality who perceives the vanity of life and enjoys reflec­
tion upon his own despair. And, of course, it includes all 
mediocrities, in so far as their lives are determined es­
sentially by the contrast between the agreeable and the 
disagreeable.
There are five chief incarnations of the aesthetic 
type of man which Kierkegaard has limned with especial en- 
They are all sophisticated and reflective, and 
thus represent very specialized forms of the aesthetic type 
of man.
thusiasm.
Briefly, they are:
a) The Young Persona-author of the first part of 
Either/Or. creator of the demoniac figure of John the Se­
ducer, and the person absorbed in the psychological study 
of the unhappy consciousness, not from sympathy but auto-
The nYoung Person" seeks topathically and egoistically.
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grasp life without plunging into it, to swim without entering 
the water, to get experience through reflection alone. In 
the Stages on Life’s Wa£, therefore, he finds love a riddle 
and marriage a mystery, because his thought cannot explain 
beforehand such an experience, but rather finds it ridi­
culous and contradictory. He is always possibility and 
never decisive action and all his thought only serves to 
plunge him further into his characteristic mood—reflective 
melancholy.
b) Constantin Constantius—author of Repetition and 
arranger of the banquet in Stages on Life’s Wav, 
represents a cold and superior intelligence who has des­
paired of the possibility of a successful repetition of 
life’s happiest moments.
c) Victor Eremita~publisher of A’s and B’s papers
in Either/Or and author of a speech about Woman in the Stages. 
This type is characterized by sympathetic irony; this is the 
individual who is cognizant of the ethical categories, but 
uses them only to recall them again as inapplicable.
d) John the Seducer—whose diary is published in 
Either/Or and who expounds his view of life in the Stages.
This individual is one who sees woman as a lure of the gods
This type
whom only he knows how to enjoy without being caught and im-
He is morallyprisoned in the illusion and drudgery of life, 
dead, and the ruin of his personality is evident the moment
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he opens his mouth to speak.
e)The Dressmaker--that fanatic figure who devotes his 
life to making woman appear as ridiculous as she is. This 
type is the expression of aesthetic despair. His method is 
to entice women to a worship of fashion—the crazier the 
better
The "Young Person" is perhaps the most effective 
presentation of the underlying despair of the aesthetic life 
and its moral bankruptcy. He uses memory or forgetfulness 
to tamper with and contest these emotional experiences, the 
chief requisite for which is a freedom from every deeper en­
thusiasm, detachment from every intense hope and aspiration, 
a refusal to enter into any permanent or binding commitment, 
such as marriage, friendship, or a career. By the use of 
extraordinary skill, and with the aid of freedom from eco­
nomic cares, this individual devotes himself to staving off 
boredom. (With variations, this type of individual reappears 
with frequency in the twentieth century novel.)
2)The Ethical Sphere. In Kierkegaard, the ethical is 
almost invariably tinged with the religious, since it pre­
supposes the existence in the background of a divine being.
As previously stated, the ethical man sets for himself the 
realization of his possible self through the performance of
^*T am indebted to Professor Swenson’s Something about 
Kierkegaard [prev. cited], pp. 166-177 for his presentation 
of the five aesthetic types which I have paraphrased here.
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his duty before God. The ethical man, however, has no other 
relation to God than that which is universal to all men, gnrf 
universal as a common public tie which binds them together. 
His relation to God is never private; it is without secrets, 
without mysteries, and without privacies. God is the uni­
versal background for his life, but He does not in any special 
sense break into it.
The ethical mood is one of action, action with victory 
assured. Ethical faith is the resolute faith in the victory, 
and ethical enthusiasm is sharply distinguished from all 
forms of aesthetic enthusiasm. Aesthetic pathos receives its 
adequate expression in words or in other forms of art; ethical 
pathos has no other expression than in the transformation of 
existence in its transition from potentiality to actuality.
Aesthetic pathos leads a man to forget himself and lose him­
self in or fuse with the object or idea; ethical pathos 
leads a man to forget the whole world in order solely to at-
Aes-tend to himself and his own ethical transformation, 
thetic pathos is essentially imaginative, the pathos of 
distance; for ethical pathos, the imagination and its pro­
ducts are irrelevant.
From the standpoint of the personality, all aesthetic 
pathos is immaturity; ethical pathos is maturity, 
pathos is differential pathos, aristocratic pathos, varying 
in depth and quality with the aesthetic endowment of the
Aesthetic
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personality; ethical pathos is equally accessible to sill 
human beings, and is thus the poor man’s pathos. Aesthetic 
pathos is essentially determined by the accidental; ethical 
pathos has liberated itself from the accidental and the 
certain, and bases itself securely on the essential and the 
eternal in the personality.
3) The Religious Sphere. The ethical sphere requires 
committal to certain ends. Soon the individual finds him­
self absolutely committed to relative ends, thus interfer­
ing with his absolute commitment to the absolute end. In 
this situation the individual must first be changed, and 
the change must come from the eternal and divine, towards 
which the imperfect, actual self assumes a passive attitude. 
One must submit himself passively to the divine in order 
that the imperfect may be rooted out. This process is felt 
in the human being as suffering, and suffering is therefore 
a decisive category for the religious life, just as enjoy­
ment is the decisive category for the aesthetic life. Kierke­
gaard does not teach that all suffering is religious by being 
incorporated into a God-relation of . only the type just 
described, but all religious life involves suffering, s© that 
if the suffering is taken away the religious life is also 
abolished.
un-
But why suffering? Suffering arises out of the in­
commensurability between the individual and his task. Pleasure,
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in contrast, lies precisely in the commensurabilitr of the 
individual to his task, as was stated earlier. But why is 
the individual unequal to the task, thus requiring the trans­
forming discipline of suffering? The answer, at bottom is 
guilt. As the personality advances to this higher stage, he 
has to relate himself to his ideal through the neverssuspended 
donsciousness of, and everlasting memory of, guilt. The sense 
of guilt is not the memory of an individual wrongful act, but 
a consciousness of a quality affecting the whole personality, 
a total and all-pervasive coloring, which does not admit of 
differences of degree when viewed essentially and from within. 
Between man. and God, guilt is guilt.and that is the end of 
the matter, the quality being essential and the degree ir- , 
relevant.
More original than Kierke-Religion A and Religion B. 
gaard’s views of original sin, suffering, and guilt in the re­
ligious sphere is his valuable distinction between immanent 
and transcendent religion, or Religion A and Religion B, as 
he calls them in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
Religion A is roughly what was described above: the
passive relationship to the divine, with the accompanying
In this immanent form ofsuffering and sense of guilt, 
religion, the tie that binds the individual to the divine
Suchis still, in spite of all tension, essentially intact, 
a form is more like paganism than like true Christianity.
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Transcendent religion—Religion B—modifies the sense
of guilt into the sense of sin, by which all continuity is 
broken off between the actual self and the ideal self, the 
temporal self and the eternal self. The personality is in­
validated, and thus made free from the law of God because it
is unable to comply with its demands. By sin, man becomes 
absolutely different from God, and there is no fundamental
contact left with the divine.
Religion B is Christianity. It is marked by an ab­
solute transcendence, by the introduction of a new passion: 
faith. It is marked by a new contact with the divine and 
a new point of departure in the consciousness of the indi­
vidual: conversion. All of these conceptions are, from the 
standpoint of the old, invalidated personality, seen as para­
doxical and absurd: the doctrine of sin, the doctrine of the 
God-man in Christ, the doctrine of the forgiveness and ab­
solution of sins—all are contrary to reason, are ’'absurd.”
Indeed, reason and faith are contrary passions, for 
reason is the self-assertion of the personality, its sense 
of fundamental integrity, while faith embraces a re-inte­
gration of the personality as a divine gift, under which 
reason is subject and made subservient, just as self-love
Thus, Kierkegaard does not mean 
by "reason” any abstract logical faculty, but the systematized 
common sense of the personality in its fundamental self- 
confidence and self-assertiveness.
is subjected in true love.
45
Summary. The major themes of Kierkegaard may be 
grouped into three categories which will include most of
what has here been presented: 1) Anti-depersonalization;
2) Emphasis on the individual human being, the self; and
3) Being '’before God.” The principle which seems to under­
lie all three of these categories is that in all thought 
about human life the direct and immediate experience of 
existence (and through it of one's own being and that of
God) must come first, for man has, given with this existence, 
a subjective knowledge about his own being (his Existenz).
In all thought about human life, then, human existence must 
come first.
1) Anti-depersonalization. Kierkegaard’s opposition
to the depersonalization and despiritualization and desub-
jectivization of man expressed itself in the negative form
of a protest against factors which he held were partially 
far
responsible/man's loss of himself, his subjective self.
This protest was against systems and systematic knowledge, 
the use of logic, intellectualizing human reality, objec­
tivism, abstraction, determinism, Hegelian idealism and es- 
sentialism, and philosophical speculation about history. 
These factors tended to overlook subjectivity and to deny
the real existence and real problems of the individual.
The positive2) Seeking the self: individualism, 
side of Kierkegaard's views on individuality and subjectivity
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expressed themselves in a theory of the existing self which 
provides the basis for much later Existentialist thought.
He submitted the concept of Existenz: the concept of becoming 
as a transition from non-being to true being, a concept of 
human life as constant becoming; the concept of freedom as 
absolute contingency, as a creative factor in life; the con­
cept of the need for a moment of decision, a leap, a break 
in logical continuity; the concept of absolute responsibility 
for one’s acts because of the existential freedom of choice 
(absolute power of choice entails absolute responsibility); 
the concept of a personal reality, of life as a secret which 
cannot be communicated, therefore positing the radical in­
communicability of reality and requiring indirection (com­
munication through parables, etc.)because life cannot be 
communicated logically; the concept of the need for in­
creased subjectivity and inwardness; the concept of inward­
ness as truth and the transfer of truth as an ’’appropriation” 
of an ”objective uncertainty”; the concept of the value of 
action rather than reflection, for the ethical and religious
man acts rather than reflects—life is dynamic, passionate,
as
strenuous; and the concept of the process of life/involving 
not a progressive evolution, but a radical and logically un­
accountable breach (a leap) of continuity at every important 
Thus, Kierkegaard does not merely protest against 
systems, but submits a positive set of values, a theory of 
the self.
juncture.
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3) Being "before God." Kierkegaard does not submit
a theory of the self as alone in nothingness, but as "before 
God" at all times. The inauthentically existing human being 
does not consciously recognize this relationship to God, but
with authenticity comes the recognition of this relationship 
and a whole series of related recognitions. Indeed, it was
because of Kierkegaard's recognition of his being "before
God" that he came to the recognition of the basic and per­
vasive fallenness of man, his finitude, his "original sin"; 
the recognition of the impossibility of salvation through 
knowledge or reason; the recognition of the need to absolutely 
transcend one's finite self, and the recognition of the need 
for God in order to achieve this transcendence; the recog­
nition that man can do nothing, that self-realization can 
come only through God, through a realization of the trans­
parency of the self before God, a leap of faith in Him, and 
a free granting by Him of the gift of grace; and the recogt 
nition of the central role of suffering in the religious 
life. These recognitions bring about the consequent recog­
nition that the finite-infinite antithesis is a basic dia­
lectic of life; the recognition of the defeat of aestheticism 
and all orientations in which pleasure values are primary; 
the recognition that the basic doctrines and truths of the 
Christian faith are impervious to human reason, seem to be 
absurd and paradoxical; and finally there is the recognition
4S
of man as a choosing creature, facing the moral either- 
or’s of life, choosing between inauthentic existence (char­
acterized by despair) and authentic existence (characterized 
by suffering and transcendence).
Kierkegaard conceives of man as finite and infinite; 
fallen,yet free to choose transcendence; surrounded by ex­
ternality and objectivity, yet needing desperately to achieve 
innerness and the truth of subjectivity.
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MARCEL
The thought of Gabriel Marcel eludes easy summary, 
for his writings tend to be in the form of jottings which 
are unsystematic, discursive, arriving at points dialectic- 
In point of time, the Journal Metaphvsique (which in 
the first volume dates from 1914-1923) precedes the work of 
the other major Existentialist thinkers, and a large part 
of Marcel's thought about existence was set down before he 
became acquainted with Kierkegaard.
This dissertation will consider Marcel's contribu-
ally.
tion to the thought of Existentialism briefly in six areas: 
1) The resolution of so-called dualisms; 2) the mystery of 
Being; 3) Being and having; 4) transcendence through Chris­
tian virtues; and $) the I-Thou relationship.
1) The resolution of so-called dualisms, 
sire in Marcel is to overcome such traditional separations 
as subject and object, body and soul, and the "I" and God. 
Indeed, Marcel might seem initially in his attempt at a 
"higher unity" to be a disciple of Hegel, 
fuses to construct a dialectic system; each problem, and 
with it each duality, which is overcome stands by itself.
A basic de-
But Marcel re-
The duality of subject and object yields to a higher unity
The duality of subject and predicates 
is based only on an abstracting consciousness; it is not a
Similarly, Marcel strives to
in Christian love.
duality in itself or in life.
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overcome the opposition between being and thought, between 
knowledge and the will, between body and soul, between "I" 
and "Thou^7 and most important of all, between "I" and God.
The oppositions, Marcel asserts, are really only apparent 
oppositions; one must seek in the depths of true reality 
for what lies ontologically behind them.
There are, however, some much more genuine oppositions 
which he wrestles with in his Journal: the objective, abstract, 
so-called npure" reason of the Kantians as against an tinder­
standing and grasp of the concrete, immediate, particular, 
individual existence; the "problem” in science and sociology 
and the tendency to look on life in problem terms as over 
against life as "mystery," as the "mystery of Being"; tech­
nology versus metaphysics; having versus being; shallow 
optimism versus true hope; seeing the "he" versus seeing 
In each case the first term tends to be ab­
stract and empty and the second more nearly to approach con­
crete reality in all its richness, fullness, and mystery.
Reason must yield to understanding, the abstract to the con-
the Bthou."
Crete, the objectified problem to the inexplicable mystery, 
mere technology to metaphysics, having to being, optimism 
to hope, and the impersonal "he" to the personal "thou."
Marcel considers that in trying2)Being as a mystery, 
to achieve a knowledge of the being of the self, one must 
be careful not to see the self as an object, as something
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to be observed, but rather as something mysterious—a mys- 
Life is a mystery, something into which I must enter 
with my concrete individual existence.
tery.
The mystery of being 
can be known directly,' but it cannot be known discursively or
treated dialectically. Modern man tries to live in a world 
devoid of mystery; he refuses to admit or see mystery. Yet 
mystery is an important component of reality:
Un monde d'ou le mysterieux serait exclu et un monde 
ou tout ce qui aurait la puissance de se communiquer se 
coramuniquerait directement, spontanement—ce monde-lk 
n’est surement pas le notre.^
Marcel would agree with Kierkegaard that life is inner, life 
is incommunicable, life is a secret. Marcel demands of
philosophy that it become aware of the significance of the
The method of treating a mysterymysterious aspects of life, 
is not to be objective and analytical, but a feeling into 
things with the understanding; the method is not an analysis 
(literally a"breaking up" of things) but a putting things to­
gether, a gathering up of things, a "recueillement."
Recueillement, Marcel asserts, substitutes for the 
endless taking apart of things by the analytical method a
synthetic method, a method which puts things together again.
It may appear to beReality must be inwardly reconstructed, 
split up and divided into many parts, but a "second reflection"
^■Journal Metaphysique. 4th ed. (Paris, 1935)* P» 160• 
Hereinafter abbreviated k,JM."
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upon this breaking up leads to an awareness of its impos- 
Like Bergson, Marcel asserts that true philo­
sophy aims at a reconstitution of concrete reality, which 
has been broken up by disconnected, fruitless efforts of 
abstract thought.
Indeed$.nwh’env6ng.tries to think about Being, its 
mysteriousness becomes obvious (Being and Mystery are very 
close to each other; "problem" is related to having), for 
the very person who studies Being has Being:
I do not even clearly know the meaning of the ques­
tion "what am I?” though I am obsessed by it. So we see 
the problem of Being here encroaching upon its own data, 
and being studied actually inside the subject who states 
. In the process, it is denied (or transcended) 
problem, and becomes metamorphosed into mystery.2
Because one is personally involved in Being,it cannot be
studied as a problem. This furnishes Marcel's distinction
between problem and mystery:
A problem is something which I meet, which I find 
complete before me, but which I can therefore lay siege 
to and reduce. But a mystery is something in which I 
am myself involved, and it can therefore only be thought 
of as a sphere where the distinction between what is in 
me and~what is before me loses its meaning and its 
initial validity. LBH, p. 117J
The dichotomy between subject and object loses itsvalidity
in the mystery of my own Being.
sibility.
it as
^Being and Having [Etre et Avoir], trans. Katharine 
Farrer (Westminster, 1949), p. 117* Hereinafter abbre­
viated "BH."
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3) Being and having. Being, as noted above, is in 
the realm of mystery because one participates in it even in
the very act of defining it. Having, however, is in the area 
of the objective, what one can possess and manipulate, the
area separate from the self, the area of "problem." Marcel 
contends that Having dominates present thought, and that the 
awareness of Being has progressively declined since the
This awareness of Being would be an awareness 
of participating in Being, of sensing the importance of mystery. 
This awareness would, if properly felt, give one the sense of 
belonging to Being—which transcends oneself—rather than to 
oneself.
Middle Ages.
Marcel's endeavor, then, is to restore a proper under­
standing of the nature of Having. This understanding will, 
of course, lead to a renewed consciousness and appreciation 
of Being. This understanding of Having will be phenomonological 
rather than psychological:
A phenomenological analysis of Having might well be a 
useful introduction to a renewed analysis of Being. By 
"phenomenological analysis" I mean the analysis of an im­
plicit content of thought, as opposed to a psychological 
analysis of "states." [BH, p. 151]
The realm of Having is the realm of objectivity, of the char-
acterizable, of the opposition of "without" and "within":
we cannot express ourselves in terms of Having ex­
cept when we are moving on a level where, in whatever 
manner or in however analogical a sense, the opposition 
of without and within retains its meaning; [it seems] 
that this order is manifested to our thought as essen­
tially involving the reference to another qua other•
[BH, p. 151]
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One can characterize and possess (physically or intellectually) 
what one has, but one can neither characterize nor 
what one is (or how one is);
The order of having is the order of predication or 
the char act eri sable. But the metaphysical problem which 
faces us here is to what extent a genuine reality, a 
reality as such, lends itself to characterisation; 
also whether being is net essentially uncharacterisable*
The uncharacterisable is also that which cannot be pos­
sessed. This brings us back to presence. We return to 
the difference between the Thou and the He. It is clear 
that the Thou, treated as He, comes under the jurisdic­
tion of a characterising judgment. But it is no less 
clear that the Thou treated as Thou stands on a different 
level. [BH, pp. 151-2]
The level of the He is the level of possession; the level of 
the Thou is the level of participation. The He is impersonal;
possess
and
• • •
the Thou is personal and involves the very self of the person
The difference between Desire and Love is thewho says Thou.
difference between Having and Being, between possession and
participation:
The opposition of desire to love is a very important 
illustration of the opposition of Having to Being. Desire 
is, in fact, having and not having. Desire may be re­
garded as autocentric and heterocentric at once (the 
polarity of the same and the other). But love transcends 
the opposition of the same to the other by planting us 
in Being. [BH, p. 152]
This returns us to Marcel’s desire to unite the dichotomous, 
and it gives us an idea of his basic technique: the fact that 
one is mysteriously grounded in Being.
Unfortunately, modern thought insists on remaining on 
the level of Having, on the level of dichotomies and separation.
The world of the Same and the Other is the world of 
the identifiable. In so far as I remain its prisoner,
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I surround myself with a zone of separation. Only on 
condition that I take my stand in this zone can I think 
myself according to the category of Having. [BH, p. 153]
The finality and exaggerated importance of death
comes because of an insistence on thinking of Being as having
a body:
The dead man is the man who no longer has anything 
(at least if we take the word ’’have” in those senses 
which we can make precise). We are tempted to think 
that no longer having anything is the same as no longer 
being anything: and in fact the general trend of life 
on the natural level is to identify one’s-self with 
what one has: and here the ontological category tends 
to be blotted out. [BH, p. 84]
The possession of a body, then, is a significant case of 
having, and Marcel gives it considerable attention. Ulti­
mately, however, the relationship of the self to the body 
is more than possession; it is actualization, the mystery 
of incarnation: I am not able to identify myself completely 
with my body, nor distinguish myself completely from it;
I appear to myself as a body, yet I am more than body. The 
mystery of the intimacy of incarnation is a relationship 
which one should strive to achieve with things outside of 
the body, with other people:
Le monde existe pour moi, au sens fort du mot 
exister, dans la mesure ou j’entretiens avec lui des 
relations du type de celles que j’entretiens avec mon 
propre corps—c’est-a-dire pour autant que je suis 
incarnl. [JM, p« 261]
Man’s relationship to his world should not be one of objec­
tive manipulation, but one of intimacy, of incarnation.
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For Marcel, then, Being is mysterious, uncharacter- 
izable, unpossessable. It is personally encountered, and 
one participates in it without ever having it in the sense
of being able to dispose of it. (Rather, man is at the dis­
posal, ideally, of Being.) Being is the ontological basis
for life, the factor which, through love and other means, 
unites the separated^ Being unites; Having separates.
Having is the antithesis of mystery; it deals with a problem 
rather than a mystery. Having is the realm of possession 
and manipulation of ideas and things. In having, one does 
not participate in what one has but only possesses it ex­
ternally. One can dispose of what one has, but one can never 
dispose of Being. The realm of Having is the realm of desire 
rather than love, possession rather than participation.*1-
4)Transcendence through Christian virtues. The Chris­
tian virtues stressed by Marcel are faith, hope, and love.
For Marcel, faith is especially important, for faith is an 
act of spiritual transcendence:
La foi est l’acte par lequel 1’esprit combie le vide 
entre le moi pensant et le moi empirique en affirmant 
leur liaison transcendante; ou plutot la foi est l’acte 
par lequel 1’esprit se fait, 11 esprit et non plus le su- 
jet pensant, 1Tesprit rlalite vivante et active. LJM,p.45J
^Paul Tillich, in his Love. Power. and Justice: Onto­
logical and Ethical Applications (New York, 1954)> asserts _ 
the same thing: that the ontological basis of love is a uniting 
of the separated.
**In The Waste Land desire replaces love, and in the 
Duino Elegies. Rilke asserts that man should participate in 
nature and in things, not merely manipulate and possess them.
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If one pledges faith to a vow, how can one know whether 
his present constitution will keep on being? Faith is an
assertion of the freedom of the self to determine the future; 
it is a projection of the self into the future. Faith, in
a sense, may seem to be a sacrifice of freedom in the future, 
but it is equally an assertion of freedom. It is a remaking
of the self in a unity with Being.
Hope is distinguished by Marcel from mere optimism. 
Optimism is based on something to be experienced; hope is 
based on a direct revelation of the goodness of God and brings 
a part of the realization of what is hoped for into the pre­
sent. Hope, in other words, implies living in hope and 
standing in the relation to time which is peculiar to Chris­
tian hope. Hope contains an inner readiness to sacrifice in 
confidence in God. In hope, the self is in availability 
(disponsibilitl) to God, is ready to transcend the duality 
of knowledge and the will in unconditional action which af­
firms his experience of God’s "living permanencfe.”
permanence hope is both a guarantee and a presupposition, 
is
Love/int err elated 
connected with testimony, 
cannot and ought not to be separated:
Lorsque la loi cesse d’etre amour, elle se fige en 
une croyance objective & une puissance plus ou moins 
physiquement conyue; etd’autre part, 1’amour qui n’est 
pas la foi (et qui ne pose pas la transcendance du Dieu 
aime) n’est qu’une sorte de jeu abstrait. [JM, p. 5°J
For this
with faith, grounded in Being, and 
Marcel asserts that love and faith
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Love is grounded in Being, and the way that it unites, ab­
sorbs, transcends, all dualisms is an evidence and expres­
sion of this fact of being grounded in Being. Love is also
connected with testimony, for testimony is meaningful only 
in love and in it the ”1" loses its subjectivity and Being
loses its objectivity. Love is the ontological ground of
all the Christian virtues insofar as they participate in 
Being, that is, in the Thou that is God.
5) The "I-Thou" relationship. For Marcel, the use 
of the second-person pronoun, in reference either to another
person or to God, is of decided significance. The third- 
person tends to make its referent objective and to sever the 
involvement and participation of the person using the pro­
noun and the one to whom the pronoun refers (even as in this 
sentence one feels that the situation is externalized, pre­
sented as an objective problem). The third-person is the 
ideal pronoun for the objectivity of science. Science, in­
deed only recognizes the objective, observable fact, for 
this reason Marcel asserts, "La science ne parle du riel 
qu'a'la troisieme personne." [JM, p. 137] However, for man, 
"Dieu est le toi absolu qui ne peut jamais devenir un lui." 
[Same]
The use of "thou" emphatically asserts a tie between
It is also a re-the subject and that which is addressed, 
cognition that the addressee is a knowing subject, a subject
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that is capable of response:
Je ne m’adresse a la deuxi!me personne qu’k ce qui 
est regard! par moi comrae susceptible de me r!pondre, 
de quelque fa^on que ce soit--meme si cette reponse est 
un "silence intelligent.” Lit ou aucune reponse n'est 
possible, il n’y a place que pour le "lui." 
de rlponse est done la clef. [JM, p. 13d] -
There is a sense of reciprocity in using the "thou," a sense 
of participation. Moreover, there is a concession of the 
addressed subject’s freedom. In I-Thou communication, I 
take part in the freedom of the other, who takes part, in 
turn, in my own freedom. If I ask a question in the second 
person, I do not ask in the same manner as I ask a "he" for 
information. Into my question enters the loving communi­
cation which in turn is only possible on the ground of faith.
Thus, the "thou” is an indication of openness on the 
part of the subject to another subject, the kind of openness 
which enables both to move toward a more genuine existence. 
One must strive for the love and freedom of this openness 
to another subject which displays itself in the use of ’’thou*' 
And an openness to "Thou” (God) tends to create the ontologi­
cal basis (love) for mysterious and loving communication 
between one subject and another subject.
of communication one is locked in the circle of himself and 
exists in a destructive relationship to others:
L'idee
Without this sort
The other, in so far as he is other, only exists for 
me in so far as I am open to him, in so far as he is a 
Thou. But I am only open to him in so far as I cease to 
form a circle with myself, inside which I somehow place 
the other, or rather his idea; for inside this circle
60
the other becomes the idea of the other, and the idea 
of the other is no longer the other qua other, but the 
other qua related to me; and in this condition he is 
uprooted and taken to bits, or at least in process of 
being taken to bits. [BH, p. 107]
The difference between ”thou” and ''he" is the basic
difference between Marcel’s other major and unifying oppo­
sition, Being and Having. The use of "thou” puts one on 
the level of Being; the use of nhe” puts one on the objec­
tive level of having. The use of ”he” separates; using ”thou” 
unites. ”He” makes the addressee objective and abstracts 
the person from what is addressed. One unconsciously at­
tempts to possess and manipulate the ’’he" for one’s own 
purposes; one unconsciously recognizes the freedom of the 
”thou” and participates in it. The ’’thou” recognizes the 
mystery and subjectivity of the other person; the ”he” makes 
him an object. The ’’thou” shows an openness to the Being 
of the other person; the ”he” shows that one is lockednin 
a closed circle of himself.
Heidegger has asserted that Being is the spiritual 
destiny of the West.** 
the personal level by asserting that one’s personal spiritual 
realization hinges on the relationship that one has to the 
”thou" and the ’’Thou."
Perhaps Marcel would bring this to
^Einfuhrung in die Metaphvsik (Tttbingen, 1953), P« 26.
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JASPERS
Existenzerhellung. Karl Jaspers wished in his
philosophy to achieve what he called an Existenzerhellung. 
an "illumination of Existenz." In such an endeavor, Jaspers 
was influenced by the fact that he was an M.D. to be more
concrete, realistic, practical, and empirical about existence 
than Heidegger, with his Jesuit scholastic background, his 
admiration for Bergson, Dilth^, Husserl, Rilke, etc. While 
Heidegger was exploiting the rich etymological possibilities 
of the German and Greek languages and returning to the pre- 
Socratic philosophers, Jaspers was concerning himself with 
Die geistige Situation der Zeit, with the inroads of tech­
nological thought on modern man and the proper relationship 
of science and philosophy.
The Scientific Method and the Philosophic Method. In 
going about his task of Existenzerhellung. Jaspers makes a 
basic distinction between the scientific method (into which 
philosophy has unwittingly fallen, to its own impoverish­
ment) and the method of philosophy. The method of philo­
sophy is not Empirical and rigidly objective, for philo­
sophy deals with data which cannot be approached in this 
manner: Existenz and the transcendental. Science has no 
capacity (on account of its method) to deal with these; it 
is for the philosophers to do so. Jaspers asserts that prefix 
ent-day philosophy has allowed itself to become so hypnotized
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with science that it has forgotten that its province is 
not to imitate the scientist but to do something the scientist 
is incapable of sensing the need for; the more valuable and 
indeed tragically necessary contribution the philosophers can 
make is to engage themselves in an analysis of Being in an 
age that has forgotten it.
In science, man views himself solely as an object; 
this is the scientist’s basic manner of dealing with phe­
nomena. But science crucially fails to deal with man from 
the inside, thus creating a false concept of man as an ob­
ject. Thus Jaspers asserts that Being may be thought of as 
Objektsein or as Ichsein. but the task of philosophy is in 
the area of Ichsein.^*
Defining Existenz. Bxistenz in Jaspers is meta­
physical, transcendental being, rather than the sum of em­
it is more like ”being-pirical becoming in a human being, 
potential” expressing itself or making itself felt as rest­
lessness or anxiety.
especially in moments when one has temporarily suspended
This Unbefriedigung comes upon one
the practical and theoretical consideration of one’s exis-
In these moments one becomes conscious of himself as
It is to the illumination of this
tence.
possibility, as Existenz.
Unbefriedigung. this Existenz. that Jaspers devotes himself.
[See Phil., pp. 299, 301] But, as noted above, the method
•^Philosophie. 2nd ed. in one vol. (Berlin, 1946), p. 4« 
Hereinafter abbreviated ”Phil.”
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must be non-scientific:
Was in mythischer Ausdrucksweise Seele und Gott 
heisst, in philosophischer Sprache Existenz und Transzen- 
denz, ist nicht Welt. Sie sind nicht im selben Sinne wie 
die Dinge in der Welt als Wissbarkeiten, aber sie kSnnten 
auf andere Weise sein.... [Phil., p. 295]
In attempting to arrive at what Existenz is, Jaspers asks,
i * *
f
”Was gibt es dem gesamten Weltsein gegenuber?" His answer
”Das Sein, das—in der Erscheinung des Daseins—nicht 
ist, sondern sein kann und sein soli und darum zeitlich ent- 
scheidet, ob es ewig ist.” [Phil
part of ourselves, our soul (in a sense), is our Existenz.
is:
p. 295] This eternal• i
We are Existenz insofar as we are not objects; Existenz is 
that non-material part of us which is like consciousness but 
more than consciousness.
Existenz and Dasein. A clearer idea of Jaspers* 
conception of Existenz is gained in comparing it to his use 
of the term Dasein. Dasein is somewhat inaccurately trans­
lated into English as nexistence.n Literally, it means "being-
there,” but in German it is used to refer to the objective 
and materially verifiable part of existing, the what ones 
might call '’mere-exLsting-thereness” without excessive meta-
Existenz is something like an opposite,physical overtones, 
more like pure or transcendental being, potentiality.
, sondern der 
Jenes ist daNicht mein Dasein also ist Existenz Mensch ist im Dasein mogliche Existenz. 
oder nicht 3a, Existenz aber, weil sie moglich ist, tut 
Schritte zu ihrem Sein Oder von ihmhinweg ins Nichts 
durch Wahl und Entscheidung. Mein Dasein hat gegen-
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uber anderem eine Umfangsverschiedenheit zwischen 
engem und weitem Weltsein, Existenz aber ist von anderer 
Existenz wesensverschieden aus dem Grunde ihrer Freiheit. 
[Phil., p. 296]
Casein, then, is inevitably and by definition always da. 
Its essence is actuality and non-transcendence, 
is by nature transcendence and potentiality, 
is to choose, to take strides toward Being or toward Non- 
being.
Existenz
Its essence
Existenz has a certain etemality which stands in 
contrast to the temporality of Dasein:
Dasein als Sein lebt und stirbt; Existenz weiss 
keinen Tod, sondern steht zu ihrem Sein im Aufschwung .
Oder Abfall. Dasein ist empirisch da, Existenz nur 
als Freiheit. Dasein ist schlechthin zeitlich, Exis­
tenz ist in der Zeit mehr als Zeit. [Same]
Dasein stands for empirical thereness; Existenz stands for
freedom, permanence, transcendence of time.
Jaspers makes a distinction between closed and open 
being which recalls the circle image of the self in Marcel: 
Dasein is essentially closed to transcendence and potentiality, 
but Existenz is essentially open:
Mein Dasein ist endlich, sofem es nicht alles 
Dasein ist, und doch ffir sich in sich beschlossen; 
auch Existenz ist nicht ffir sich allein und nicht 
alles; denn sie ist nur, wenn sie bezogen ist auf 
andere Existenz und auf Transzendenz, vor der als 
dem schlechthin Anderen sie sich bewusst wird, nicht 
durch sich selbst allein zu sein; wShrend aber Dasein 
als relative Rundung eines Endlosen-unendlich genannt 
werden kann, ist die Unendlichkeit der Existenz ohne 
Rundung als offene MSglichkeit. [Same]
Dasein is endlich. but the characteristic of Existenz is
Unendlichkeit and transcendence of the temporal restrictionsy
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of the present. Dasein is essentially closed and determined, 
but Existenz is wohne Rundung" as open potentiality.
Thus, even in the brief compass of this clarifi­
cation of the distinction between Dasein and Existenz, 
encounters other concerns which are characteristic of the 
thought of Jaspers: the basic concern with a realm of the 
temporal and finite as against the eternal and infinite; a 
basic concern with transcendence of the finite; an explo­
ration of the idea of possibility or potentiality; an em­
phasis on choice and on freedom; and finally the suggestion 
that Existenz is characterized by an attitude of openness
one
to possibility.
The Encompassing. Like Marcel, Jaspers wishes to 
overcome the subject-object dichotomy. However he tries to 
do this in a much more complex and systematic way; he submits 
his concept of the Umgreifende. that is, the comprehensive or 
encompassing.
The Encompassing is that which unites and compre­
hends both myself as a subject and the world as perceived
Jaspers, then,object; it is what one might call Being, 
asserts that the Encompassing expresses itself in two forms:
the Being in jtself or "as such" that surrounds us, and the 
Being that we are.
a) The Being that surrounds us.
Being that is, even if we are not.
This Being is the 
It is of a two-fold
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nature: it is the world, that is to say, the being of which 
one aspect of our essence constitutes an infinitesimal part, 
if the world as a whole be considered as something that is 
not ourselves and in which we are immersed; it is transcen­
dence, that is to say, the being that is intrinsically dif­
ferent from us, in which we have no part, but in which we 
are rooted and to which we stand in a certain relation.
The world as a whole is not an object, but an idea. . What 
we know is in the world* but is never the world. Transcen­
dence, on the other hand, is the being that never becomes 
world but that speaks as it were through the being that is 
in the world. There is transcendence only if the world does 
not consist only of itself, is not built upon itself, but 
points beyond itself. If the world is everything, then 
there is no transcendence. But if there is transcendence, 
perhaps there is something in the world’s being that points 
to it. [See the subsequent treatment of ciphers of transcen­
dence.]
b) The Being that we are. Jaspers describes four 
modes in which we become conscious of our own being: 1) dasein, 
2) consciousness as such, 3) ideas, and 4) potential Existenz.
Like all living things, we 
The Encompassing in this being alive 
and so concrete becomes an object of inquiry in its manifes­
tations, in the products of life, in physical forms, in psycho-
1) Dasein. "being-there.” 
live in an environment.
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logical functions, in hereditary morphological contexts, 
in behavior patterns, in environmental structures, 
dition, man,and only man, produces languages, tools, ideas, 
acts; in short, he produces himself. All life except for 
man is merely being-there within its environment. What com­
pletes man’s being-there is that the following modes of En­
compassing enter into it, either through man as a vehicle or 
forced by man into his service.
2) Consciousness as such. We are consciousness as 
such in the division of subject and object. Only what enters 
into this consciousness is being for us. We are the encom­
passing consciousness in which everything that is can be 
known, recognized, intended as an object. We break through 
our mere environment to the idea of the world to which all 
environments belong; indeed, we think beyond the world, and 
in our thoughts we can make it disappear as though it were 
nothing.
In ad-
The life of the mind is the3) Ideas. We are mind, 
life of ideas. Ideas—for example the practical idea em­
bodied in our professions and tasks, the theoretical ideas of 
world, soul, life, and so on—function as impulses in us, 
as an abstract of the total purpose inherent in the object, 
as systematic method of penetration, adaptation, and reali­
zation. And as such they lead us. They are not objects, 
but manifest themselves in schemata and forms. Theyoare ef­
fective and actual, and at the same time infinite tasks.
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These three modes of the Encompassing—dasein. 
sciousness as such, and ideas—are the modes in which we 
are objects in the world; in other words, as this Encom­
passing is objectified into a thing that confronts us, we 
ourselves become adequate empirical objects of biological, 
psychological, sociological and historical inquiry. But 
this does not yet exhaust our being; we are also Existenz.
4) Existenz. We are potential existence. We take 
our life from a primal source that lies beyond the being* 
there that becomes empirical and objective. This source is 
beyond consciousness and beyond mind or ideas. This aspect 
of man's nature is revealed in several ways: a) in man's 
experience of restlessness and dissatisfaction with himself, 
for man feels constantly that he is inadequate to what he is, 
to his knowledge, his intellectual world; b) in the Absolute, 
to which he subordinates his empirical existence as to his 
own authentic selfhood, or as to that which is said to him 
intelligibly and convincingly;' c) in the unremitting urge 
for unity, for man is not content in one mode of the Encom­
passing, or in all modes taken together, but presses toward 
the fundamental unity which alone is being and eternity; 
d) in the consciousness of an indefinable memory, as though 
man shared in the knowledge of creation, or as though he re­
membered something beheld before any world existed (Plato); 
and e) in the consciousness of immortality, that is not a
con-
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type of survival in another form, but a time-negating im­
mersion in eternity, appearing to man as a path of action 
forever continued in time.^
As Existenz. then, man finds a constant feeling of 
being more than mere existence, 
the Beyond.
Existenz is a pointer to 
Its five forms listed above were all only ways 
that man seems to become conscious of, or to point to, the 
Beyond: dissatisfaction with oneself, recognition of the 
Absolute, the urge for unity, the higher memory, and the
consciousness of immortality.
Jaspers notes that the four aspects of the Encom­
passing that I am form an implied polarity of the self 
relating itself to a sort of non-self within the self, that 
is, to Being. On the four levels the polarity becomes: 
(dasein) inner world and environment; (consciousness as 
such) consciousness and object; (idea) the idea that is in 
me and the objective idea that comes to me from things; and 
(Existenz) existence and transcendence. Thus, the Encom­
passing that I am relates itself to the two major aspects
of the Being that surrounds me (previously discussed), that
For, the first threeis, to "world” and to "transcendence." 
modes (dasein. consciousness, idea) relate themselves to
"world," and the mode of Existenz relates itself to tran­
scendence.
^This presentation of the Encompassing is condensed 
from The Perennial Scope of PhilosophytBar philosophische 
Glaube!). trans. R. Manheim (London, 1950)7 pp. 17-20* Here­
inafter abbreviated "PSP."
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Philosophical Faith. A basic aim in Jaspers’ philos­
ophy is the achievement of what he calls "philosophical
faith." Jaspers has set forth his concept of philosophical 
faith in his series of lectures published under the title, 
Per philosophische Glaube.^ Philosophical faith is based 
on and intimately related to the concept of Encompassing. 
Philosophical faith is like a sense of reality, a sense of 
the way things are, a sense of "presence," a sense of Being. 
Thus Jaspers asserts that one feels a compelling need to 
recognize a thing as true or false. [PSP, p. 21] And this 
compelling need "comes from a source of its own, which I 
cannot will, but through which I will, am, and know." [PSP, 
p. 20] On the idea-level* or mode,of the Encompassing, this 
sense of presence manifests itself in the urge to unify and 
render ideas comprehensible. Even what is fragmented in 
the understanding is held together in the mind. Ideas are 
like the binding force of faith, for "where ideas vanish, 
the world collapses into an infinity of scattered objects." 
[PSP, p. 21]
Of the modes of Encompassing, the experience of tran­
scendence in existence is perhaps the most important ground 
One senses transcendence in the realization that
Even my freedom,
for faith.
"I am not by virtue of my decision alone, 
my being-through-myself has been given me." [PSP, p. 21]
3(Zurich, 1948).
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Indeed, faith is, in itself, an expression of transcendence 
and at the same time even encompasses the Encompassing:
faith proper is the existential act by which tran­
scendence becomes conscious of its actuality. Faith is 
life out of the Comprehensive [the Encompassing], it is 
guidance and fulfilment through the Comprehensive.
Faith that springs from the Comprehensive is free, be­
cause it is not fixed in any finite thing that has been 
made into an absolute. [PSP, pp. 21-2]
To fix faith on any finite thing—even a conceptual idea of 
God—approaches idolatry, asserts Jaspers, 
tially to finitize what cannot be made finite at all. 
to speak of faith as such involves the constant effort to 
remember that one is a prisoner of what could be called "ob­
it is essen-
Even
ject thinking," a kind of thinking that must reduce the in­
conceivable to a concept.
Thus, even to speak of philosophical faith requires 
the operation of philosophical faith, of transcendence of 
object thinking. Ultimately one can only use object thinking 
to point to the Beyond—and one realizes that even the act of 
pointing seems to imply a choice among finite directions; one 
realizes, in other words, that one must exist, as it were, in
Thus Jaspers assertsa prison of the nature of human reason, 
that the basic operation of philosophical faith is to ascer­
tain the Encompassing "by transcending the object within the 
object thinking which remains forever inevitable." [PSP, p.22] 
But there is something in us that resists this basic 
operation and thus resists philosophical thought itself.
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We tend, in other words, always to strive for something
We fight against the vertigo of philosophy, and 
"wish to remain 'sane* by holding on to our objects and 6 -
feeding the rebirth of our nature in the act of transcending." 
[Same]
tangible.
Thus, philosophical faith is in open opposition to 
all dogmatic creeds (which falsely seek to objectify the un- 
objectifiable) and asserts something very close to what 
Tillich calls the "Protestant principle" that only God is 
holy, and no Church, no doctrine, no saint, and no rite is 
holy in itself. The Unconditional and Infinite cannot be 
made conditional and finite.^ It follows, too, that the 
world cannot be God, that the assertion that the world is 
God is idolatrous. Jaspers therefore calls the tendency 
to objectivize the world, and to assert that the world is 
everything, unfaith:
The propositions of unfaith are:
First: there is no God, for there is only the world 
and the laws of nature; the world is God.
Second: there is no absolute, for the commandments 
that I follow came into being and are conditioned by 
habit, practice, tradition, obedience; everything is 
relative ad infinitum.
Third: the world is everything, the sole and authen­
tic reality. Everything in the world is indeed tran­
sient, but the world itself is absolute, eternal, not 
ephemeral, not suspended in transition. [PSP, p. 40]
In each of these three propositions of unfaith there is
%>aul Tillich’s version of faith, too, rests on this 
principle. See his Dynamics of Faith, paperback ed., (New 
York, 1958), p. 29. Also seefhe Protestant Era, trans. 
James Luther Adams (Chicago, 1948).
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a denial of 'transcendence and of the Transcendent*
Philosophical faith, however, asserts in its pro­
positions that there is transcendence* The corresponding 
three propositions of philosophical faith are: 1) God is;
2) there is an absolute imperative; and 3) the world is an 
ephemeral stage between God and existence. Jaspers explains 
these three propositions as follows:
1) God is* Transcendence beyond the world or before 
the world is called God. There is the profoundest difference 
whether I regard the universe as being in itself and nature 
as God, or whether I regard the universe as not grounded in 
itself and find the foundation of the world and myself in 
something outside the world.
God is therefore completely distinct from this
finite world. Therefore one does not start from the finite
world and prove God; God cannot be proved in this way. Only
he who starts from God can truly seek him:
something that stands in finite form 
But finite things serve as
metaphor, symbol, analogy, enabling us to realize the 
presence of the divine. [PSP, p. 3°]
One will never gain a scientifically cogent proof of God.
A certainty of the existence of God, however rudimentary
and intangible it may be, is a premise not a result of all
philosophical activity*
2) There is an absolute imperative* Jaspers means 
by an absolute imperative the command of one’s authentic
God is not 
before the eyes or the mind.
• • •
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self (his Existenz) to one’s empirical self, 
command of what I am eternally (in the face of the tran-
This is the
scendent) to the temporality of my present life, 
solute itself does not become temporal, 
cuts across time.
The Ab-
Wherever it is, it 
(This is the essential relationship of
the Transcendent, that it ’’cuts across” time.) By way of 
our freedom, the Absolute erupts from the Transcendent into 
this world. [PSP, p. 37]
3) The reality of the world subsists ephemerally be­
tween God and existence. The indeterminate character of all 
modes of known reality, the interpretive character of all 
cognition, and the fact that we apprehend all being through 
a dichotomy of subject and object bring one inevitably to 
the philosophical insight that the world is merely ephemeral.
The phenomenality of the empirical world is a basic 
insight of philosophical thought. This insight is not 
empirical; it can be attained only by an act of tran­
scendence. [PSP, p. 3S]
The assumption of God as eternal and transcendent goes hand 
in hand, then, with the assumption of the ephemerality and 
phenomenality of this world. This world may in various ways 
point to tha Beyond, may seem to be the "speech of God" [PSP, 
p. 39], but the world will remain distinct from Him, something 
created by him, the "language" of God.
What is the significance of the world to philosophical 
faith? The world is the place where the infinite intersects 
the finite:
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For such faith [philosophical faith] our being in 
time is an encounter of existence and transcendence— 
of the eternal that we are, as beings that are both cre­
ated and self-given—and of the eternal in itself. The 
world is the meeting point of that which is eternal and 
that which manifests itself in time. [PSP, p. 39]
Philosophical faith, then, is faith without an ob­
ject—for the eternal can never be object~yet it is grounded 
in an unshakable certainty of transcendence and the Beyond.
Freedom. Jaspers asserts that there are two ways of 
looking at man: either as an object of inquiry, or as free­
dom. [PSP, p. 56] The first way (associated with science) 
may seem to give results that are decisive, but only the 
second can furnish results that are truly important and 
fundamental for man. The first way merely deals with a 
substratum of man, and when its data are mistakenly gener­
alized into a theory of man a positive loss of freedom 
occurs:
Man cannot be derived from something else, but is 
immediately at the base of all things. To be aware of 
this signifies man's freedom, which is lost in every 
other total determination of his being, and comes en­
tirely into its own only in this one total determination. 
* Every insigjit into man, if it is absolutized into 
a supposed knowledge of man as a whole, destroys his 
freedom. And this is the case with such theories of 
man, meaningful for limited perspectives, as have been 
propounded by psychoanalysis, Marxism, racial theory. 
They veil man himself as soon as they attempt to in­
vestigate anything more than aspects of his nature.
[PSP, p. 61]
For Jaspers, man's freedom is fundamentally based
Man is imprisoned byon a relationship to transcendence, 
his finitude, but transcendence gives him freedom—and his
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use of freedom in decision gives him the power of tran­
scending finitude. By an absoluteness of decision man 
feels the transcendence that is freedom and thereby trans­
forms and revitalizes even the mode of his finitude:
But if in the absoluteness of his decision in the 
face of everything finite in the world, he becomes 
through his independence, certain of his infinity as 
his authentic selfhood, this infinity also reveals a 
new mode of his finiteness. This finiteness as exis­
tence means that even as himself man cannot ascribe 
himself to himself.[PSP, p. 66]
Because man-cannot ascribe himself to himself, Jaspers as­
serts that man is actually given to himself over and over 
again by transcendence and only with the help of the hand 
of transcendence can man have freedom at all:
If man maintains his inner integrity in the face 
of fate and even of death, he cannot do so by himself 
alone. What helps him here is of a different kind 
than any help in the world. Transcendent help reveals 
itself to him solely in the fact that he can be him­
self. That he can stand by himself, he owes to an in­
tangible hand, extended to him from transcendence, a 
hand whose presence he can feel only in his freedom.
[Same]
Because ofFreedom is the prodf, then, of transcendence, 
this relationship to transcendence it is also intimately
related to faith:
Faith stands on the road to freedom that is not 
an absolute and not an empty freedom, but that is 
experienced as the possibility of being given or not
It is only through freedom that 
• LSame]
given to oneself.
I become certain of transcendence
Transcendence and freedom, then, are somewhat dif-
God does not figureferent in Jaspers than in Sartre.
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in Sartre's conception, 
relates itself to God, Sartre's transcendence is more like
It
Uberschreitung: that is, it is not so much a relationship 
to infinite Being as merely an over-stepping of certain
Thus, while Jaspers' Transcendenz
limitations, a surpassing of the self by the self without 
outside help. For Jaspers and for Marcel, man's relation­
ship is as much with the Beyond as with the world about him
and with himself; a removal of this intimate relationship 
would radically affect their conceptions. Thus, one sees 
in the conception of freedom a basic difference between 
the theistic and the non-theistic orientations; in the 
theistic orientation, transcendence is the evidence and 
manifestation of a real external power, while in the non- 
theistic orientation transcendence is merely man surpassing 
himself.
History: Geschichtlichkeit and Geschichtsphilosophie. 
With reference to the relationship of man to history, Jaspers 
asserts his idea that man is an infinite Existenz which must
find realization and actualization in a finite time and place,
History, then, is the finite arena 
Further, man is always already
that is, in history$ity. 
in which man must operate, 
in time and spacer he does not choose his place in history. 
The idea that man is always already in history and the idea 
that he must actualize his Existenz in and through history
Jaspers calls Geschichtlichkeit. generally translated as
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"historicity." Authentic existence requires an historical 
consciousness, a realization that man must always be "in- 
situation,” so to speak, and that this situation is an his­
torical situation whose proper dimensions extend into the 
past and the future.
Because history is the arena in which the Existenz
expresses itself, the proper study of history is not a 
scientific study of history but a philosophical examination 
of the past for evidence of the way Existenz has expressed 
itself. This more philosophical approach to history Jaspers 
calls Geschichtsphilosophie. History must receive its use­
fulness from a relation to Existenz: thus, Jaspers is con­
cerned with distinguishing between a dead scientific his­
tory of mere facts and a history that is an expression oij 
and otherwise related tcv Existenz. In other words, history 
as mere knowledge must be distinguished from history as 
philosophy; otherwise true history will sink into oblivion:
Damit Existenz sich mit Existenzen in dem geraein- 
samen geschichtlichen Grunde verstehe, bedarf es des 
Wissens vom Vergangenen. Dieses Wissen, als Wissen 
methodisch-kritisch gepruft, ist Historie als Wissen- 
schaft: verwandelt in existentielles SelbstverstSndnis, 
ist es Geschichtsphilosophie. Beide sind als Anspruch 
Gegenstand eines Kampfes. der schliesslich im Willen 
zur Geschichtslosigkeit versinken kann. [Phil., p. 635J
Scientific history and accurate data are necessary, but 
without an historical consciousness which gives them sig­
nificance in relationship to self-understanding they may 
degenerate into mere objective Historie:
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Wenn die historische Forschung die Tendenz hat, « 
vom geschichtlichen Bewusstsein der Existenz zu losen 
um als historisches Bewusstsein nur noch Wissen
sich
»zu sem,
so bringt diese Verwandlung zwei Gefahren; die eigent- 
liche Geschichtlichkeit kann mir verlorengehen bis zu 
der Resterscheinung eines endlosen historischen Wissens: 
Oder ich will mich von ihr losen zu einem allgemein- 
menschlichen Wahren fur alle, das ich in historischer 
ObjektivitSt als Autoritat kenne. [Phil., p. 636]
History, then, can never be objective knowledge in the 
scientific sense, for it treats of man. And because it 
treats of man in time and space as a manifestation of some­
thing non-objective, the attempt to reduce it to objectivity 
is actually another form of what Jaspers has called unfaith.
To avoid the loss of a proper historical conscious­
ness, Jaspers submits his Geschichtsphilosophie. Geschichts- 
philosophie involves a systematic relating of encompassing 
and transcendence and Existenz to history. In brief, it 
involves a perception of the limitations of historical data 
and history itself, the limitations of man’s consciousness 
of history, and finally the symbolic nature of history as 
a cipher of transcendence.
In conclusion, one may say that Jaspers' concept of 
Geschichtlichkeit contains both an affirmation and a denial.
p. 636][See esp. Phil • 1
It affirms the necessity for man's Existenz to be actualized
At the same time, it deniesin an historical place and time, 
the finality of history, tifor man can overcome history in 
history by finding in it anu expression of more than history.**
^For eight ways of overcoming history see The Origin 
and Goal of History, trans. M. Bullock (London, 1953),PP» 272-6.
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Ciphers. Jaspers’ Philosophie culminates with an
elaboration of his concept of ciphers (Chiffre. Chiffre- 
schrift). All through the Philosophie the essential limi­
tations of the world, of human existence, and of human 
thought, were shown to seem to point to something beyond, 
something like an ultimate, infinite, inconceivable, encom­
passing Being. Myth, theology, and philosophy are limited 
human creations, but can point to transcendence. With his 
concept of ciphers, Jaspers attempts to elaborate more spe­
cifically on the manner of this pointing to transcendence.
For Jaspers, reality is ultimately symbolical. The 
world is by nature ephemeral and unstable, and its phenomena 
disappear as soon as they have spoken (as ciphers of tran­
scendence) to Existenz. One might say that what experience 
is for consciousnessTas-such (namely the link between object 
and subject) the cipher is for Existenz—the link to tran­
scendence. Ciphers are not identical with appearances as 
such, but are the language spoken through them by transcen­
dence.
A cipher, in other words, may be considered to be a
However, symbols may be of two kinds, Jaspers 
asserts—a deutbares Symbol , in which case it points to some­
thing in the world, or a schaubaresSymbo1 . which cannot be 
interpreted but only intuited, which refers not to a specific 
and determined something, but instead to a reality different
type of symbol.
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in kind. The deutbare3 Symbol is the world speaking in its 
empirical dimension to consciousness-as-such; the schaubares
Symbol speaks symbolically (as a cipher) to Existenz. A 
cipher is not a deutbares Symbol , but a schaubares Symbol . 
It does not point to something in the world, but is, in a 
sense, what is pointed at as it subsists super-empirically 
in the empirically given world and in the experience of 
human beings.
Ciphers will be illustrated in the subsequent con­
sideration of Scheitern. or "shipwreck," for shipwreck may 
be a cipher of transcendence. Freedom, too, is a cipher, 
for it points to Transcendence. Ciphers are related to the 
concept of Geschichtlichkeit. for history must be read as 
a cipher and one tends to transcend history when it is con­
sidered as a cipher. The cipher, then, is that within an 
object or action or power which, though not empirically con­
ceivable, speaks to Existenz to indicate transcendence. It 
is the "language" of transcendence.
Grenzsituationen. The concept of the Grenzsituation. 
generally translated as "boundary situation" or "ultimate
situation," is one of the most characteristic aspects of
Ultimate situations are those situationsJaspers’ philosophy.
which all human beings must experience, 
pies of these ultimate and inescapable "situations" in which
The six major exam-
man finds himself both involved and restricted are:
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D Geschichtlichkeit. 2) death, 3) suffering, 4) struggle, 
5) guilt, and 6) Fragwiirdigkeit. It is equally as senseless, 
Jaspers asserts, to seek the ultimate situations as it is to
try to blind oneself to them. The proper attitude is to dare 
to face them while not seeking to bring them on. 
titude one may realize his Existenz in the very process of 
"coming up against a wall."
In this at-
Jaspers presents a Systematik of these six boundary 
situations [Phil
be
p. 474] which may/summarized as follows:•»
I. One must always be in-situation. One cannot get out 
of history, change the fact that he is a man or 
that he is young or old or that he is well-formed 
or ill. These remind man that while he possesses 
potentiality, he is not pure potentiality.
II. Particular ultimate situations. This second category 
includes situations involving a personal and in­
dividual and particular encounter with various 
forms of one's finitude:
A. Death
B. Suffering
C. Struggle
D. Guilt
III. Fragwiirdigkeit is the third category, and is in part a 
product of the first two. It is essentially the 
human encounter with ultimate questionability— 
the questionability of the being of the world 
and finally the questionability of my being itsel&
These three categories correspond to the major divisions
of the Philosophie. as Jaspers indicates in a section called
"Stufen des Sprunges der in den Grenzsituationen werdenden
Existenz," that is, "Stages of the Leap by the becoming
Existenz in Ultimate Situations":
Die drei Spriinge gingen vom Weltdasein angesichts 
der Fragwiirdigkeit von allem zur substantiellen Einsam— 
keit des universal Wissenden. vom Betrachten der Dinge
$3
angesichts meiner notwendigen Teilnahme an der Welt des 
Scheiterns zum Erhellen moglicher Existenz. vom Dasein 
als moglicher Existenz zur wirklichen Existenz in Grenz- 
situationen. Der erste fuhrt zum Philosophieren in Weltr 
bildern, der zweite zura Philosophieren als Existenzerhel- 
lung, der dritte zura philosophischen Leben der Existenz# 
[Phil., p. 472]
These are leaps bd establish a proper relationship with 
world, with existence, and with transcendental Existenz— 
the three major efforts of the Philosophic.
Professor Edwin Latzel distinguishes five pervasive 
and fundamental ideas in Jaspers with reference to ultimate 
situations: 1) "The senselessness of a direct seeking of 
the ultimate situation"; 2) "The unavoidability of the ul­
timate situation"; 3) "The dual aspect of the ultimate sit­
uation"; 4) "The awakening of Existenz in the ultimate sit­
uation"; 5) "The ’existential* necessity of the ultimate 
situation#"^
The senselessness of a direct seeking of the ulti­
mate situation has been discussed earlier, as well as the 
unavoidability of it. One note may be added regarding un— 
avoidability, and that is concerning guilt, 
avoidable# Jaspers asserts that merely by actively par­
ticipating in life one takes something away from others; 
on the other hand, if one does not participate, one is 
guilty of denying his own potential, his Existenz#
The Concept of ’Ultimate Situation’ in Jaspers’ 
Philosophy," in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers. "Library of 
Living Philosophers,T series, ed# P«A# Schilpp (New York,
1957), pp# 196-201..
Guilt is ion-
$4
Dadurch, dass ich tStig das Leben ergreife, nehme 
ich also anderen weg, lasse ich in den Verstrickungen 
die Unreinheit der Seele entstehen, verletze ich durch 
meine ausschliessende Verwirklichnng im Zuriickweisen 
mogliche Existenz. [Phil., p. 507]
Thus, if I act or do not act, in either case I am in guilt.
The dual aspect of the ultimate situation refers to
the fact that it is both creative and destructive, and that 
is, in a sense, paradoxical. Geschichtlichkeit. for instance, 
involves the idea that only in destruction can come the posi­
tive realization of one’s being and of transcendence:
Die Geschichtlichkeit als das sich stets zerstorende 
Hervorbringen ist die Erscheinung, in der allein ich 
meiner selbst und der Transzendenz gewiss werde. Mur 
in dieser Erscheinung ergreife ich das Sein. [Phil., 
p. 512]
Happiness, too, has a negative value for true being; only 
suffering and shipwreck give true joy, or the truth of joy:
WSre nur Gluck des Daseins, so bliebe mogliche
Es ist Wunderlich, dass das 
Wie Leiden das faktische
Existenz im Schlummer. 
reine Gluck leer wirkt.
Dasein vernichtet, so scheint Gluck das eigentliche 
Sein zu bedrohen. Im Gliicklichsein ist ein Selbst- 
einwand durch ein Wissen, das es nicht bestehen
Das Gluck muss in Frage gestellt sein, urn
zu wer-
18sst.
als wiederhergestellt erst eigentlich Gluck 
den; die Wahrheit des Glucksrrersteht.auf: dem Grunde 
des Scheiterns. [Phil., p. 493]
Paradoxically, then, just as suffering tends to negate one’s 
factual being, so happiness threatens one’s actual being.
Mere happiness obstructs the realization of one’s being, but
Shipwrecksuffering is the gate to joy and transcendence, 
has the dual aspect of being apparently destructive but ac­
tually creative—the ground of transcendence.
&5>
Ultimate situations, then, seem to be-ithe negation 
and end of one's being; but in the shipwreck of the ultimate 
situation there comes the awakening of one's Existenz. 
if all of existence were happiness, Existenz would remain 
Struggle and suffering create the authentic man, 
even while leaving their marks on him. 
questionableness of the world and of man's being that turns 
him decisively to Existenz.
Ultimate situations, finally, are an existential neces- 
"Pure happiness is empty," says Jaspers; suffering is 
Guilt is needed to shatter the self-righteous- 
Fragwiirdigkeit turns man to his own Exi stenz. 
Thus, one is not surprised to hear Jaspers say that true 
Being is experienced in Grenzsituationen or not at all:
For
dormant.
And it is the ultimate
sity.
a necessity, 
ness of man.
Da also das wahre Sein nur in der Grenzsituation Oder 
gar nicht erfahren wird, so hatte in einer Welt ohne 
Antinomik, mit bestehender absoluter Wahrheit als objek- 
tiv vorhandener, Existenz aufgehort zu sein und mit ihr 
das Sein im Dasein, dem Transzendenz fiihlbar werden kann.
[Phil., p. 511]
Gr enz situationen are the result of the existence of antinomies* 
Without antinomies, life as it is experienced by human beings 
Without antinomies, transcendence and equally 
Existenz could by definition no longer be, for there would 
be nothing to transcend and possibilities would vanish; only 
in an existence characterized by antinomies and ultimate sit­
uations do Existenz and transcendence have any meaning.
would cease.
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Scheitern. Scheitern is generally translated either 
The ultimate situations dis-"shipwreck" or "foundering." 
cussed immediately above are themselves illustrations of 
this foundering. What is foundering? Foundering is the 
essential relationship of man to the Transcendent. It is 
a result of man’s inability to actually encompass the En­
compassing; it is an expression of man’s inability to think 
transcendence; it is involved in the process of the indi­
vidual Existenz pointing the Dasein to the ground of all 
being; it presents the experience of human beings trying 
to overcome the necessity inherent in their finitude and 
coming up against a wall. All the forms of existing where 
human beings striving for authenticity "come up against a 
wall" are forms of foundering.
Antinomies are responsible, or at least integral, 
for foundering. Jaspers takes into account the power of 
passion when it gains ascendency over reason, as a form of 
foundering, as may be seen in his famous chapter, "Das 
Gesetz des Tages und die Leidenschaft zur Nacht." [Phil., 
pp. 762-74] Jaspers does not place a positive value on 
passion, however; rather "passion for the night" is an ul­
timate, insurmountable experience not assimilable to order. 
The power of night (passion) asserts itself as an obstacle 
to any neat conception of the reasonableness and order of 
man. Jaspers posits other antinomies in which even as man
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strives for one pole9 he finds himself foundering on the 
otherz?Trotz und Hingabe. 
and diversity, 
the existence of man.
Abfall und Aufstieg. dnd Unity 
Foundering, then, is inescapably built into
In the final portions of the Philosophic. Jaspers 
shows foundering as a cipher. This includes all foundering 
except ultimate foundering, for since a cipher is a pointer
at transcendence, ultimate fophdering would not be ultimate 
if it pointed beyond. All other forms of foundering are 
ciphers, however, because of the fact that as one comes up
against the barriers involved in foundering one becomes keenly
The awareness of the bar-aware of the barrier as a barrier, 
rier as barrier is equally an awareness of something beyond 
the barrier, so the very process of coming up against that 
barrier becomes a cipher of transcendence.
Ultimate foundering, however, creates a situation 
where the cipher becomes uninterpretable, 
in this connection, ruinous wholesale destruction, the early 
extinguishing of human potentialities through insanity or 
death, and the possibility of the annihilation of historical 
continuity (through the loss of documents and all evidence 
telling of human activity).
8 Jaspers considers,
In these cases foundering is
7”Uns aber, wo wir Eines meinen, ganz,/ist schon des 
ander Aufwand fiihlbar... .Da wird fur eines Augenblickes Zeich- 
nung/ein Grand von Gegenteil bereitet, muhsam, dass wir sie 
sahen....” Rilke, Duino Elegy IV, 9-10, 14-16.
®The death of a child in Rilke’s Duino Elegy IV nist 
unbeschreiblich.” This is ultimate foundering.
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no longer a cipher, but only the presence of nothingness. 
This creates the radical despair and Angst for which there 
is no answer—only silence.
Nur vor der undeutbaren Chiffre wird schliesslich 
das Ende der Welt das Sein. Wahrend fur das Wissen 
jedes Ende in der Welt und in der Zeit -istj niemals ein 
Ende der Welt und der Zeit, steht das Schweigen vor 
der undeutbaren Chiffre des universalen Scheiterns in 
bezug auf das Sein der Transzendenz, vor dem die Welt 
vergangen ist. Das Nichtsein alien uns zuganglichen 
Seins, das sich im Scheitern offenbart, ist das Sein 
der Transzendenz.
Keine dieser Formeln sagt etwas, jede sagt dasselbe, 
alle sagen nur: Sein. Es ist, als ob sie nichts sagten, 
denn sie sind ein Brechen des Schweigens, ohne es bre- 
chen zu kSnnen. [Phil., p. S76]
Anguish in its ultimate form, then, is anguish be­
fore the experience of uninterpretable foundering. It is 
anguish before nothingness, before meaninglessness. And 
it is this ultimate foundering and anguish which ’'resonates" 
all the milder, interpretable forms of foundering. But what 
does Jaspers propose at this point (which occupies the final
pages of the Philosophie)? The only answer is an irrational
Thus, in the end of his Philo-and incomprehensible leap.
Sophie the ultimate action of the anguished being is, when
Likethere is no way out, to leap from anguish to peace. 
Kierkegaard’s ultimate leap, the "leap of faith" into the
irrational and absurd, Jaspers’ leap is irrational and per­
haps could as easily be a leap into nothingness as into Being. 
But then this is precisely the reason that it is in both cases 
a leap of faith:
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die eigentliche Angst ist die, die sich fur das 
Letzte hSlt, aus der kein Weg mehr ist. Der Sprung in 
ein angstloses Sein scheint ihr wie eine leere Moglich- 
keit: ich^will springen, aber ich weiss schon, dass ich 
nicht heruberkomme, sondern nur in den bodenlosen Ab- 
grund der ■ endgiiltig letzten Angst versinke.
Der Sprung aus der Angst zur Ruhe ist der unge- 
heuerste, den der Mensch tun kann. Dass er ihm gelihgt, 
muss seinen Gr.und (iber die Existenz des Selbstseins hin- 
aus haben; sein Glaube knfipft ihn unbestimmbar an das 
Sein der Transzendenz. [Phil., p. 877]
Ultimate foundering leads to the ultimate irrational, in­
comprehensible leap of faith. But in a shipwreck, who knows 
but that such a leap is an invalid solution? And in Jaspers 
even ultimate foundering seems to affirm or facetBeing.
Communication. Only with an understanding of Jaspers’ 
concepts of Existenz. of Geschichtlichkeit. of ciphers, and 
of transcendence, can a proper appreciation of his idea of 
communication be achieved. Communication takes place on
many levels, but the most authentic level is the communi-
It involves a certaincation between Existenz and Existenz.
Geschichtlichkeit even as it transcends it, because the com­
munion is between two existing beings in an historical time 
It involves the idea of the cipher because forand place.
the Existenz. the fact of communication with a co-Existenz
It involves transcendence,is a cipher of transcendence, 
because the ultimate basis of true communication is the com­
mon ground in Being.
True communication, then, is a form of communion. 
This is noted by Professor Fritz Kaufmann in his valuable
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article on communication in Jaspers:
Man's love for God has its proper actuality only 
in this loving communication with his actual Thou in 
a concrete situation of human life. Although this 
love evaporates if squandered in unworldly reverie, 
it becomes substantial and productive in the absolute 
seriousness of the partnership between man and man, 
as sustained appeal to one another's self-hood. Such 
co-Existenz is, within the medium of this world, 
kind of holy communion and divine service.9
Not only does man show his love for God through loving com­
munication, true communication is grounded in God:
Being founded in actuality proper and by it, being 
oriented by and towards its unity, all true communication 
has its locus in God—is an amare in Deo (a loving in 
God)—even though there seems to be no communication 
urith Him. [Same, pp. 223-4]
Jaspers' concept of loving communication is, in many 
ways, an extention of Marcel's ideas on communication. Loving 
communication is the only genuine communication; it is the 
communication which recognizes, appreciates, and respects
a
the individuality of the other Existenz on aiilevel which calls
Loving communication is ultimatelyfor the pronoun, "thou." 
grounded in God.
Jaspers also treats of the communication involved in 
an artist's "feeling into" nature and into his work. Man
and especially the artist must commune with things, must 
come to be able to say "thou" to things as well as to other 
Man must constantly strive to overcome mere juxta-beings.
^"Karl Jaspers and a Philosophy of Communication," 
in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. P. A. Schilpp, [prev. 
cited] p. 223.
91
position| must strive to transform this juxtaposition into 
a higher relationship of communion with other selves and 
with things. True art-objects are a product of true com­
munion and continue it; they are ciphers of transcendence. 
Indeed, they are more than ciphers~that is, more than some­
thing to be merely read; they are to be communed with 
being (like other selves) a concretization of Being.
as
Communication involves community, and Jaspers even 
goes so far as to say that philosophical truth may be gauged 
in terms of whether it promotes true community. But com­
munity in this sense is not conceived externally in terms of 
a social group, but in terms of the relationship of Existenz 
to co-Existenz, a relationship of common grounding in love 
and Being. Professor Kaufmann states this relationship as 
follows:
Our fellow being is our companion as partner in a 
common love for Being as such—for Being as Transcendence 
proper. Transcendence is the ground—not merely the sum 
total—of all phenomena, the "common depth11 which is not 
our habitation, and in which, nevertheless, we live, 
and have our particular being; it is the "other side of 
nature”; and it is the only locus in which two lines of 
personal life, surpassing this world and independent in 
their original spring, can ultimately meet. A philo­
sophical thought is true as far as its actualization 
both needs and promotes communication and community—
however, its root in individual Existenz.
move
without losing,
[Same, p. 224]
Thus, Jaspers (more than any of the other Existen—
tialist^philosophers considered in this dissertation) recog­
nizes that without the co-Existenz, the solitary Existenz,
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for all its self-consciousness, is nothing, 
exist in relationships with others.
Existenz must
These relationships 
may be in various forms—the feeling of "we," sympathy, in­
terest, understanding, or the highest form, love, 
case, loving communication is the highest possibility to 
which an existing, temporal being can attain, 
self, puts it masterfully in Von der Wahrheit:
In alien diesen Fallen des Miteinanderseins—An- 
steckung, Mitgefiihl, Miteinandererleben, Verstehen— 
wird dieses erfiillt von den Weisen des Umgreifenden, 
von der Einheit des Lebensstroms (der Interessen, Ge- 
wohnheiten, Gegnerschaften), der Einheit des Bewusst- 
seins iiberhaupt, der Einheit des Geistes. Eigentliche 
Liebe aber ist erst aus dem Ursprung des Selbstseins 
(der Existenz). Liebe in Kommunikation selbstseiender 
Menschen ist die letzte Moglichkeit im Zeitdasein.-1-0
This is a significant statement of Jaspers'positive position,
and a vindication of love as an existential reality.
munication among authentically existing selves is the path
to the realization of Existenz. and it is a keystone in the
whole philosophical structure of Jaspers’ thought.
In any
Jaspers, him-
Com-
Art. Art in its genuine form is, as one might an-
It is a product ofticipate, a cipher of transcendence, 
reading the ciphers of nature, history, and man, but what
it says can be said in no other way:
Das Lesen der Chiffre in Natur, Geschichte und im 
Menschen mitzuteilen, ist Kunst, wenn die Mitteilung 
in der Anschaulichkeit als solcher, nicht im spekulativen 
Gedanken erfolgt. Da Kunst die Chiffren sprechen lSsst, 
aber was sie als Kunst sagt, auf keine andere Weise-
■^(Munchen, 1947), p. 1010.
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gesagt warden kann, und das so Gesagte doch das eigent- 
liche Sein trifft, um das alles Philosophieren sich be— 
wegt, wird hier die Kunst das Oreanon der Philosoohie 
(Schelling). [Phil., p. 840] ----------------------- *----
Because art involves a contemplation of the ciphers of tran­
scendence, it serves to illuminate Existenz.
In ihrem Ursprung ist Kunst die Erhellung der Exis­
tenz durch eine Vergewisserung, welche das Sein im Da- 
sein anschauend zur Gegenwart bringt. [Phil
Art is a sort of actualization of Being.
Since, however, Being suffers and is in some sense 
travestied and betrayed by every attempt to make it objective, 
art founders in its attempt to render Being—indeed, it must 
founder to the very extent it is genuine art. 
is between the finitude of temporal existence and the in­
finity of eternal Being; it is, as Professor Johannes 
Pfeiffer sums it up, both more and at the same time less 
than reality:
P. 2S3]•»
Art, then,
the perception of the artistic imagination is at 
one and the same time both more and less than the reality 
of our existence in time: more, if one proceeds from the 
mere factuality of the dull cares of existence; less, if 
one looks at authentic Existenz in the concentrated seri­
ousness of its responsible openness. From the point of 
view of the former, art is a soaring which liberates; 
from that of the latter, a non-committal suspension; but 
this suspended self-oblivion is at the same time a con­
dition for the possibility of authentic self-being: In 
so far as it frees us from the narrowness and constraint 
of our own purpose-circumscribed private existence. Or 
vice versa: In the world’s transfiguring of itself into 
a cipher, phenomena gain their beauty in themselves and
, the consciousness ofgrand us, for fleeting moments 
time-conquering fulfillment.11
^■"Jaspers' Interpretation of Art,” in The Philosophy, 
of Jaspers, ed. P« A. Schilpp, [prev. cited] p. 710.
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However important time-conquering fulfillment is, its achieve­
ment in contemplative form through art must never become a 
substitute for action:
To be non-committal is, indeed a danger which belongs 
to the essence of art as such
the totality and depth of life to present completion 
Therein lies the seduction: in artistic creation as in 
imitation, to lose oneself, in contemplative enjoyment, 
to a timeless fulfilment in the present. In the per­
ception of the whole, which takes up into itself every­
thing dark and fragile, something akin to salvation from 
temporal existence is finally anticipated, at the price, 
however, of an 'existential* de-realization....[Same^ p. 70£3
its detachment brings• • • • • •
• • • •
One must exercise the greatest care that the entering into 
the detached calm of the symbolic presence of Being not be 
a one-way trip, that it always be only a temporary withdrawal 
from, and then return to, the Existenz which at once enters 
into and comprehends it. One cannot enter into a detached 
and non-committal aestheticism, for one then abandons the 
spiritual-moral basis of life.
For Jaspers, then, transcendence through art is of 
great value; but if it leads to a permanently detached and 
contemplative attitude toward life, it loses value, 
even be antithetical to authenticity, if it seeks to take a 
detached and impersonal attitude toward, for instance, the
If one takes a detached attitude toward 
death, or toward guilt, then it is robbed of its power to 
bring the individual to authentic Existenz realization. Only 
as one faces actively the ultimate situation as m^ death, or 
my guilt, can one come to transcendence through shipwreck.
It can
ultimate situations.
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In conclusion| one may say that; Jaspers sees art as 
a cipher of transcendence, but is quick to note the inherent 
dangers in the artistic attitude of detached contemplation*
Summary* An effort has been made in all-too-brief a
compass to characterize some of the fundamental concepts in 
the Existenzphilosophie of Karl Jaspers* Perhaps the most 
central concepts to Jaspers1 way of philosophizing could be
said to be Encompassing, Existenz, and transcendence* But 
of basic importance also are freedom, Geschichtlichkeit, ul­
timate situations, foundering, and ciphers* Loving communi­
cation is a keystone to fulfillment in his philosophy, as is 
faith and the ultimate leap of faith* Important, too, in un­
derstanding his thought is his threefold division of his 
Philosophie into world, individual Existenz, and metaphysics, 
for these indicate the nature of the kind of orientation to
In each of these levelsBeing which he is trying to suggest.
(which remotely parallel the three stages of Kierkegaard), the
individual is obliged to exist and to cope with certain prob­
lems and realities* Jaspers has furnished an exploration 
of these realities and at the same time related his thought
to the tradition in philosophy; he has made the existential 
attitude which was originally anti-philosophical into an al-
In a sense, Jaspersmost systematic philosophy of Existenz* 
has transformed Kierkegaardfs experientialism into a meta-
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physics. The emphasis is shifted from inwardness to 
philosophy of disclosure of transcendence.
a
From passionate
religious fear and trembling and self-torture, the emphasis 
shifts to the multiple modes of Encompassing and to the
foundering on the rock of transcendence. Existentialism 
has become a philosophy.
To consider it a philosophy in the conventional 
sense would be inaccurate and even unjust; more correctly, it 
is a wav of philosophizing—one might even use the word Tao.
The message of his philosophy is not in any set of propositions 
so much as in the movement and manner of his philosophizing. 
Jaspers has asserted that conceptual knowledge is doomed to 
founder. By this token, one may assert that Jaspers' philo­
sophy itself is also doomed to founder. But in the very
mode of this foundering something other than the specific
The intangible "content” andpropositions comes through. 
elan convey something that is not translatable into words. 
Perhaps Jaspers has at least partially succeeded in what he 
considers the central and difficult task of philosophy and
the basic objective of his own thinking: to convey with ob­
jective thinking and objective concepts what is not objective; 
to convey with and through words what cannot really be put 
into words.
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HEIDEGGER
A fundamental ontology. Heidegger calls his philo- 
V/hile his ultimate concernsophy a "fundamental ontology." 
is with Being as such, he asserts that the best way to study 
it is through a phenomenological examination of the human 
being; for man is the being that is in the world and has 
a consciousness of his own being. Since man is being and is 
"there" in the world, Heidegger calls him "Dasein." literally,
"being-there."
Heidegger’s central concern, then, is with Being, 
concern with man is largely as he is an expression of Being; 
he wishes to see man as a mode of being, 
is not to be taken as a psychological, sociological, or scien­
tific analysis; rather he is concerned with the nature of the
He is not concerned with "that which 
is" (das Seiende) but with the"being of that which is" (das 
Sein des Seienden).
His
His analysis, then,
mode of being of man;
His terms and designations, too, are not to be taken 
in the ordinary senses of those words in everyday language, 
but in a special sense, as a concrete term foe an attribute 
of Being. Sorge. for instance, is not to be taken as synon­
ymous with worldly cares, but as an element or mode of ab­
stract Being, as a tendency to direct attention forward to-
One must bear in mind,ward the fulfillment of possibility, 
then, that Heidegger is attempting to "start again" in a
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radically different way of thinking from that of the 
His aim is to stimulate
present.
a new kind of awareness of Being which 
will be most like that done by pre-Socratic philosophers. In
this effort to create a new type of philosophizing, Heidegger 
has eschewed traditional terminology because it tends to 
carry with it the static and erroneous conceptions of essen- 
tialistic thinking; he has, in short, literally had to create 
a new terminology to clothe a new type of thinking about Being.
Heidegger’s thought is, consequently, more revolutionary 
(and at the same time more reactionary) than Jaspers. Jaspers 
tries to use the older categories of philosophy, such as meta­
physics and transcendence in new ways (much in the same way 
as Hegel tried to incorporate motion into his philosophy by 
means of the dialectic); Heidegger, however, scraps the tradi­
tional categories (Will, Idea, and so forth) and starts all 
over again with man’s awareness of Being.
Seinsverstandnis. The understanding of Being which 
is given to man with his own being is called by Heidegger 
Seinsverstandnis. Thisuiderstanding is super-rational, 
vague, and general—but an undeniable fact, a positively
existing phenomenon:
Dieses durchschnittliche und vage Seinsverstandnis 
ist ein FaktumI Dieses Seinsverstandnis mag noch so 
sehr schwanden und verschwimmen und sich hart an der 
Grenze einer blossen Wortkenntnis bewegen—diese Un- 
bestimmtheit des je schon verfiigbaren Seinsverstand- 
nisses ist selbst ein positives Phanomen, das der Auf-
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klSrung bedarf.1
The exploration and explanation of this Seinsverstandnis is 
the basic and underlying aim of all of Heidegger's thought.
D&s Sein und das Seiende. Heidegger makes a dis­
tinction between Being (permanent and unchanging) and an in­
dividual being as it subsists empirically in the realm of 
change and becoming. The first, he calls "das Sein": the 
second, he terms "das Seiende." Das Sein is something like 
"pure Being," while "das Seiende" is the human being from
the point of view of all the empirical attributes of his fini- 
2tude. Heidegger’s concern is the "das Sein des Seienden" 
through Seinsverstandnis. He is interested in the "ontolog­
ical" rathernthan the "ontic" structures of Being.
Ontological and ontic. The word "ontological" in 
Heidegger refers to attributes and structures in the nature 
of Being, that is, in the way things are; "ontic" comes close 
to the traditional word "empirical," or ’hctual" in its con­
ventional sense. "Ontological" refers to the unchanging 
structures and dynamics of the reality above all actual be­
ing, which both permit and determine the real structures of
"Ontic" refers to at-actual events in the empirical world, 
tributes of actual processes of change and becoming.
1Sein und Zeit. (Tubingen, 1927), pp.15-6. 
abbreviated "SZ."
^Das Seiende corresponds to Jaspers’ das Dasein. 
Heidegger’s use of Dasein is more general in its connotation 
than Jaspers’, and may often be translated as the "human being."
Hereinafter
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The distinction between ontological and ontic leads 
to a distinction between the attributes which are ontologi­
cal, which Heidegger puts in the category of "Existentiale." 
and the attributes which are ontic, which he calls nExis­
tent ielle.” Heidegger’s "fundamental ontology” is basically 
a study of Existentiale. but involves beginning with the
human being rather than trying to approach Being-as-such 
directly. Thus, Heidegger’s ontology is predicated on an 
analysis of human being:
Die Analytik des Daseins 
ontologische Problematik, die Frage nach dem Sinn von 
Sein iiberhaupt, vorbereiten. [SZ, p. 183]
Heidegger’s ontology is a foundation-laying ontology; one
might even say a pre-fundamental ontology. Heidegger uses
the word "fundamental" largely to indicate that he is not
dealing with a special branch of ontology, but with its
most fundamental aspects.
Heidegger versus Jaspers. What, then, are the basic 
differences between the thought of Heidegger and that of 
^aspers? Heidegger contends that Jaspers remains too much
soli die fundamental• • •
on the level of das Seiende, analyzing actual situations in
Thus, he tends totheir finite and psychological regions, 
reason from the shipwreck in the realm of das Seiende to a 
transcendence that is little different from the traditional
Instead of furnishing ontological structures of 
Being, Jaspers (Heidegger asserts) submits merely ontic
conception.
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Instead of digging away at a new exploration of 
Being and a new definition of metaphysics, Jaspers accepts 
the tradition of metaphysics and constructs a metaphysics 
instead of an ontology, 
enough to suit Heidegger.
Jaspers, then, seems always to move from existence 
to transcendence; Heidegger conceives of motion as always 
feofli Being to existence. This is a difficult distinction 
to make since both emphasize the priority of Being, but 
Heidegger asserts that Jaspers seems always to be inferring 
transcendence from physical foundering and from human limi­
tations; Heidegger thinks of himself as concerned with Being 
as it emerges into actualization and temporality in truth, 
in, for instance, the naming of the gods. Heidegger con­
siders that Jaspers has remained bound to tradition, while 
he has achieved a radical break with present philosophy 
with a new conception of Being in his ontology, and a new 
conception of time in his ecstatic theory of time. Jaspers 
has tended to remain more restrained, more methodical, more 
traditional.
analyses.
Altogether, Jaspers is net radical
Among Heidegger's ardent admirers there is sometimes 
something approaching disdain for Jaspers—as for instance 
in a valuable article on Heidegger by Karl Lowith, in which 
Jaspers’ "philosophical faith” is unfairly characterized as 
the last echo of secularized Christianity in German idealism:
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In the last analysis, the religious positions of 
Jaspers and Heidegger are even strangely inversed: the 
intellectual background of Jaspers, who has a certain 
leaning toward religion and a definite affinity to 
liberal protestantism, is positive science, while 
Heidegger, from whose philosophy Sartre has drawn athe­
istic conclusions, was nurtured by theology and still 
retains much more of a religious pathos than Jaspers’ 
’’philosophical faith,” which is no more than the last 
echo of secularized Christianity in German idealism.3
Professor Lowith finds Jaspers riddled with relativism 
(which has led one critic to characterize him as ”the gliding 
philosopher” [Heinemann, p. 74]) while Heidegger is more mod­
em and radical:
He [Heidegger] is more radical because his analysis 
of Being within the horizon of Time does not, like the 
’’elucidation of existence” by Jaspers, presuppose, and 
then relativize, the objective knowledge of positive 
science and aim at a traditional though relativised 
metaphysics of objective transcendence. [Lowith, p. 34#]
The most crucial distinction between the thought
of Heidegger and Jaspers, however, occurs with reference
Jaspers posits a realm of theto finitude and temporality.
infinite and eternal; Heidegger posits no such realm and his
Being, then,concept of time is both ecstatic and horizonal. 
for the two thinkers is radically different in nature, for 
in Jaspers it is infinite and eternal and ”cuts across” time,
while in Heidegger Being as such is within the horizon of time.
These contrasts create theBeing, for Heidegger, is finite, 
striking differences between the metaphysics of Heidegger and
3 ’’Heidegger: Problem and Background of Existentialism,” 
esearch. XV (September, 194^7, 349.
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that of Jaspers, as Professor LSwith notes:
Heidegger rejects the whole enterprise of "meta- 
physics in the traditional sense of this word where it 
indicates something eternal, infinite, perfect. Instead 
he proposes to understand man's being in particular and 
Being in general within the horizon of Time. What 
Heidegger calls metaphysics is bound up with the struc­
ture of man's finite existence in the world. It is meta4 
physics in an entirely untraditional sense, namely, a 
"finite metaphysics of finiteness." And since Heidegger 
neither starts with positive science nor aims at meta­
physics, the middle concept of Jaspers' philosophy, 
"existence," also has a different meaning for him. It 
is true that human existence as understood by Heidegger 
also oversteps or "transcends" itself, but not toward a 
perfect Being. Existence transcends itself toward its 
own world, and nothing else. Heidegger's existentialism 
is uncompromisingly "worldly," not even this-worldly but 
simply worldly, without any positive or negative concern 
about a beyond; and yet it is not at all a positivistic 
secularism. [Same, p. 34S-9]
A final distinction between Jaspers and Heidegger 
is made by Lowith in reference to their "styles of thinking":
with regard to their style of thinking: Jaspers 
retains the Hegelian ambition of embracing the totality 
of possible levels and attitudes. He built up a system 
which is in principle finished, though fluid and undu­
lating. Heidegger is cutting through and digging in, 
and the apodictic form of his diction should deceive no 
one about the unresolved tensions of an unfinished and 
still maturing conception. [Same, p. 349]
Jaspers, L8with contends, is trying to construct a system
*
A-la-Hegel, while Heidegger is presenting a tentative and 
still (after thirty years) unfinished conception of Being 
and time. Although Professor Lowith tends to exaggerate and 
give an unjustly pejorative view of Jaspersf his contrasts 
between Heidegger and Jaspers furnish some of the differences 
(from a Heideggerian point of view) between the two thinkers 
and help to clarify some of Heideggerfs basic aims.
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Heidegger distinguishes
two major modes of Being: Dasein and Vorhandenheit. 
denheit is the mode of being of things, and is analyzed in 
terms of Kategorien and static Qualities.n
Dasein and Vorhandenheit.
Vorhan-
Dasein is the
human, conscious mode of being, and is analyzed in terms of 
modes, ways of being, Existenzialien. Man, Heidegger asserts, 
is too often analyzed in terms of Kategorien and qualities,
in terms which are more applicable to mere physical objects. 
Any approach to man presupposes a view of man either as an 
object, as Vorhandenheit. or as freedom, possibility, con­
sciousness, as Existenzialitat:
Alle Explikate, die der Analytik des Daseins ent- 
springen, Sind gewonnen im Hinblick auf seine Existenz- 
struktur. Weil sie sich aus der Existenzialitat bestim- 
men, nenner wir die Seinscharaktere des Daseins Existen- 
zialiena. Sie sind scharf zu trennen von den Seinsbe- 
stimmungen des nicht daseinsmassigen Seienden, die wir ' 
Kategorien nennen. [SZ, p. 44]
The term Existenz can only be applied to Dasein—not Vor­
handenheit. The becoming being, "das Seiendel1 can be analyzed 
as a physical thing or as Existenz: as Heidegger puts it, he 
may be analyzed as a ’’who" or as a "what": wSeiende ist ein 
Wer (Existenz) oder ein Was (Vorhandenheit im weitesten 
Sinne)." [SZ, p. 45] Heidegger contends that too many people 
would rather be a what than a who: they would rather be
thought of in terms of "categories” into which they fall
Sartre speaksthan as authentically existing human beings, 
of this phenomenon from an almost psychological point of
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as a fear of freedom, a secret yearning to become a 
thing which is acted upon rather than a responsible, inner- 
dire cted being vho can ask: Who am I?
Heidegger contends that man in the Western tradition
view,
has been philosophically conceived in static terms of essence
"What"-thinking and "thing"-thinking have 
tended to dim man's apprehension of being as temporal and 
in flux.
and substance.
Man has too often been considered in terms of a
qualitative description of whatness, in terms of substance, 
in Cartesian terms of being a thinking thing, rather than 
in terms of man defined in terms of the special manner in 
which man stands in relation to time and exists in and through 
An analysis of this latter type is what Heidegger is
Indeed, one
time.
attempting to introduce in his Sein und Zeit. 
critic has cogently interpreted Heidegger’s overall aim as 
being to destroy the Cartesianism of the present dayt since 
Existentialists tend to identify Descartes with the genesis 
of objective, substance-oriented thinking.^
Heidegger’s central concern, as one might guess, is 
not with Vorhandenheit, but with an analysis of Dasein. Vor-
handenheit involves a manner.of being which is not easily
knowable, for man is not readily able to communicate with
Heidegger does, however, distinguishthe being of things, 
between things which have little relationship to man (Vor—
handene) and those things which are related to man as
4w■■'werner Marx,’’Heidegger’s New Conception of Philosophy: 
The Second Phase of ’Existentialism,’" Social Research. XXII 
(Winter. 1955). 451-474.
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utensils, as tools or objects which receive part of their
identity from the very way they are "at hand" (Zuhandene. 
Zeug). Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is of central im­
portance to his total effort to feel into the nature of 
Being as such, however, and it is to this analysis that
we now turn.
Dasein as '.? geworfene Entwurf These two words, 
"geworfene Entwurf," more than any other two words seem to
summarize Heidegger's view of man. The first indicates
that man is "thrown" into the world, into history, into his 
situation. The second term indicates that man's essential 
mode of being is projective—man projects himself into the 
Man, then, is a "thrown pro-ject,#" (putting the 
accent on the second syllable), a "geworfene Entwurf." 
he is admittedly thrown and determined, he also throws himself
future.
While he
V\fr
—into the future; while^is created, he is also creative;
Man is partly thewhile he is confined, he is also free, 
situation into which he is thrust and partly a creator of
his future situation; he is partly given, partly self-given. 
Heidegger's whole analysis of man could be divided
Geworfenheitinto these two aspects of man's mode of being, 
indicates the fact that Being, in becoming being (small "b," 
human being), must be in the world, and in coming into this 
form of disclosure (Erschlossenheit) it must submit to the 
modes of being-in-the-world, the modes of "In-sein," in-being.
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Entwurf. the second of the two major terms, would 
include those portions of HeideggerTs analysis which seek 
to show the ways in which ontological potentialities 
realized in the ''ecstatic” temporal structure of Dasein 
it extends itself into the future towards death, 
portions, then, would include discussions of Spree ("concern” 
in a purely ontological and non-ontic sense), mogliche Ganz- 
sein (potential unity), Sein zum Tode (being towards death), 
eigentliche Seinkonnen (authentic capacity for being), and 
so forth.
are :
as
These
Three modes of In-sein: Befindlichkeit. Verstehen. Rede. 
In-sein is an exploration of the ontological content of the 
"Da" in Dasein. Three important modes of In-sein are those 
above, but Heidegger lists others which belong specifically
to inauthentically existing individuals, which Heidegger 
has epitomized in his conception of das Man, the dead, con­
formist, public man. These inauthentic modes will be dis­
cussed in a succeeding section.
1) Befindlichkeit. This term indicates the way in 
which a Dasein is "placed" or finds himself" (sich befinden) 
in life and in the world. This is revealed to the indi­
vidual especially in the way in which he is "tuned" to his
Professor Werner Brock has des-environment and in "mood." 
cribed the three aspects of the way in which the disclosure 
(Erschlossenheit) of Befindlichkeit takes place through "mood":
10$
The "Befindlichk eit" and its self-revelation through 
"moods" is analysed in three main respects: (a) Thought 
the "wherefrom" and the "whereto" of Dasein remain veiled, 
the fact "that it is", i.e. the "thrownness" (Geworfen- 
heit) of Dasein into its "There", and that it is left to 
its own devices and responsibility (tfberantwortungi) is 
disclosed to it undisguisedly. The "mood", in its deeper 
meaning, brings the Dasein face to face with the "That", 
the fact, of the "There", (b) The "mood" has already 
always disclosed the "Being-in-the-world" as a whole and 
makes it possible that the Dasein directs itself towards, 
and concerns itself with, some things, persons, itself 
in the world. (c) The Dasein which is circumspect can be 
affected, impressed, and also threatened, in its "There" 
by the things and the persons.5
The above quotation is a good example of the fact that 
Heidegger’s thought is not any more understandable when con­
densed and translated into -English than it is in the original 
In any event, in Befindlichkeit. the character of 
man’s present "thereness" in the world is disclosed to him 
through the particular way in which he is tuned to his en­
vironment as this is revealed to him in "moods."
Verstehen is the aspect of In-sein
It is not a dis-
It is a part
German.
2) Verstehen.
which makes man aware of his potential, 
closure of the fact that man is in the world, 
of man that suggests to him "for the sake of what" man is
It is, therefore, a part of the projective 
nature of the being of man, and is intimately linked with 
possibility, for it is the perception of possibility.
in the world.
^Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being, [four impor­
tant essays trans. into English plus an extended introduction 
containing an account of Sein und ZeitJ ed. and introduced 
by Werner Brock (London, 1949)* P» 48* Hereinafter abbreviated 
"EB."
109
As Heidegger states,
Das Dasein ist ihm selbst iiberantwortetes Moglich- 
sein, durch und durch geworfene MSglichkeit. Das Dasein 
ist die Moglichkeit des Freiseins -fur das eigenste Sein- 
kSnnen. [SZ, p. 143]
Verstehen is the perception of this possibility.
Verstehen is not only the perception of possibility 
but a condition of possibility, and an inner grasping of the 
"woran," the "wherefore," the significance of being-in-the - 
It is a "given" with being-in-the-world and cannot 
be conceived separately; yet it is more, for it involves the 
reaching into possibility, into the very "way things are" for 
the possibilities of realizing oneself in the world:
world.
Dieses "Wissen" ist nicht erst einer immanenten 
Selbstwahrnehmung erwachsen, sondern gehort zum Sein 
des Da, das sein Da ist, kann es sich verlaufen und 
verkennen. Und sofern Verstehen befindliches ist und 
als dieses existenzial der Geworfenheit ausgeliefertes, 
hat das Dasein sich je schon verlaufen und verkannt.
In seinem Seinkonnen ist es daher der Moglichkeit fiber- 
antwortet, sich in seinen Moglichkeiten-erst wieder zu 
finden.
Verstehen ist das existenziale Sein des eigenen 
Seinkonnens des Daseins selbst. so zwar, dass dieses 
Sein an ihm selbst das Woran des mit ihm selbst Seins 
erschliesst. LSZ. p. 144]
Because Verstehen involves this instinctive grasp of pos­
sibilities, it is related to that part of man called the 
Entwurf. the part of man that reaches into tiie future:
Warum dringt das Verstehen nach alien wesenhaften 
Dimensionen des in ihm Erschliessbaren immer in die 
Moglichkeiten? Weil das Verstehen an ihm selbst die 
existenziale Struktur hat, die wir den Entwurf nennen. 
Es entwirft das Sein des Daseins auf sein Worumwillen 
ebenso urspriinglich wie auf die Bedeutsamkeit als die 
Weltlichkeit-seiner jeweiligen Welt. Der Entwurf-
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charakter des Verstehens konstituiert das In-der-Welt- 
sein hinsichtlich der Erschlossenheit seines Da als Da 
eines Seinkonnens.... Das Verstehen ist, als Entwerfen, 
die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es seine Moglichkeiten 
als Moglichkeiten ist. [SZ, p. 145]
Verstehen is both the instrument of the disclosure of 
sibilities and the ver 
3) Rede.
pos-
way of being of possibilities.
Rede is not to be understood as an ontic 
structure, but the ontological superstructure to language. 
It is an explanation of the way things must be in order 
that there may be language as such. Heidegger is quick to 
say that Rede is "gleichursprunglich" with Befindlichkeit
and Verstehen. for the first (Befindlichkeit) senses the 
fact, the second (Verstehen) penetrates the meaning and 
possibilities of the fact and of being, and the third (Rede) 
supplies the sign, the articulation of VerstSndlichkeit. 
Although Rede is not an ontic structure (rather it is "das 
existenzial-ontologische Fundament der Sprache,"[SZ, p. 160]), 
it is nevertheless an aspect of the In-sein explanation (of 
the Da of Dasein) because it is weltlich in character:
Wenn die Rede, die Artikulation der VerstSndlichkeit 
des Da, urspriingliches Existenzial der Erschlossenheit 
ist, diese aber priraSr konstituiert wird durch das In­
muss auch die Rede wesenhaft eine spe-
Die befindliche Ver- 
standlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins spricht sich als 
Rede aus. Das Bedeutungsganze der VerstSndlichkeit 
kommt zu Wort. Den Bedeutungen wachsen Worte zu.
Nicht aber werden Worterdinge mit Bedeutungen versehen. 
[SZ, p. 161]
Coevil with Rede, too, is meaningful listening and silence:
der-Welt-sein 
zifisch weltliche Seinsart haben.>.
Ill
Zum redenden Sprechen gehoren als Moglichkeiten 
Horen und Schweigen. An diesen Phanomenen wird die 
konstitutiv Funktion der Rede fur die ExistenzialitSt 
der Existenz erst vollig deutlich. Zunaehst geht es 
vun die Herausarbeitung der Struktvir der Rede als 
solcher. [SZ, p. 161]
Through Rede the Existenzialitat der Existenz first becomes 
fully clear.
Although Heidegger treats of "constitutive” charac­
teristics of speech, such as das Woriiber der Rede (what is 
spoken of), das Beredete (what is said as such), Mitteilung 
(communication), and Bekundung (the information given), these 
are not to be taken as qualities empirically gathered, but 
as Existenziale, the traits rooted in the constitution of 
Dasein which make something such as language ontologically 
possible. Heidegger points out that former attempts to grasp 
the "essence of language" have concentrated on one or the 
other of these aspects, but an adequate conception would 
attempt to elaborate the structure of Rede on the basis of 
the analytics of Dasein rather than isolating and objec­
tifying language.
AlltSglichkeit and "das Man.” 
tation to existing is called by Heidegger "Alltaglichkeit." 
This orientation is characterized by a rigid and thoughtless
One senses
The inauthentic orien-
conformity to the established everyday pattern, 
in it a decreasing amount; of consciousness, a depressing 
monotony, as the power of routine and pattern becomes ab­
solute. In this type of existence, man becomes a robot,
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a pawn with only enough consciousness to do mechanical
In this type of existence, man denies his essential 
freedom and sacrifices the realization of creative possi­
bility.
tasks.
Heidegger has created a model or prototype for this
Das Man istype of existing and has called him "das Man." 
the person of whom one speaks when one uses the impersonal 
pronoun "man" in such expressions as "man sagt." Das Man
is the completely public man; he is the person who is not
trying to be himself but succumbing to the pull of the force 
which whirls him into a mode of existence as one of the 
crowd. This whirl, this downward spiral, Heidegger calls 
"das Verfalien des Daseins." that is, the decline or de­
generation of the self. Das Man is what Riesmann Cprev. cited] 
calls the "other-directed" man, the man without a face and 
without identity because he is not distinguishable from 
"everybody." He is dailiness (AlltSglichkeit) incarnated 
in a human being.
How do the three modes of In-sein (Befindlichkeit,
Verstehen. Rede) apply to das Man? Does he have any true 
understanding of the way he is placed in the world or of 
his potentialities? This creates a problem for Heidegger, 
'.and.;; he attempts to remedy the situation by setting up 
three modes which externally and inauthentically corres­
pond to the more genuine modes of In-sein.
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Three inauthentic modes of In-sein: Gerede. Neugier. 
Zweideutigkeit. Three modes of "alltfigliche Seinw are ana­
lyzed in connection with Verfalien, the declining, or inau­
thentic mode of being in the world, 
to be a perversion of Verstehen and Rede, a perversion where 
the understanding is external and grasps only accepted inter­
pretations and where speech becomes mere talk without depth.
Gerede (talk) is a modification of Rede, which
These three modes seem
1) Gerede.
Werner Brock asserts occurs when
...what is spoken of is not so much understood, but 
where one listens only to what is said; it implies an 
indifferent and superficial, but no "genuine" under­
standing and moves in the wide realm of common and ac­
cepted interpretations; like the other two [Neugier and 
Zweideutigkeit] it is a positive and constitutive mode 
in which everyday Dasein understands and interprets 
events, things, persons, the world and Dasein itself.
CEB, p. 55]
2) Neugier. Neugier is superficial curiosity. It 
does not look at the world in order to understand what is 
seen, but merely to see what things look like. The new 
(neu) is merely attractive because of its novelty, 
a perversion of true sight; it is sight without insight.
3) Zweideutigkeit. Zweideutigkeit (ambiguity) in­
volves a weakness of understanding, an inability to discern 
what is truly a reflection of Being and what is a form of
Itccannot tell what is authentically dis­
closed by Verstehen and what is not; it is lost in a world of 
dailiness and cannot tell the voice of others from its own:
It is
Verfallenheit.
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Wenn im alltaglichen Miteinandersein dergleichen 
begegnet, was jedem zuganglich ist, und woriiber jeder 
jedes sagen kann, wird bald nicht mehr entscheidbar, 
was in echtem Verstehen erschlossen ist und was nicht.
Diese Zweideutigkeit erstreckt sich nicht allein auf 
die Welt, sondern ebensosehr auf das Miteinandersein 
als solches, sogar auf das Sein des Daseins zu ihm 
selbst. [SZ, p. 173]
All three of the inauthentic modes involve a loss of meaning, 
and this loss is the consequence of a view of things based 
on externalities; all three are marked by a failure of any 
inner understanding. Paradoxically, in an age in which man 
thinks he is seeing deeper and deeper into things, there is the 
problem of a loss of meaning that betokens a loss of under­
standing, an inner failure.
Verfallen. The preceding quotation indicated that 
there were inherent dangers in the mere being-with-others 
involved in being in the world. When Miteinandersein be­
comes a controlling factor rather than Selbstsein. Seins-
verstandnis. and the realization of mogliche Dasein, then
This leadsone surrenders to the crowd and becomes das Man, 
to a denial, in effect, of one's being and constitutes being
in a mode of decline which Heidegger calls "Verfallen." 
deed, there is a force (related to the original Geworfenheit)
In following in the
In-
which subtly draws one into the pattern, 
pattern one feels a sort of appeasement (Beruhigung)| one de-
Paradoxically, however,ceives himself that all is in order, 
this Beruhigung does not bring peace or rest (Ruhe), but on
the contrary, restlessness and meaningless activity. It
115
only brings an Entfremdung (self-estrangement) which 
tangles the Dasein. conceals potentiality of being, and 
throws the Dasein into a tail-spin, the downward spiral of 
Verfalien:
en-
Die versuchend-beruhigende Entfremdung des Ver- 
fallens fiihrt in ihrer eigenen Bewegtheit dazu, dass 
sich das Dasein in ihm selbst verfSngt.
Die aufgezeigten PhSnomene der -VersuchungCtempta­
tion] , Beruhigung, der Entfremdung und des Siehver- 
fangens (das VerfSngnis) charakterisieren die spe- 
zifische Seinsart des Verfallens. Wir nennen diese 
"Bewegtheit'' des Daseins in seinem eigenen Sein den 
Absturz. Das Dasein stiirzt aus ihm selbst in es 
selbst, in die Bodenlosigkeit und Nichtigkeit der 
uneigentlichen Alltaglichkeit. [SZ, p. 176]
Paradoxically, one may externally seem to be in the ascend­
ency when one is actually in decline:
Dieser Sturz aber bleibt ihm durch die offentliche 
Ausgelegtheit verborgen, so zwar, dass er ausgelebt 
wird als "Aufstieg" und "konkretes Leben." [Same]
This Sturz. this Verfallen. is a yielding to the thrown- 
ness of the geworfene Entwurf. and is a denial of the reali­
zation of the potentialities implied in being Entwurf. 
deed it continues the downward motion of the thrownness in
Ver-
In-
a whirl (Wirbel) which swings, it down into das Man. 
fallen is, then, a native and inherent tendency in all exist 
Ling beings whether they be authentically existing or not; 
the authentically existing individual, however, struggles 
against Verfallen and asserts himself against its power.
As was statedThe "Da" and the "Sein" of Dasein. 
earlier, Heidegger's analysis divides into a consideration
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of the aspects of "Da” and the aspects of "Sein." 
analysis thus far has dealt with aspects of "Da," Heidegger 
summarizes these aspects as follows and then turns to a 
consideration of the aspects of tKe.."-Sgin" half of Dasein:
Die leitende Frage dieses Kapitels ging nach dem 
Sein des Da, Thema wurde die ontologische Konstitution 
der zum Dasein wesentlich gehorenden Erschlossenheit.
Ihr Sein konstituiert sich in Befindlichkeit, Verstehen 
und Rede, Die alltagliche Seinsart der Erschlossenheit 
wird charakterisiert durch Gerede, Neugier und Zwei- 
deutigkeit. Diese selbst zeigen die Bewegtheit des 
Verfallens mit den wesenhaften Charaktern der Versuchung, 
Beruhigung, Entfremdung und des VerfSngnisses.
Mit dieser Analyse ist aber das Ganze der Existen- 
zialen Verfassung des Daseins in der Hauptzugen frei- 
gelegt und der phSnomenale Boden gewonnen fur die "zu- 
sammenfassende" Interpretation des Seins des Daseins 
als Sorge, [SZ, p, 162]
This turning represents the crossing of a major division 
in Heidegger's analysis: from the Da of the Dasein to the 
Sein of Dasein. from the Geworfenheit aspect to the Entwurf 
aspect, from being as Faktizitgt to being as Existenz. 
the Sein of the.--Sein in Dasein expresses itself as Sorge.
Die Sorge als Sein des Daseins. Sorge is Heidegger.! s 
term to describe man's involvement in the world. The nature 
of this relationship is that man is being with, man always 
has an "already" (a past) and stands in a certain relation­
ship to it, and finally man's involvement seems to be more 
than the relationship to the past (the already) and the pre-
The
And
sent (the with), for it is really above both of these and
These aspects formlooking back on them from the future, 
what Heidegger calls the "structure" of Sorge: being already
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in the world, being with, and being ahead of itself (im- 
schon-sein-in, Sein-bei. and Sich-vorweg-sein). 
structure may be called the three—fold structure of Sorge.
Of the three parts of the structure, the Sich-vorweg- 
seln is the most important aspect of Sorge. for this 
presents the way in which the self projects itself into 
the future, into possibility, into Existenzialitat. But 
whether one exists primarily in the past, present, or 
future (in Verfallen. Faktizitat. or Existenzialitat), one 
cannot escape the simultaneous influence of all three modes 
of Care or Involvement (Sorge):
This
re-
Die Sorge charakterisiert nicht etwa nur Existen­
zialitat abgelost von Faktizitat und Verfallen, sondern 
umgreift die Einheit dieser Seinsbestimmungen. Sorge 
meint daher auch nicht primar und ausschliesslich ein
Sorgeisoliertes Verhalten des Ich zu ihm selbst 
kann nicht ein besonderes Verhalten zum Selbst meinen, 
weil dieses ontologisch schon durch das Sich-vorweg- 
sein charakterisiert ist; in dieser Bestimmung sind 
aber auch die beiden anderen strukturalen Momenta der 
Sorge, das Schon-sein-in 
gesetzt. [SZ, 192-33
• • • •
und das Sein-bei mit-• • •e • •
Thus, Sorge posits a three-fold structure of involvement, 
and this structure seems to hinge on the factor of time, 
since the three aspects emphasize past, present, and future. 
Das Zeitlichkeit als der ontologische Sinn der Sorge.
At this point Heidegger adds perhaps the most crucial turn 
to his whole message in Sein und Zeit. for he superimposes 
and unites the three-fold structure of Sorge with the three-
involvement (Sorge) is the "Seinfold structure of time.
lid
des Daseins” and Zeitlichkeit is the ontological meaning 
of Involvement.
Sich-vorweg-sein 
Schon-sein-in 
Sein bei
This creates a three-fold parallel:
— ExistenzialitSt 
— FaktizitSt 
— Verfallen
Zukunft 
Gewesenheit 
Gegenwart
This three-fold structure of Involvement means that one 
lives in the future, present, and past—all at the same 
time, that (in other words) these three aspects of time are 
actually wavs that Dasein stands out from Being.
TT
• • •
• • •
These
three temporal ways of standing out from Being Heidegger 
calls "ec-stasies" (from the Greek £k-C"out”] STnri/tor [Mto 
stand"]) of Zeitlichkeit. One can see, at this point, how 
important time is in Heidegger’s thinking: Time (Zeitlichkeit)
is the essential mode of. and key to. Being.
ExistenzialitSt. FaktizitSt. and Verfallen have all
been analyzed in connection with man’s "dal’ his "being-there- 
ness." Now they are identified with aspects of time, and 
although all three are modes which are existed simultaneous­
ly the three above have been identified with future, past,
They necessarily all co-existand present, respectively, 
in varying valences depending on one’s predominant mode of
Verfallen (decline) is associated with the presentbeing.
tense because it represents "compromise" with the world into 
which Being is thrown; FaktizitSt is associated with the
past since it emphasizes the past of the individual and his 
essential thrownness; ExistenzialitSt extends itself into
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th&ufuture in its emphasis on the potentialities of the 
Dasein.
The second half of the portion of Sein und Zeit 
which was presented in 1927 (and which was to be continued 
but never has been) endeavors to bring Heidegger’s concep­
tion of Zeitlichkeit to bear on the major analyses presented 
in the first half, especially in elucidating the authentic 
and inauthentic modes of In-sein and in elaborating on the 
ontological structure of Sorge. And aspects of the unity 
of both Sorge and Zeitlichkeit are brought to bear on such
human and existential problems as death, conscience, guilt, 
resolve, authenticity, and Ganzseinkonnen. It is to these 
problems in the second half of Sein und Zeit that we now 
turn.
Death and ftSein zum Tode.” The preoccupation with 
death is a major aspect of Heidegger’s thought. Without 
death, Zeitlichkeit would have little meaning; death is a 
factor which intensifies and gives meaning to all of life. 
Both the authentic and inauthentic man realize.; thatth^must
die; the difference lies in whether the consciousness of• <
death is suppressed or made into something creative, 
is a major dynamic of life, then, for all human beings.
The aspects of Verfallen mentioned earlier may be 
said to be a part of the inauthentic attitude toward death. 
These aspects—Beruhigung, Versuchung. Entfremdung-(appease-
Death
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ment} temptation, self-estrangement)—typify the way in 
which the inauthentic man tries to deny and turn away from
death as a personal fact through misinterpretation, inauthen­
tic understanding, and disguise. Yet despite these, death
retains its certainty (Gewissheit )and indefinability (Un- 
bestimmtheit). The inauthentically existing person makes 
this certainty merely an external and objective fact, not
a personal fate. Because death is indefinable and indefi­
nite as to when it will occur, it yields itself to being 
objectified into a general feeling, "Well, we all must die 
sometime.” Yet despite all the illusions and objectivising 
by the alltSgliche Dasein, death remains ”die eigenste, un- 
beziigliche, uniiberholbare Moglichkeit” (the unique, unrelated 
and absolute, unovertakable eventuality). [SZ,rips 25Q]raBeath 
isi.somethingrwhichialliiHimst eventually face; no man can re­
lieve another man of his having to die ("Keiner kann dem 
Anderen sein Sterben abnehmen."). [SZ, p. 240]
On the other hand, the authentic Dasein faces death
as the innermost and absolutely irrelative potentiality or
He extends himself in thought (Vor-eventuality of being. 
laufen) towards death and allows its full significance for
Heidegger treats of five aspects 
of the significance of death which particularly affect the 
authentic Dasein; 1) its personalness, 2) its absoluteness,
3) its inescapability, 4) its certainty, and 5) its indefinite-
his existence to be felt.
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The reaction of the Dasein in each of these fires 
categories may/described
ness.
as follows:
1) Death as one's own innermost eventuality ("eigenste 
The authentic Dasein realizes that death isMgglichkeit"):
not impersonal and objective but his own innermost potential­
ity; he perceives the unconsciousness of death in das Man 
and stands aloof from this attitude. 2) Death as the ab­
solute and unrelated eventuality ("unbezugliche Mgglichkeit"): 
The authentic Dasein is primarily concerned with his own 
absolute death unrelated to anything outside himself; the 
absoluteness of death is an individual absoluteness.
3) Death as unovercomable and unovertakable ("unuberholbare 
Moglichkeit”): Death must be faced. In ultimate renun­
ciation, the authentically existing Dasein gains a sense
of freedom and proper dimension in his life which das Man 
never experiences. Das Man never experiences freedom, then, 
paradoxically because he will not face squarely his ultimate 
limitation—death—and see himself in relationship to it.
4) Death as a certainty (Gewissheit): Death becomes for the 
authentic Dasein a more fundamental certainty than anything 
rationally proved, because it does not have to be proved.
5) Death as indefinite (Unbestimmtheit): Because death is 
indefinite as to when it will occur, the authentic Dasein 
experiences the creative dread which is a prerequisite of 
freedom. Authentic, creative being-towards death becomes
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’’freedom towards death”:
Die Charakteristik des existenzial entworfenen 
eigentlichen Seins zum Tode ISsst sich dergestalt 
sammenfassen: Das Vorlauf.en enthullt dem Dasein die 
Verlorenheit in das Manselbst und bringt es vor die 
Mo^lichkeit, auf die besorgende Fiirsorge primar unge- 
stutzt, es selbst zu sein. selbst aber in der leiden- 
schaftli'chen, von den Illusionen des Man gelSsten.
ihrer selbst gewisseh undofeichsSngste~nden 
Tod e'. LSZ. p. 266]
One sees in this quotation a fairly clear picture of Heideg­
ger’s authentic man; one whose running forward in thought 
reveals its complete lostness as a mere self, and its poten­
tiality for being a true self, free from the undue influence 
of others, free of the illusions of das Man and open to death. 
The quotation presents man as essentially vor die Moglichkeit. 
and one may say that for Heidegger man is judged before his 
own potentialities, just as in Kierkegaard man is ’’before God.” 
The reference to illusion is significant and is a characteris-
Finally
one may note that only by actually facing death authentically 
does one achieve existential freedom.
But how is freedom ultimately related to death? And 
why, exactly, does authentic Being-towards-death have the 
ontological capacity to generate freedom? To answer these 
questions properly takes one into an exploration of the inter­
relationship of Being, truth, freedom, and Being-towards- 
death. The following brief explanation may be made, 
is the essence of truth (this is the burden of Heidegger's
zu-
faktischen. .__
Frr e i h e i t zum
tic existential condemnation of the inauthentic man.
Freedom
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essay, ”Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” 1949 [trans. in EB])„
Truth emerges from Being in freedom; freedom is an essen­
tial expression of the nature of Being, 
wards-death, since it is essentially a process of realization 
of Being, inevitably generates freedom.
Ganzseinkonnen.
Thus, Being-to-
Heidegger repeatedly asserts that 
while Jaspers sees man on the three levels of his philosophy 
(Man in the world, Existenzerhellung. and Metaphysik). he
sees man’s being only ontologically and consequently as a
,,whole,,, as a single unified structure of interacting Exis- 
tenzialen. The validity of this assertion regarding himself 
and Jaspers is not our concern here; but this assertion has
relevance to the above consideration of Being-towards-death 
and the relative significance of death in the thought of 
Heidegger and Jaspers. For Jaspers, death is another gate 
to transcendence; for Heidegger death is the opposite of 
transcendence, for it is the ultimate and unovertakable even-
For Heidegger, death is the end of 
For Jaspers, the Encompassing never quite en­
compasses all of Being and for the human being Encompassing
For Heidegger, death means that life
Thus,
an authentic mode of Being—towards—death takes account of 
death as the end of Dasein and thus enables the Dasein to 
grasp its own being as a whole of past, present, and bounded
tuality of our being, 
our being.
ultimately founders, 
has an end and can be said to constitute a ’’whole.”
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future. Only as one grasps his Dasein as a whole—as not 
oniy past and present, but extending in thought into the 
future, clear to the end of the future: death—does one 
exist authentically. Naturally, the prospect of the end
of the future, of nothingness in a sense, produces anxiety 
(Angst). But anxiety, as we shall see presently is not only 
dread at this nothingness but dread at being-in-the-world
as such, cFor this reason Angst is a fundamental and ever­
present Befindlichkeit des Daseins (that is, "way the Dasein 
is tuned to the situation in which he finds himself ’placed’ 
in the world," or the mood at being-in-the-world). 
Being-towards-death is a prime requisite of the capacity to 
be a whole (Ganzseinkonnen).
Therefore,
Authenticity—and Conscience. Guilt. and Resolve. 
Being-towards-death has above been said to be a condition 
of and point to the making real to human beings of Being; it
Authenticity may 
also be defined as that mode of human existing which points
To this end, an abundance 
Of these factors, Heidegger
contributes to the realization of Being.
to and tends toward true Being.
of factors act upon the Dasein. 
singles out three phenomena for his ontological analysis:
1) Gewissen (conscience), 2) Schuld (guilt), and 3) Wahl
The three are, of course,
interrelated, for conscience reminds one of his lostness and 
guilt, and at the same time calls for decision, for choice
Gewissen?-haben-wollen (re solve) •
125
of one's true self, 
decision,
Guilt furnishes motivation for the 
and the choice is a resolve to have conscience, 
to open oneself to one's inner potentialities.
1) Conscience. Conscience is to be sharply dis­
tinguished from the usual meaning of a sense of having de­
viated from certain socially accepted norms of behavior. 
Rather, conscience is the call of the true self in the Da­
sein to the realization of its own potentialities rather 
than to vegetate in the publicity and inertness of das Man:
Das Gewissen fuft das Selbst des Daseins auf aus 
der Verlorenheit in das Man
Das Dasein ruft im Gewissen sich selbst 
wird ja gerade nicht und nie von uns selbst weder ge- 
plant, noch vorbereitet, noch willentlich vollzogenV'es'* 
ruft, widererwarten und gar widerwillen. Andererseits - 
kommt der Ruf zweifellos nicht von einem Anderen, der 
mit mir in der Welt ist. Der Ruf kommt aus mir und 
doch iiber mich. [SZ, pp. 274-5]
• • • •
Der Ruf• • • •
The call comes from the self above the self to that self 
below the true self—das Man. It is not something which 
arises after the deed (as with conventional conscience in 
many cases) but always before; it is always present and 
awake. It is, despite its vagueness, unambiguous in pointing 
the direction for the Dasein to move: towards authentic 
Being, towards realization of one's own being.
In its three-fold sensing of onete lostness and com­
pulsory being in the world and finally one's potentiality, 
conscience definitely relates itself to Care (Sorge) and 
might eyen be said to be the voice of Care itself:
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Der Satz: Das Dasein ist der Rufer und der Ange- 
rufene zumal, hat jetzt seine formale Leere und Selbst- 
verstSndlichkeit verloren. Das Gewissen offenbart sich 
als Ruf der Sorge: der Rufer ist das Dasein, sich angstend 
in der Geworfenheit (Schon-sein-in...) um sein Seinkonnen. 
Der Angerufene ist eben dieses Dasein, aufgerufen zu ■ 
seinem eigensten SeinkSnnen (Sich-vorweg...). Und auf­
gerufen ist das Dasein-durch den Anruf aus dem Verfallen 
in das Man (Schon-sein-bei der besorgten Welt). Der Ruf 
des Gewissens, d.h. dieses selbst, hat seine ontologische 
Moglichkeit darin, dass das Dasein im Grunde seines Seins 
Sorge ist. [SZ, pp. 277-8]
Heidegger then proceeds to identify Sorge with guilt. ("Das 
Schuldigsein konstituiert das Sein, das wir Sorge nennen." 
[SZ, pp. 286-7]) A further elucidation of conscience there­
fore requires a consideration of the nature of guilt.
2)Schuld (guilt). Guilt is the necessary and unavoid­
able consequence of the fact that we are always already in 
the world and involved in it. We cannot escape involvement; 
we are all guilty. It is not that we become guilty; we are 
intrinsically guilty because we, as finite beings, are exis­
ting in the world. It is a constituent aspect of thrownness. 
We have Sorge (involvement) as a structure of our being, and 
however authentic we may become in a consciousness of poten­
tialities in the future (our Existenz), we nevertheless can­
not divorce ourselves from being in the world at present and 
from having our past! However much Sorge may emphasize its 
ExistenzialitSt. it is still also composed of FaktizitSt 
(the past) and Verfallenheit (present compromise and 
sequent decline) in its three-fold structure.
con-
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Guilt, however, is even more complicated than this, 
for it is not merely the inevitable consequence of being- 
in—the—world, but is also a form of negation-—of the authen­
tic self. It is, therefore, integrally related to Heidegger’s 
concept of nothingness, which will be discussed in detail
subsequently. At this point, however, the negation involved 
will be discussed without exploring the nature of nothingness
as such. Nevertheless, one fact may be borne in mind: that 
nothingness and negation are not the same; rather negation
is grounded in nothingness and is only one expression of it.
A negation of Being is shown when the self seeks its 
self only, for then it takes on the "not"character of the 
inauthentic self which asserts itself and not Being:
Der Nichtcharakter dieses Nicht bestimmt sich exis- 
tenzial: Selbst seiend ist das Dasein das geworfene 
Seiende als Selbst. Nicht durch es selbst, sondern an 
es selbst entlassen aus dem Grunde, urn als dieser zu 
sein. Das Dasein ist nicht insofern selbst der Grund 
seines Seins, als dieser aus eigenem Entwurf erst ent- 
springt, wohl aber ist es als Selbstsein :das Sein des 
Grundes. Dieser ist immer nur Grund eines Seienden, 
dessen Sein das Grundsein zu iibernehmen hat. LSZ, pp. 
2S4-5]
This negation is a tendency inherent in the thrownness of 
Dasein. but at the same time it also negates the potential, 
too, of Dasein—the Entwurf aspect of its mode of being.
The Entwurf. however, is also essentially negative. 
This is not, as one might suppose, merely because Entwurf 
necessarily involves something which has not yet "come into 
being," so to speak, but rather because of the fundamental
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relationship of negativity to the nature of freedom and 
possibility:
Das Dasein ist sein Grund existierend, d.h. so, 
dass es sich aus Moglichkeiten versteht und derge- 
stalt sich verstehend das geworfene Seiende ist. Da­
rin liegt aber: seinkonnend steht es je in der einen 
Oder anderen Moglichkeit, stSndig ist es andere nicht 
•, und hat sich ihrer im existenziellen Entwurf begeben.
. .--Er Entwurf ist nicht nur als je geworfener durch die
Nichtigkeit des Grundseins bestimmt, sondern als Ent­
wurf selbst wesenhaft nichtig. Diese Bestimmung meint 
wiederum keineswegs die ontische Eigenschaft des "er- 
folglos" Oder "unwertig", sondern ein existenziales 
Konstitutivura der Seinsstruktur des Entwerfens. Die 
gemeinte Nichtigkeit gehort zura Freisein des Daseins 
fur seine existenziellen Moglichkeiten. Die Freiheit 
aber ist nur in der Wahl der einen, d.h. im Tragen 
des NichtgewShlthabens und NichtauchwShlenkonnens der 
. LSZ,
Thus, freedom depends on nothingness. (And it depends on 
Being in its function as the essence of truth.) Freedom 
demands the possibility of the choice to negate.
P. 2851anderen
One may say, then, that nothingness is to be found
But how is nothing-bo th in Geworfenheit and in the Entwurf.
ness related to guilt? Dasein as Dasein is guilty because
Another aspect of this isof its intrinsic not-character, 
the fact that the very Sein of Dasein is Sorge, and Sorge, 
as previously noted, is structurally shot-through with 
Thus, Dasein as such is guilty:nothingness. v-
In der Struktur der Geworfenheit sowbhl wie in der 
des Entwurfs liegt wesenhaft eine Nichtigkeit des un- 
eigentlichen Daseins im Verfallen, als welches es je 
schon immer faktisch ist. Die Sorge selbst i^in ihrem 
We sen dur ch und durch von Nich'bigkei't durch se'tz't» Die 
Sorge—das Seins des Daseins——besagt demnach als ge—
Das (nichtige) Grund-sein einerworfener Entwurf:
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Nichtigkeit. Und das bedeutet: Das Dasein ist als 
solches schuldig, wenn anders die formale existenziale 
Bestimmung der Schuld als Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit 
zurecht besteht. [Same]
With this understanding of guilt, we are now able t
to grasp the idea that conscience not only points forward 
to unfulfilled possibility but backward to the present anrf 
past to testify that man is guilty. The call of conscience, 
as Heidegger puts it, is a ttvorru£ender Ruckruf”; it not
only reminds man of his Existenzialitat. but also of his 
FaktizitSt and Yerfallenheit. One will recall that these 
three aspects form the three-fold structure of Sorge. The 
call of conscience, then, is an expression of Sorge: it is 
the call of Sorge:
Der Ruf ist Ruf der Sorge. Das Schuldigsein kon- 
stituiert das Sein, das wir Sorge nennen. In der Un- 
heimlichkeit steht das Dasein urspriinglich mit sich 
selbst zusammen. Sie bringt dieses Seiende vor seine 
unverstellte Nichtigkeit, die zur Mdglichkeit seines 
eigensten Seinkonnens gehort. JSofern es dem Dasein— 
als Sorge—um sein Sein geht, ruft es aus der Unheim- 
lichkeit sich selbst als faktisch-verfallendes Man 
selbst auf zu seinem Seinkonnen. [SZ, pp. 2S6-7]
Since the call of conscience is also the call of Sorge, it 
expresses the three-fold structure of Sorge in the fact that 
it incorporates into its call a backward and forward move­
ment at the same time:
Der Anruf ist vorrufender Ruckruf, vor: in die 
Moglichkeit, selbst das geworfene Seiende, das es ist, 
existierend zu iibernehmen, zuriick: in die Geworfenheit, 
um sie als den nichtigen Grund-zu verstehen, den es in 
die Existenz aufzuhehmen hat. Der vorrufende Ruckruf 
des Gewissens gibt dem Dasein zu verstehen, dass es<?- 
nichtiger Grund seines nichtigen Entwurfs in der Moglich-
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keit seines Seinssstehend—aus der Verlorenheit in das 
Man sich zu ihm selbst zuruckholen soil, d.h. schuldig 
ist. [Same]
With the recognition of guilt, the Dasein is enabled 
to see what is closed to das Man, and to listen to the cal], 
of conscience to choose oneself:
Mit dieser Wahl ermoglicht sich das Dasein sein 
eigenstes Schuldigsein, das dem Man-selbst verschlossen 
bleibt. Die Verstandigkeit des Man kennt nur Genugen 
und UngenUgen hinsichtlich der dhanlichen Regel und 
offentlichen Norm. Verstosse dagegen verrechnet es 
una sucht Ausgleiche. Vom eigensten Schuldigsein hat 
es sich fortgeschlichen, um desto absoluter Fehler zu 
bereden. In Anruf aber wird das Manselbst auf das 
eigenste Schuldigsein das Selbst angerufen. (SZ, p. 2SS]
Genuine conscience, then, is not known to the inauthentic
man, for the inauthentic man also knows no true guilt; on
the other hand, the authentic man hears in conscience the
call to recognize his essential guilt.
3)Resolve. Above, it has been noted that conscience 
and authentic guilt involve a third factor: choice. To 
truly understand the call is to accept guilt and to will 
to have (choose to have) conscience:
Das Rufverstehen ist das WShlen—nicht des Gewissens^ 
das als solches nicht gewShlt werden kann. 
das Gewissen-haben als Freisein fur das eigenste Schuld— 
sein. Anrufverstehen besagt: Gewissen—haben-wollen.
[Same]
And this resolve (Gewissen-haben-wollen) is a condition for 
the achievement of authentic guilt and thereby authentic 
Being:
k-
GewShlt wird
Das Gewissen-haben-wollen ist vielmehr die ursprung- 
lichste eyistenzielle Voraussetzung fur die Moglichkeit
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des faktischen Schuldigwerdens. Rufverstehend ISsst das 
Dasein das eigenste Selbst aus seinem gewahlten Sein- 
konnen in sich handeln. Nur so kann es varantwortlich 
sein. [Same]
Resolve, too, relates itself to nothingness, through 
its decision to accept authentic guilt. It is,therefore, 
also a decision to accept dread, since this is a product of
being-in-the-world authentically and of encountering nothing- 
Indeed, we shall see that the very Entwurf character 
of Dasein is a projection:: into nothingness. while existing 
authentically in the world, 
so-called ,,resolve,f as follows:
ness.
Werner Brock interprets this
This projecting of oneself, in silence and in readi­
ness for dread, into one’s own Being-guilty—an- outstanding 
mode of the disclosed state of Dasein, testified by the 
conscience—is termed "resolve.” The'Sresolve" 
terised as the "authentic self-Being," which means not a 
Dasein isolated from the world, but "Being-authentically- 
in-the-world." [EB, p. 65]
Heidegger’s emphasis on the factor of resolve, of
is charac-
having to choose authenticity and genuine guilt or else re­
main in the state of das Man, corresponds to Kierkegaard’s
The five Existential-stress on the importance of decision, 
ists with which this dissertation deals all stress the need
for decision, the need to come up out of the anonymity of 
the crowd and actively choose authentic being, 
authentic being one chooses oneself—but not the self of das 
Man.
In choosing
Interestingly enough* in Heidegger’s thought guilt aind 
conscience (often treated as ethical sanctions) do not
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have an ethical content (in the conventional social 
of ethics).
and self-realization only.
sense
Heidegger’s is an ethics of self-realization
Conscience, for Heidegger, 
often involves the denial of the norms of das Man: it is
not a form of repentance for social transgression, but even 
a justification of some forms of transgression. Nor is 
guilt a result of transgression as such; it is a result of 
being-in-the-world and partially the result of the denial 
of the self in deference to social norms—exactly the re­
verse of social ethics. Thus, precisely where one might 
expect some ontological basis for ethics—namely in the 
areas of conscience and guilt—one finds a concern only
with the self and its quest for realization of authentic 
being. Existentialism, then, would seem to be anti-ethical. 
One may, perhaps, hypothesize as to what Heidegger!s
First, such a charge isreply to such a charge would be. 
illustrative and symptomatic of practical thinking, thinking
in terms of cause and effect, in the terms of science and 
das Man. In any case, one may still assert the ontological 
priority of Being to any form of human ethics, and point out 
that in the expression of Being in freedom and truth lies
Heidegger’sthe ultimate basis for any adequate ethics, 
ethics is an ethics of authentic being, of being in a manner 
that involves integrity and decision and openness to Being.
Any ethics which attempts to negate these personal factors
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by invoking external social norms is at the same time ne­
gating Being and thereby a form of inauthenticity.
In any event, the three aspects of authenticity here 
under discussion-conscience, guilt, and resolve—are not 
matters of social ethics but of purely personal purity. They
are matters of self-realization through authenticity, through 
is
a self that/open to Being.
Freedom is the essence of truth. This assertion is 
the subject of one of Heidegger's best-known essays, [trans.
In this essay, "Vom Weseninto English in EB, pp. 317-351], 
der Wahrheit," Heidegger contends that truth reveals some­
thing which is already in existence, is already in the realm 
of the overt (das Offene). Truth is identified with the
rightness of a representative statement about something
And the nature of "that which is,"which is already overt, 
by the fact that it is overt, is able to enjoin the repre­
senting statement to express it rightly, for wthe statement 
submits to a directive enjoiniqg it to express what-is ’such- 
as’ or just as it is.” [EB, p. 329] By following this di­
rective the statement "rights itself" (sich richtet nach) 
Directing itself in this way the statement is 
And what is thus stated is rightness (truth).
by what-is. 
right (true).
This is one level of truth.
But where does one find a criterion for this right- 
At this point freedom enters the picture in the essay,ne ss?
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for the statement must have absolute freedom in order to 
"right itself":
The statement derives its rightness from the overt­
ness of behaviour, for it is only through this that any­
thing manifest can become the criterion for the approxi­
mation implicit in the representative statement.... But 
if rightness (truth) of statement is only made possible 
by the overt character of behaviour, then it follows 
that the thing that makes rightness possible in the first 
place must have a more original claim to be regarded as 
the essence of truth. [Same]
And the thing which makes rightness possible is freedom.
Therefore, freedom is the essence of truth. The essence of
truth, then, is not in any proposition, but in freedom:
Thus the traditional practice of attributing truth 
exclusively to the statement as its sole and essential 
place of origin, falls to the ground. Truth does not 
possess its original seat in the proposition. [Same]
But even freedom itself is not, standing alone, ade­
quate to explain the essence of truth; freedom itself must 
be elaborated. Freedom is grounded in the ultimate form of 
truth found in Being, what one might call the truth of Being:
freedom is the basis of the inner possibility of 
rightness only because it receives its own essence from 
that thing of earlier origin: the uniquely essential 
truth. [EB, pj3. 332-3]
In order to understand this higher level of freedom and 
truth one must move into a consideration of the nature of 
freedom itself.
Freedom as the "letting-be" of what-is. Heidegger 
explains the relationship of freedom to "letting—be" as 
follows:
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Freedom was initially defined as freedom for the 
reyelation of something already overt. How are we to 
think of the essence of freedom so conceived? The 
Manifest (das Offenbare), to which a representative 
statement approximates in its rightness, is that Which 
obviously "is” all the time and has some manifest form 
of behaviour. The freedom to reveal something overt 
lets whatever "is” at the moment be what it is. Free­
dom reveals itself as the "letting-be" of what-is. [EB, 
P. 333]
We usually talk of "letting-be" when we stand away from 
something and have nothing more to do with it. This is the 
negative sense of "letting-be,” a sense that can even mean 
renunciation, indifference, or neglect. However, the letting- 
be of what-is is the very opposite of neglect:
To let something be (Seinlassen) is in fact to have 
something to do with it (sich einlassen auf). This is 
not to be taken merely in the sense of pursuing, con­
serving, cultivating and planning some actuality casu­
ally met with or sought out. To let what-is be what it 
is means participating in something overt and its overt­
ness, in which everything that "is" takes up its position 
and which entails such overtness. [Same]
Thus, letting-be allows the what-is to reveal itself, and
this revealment is "truth"--non-concealment, a-leithea;
[Conceiving of truth as dis-covering the overt] re­
quires us to revise our ordinary idea of truth in the 
sense of propositional correctitude and trace it back 
to that still uncomprehended quality: the revealedness 
(Entborgenheit) and revelation (Entbergung) of whatsis.
[EB, p.334]
This revealed nature of what-is then acts as a criterion for 
the authentic being who takes the proper attitude of partici­
pating retirement before it, "so that what-is may reveal it­
self as what and how it is." [Same] "Letting-be" (freedom) 
thus becomes a participant in the very process it is letting
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be; freedom itself becomes a process of revelation of the 
revealed nature of what-is.
Freedom, then, is for Heidegger emphatically different 
from the usual conception of freedom as non-interference in 
choice, a conception with no relationship to truth* Freedom,
rather, is more adequately conceived as a participation in 
the revealment of what-is-as-such (das Seiende als ein 
solches), and truth is more adequately conceived as the ac­
tual revelation of what-is.
Untruth as mystery and erring* Heidegger distinguishes 
between two types of not-truth: "mystery” and "erring.” The 
former is authentic, because it refers to the overt which has 
not been disconcealed (revealed) in truth. It is still in 
the realm of not-truth, however. This authentic not-truth 
may consist partly of what can never be adequately discon­
cealed and partly of what is not yet disconcealed. Mystery 
is coeval with truth, as one is a form of revealed the other 
of unrevealed overtness. Indeed, mystery may be said to pre­
cede truth, for truth emerges from the untruth of mystery.
Error, on the other hand, is not unrevealed right­
ness but the counter-essence of rightness! Wrong. It is 
"the manifest theatre for all counter-play to essential 
truth." [EB, p. 345] Erring is the opposite of mystery; it 
consists in taking man himself as the uh—mysterious measure 
of all things, in taking accessibility and practicality as
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the be-all and end-all of creation, 
from mystery:
Error is turning away
"Man’s drifting from the mystery to the prac­
ticable and from one practicability to the next, always miss­
ing the mystery, is erring (das Irren)." [EB, p. 344]
Thus Heidegger asserts, "The mystery rules and the erring 
oppresses; and man, in the Ex-sistence of his Dasein, is 
subject to both of them." [EB, p. 179]
Because error is so basic—the essential counter­
essence (das wesentliche Gegenwesen) of the original essence 
of truth—it is not something that man falls into, 
guilt, it is something which is in the inner structure of 
Dasein: it is a consequence of the fact that, as Heidegger 
say^ "Da-sein not only ex-sists but in-sists at the same
Like
time, i.e. obstinately holds fast to (besteht auf) that which 
actuality (das Seiende), as though open of and in itself, of-
The Dasein not only stands outfers him.” [EB, p. 344] 
into Being—ex-sists—but also inevitably stands into the
world and into its own FaktizitSt.
Thus both error and truthr^s rightness emerge from 
the realm of mystery with statements about the overt. Error,
however, tends to deny its background of mystery, and to op-
Ultimately, however, onlypress rather than free the Dasein.
a recognition of mystery brings an insight into the nature of 
truth; and a grasp of the truth of what-is (das Seiende) will not
Inevitably, he will presscompletely satisfy Dasein’s search.
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on to ask what is behind the overtness of what-is, to ask 
the basic question: What is the being of what-is? What is 
the totality behind the revealed what-is? Only when the
question of the nature of Being is answered will one truly 
grasp the ultimate nature of truth:
The letting-be of what-is is accomplished in the 
sphere of overt relationship. But the letting-be of 
what-is-as-such in totality is only accomplished in 
conformity with the essence of it when the latter (I.e. 
what-is-as-such in totality) is assumed (ubernommen) in 
its original essence..*i’i'eThen the question concerning 
the essential nature of truth is being asked more pro­
foundly and originally. Then the reason why the essence 
of truth is bound up with the truth of essence stands 
revealed. Gazing out of error into the mystery is a 
questioning in the sense of the only question that exists: 
What is that which is as such in totality? This question 
meditates the essentially confusing and, because of its 
multifarious aspects, still unmastered question regarding 
the Being of what-is (das Sein des Seienden). [EB, pp. 
346-7]
Thus, we find ourselves with the phrase with which all of
Heidegger's thought has been directly or indirectly concerned:
What is the Being of what-is? Thisdas Sein des Seienden. 
is Heidegger’s basic question.
At this point it may be well to pause and survey both 
what has been covered and what will be treated in the remain­
der of this exposition of Heidegger's thought, 
tion thus far has largely been an exploration of the struc­
ture of the Dasein. treating both the authentic and inauthen-
The exposi-
tic modes of In-sein and the Structure of Sorge as it ex-
And it has been noted thatpresses itself in various forms.
Heidegger seeks in the second portion of Sein und Zeit to
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present Zeitlichkeit as a key to the understanding of Being, 
and to superimpose this Zeitlichkeit as a central illumi­
nating factor on the major aspects under consideration in 
the first portion. Finally, the consideration of the nature 
of freedom and the nature of truth haso brought us to Heideg­
ger’s central question regarding the nature of the Being of
what-as. The remainder of this exposition will attempt to 
present Heidegger’s conception of Nothingness, will explore
his conception of Being as such, man as the guardian of Being, 
and poetry as the revelation of Being, and finally will let 
Heidegger himself assert that Being is the real problem of 
our day and the spiritual destiny of the West.
The present consideration of Heidegger’s 
conception of nothingness will be divided into three major
1) Nothingness as the backdrop for the finite what-is 
in.^totality; 2) Nothingness as the foundation of negation; 
and 3) Heidegger’s misgivings regarding possible misinter­
pretations of his conception of nothingness.
1) Nothingness as the background of what-is in totality. 
Heidegger asserts that the experience of coming face to face 
with what-is in totality is found in real boredom and in 
real love; on the other hand, the experience of coming face 
to face with nothingness is found in Angst (dread) and even
What-is is always seen against a background 
of nothingness——which reveals the finitude of what—is, and
Nothingness.
areas:
produces dread.
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indeed the finitude of all of Being.
Real boredom occurs when one stops being concerned 
with anything in particular or with oneself and suddenly 
gets a disinterested but unmistakable sense of the "whole." 
While one always has a consciousness, however vague, of 
being within the unity of a "Ganz«" only in real boredom 
does one come face to face with it in itself:
Real boredom is still far off when this book or 
that play, this activity or that stretch of idleness 
merely bores us. Real boredom comes when "one is 
bored." This profound boredom, drifting hither and 
thither in the abysses of existence like a mute fog, 
draws all things, all men and oneself along with them, 
together in a queer kind of indifference. This bore­
dom reveals what-is in totality. [EB, p. 364]
This boredom is almost like a state of aesthetic contem­
plation from an infinite distance of what-is in totality. 
The opposite type of encounter with what-is in totality is 
the total personal involvement of the joy of love:
There is another possibility of such revelation, 
and this is in the joy we feel in the presence of the 
being—not merely the person—of someone we love.
Because of these moods in which, as we say, we 
"are" this or that (i.e. bored, happy, etc.) we find 
ourselves (befinden un&) in the midst of what-is-in— 
totality, wholly pervaded by it. The affective state 
in which we find ourselves not only discloses, aceor^ing 
cording to the mood we are in, what-is in totality, 
but this disclosure is at the same time far from 
being a mere chance occurrence and is the ground- 
phenomenon of our Da-sein. ISaipe}
Thus, one may say that boredom and joy express two ground-
reactions to a contemplation of what-is-in-totality.
one must turn to the reaction to the contemplation of the
Now
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everpresent backdrop to what-is-in-totality~nothingness. 
This reaction is Angst*
Angst. Unfortunately, Heidegger's conception of 
dread has not remained the same since Sein und Zeit.
^eln ufld Zeit. Heidegger asserts, "Das Wovor der Angst ist
In
das In-der-Welt-sein als solches." [SZ, p. 1S6] Later, in 
"Was ist Metaphysik?" (1943)» Heidegger states that the 
nothingness in the wake of "the withdrawal of what-is-in-
totality,which then crowds round us in dread—this is what 
oppresses us." [EB, p. 366. The essay occupies pp. 353-392] 
This shift in the conception of dread is part of the
shift of emphasis involved in what one might call Heidegger's 
"second phase." The shift is towards a decreasing emphasis 
on Dasein, and an increasing concern with Being in its mani­
festations in poetry and nature. The shift in respect to 
dread is to make it more a reaction to nothingness than to 
being thrown into the world and being thrown into time.
One might call the change a shift from Being and Time to a 
consideration of the interaction of Being and nothingness— 
t not nothingness as Sartre would define it, but a more
metaphysical nothingness that can inspire a metaphysical 
In Sein und Zeit. nothingness is an integral part 
of the world and Being, but in the later essay, it becomes 
the field into which Being and Being-in-the-world is pro- 
It becomes the background of what-is in totality
dread.
jected.
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and of the existence of Dasein. As Heidegger says in this 
later essay, nothingness "is that which makes the revelation
of what-is as such possible for human existence." [EB, p.370] 
This statement is highly significant and Professor Michael 
Wyschogrod asserts that this statement in itself shows that
the purpose of the whole metaphysical discussion 
of Nothing has been to create the possibility for a 
dissolution of Being into a field which permits Da­
sein to project itself into Nothing by means of tran­
scendence. Whereas, as has been shown, Heidegger in 
Sein und Zeit used Care and ecstatic timeliness as 
the elements that dissolved Dasein into a field of 
possibilities and thereby permitted Being-in-the- 
world as an essential determination of Dasein, in this 
new approach it is in terms of something outside Da­
sein that Dasein*s openness must be understood; and 
this role is assigned to Nothing. [Wyschogrod, p. 73]
Thus, we see that the pervasiveness of Zeitlichkeit. while
certainly not abandoned as Heidegger*s thought evolves, is
replaced by nothingness as the essential field into which
Dasein projects itself.
Indeed, the very projection of Dasein into nothingness 
becomes the basis of Heidegger’s version of transcendence, 
"This projection into Nothing: on the basis of hidden dread 
is the overcoming of what-is-in-totality: Transcendence."
[EB, p. 374]
Being and Nothingness are coevil9 because one cannot
Nothingness ceases to havebe defined without the other, 
its historical meaning as merely Tfthe conceptual opposite of 
what truly and authentically fis,1 i«e« as the negation of
it” and ”ceases to be the vague opposite of what-is: it now
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reveals itself as integral to the Being of what-is." [EB, 
pp. 376-7] Thus Heidegger asserts that Hegel was right in 
thinking that Being and Nothingness hang together:
’’Pure Being and pure Nothing are thus one and the 
same.” This proposition of Hegel's is correct. Being 
and Nothing hang together, but not because the two 
things—from the point of view of the Hegelian concept 
of thought—are one in their indefiniteness and im­
mediateness, but because Being itself is finite in es­
sence and is only revealed in the Transcendence of Da- 
sein as projected into Nothing
Only because Nothing is revealed in the very basis 
of our Da-sein is it possible for the utter strangeness 
of what-is to dawn on us. Only when the strangeness of 
what-is forces itself upon us does it awaken and invite 
our wonder. Only because of wonder, that is to say, 
the revelation of Nothing, does the "Why?" spring to 
our lips
Man's Da-sein can only relate to what-is by pro­
jecting into Nothing. Going beyond what-is is the 
essence of Da-sein. [EB, pp. 377—9]
Thus, for Heidegger, the Being of what-is (das Seiende).
nothingness, and transcendence are all interrelated; and all
point to the fact that Being is essentially finite against
a background of nothingness.
2)Nothingness as the foundation of negation. As is 
apparent above, nothingness is much more than mere negation. 
Heidegger is concerned to prove that negation is only an 
expression of nothingness, and that nothingness could not 
possibl^ybe merely a derivative of negation:
How indeed could negation produce the Not out of 
itself, seeing that it can only negate when something 
is there to be negated.... But the Not can only mani­
fest itself when its source—the nihilation of Nothing 
and hence Nothing itself—is drawn out of concealment.
The Not does not come into being through negation, but
• • • •
• • • •
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negation is based on the Not, which derives from the 
nihilation of Nothing.... [EB, p. 372]
Indeed, Heidegger remarks, negation is one of the
fainter aspects of true nihilation:
negation cannot be cited either as the sole or even 
the chief mode of nihilation, with which, because of 
the nihilation of Nothing, Da-sein is saturated. More 
abysmal than the mere propriety of rational negation is 
the harshness of opposition and the violence of loathing. 
More responsible the pain of refusal and the merciless­
ness of an interdict. More oppressive the bitterness 
of renunciation. [EB, p. 373]
These possible modes of nihilating behavior which are en­
dured by the Dasein-are more than mere negation, although 
they can also express themselves through negation; they are 
a breaking through of nothingness into predominance over 
Being:
The permeation of Da-sein by nihilating modes of 
behaviour points to the perpetual, ever-dissimulated 
manifestness of Nothing, which only dread reveals in 
all its originality. Here, of course, we have the 
reason why original dread is generally repressed in 
Da-sein. Dread is there, but sleeping. [Same]
This century is certainly not deficient in painful examples 
of what Heidegger above calls the ”permeation of Da-sein by 
nihilating modes of behaviour,” and certainly these modes 
evidence more than mere negation; they spring from a nothing­
ness in the innermost core of the Being of man.
’’Dread is there, but sleeping.” 
tence in Heidegger’s interpretation of inauthentic modes of 
In the inauthentic dailiness and publicity of das
This is a key sen­
being.
Man there is always an undercurrent of repressed anxiety,
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a fear of authentic being; as Kierkegaard put it, "in the 
midst of the self-importance 
of despair over being human." [CUP, p. 317]
Dread is a basic component of the human being; it is 
always present and can never be altogether escaped. Why? 
Ultimately, because nothingness, too, is built in the very
there is revealed a sense• • •
nature of the Dasein. and dread is the reaction (in the form 
of mood) to this nothingness. Dread, one might say, is as 
inseparable as the Da- is from the Da-sein; indeed, precisely
because the Sein suffers the actualization and finitization 
of appearing overtly in the world, dread is there;’ for dread 
is the reaction to the nothingness which serves as a back­
drop to all finitude. Without nothingness finitude would 
have no meaning. In one sense, then, dread is a reaction 
to finitude as such. Dread is therefore both dread before 
nothingness and before the realization of being-in-the- 
world; being-in-the-world is shot through with nothingness 
but there would be no nothingness without Being.
3) Heidegger fears misinterpretation of his "nothingness." 
In a postscript to his essay on nothingness and dread ["Was 
ist Metaphysik?"], Heidegger anticipates three misinterpre­
tations of his conception of nothingness; (a) Since his 
essay on metaphysics deals only with nothingness, people may 
wrongly assume that everything is nothingness and that his 
thought is a philosophy of nothingness, a form of nihilism.
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(b) Since his essay raises an isolated and morbid mood 
(dread) to the status of a key-mood, his thought will be 
considered a philosophy of dread, a philosophy which des­
cribes the psychic state of nervous people and cowards and 
eschews the stout-hearted attitude of the courageous thereby 
ultimately paralyzing the will to act. (c) Since the essay 
assails logic, people will wrongly assume that Heidegger’s
new type of thinking is a philosophy of pure feeling, a 
philosophy that imperils '’exact" thinking and certainty of 
action, denies that reason contains the criteria for all cal­
culation and classification, and ultimately delivers all 
judgments regarding truth up to a chance mood. [EB, pp. 3^3-4] 
Heidegger endeavors to reply to each of these char­
ges, and to show his philosophy makes an advance over this 
categorical type of thinking by advancing a philosophy that 
treats more genuinely of Being because it incorporates no­
thingness (a philosophy of Being and nothingness); that treats 
of a more genuine courage because this courage incorporates 
dread and the recognition of nothingness (a philosophy of 
courage and dread); and that, finally, treats of a more 
genuine type of thinking because it adds considerations of 
the mystery of Being as well as the importance of subjec­
tivity to the present mystery-denying tendency to scientific 
objectivity and the depersonalization of reasonfa philosophy 
of both finite and temporal becoming as well as mysterious 
Being)•
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Heidegger’s thought represents a reassartion of a
realm that is other than merely what—is (das Seiende); it
represents a recognition of the mystery of Being. Heidegger
contends that science denies the mystery of Being and
serts that das Seiende constitutes the whole of Being:
No matter where and however deeply science inves­
tigates what-is it will never find Being. All it en­
counters always, is what-is, because its explanatory 
purpose makes it insist at the outset on what-is.
But Being is not an existing quality of what-is, nor, 
unlike what-is, can Being be conceived and established 
objectively. This, the purely "Other” than everything 
that "is," is that-which-is-not (das Nicht-Seiende).
Yet this [so-called] "Nothing" functions as Being.[eb, p. 3£4]
Earlier, in the essay, Heidegger had opposed das Seiende
to this thing the scientist calls "Nothing":
[Science asserts:that:]
That to which the world-relationship refers is 
what-is—and nothing else.
That by which every attitude is moulded is 
what-is—and nothing more.
That with which scientific exposition effects its 
"irruption" is what-is—and beyond that, nothing.
[EB, p. 358]
as-
Thus, science rejects this so-called "Nothing" as null and 
void; but this very Nothing is precisely the area of Heideggeife
has to assert its sobernessphilosophizing. "Science 
solely with what-is 
Nothing." [EB, p. 359]
This definition of. Nothing and nothingness puts them
• • •
Science wishes to know nothing of• • • •
in a new relationship to Being, for both Being and nothingness
In this sense, Heidegger isare Nothing for the scientist#
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content to admit that his central concern is Nothing.
But the scientific restriction to what-is is far more dan­
gerous to human life than concern with this "Nothing," for 
it represents an abandonment of Being, a descent into Sein- 
losigkeit:
Instead of giving way to such precipitate and empty 
ingenuity and abandoning Nothing in all its mysterious 
multiplicity of meanings, we should rather equip our­
selves and make ready for one thing only: to experience 
in Nothing the vastness of that which gives every being 
the warrant to be. That is Being itself. Without Being 
whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence is vouchsafed 
us by Nothing in essential dread, everything that "is" 
would remain in Beinglessness (Sein-losigkeit). But 
this too, in its turn, is not nug^tory^NothingVoasing, 
suming that it is of the truth of Being that: Being 
may be without wh^t-is, but never what-is without Being. 
[EB, p. 335]
The tragic error of science and our science-minded age is 
that we assert that there can be a what-is without Being. 
Thus, Heidegger’s answer to the assertion that his thought 
is a philosophy of nihilism, a philosophy of nothingness, is 
that the tragic need is for a philosophy of something that 
can transcend the ontic level of das Seiende—and this is
the central aim of his philosophy.
Regarding the matters of courage and dread, Heidegger 
would assert that dread is the condition of the wisdom with—
Moreover, dread is not toout which valor is meaningless.
be thought of as a mere physical state; indeed the classi­
fying of dread with physical states is precisely an illus-
Rather dread, intration of the lack of vision of science.
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its true form, involves a courageous act of facing nothing­
ness and through it achieving the most mysterious of all
the experience of Being.
awe are very close, for this very
possibilities, 
siders that dread and
Heidegger con-
reason.
For hard by essential dread, in the terror of the 
abyss, there dwells awe (Scheu). 
folds that region of human being within which 
dures, as at home, in the enduring.”[EB, p. 386]
As for the final charge of an opposition to logic, 
Heidegger prefers to think of himself as the advocate of a 
different type of thinking, the kind that transcends logic— 
the kind of thinking which makes man a "shepherd” or guar­
dian of Being.
Awe clears and en-
man en-
Man as the guardian of Being. Man is the being whose 
Thus, in later Heidegger,thinking should search for Being.
the authentic man seeks the truth of Being and sacrifices 
himself for Being; man is the guardian of Being, 
cept seems to move beyond Heidegger’s earlier existentialism
In-r
This con-
into something like a mystical relationship with Being, 
stead of remaining on the level of what-is (das Seiende), 
the ’’essential man" goes beyond this to the essence without
Logic and "cal-which das Seiende has no warrant for being, 
culatiorf may be adequate to das Seiende. but essential
thinking—thought about Being—goes beyond it:
That which, however, is always and everywhere closed 
at the outset to the demands of calculation and, despite 
that, is always closer to man in its enigmatic unknowable-
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ness than anything that "is,” than anything he may 
range and plan, this can somethimes put the essential 
man in touch with a thinking whose truth no ’’logic” 
can grasp. The thinking whose thoughts not only do 
not calculate but are absolutely determined by what 
"other" than what-is, might be called essential 
thinking. Instead of counting on what-is with what- 
is, it expends itself in Being for the truth of Being. 
CEB, p. 389]
ar-
This is the kind of thinking which satisfies the demands 
of Being. All this orientation to Being begins to sound 
very much like religious devotion; It demands surrender 
and sacrifice and reverence for Being;
man surrenders his historical being to the simple, 
sole necessity whose constraints do not so much neces­
sitate as create the need (Hot) which is consummated 
in the freedom of sacrifice. The need is: to preserve 
the truth of Being no matter what may happen to man and 
everything that "is.” Freed from all constraint, be­
cause born of the abyss of freedom, this sacrifice is 
the expense of our human being for the preservation of 
the truth of Being in respect of what-is. In sacrifice 
there is expressed that hidden thanking which alone 
does homage to the grace wherewith Being has endowed 
the nature of man, in order that he may take over in 
his relationship to Being the guardianship of Being.
[Same]
Man has an obligation to sacrifice himself in order to 
thank Being for having given him a nature endowed with Being}
The religiousman must assume the guardianship of Being.
cast of this type of thought is inescapable**
Being has a voice, the Word of which is the source 
This voice is echoed in sacrificialof the human word.
thanking:
Original thanking is the echo of Being’s favour 
wherein it clears a space for itself and causes the
This echo is man’sunique occurence: that what-is is.
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answer to the Word of the soundless voice of Being.
The speechless answer of his thanking through ,____
fice is the source of the human word, which is the 
prime cause of language as the enunciation of the 
Word in words. [Same]
sacri-
Thus, even language originated in an echo of Being, 
naming of the gads.
a
As will be seen in the section dealing 
with poetry, poetry was the first form of language. Language
is basically a sacred trust to man; language is the enun­
ciation of the Word in words.
Sacrifice, then, becomes the cardinal virtue in the 
guardianship of Being. Without sacrificial thanking, in­
deed, man "could never attain the thinking 
inally thinks the thought of Being." [EB, p. 390] And 
the fact that man can thank is a favor granted by Being:
"How else could humanity attain to original thanking unless 
BeingTs favour preserved for man, through his open relation­
ship to this favour, the splendid poverty in which the free­
dom of sacrifice hides its own treasure?" [Same] The goal 
of the essential man is the sacrifice to Being:
Sacrifice is a valediction to everything that "is" 
on the road to the preservation of the favour of Being. 
Sacrifice can be made ready and can be served by doing 
and working in the midst of what-is, but never consum­
mated there. Its consummation comes from the inward­
ness out of which historical man by his actions—essen­
tial thinking is also an act—"dedicates the Da-sein he 
has won for himself to the preservation of the dignity 
of Being. [Same]
Then Heidegger makes an identification of sacrifice with 
inwardness which is reminiscent of Kierkegaard1s connection
which orig-• • •
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of suffering, inwardness, and the leap of faith:
This inwardness is the calm that allows nothing to 
assail man’s hidden readiness for the valedictory nature 
aH sacrifice. Sacrifice is rooted in the nature of 
the event through which Being claims man for the truth 
Being. [Same]of
Like Kierkegaard’s subjectivity, this subjectivity is truth 
and is anti-logical because it transcends all logic:
Therefore it is that sacrifice brooks no calculation, 
for calculation always miscalculates sacrifice in terms 
of the expedient and the inexpedient, no matter whether 
the aims are set high or low. Such calculation distorts 
the nature of sacrifice. The search for a purpose dulls 
the clarity of the awe, the spirit of sacrifice ready 
prepared for dread, which takes upon itself kinship with 
the imperishable. [Same]
One may well conclude that Heidegger seems to be as­
serting an irrationalism which is not emphasized in Sein 
und Zeit. Man’s essential task in Sein und Zeit is extending 
himself into the future in order to realize his authentic 
Existenz. his unique potentialities. But here, at the end 
of the postscript to the essay, "Was ist Metaphysik?”, the
’’maturing conception” (as LSwith calls it) makes man a shep-
The self and the realization of the self
Heidegger claims that Being has al-
herd of Being, 
are hardly mentioned, 
ways been his concern and that his thought has evolved-—but
This may be so, but the differencenot contradicted itself.
in emphasis between Sein und Zeit and the postscript is in—
The horizon in which the human being is conceivedescapable.
is no longer so much care and ecstatic timeliness, as Being 
and nothingness—joined in the conception of the other-thanv
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das Seiende, which those who see nothing but das Seiende 
are pleased to call "Nothing.” 
authentic man the "veil of Being":
One of the essential theatres of speechlessness is 
dread in the sense of the terror into which the abyss 
?£ ^ot^lng plunges us. Nothing, conceived as the pure 
Other" than what-is, is the veil of Being. In Being 
all that comes to pass in what-is is perfected from 
everlasting. [EB, p. 392]
This even reveals a sort of determinism—but a determinism 
which can never be grasped by logic and calculation, and is 
so distant and hidden that it can hardly be called determin­
ism in the sense in which it is commonly conceived.
The guardianship of Being, then, stands in contrast 
to the emphasis on self-realization in Sein und Zeit: the 
guardianship of Being seems to develop towards self-denial, 
mysticism, and essentialist thinking. Yet unlike other 
thinking, it seeksno logical hold in the ontic realm:
The thought of Being seeks no hold in what-is. 
Essential thinking looks to the slow signs of the in­
calculable and sees.-1.in this the unforeseeable coming 
of the ineluctable. Such thinking is mindful of the 
truth of Being and thus helps the Being of truth to 
make a place for itself in man*s history. This help 
effects no results because it has no need of effect. 
Essential thinking helps as the simple inwardness of 
existence, insofar as this inwardness, although unable 
to exercise such thinking or only having theoretical 
knowledge of it, kindles its own kind. LEB, p. 3913
The essential man is not primarily a self-realizer, 
but rather a servant of Being:
Obedient to the voice of Being, thought seeks the 
Word through which the truth of Being may be expressed. 
Only when the language of historical man is born of the 
Word does it ring true. But if it does ring true, then
Yet this Nothing is to the
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the testimony of the soundless voice of hidden springs 
lures it ever on. Thought of Being guards the Word 
and fulfils its function in such guardianship, namely 
care for the use of language. [Same]
Guardianship of Being is inseparable from "care for the use 
of language." True language is not a mere tool for communi­
cation among men, but a revelation of Being. (This tends 
to explain Heidegger’s fondness for etymological explora­
tions.) The poet names and thus reveals the unseen, the 
holy. Thus, in a way, the poet precedes the thinker in 
nearness to Being, for the thinker cannot utter Being when 
"holy names are lacking":
Out of long-guarded speechlessness and the careful 
clarification of the field thus cleared, comes the ut­
terance of the thinker. Of like origin is the naming 
[function] of the poet. But since like is only like 
insofar as difference allows, and since poetry and 
thinking are most purely alike in their care of the 
word, the two things are at the same time at opposite 
poles in their essence. The thinker utters Being.
The poet names what is holy.
We may know something about the relations between 
philosophy and poetry, but we know nothing of the dia­
logue between poet and thinker, who "dwell near to one 
another on mountains farthest apart"[quotation from 
Holderlin's ode, "Patmos"]. [EB, pp. 391-2]
Thus, although at opposite poles "in their essence," the 
poet and thinker "dwell near to one another" in their love,
recognition, and guardianship of the word and the Word.
Heidegger is concerned with the
In his famous
Poetry and Being.
question, "What is the essence of poetry?" 
essay on this subject, he selects five seminal passages of 
poetry from the works of Holderlin and seeks to arrive
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through an understanding of them at an understanding of 
the nature of poetry. Why did Heidegger choose Holderlin? 
The reason is "solely because HSlderlin’s poetry was borne 
on by the poetic vocation to write expressly of the essence
of poetry." [EB, pp. 294-5]
The five passages whose significance Heidegger seeks 
to explore in order to understand the nature of poetry are 
as follows:
(1) Writing,poetry: "That most innocent of all occupa­
tions."0
(2) "Therefore has language, most dangerous of possessions,
so that he may affirm what hebeen given to man
" [Holderlin, IV, 246]
• • •
is • • • •
(3) "Much has man learnt.
Many of the heavenly ones has he named,
Since we have been a conversation
And have been able to hear from one another."
[Holderlin, IV, 343]
(4) "But that which remains, is established by the poets."
[Holderlin, IV, 63]
(5) "Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells
Man on this earth." [Holderlin, VI, 25]
Poetry is not overtly serious, "is like 
playing with words, and not the
(1) and (2)i
a dream, and not reality; a 
seriousness of action."[EB, p. 296] Yet language is a danger­
ous possession because "it is only by virtue of language at
^Holderlins Werke, ed. Norbert von Hellingrath (Berlin, 
The above translations all taken from EB, 
"Holderlin and the Essence of1914), HI, 377.P« 293t preface the essay, 
Poetry," pp. 291-315.
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all that man is exposed to something manifest, which, as 
what is existent, afflicts and enflames man in his existence, 
and as such is non-existent,
is language which first creates the manifest conditions for
deceives and disappoints. It
menace and confusion to existence, and thus the possibility 
of the loss of existence, that is to say—danger." [EB,p.298]
Language is a dangerous and disturbing phenomenon because 
it reveals. In language what is manifest is suddenly ex- 
"Only where there is language, is there 
world, i.e. the perpetually altering circuit of decision
pressed in words.
and production, of action and responsibility, but also of 
commotion and arbitrariness, of decay and confusion." [EB, 
p. 300] Language creates the possibility of history; it is 
the condition of man's existing historically.
(3) But how does language become actual? Language 
is not a stock of words and syntactical rules; these are 
only the threshhold of language. Language is a conversation, 
a single conversation between Being and man extending through 
time. Since language really became actual as conversation, 
the gods have acquired names and a world has appeared, 
the presence of gods preceded the actualization of language. 
More accurately, we come into being and are this 
sation":
But
"conver-
it is precisely in the naming of the gods, and in 
the transmutation of the world into word, that the real 
conversation, which we ourselves are, consists. [EB,p.303J
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Since language is a dialogue, it requires both mgn
and Being. Without man, indeed, there would be no language 
and no naming of the Gods. This is a form of mutual re- 
?>onse and participation which has been noted in Jaspers, 
Marcel, and Rilke.1
But the gods can acquire a name only by addressing 
and, as it were, claiming us. The word which names the 
gods is always a response to such a claim. This re.;- 
qponse always springs from the responsibility of a des­
tiny. It is in the process by which the gods bring our 
existence to language, that we enter the sphere of the 
decision as to whether we are to yield ourselves to the 
gods or withhold ourselves from them. [Saveli1 -
(4) The poets, then, are the establishers of the wordy 
the word which names the permanent, Being. "Poetry is the 
act of establishing by the word and in the word. But if the 
word establishes the permanent, of what value is it, since 
the permanent has always been, to establish what is already 
present? Even the permanent must be fixed so that it will 
not be carried away, the simple must be wrested from con­
fusion, proportion must be set before what lacks proportion. 
That which supports and dominates the existent in its en­
tirety, must become manifest. "Being must be opened out, 
that the existent may appear." [EB, p. 304] Thus, the func­
tion of the poet becomes that of naming and establishing 
the gods and everything that is:
so
The poet names the gods and names all things in
This naming does not consistthat which they are. 
merely in something already known being supplied 
with a name; it is rather that when the poet speaks 
the essential word, the existent is by this naming
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nominated as what it is. So it becomes known as exis­
tent. Poetry is the establishing of being by means of 
the word. [Same]
The poet, then, puts human existence firmly on its founda­
tion—Being—and gives it a genuine relationship to this 
foundation:
But when the gods are named originally and the 
essence of things receives a name, so that things for 
the first time shine out, human existence is brought 
into a firm relation and given a basis. The speech 
of the poet is establishment not only in the sense of 
the free act of giving, but at the same time in the 
sense of the firm basing of human existence on its 
foundation. [EB, p. 305 J
(5) What man works at and pursues is through his 
own efforts earned and deserved. Yet, all this does not 
touch the essence of man's sojourn on earth, does not reach 
the foundation of his existence. This foundation is aptly 
described as "poetic"; marfsmanner of dwelling on earth is 
essentially "poetic":
To "dwell poetically" means: to stand in the pres­
ence of the gods and to be involved in the proximity of 
the essence of things. Existence is "poetical" in its 
fundamental aspect—which means at the same time: in so 
far as it is established (founded), it is not a recom­
pense, but a gift. [EB, p. 306]
The poet, like the thinker, dwells near the essence of life,
Being. At his best, man, too, "dwells poetically"—near
Being, and deals with something immediate, yet intangible.
But Being is near yet difficult to grasp because it eludes
all calculation; as Holderlin says in the opening lines of
the ode, "Patmos," God is near yet hard to grasp:
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Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott. 
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wachst 
Das Rettende auch.
In the danger of this search for Being t .:.. man achieves 
authentic existence, 
and establishes.
Poetry is dangerous, for it reveals 
To reveal is more and more dangerous as
one approaches nearer to Being, yet "Wo aber Gefahr ist, 
wSchst/ Das Rettende auch." The poet Stands between the 
people and the gods, and his whole being is shivered with 
divine lightnings. The excessive brightness can blind (and 
this may have symbolic significance for such great blind 
poets as Homer and Milton), and the poet must transmit it 
in diminished form. Yet this vantage-point between man
and gods gives the poet the perspective he needs to see 
"who man is":
He [the poet] is one who has been cast out—out 
into that Between, between gods and men. But only and 
for the first time in this Between is it decided, who 
man is and where he is settling his existence. [EB, p. 
312]
The present time, says Heidegger, is an especially
It is a time when "holy namesneedy time, a durftiger Zeit.
are lacking" because old gods have fled and the new ones
The poet must step in and both es-have not yet appeared, 
tablish and anticipate a new historical time:
This [the] essence of poetry belongs to a determined 
time. But not in such a way that it merely conforms to 
this time, as to one which is already in existence. It 
is that Holderlin, in the act of establishing the essence 
of poetry * first determines a new time. It is the. time
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of the gods that have fled and of the gad that is coming, 
it is the time of need, because it lies under a double 
lack and a double Not: the No-more of the gods that have 
fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming.[EB,p. 313]
This pronouncement may seem a considerable distance 
from Sein und Zeit and from the general conception of Exis­
tentialism; nevertheless it is an integral part of Heidegger's 
thought and not so far as one might initially suppose from
Existentialism. It is part of Heidegger's explanation of 
Nietzsche's idea that "God is dead," And Existentialists 
uniformly assert that the "old gods" have lost their power, 
that the people that have extinguished them are still walking 
in darkness and dailiness, that a new time must be founded 
on the lines they propound—a new relationship of man to 
himself and to Being.
Unfortunately there is little uniformity regarding 
the nature of this Being to which man in the new time must 
become oriented. Jaspers and Kierkegaard assert that Being 
is infinite and that man must relate himself to the infinite.
Heidegger asserts that Being is finite, and man must relate
Heidegger's concept of Beinghimself to this finite Being.
as finite creates a completely different type of metaphysical 
structure, a completely different type of ontology.
There is no finite-in-The finit e nature of Being.
What infinitely surpassesfinite antithesis in Heidegger, 
the realm of das Seiende is Being; but this Being is finite
Because Being is not identified withrather than infinite.
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one inevitably begins to wonder what Heidegger 
means by Being, and why Being is not infinite.
Heidegger believes that because Being is in the 
horizon of nothingness, is defined by nothingness, and is 
meaningless without nothingness, it is necessarily finite. 
Yet this finitude is a sort of ontological finitude rather 
than what is ordinarily considered as finitude.
infinity,
One well
may ask how this ontological, finite Being contrasts with 
the ontic, finite realm of das Seiende.
Heidegger uses three names for what is over das 
Seiende: Nothing, the "Otherythan-das Seiende.” and Being.
The "Other-than-das Seiende" includes both Being and nothing­
ness. The nature of nothingness has already been treated; we 
now turn to the nature of Being as such.
What-is (das Seiende)is substance; Being is other than
Being is not-substance, per- 
It is antithetical to
substance, but not infinite, 
manent, always-present, unchanging.
Becoming, Appearance, Thought, and Ought; but it is not in- 
These four aspects of Being are treated in the last 
section of Heidegger’s Einftihrung in die Metaphysik (1953)»
finite.
entitled, "limitation of Being":
The determination of Being was brought to view 
through the exposition of the four divisions:
[1] Being is, in balance to becoming, permanence.
[2] Being is, in balance to appearance, the permanent 
model, the unchanging.
[3] Being is, in balance to thought, the fundamental, 
that which is actually there.
[4] Being is, in balance to ought, that which is presented 
what ought to be and is or is not already realized.as
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Permanence, unchangingness, there-ness, being-pres- 
fn as3 i fy7at ^he same thing: constant presence,
Being is constant and unchanging "presence." With this con­
cept of Being, Heidegger comes as close to the more tradi­
tional concepts of infinity as he ever does.8 What 
pects of infinity in'traditional metaphysics are in Heidegger 
attributes of finite Being, of "constant presence."
One may conclude by relating the nature of Being as
are as-
constant presence to the poet’s vocation of naming and es­
tablishing this presence, to the fact that Being is "near 
yet hard to grasp," and to "dwelling poetically." 
stant presence is so near that it is within us; the poet 
gives the presence a name; the authentic man dwells poetically 
by participating in the realization and actualization of Being 
(which is a function of the poet in naming) and by dwelling 
in nearness tq and guardianship of, Being;
"Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells 
Man on this earth."
The con-
?Quoted in Marjorie Grene, Martin Heidegger (London, 
1957), p. 114. Originally in Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik 
(Tubingen, 1953), p. 157.
^Another objection Heidegger would have to the concept 
of infinity is that it is embedded in a metaphysics of sub­
stance rather than of modes of Being; thus infinity is the 
label for non—substance, but at the same time is static and 
burdened with the accumulation of a history of being conceived 
as the opposite of static substance. Sueh a term would imply 
all the assumptions of a substance—metaphysics. Heidegger is 
not only opposed to the materialism of America and Russia, 
but to materialistic—based on substance-metaphysics which 
he claims has dominated Western thought since Plato, 
cept of Being is, therefore, emphatically other than infinity.
His con-
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Das Sein als das geistige Schicksal des Abendlandes. 
Appropriately, this consideration of the thought of Heidegger 
concludes with a question, the question which is central to 
Heidegger from his earliest publication to the present day, 
the question which goes to the heart of the human situation, 
to day:
1st das Sein ein blosses Wort und seine Bedeutung 
ein Dunst Oder birgt das mit dem Wort ”Sein” Gemeinte 
das geistige Schicksal des Abendlandes?[Einfuhrung, p. 29]
Is Being a mere word and its meaning a haze, or does what 
is meant by the word ’'Being” hold the spiritual destiny of
the West? The West will take a decisive turn in history 
when it is willing to ask the question, ”Wie steht es um
das Sein?”—how is it with Being? It is this question 
which will reveal the spiritual poverty and error of our 
whole so-called ’’culture.” Our art, tooooften, is an 
apologetic display of ’’cultural” products as bits of decor 
and ornamentation which demonstrate that we are not bar­
barians. But they only witness our inner emptiness, our 
tragic preoccupation with externalities, with material 
values. The works of the mind have degenerated into trim­
mings for the ruthlessly practical, the metaphysically 
alienated, the spiritually empty world of das Man.
Bitterly Heidegger surveys the present situation in
Europe:
This Europe, wretchedly blinded, forever on the 
brink of self-slaughter, lies today in the great pin­
cers between Russia on the one hand and America on the
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other• Russia and America are, from a metaphysical 
point of view, the same: the same desolate frenzy of 
technology unleashed, and of the rootless organization 
of the Average Man. [Einfiihrung, p. 2$]
American democracy and Russian totalitarianism are both 
characterized by an obsession with externalities and with 
technological exploitation of nature. In a frenzied pre­
occupation with phantoms of the world of das Seiende, the 
world of appearance, modern man refuses to ask the crucial
and ultimate questions:
When the furthermost corner of the globe has been 
technologically conquered and opened to economic ex­
ploitation, when any event whatsoever in any place what­
soever at any time whatsoever has become accessible with 
any speed whatsoever, when we can ^experience” simul­
taneously an attempt on the life of a king in France and 
a symphony concert in Tokyo, when time is no longer any­
thing but speed, momentariness and simultaneity, and 
time as history has vanished from all the life of all 
the nations, when the boxer passes as the great man of 
a people, when the millions numbered at mass meetings 
are a triumph—the, yes, then, the question still grips 
us like a ghost through all these phantoms: what for?— 
where to?—and what then? [Same]
Modern man possesses the ultimate weapons, but refuses to 
ask the ultimate questions, the questions that would reveal
that despite all his bustle and self-importance and pursuit
Heidegger believesof things, he has lost sight of Being, 
that ”These are questions which we put at this point, not 
parenthetically, or for the good of our souls, or for the 
sake of a world-view” but are far more important; for man’s
return to a vital relationship to Being holds the ’'spiritual 
destiny of the West.”[Same]
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Ultimately, Heidegger's transformation of our pres­
ent way of thinking is so radical that he can only show us
where to begin, can only direct us to the crucial ontological 
question: how is it with Being? But to ask this question in 
itself is to begin to think in a new way, to embark on a new 
adventure in history, to set out on a frontier that still
remains as the physical frontiers are vanishing:
To ask: how is it with Being?—that means nothing 
less than to re-call the beginning of our historical- 
spiritual existence, in order to transform it into the 
new beginning. Such-.a thing is possible. It is indeed 
the decisive form of history, because it originates in 
the most basic event. But a beginning is not repeated 
by screwing oneself back to it as something that once 
was, and is now familiar, and has simply to be imitated.
No, the beginning must be begun again more radically 
and with all that a true beginning brings with it—all n
that is strange and dark and unassured.LEinfiihrung, p. 29]
To begin again, to start with a fresh awareness of Being— 
this is the spiritual destiny and hope of man. 
means a transition to human being in the light of Being.
Such a start
^This and the preceding translations from the Ein- 
fuhrnnp- in die Metaphvsik are taken from Orene, pp. 92-7*
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SARTRE
"Was it a dream, that enormous presence? It was 
there, poised over the park, tumbling from the trees, 
all soft, gluing up everything, a thick gelatinous 
mass. And was I in it, I, and the entire park? I 
was afraid, but above all I was furious, it seemed 
so stupid, so inappropriate. I despised that ignoble 
jelly. It was everywhere i It reached to the sky, 
it spread out in all directions, it filled everything 
with its sprawling mass, and I could see layer upon 
layer of it, extending much farther than the limits 
of the park and the houses and Bouville. I was no 
longer in Bouville, nor anywhere, I was floating.
I was not surprised; I was very well aware that it 
was the World, the naked World which had suddenly 
shown itself, and I was choking with rage against 
this huge absurd being 
filthy mess, what a mess.” and I shook myself to throw 
off the sticky slime but it clung to me and there was 
so much of it, tons and tons of existence, endless 
tons: I was suffocating under the weight of a tremen­
dous ennui."!
Sitting in the park, Roquentin encounters with nau­
seating immediacy what Heidegger would call "being-in-the- 
world"; he esqperiences the facticity and "thinginess" of 
the world. His world is pressing in on him like a gluey, 
gelatinous mass, a filthy mess which only clings the harder 
when he tries to "throw off the sticky slime."
What is this kind of writing? Is it the work of a 
child whose imagination has gone wild~or who is recalling 
a nightmare of gluey, slimy filthiness? No, it is the work 
of a French teacher of philosophy, consciously translating
I cried out: ’What a*...
■^Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Root of the Chestnut Tree," 
Partisan Review. XIII (Winter, 1946), 32-3*
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a philosophical idea into literary form.
One might call this paragraph “variations on vis­
cosity,” for the abundance of adjectives related to vis­
cosity is patent: soft, gluey, thick, gelatinous, jelly- 
like, sprawling, sticky, slimy, and “under the weight of
Viscosity, for Sartre, is a basic 
physical quality that reveals being, for it is the "viscous” 
which translates man’s involvement in the world into physi- 
In the final pages of his L’Etre et le Neant. 
Sartre submits an analysis of viscosity as a quality of 
Man attempts to appropriate his world only 
to find that he, himself, is being appropriated:
a tremendous ennui.”
cal terms.
man’s being.
at the very moment when I believe that I possess 
it Lie visqueuxl. behold by a curious reversal, it pos­
sesses me.... I open my hands, I want to let go of the 
viscous and it sticks to me, it draws me, it sucks at 
me. Its mode of being is neither the reassuring inertia 
of the solid nor a dynamism like that in water which is 
exhausted in fleeing from me. It is a soft, yielding 
action, a moist and feminine sucking, it lives obscurely 
under my fingers, and I sense it like a dizziness 
There is a possibility that the In-itself might absorb 
the For-itself into its contingency, into its indiffer­
ent exteriority, into its foundationless existence.2
• • • •
This is essentially a translation of Heidegger’s 
presentation of man’s plight—his being thrown into the
2Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New 
York, 1956}, pp. 608-9. Hereinafter abbreviated "BN." 
Also, L’Etre et le Neant (Paris, 194#), p. 700. Herein­
after abbreviated "EN." Miss Barnes’ rendering of "le 
visqueux" is "the slimy." I have changed this rendering 
to "viscous" to be consistent with my use of "viscous" in 
the text introducing the quotation.
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world, his having always to be in-situation, his involve­
ment with fallenness through no desire of his own, his in— 
ability to escape being appropriated by inauthentic modes 
of existing. In SartreTs hands, the inauthentic mode is 
transformed from a mode of merely being "other-directed" to 
an almost metaphysical attraction for becoming an inert
thing. Fearing freedom, the inauthentic man longs for the 
inertness characteristic of a thing.
Freedom is a fundamental dynamic of authenticity in 
Sartre, and this is translated on the physical level into 
terms of physical mobility: the inauthentic man, the bour­
geois, seeks the security of being solid, opaque, inert—
something which is acted upon but does not originate action,
The authentic man, on the othera thing without freedom, 
hand, tries to achieve a union of his potentialities—which
Sartre calls "nothingness" because they do not exist except 
as a TTlackfT which could come into being-—and the body and
the "other person"—which are always already there and with­
out which nothingness could not possibly have any meaning
This union of Con­or any possibility of coming into being, 
sciousness with the physical body and world—with what is 
always already there——is the union of nothingness and Being, 
Since consciousness is personal, it is the relationship be­
tween what is for something and what is already in something, 
Sartre calls these two modes in a person "For—itself" and
169
”In-itself” (etre pour-soi and etre en-soi); the union of 
both of these is the "In-itself-For-itself” (en-soi-pour-soi).
Both Heidegger and Sartre assert that they are not 
describing a fixed human nature, but phenomenologically des­
cribing the human situation, the situation in which a human 
being finds himself ”placed” merely by virtue of being as a 
human being. Yet, if one were to try to single out a domi­
nating concern in each of the two thinkers, that concern 
would be with Being as such in Heidegger, and with conscious-
If a second major concern were sought, it 
would be Zeitlichkeit in Heidegger and freedom in Sartre.
ness in Sartre.
Thus, one finds a distinct difference of emphasis between 
the two thinkers; one is concerned primarily with Being 
and Time, while the other is concerned primarily with con­
sciousness and freedom.
inReturning to the case of Roquentin’s experience 
the park, the key to the meaning of this experience is Sar­
tre’s conception of viscosity and his association of vis-
Consciousness, in this case,cosity with consciousness.
also be compared with Heidegger’s description of the 
state of mind in true boredom [see p. 140], for Roquentin’s
may
’’ennui” in which he suddenly sees a totality.
released from the openness of
state is an
In boredom, consciousness is 
perceiving the potentialities of the self and sees things
the reason that Roquentin is floating;as a whole. This is
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the fixity involved in holding a point of view is now 
loosened. Roquentin has "seen through" the fixed cate­
gories, classes, and social labels, to the pure thinginess 
of things in all their immediacy. They do not have the 
solidity of the fixed categories of the bourgeoisie; they 
have become only the gluey thinginess which surrounds him 
and constitutes his world.
Consciousness, for Sartre, may move in two directions: 
toward slavery in thinghood or toward freedom in self-deter­
mination. Its natural state is a flickering mobility in 
contrast to the physical solidity of things and one's body. 
Miss Iris Murdoch, in her valuable book on Sartre, has 
stated this contrast well:
Sartre pictures consciousness by means of ... 
contrast between the flickering, unstable, semi-trans­
parent moment-to-moment "being" of the consciousness, 
the shifting way in which it conceives objects and it­
self—and the solid, opaque, inert "in-themselvesness" 
of things which simply are what they are.-*
the
We may be aware of ourselves not as transparent to our own
reflective gaze, but as transfixed, solidfied, judged-—by
The authentically existingthe look from the "other person."
person's consciousness is characterized by open self-aware-
consciousness sees his self
" and tends
ness; the inauthentic person's 
as solidified by the look of the "other person, 
toward a more solid, opaque, and thing-like condition.
3Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (New Haven, 1953),
p. 42.
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It is therefore appropriate to picture the consciousness as 
a gluey or paste-like substance which depending on the tem­
perature may become more or less solidified; it may tend 
toward the freedom of mobility or the slavery of solidity. 
In the image of viscosity, Sartre can tie together the re­
fusal to think, the refusal to be free, and solidification
of the self in the gaze of others. Miss Murdoch notes,
"Glueyness" (le visqueux) is for Sartre the image 
of consciousness; and fascinates us for that reason.
It is in terms of solidification, or closing of the tex­
ture that Sartre pictures insincerity or bad faith (mau- 
vaise foi); the more or less conscious refusal to re­
flect, the immersion in the unreflectively coloured 
awareness of the world, the persistence in an emotional 
judgment, or the willingness to inhabit cosily some 
other person's estimate of oneself. [Same]
Thus, for Sartre, consciousness and freedom are as 
inter-related as Heidegger's Being and time, for in both 
cases the latter is a decisive factor in the former. Con­
sciousness may becoraeomore mobile, more liquid, more free;
or it may become more opaque, inert, more like a solid.
Yet consciousness of my unrealized potentialities, of myself 
as "pro.iet2' as "non-being" now but "being-to-be-realized" 
(which non-being Sartre calls le neant, "nothingness") may
Gas has no form;also be thought of as volatile like gas, 
it is like nothing; it disperses itself and loses itself over 
Thus, man's soiritus (pneuma, breath, air, spirit)the world.
is nothing without its form—the form in which it must
In terms of consciousness, this means that
ex­
press itself.
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consciousness can never be divorced from the body in which 
it finds itself any more than the body can be free of the 
world in which it finds itself. To attempt to be pour-soi 
without en-soi, then, is as futile as the attempt to solidify
into en-soi and deny the pour-soi. 
between—gluey, viscous, 
but he must pro.iect himself into nothingness, not lapse into 
the state of a thing.
Man is necessarily in 
Man is in the world, "in-situation,"
Indeed, the most distinctive aspect of man is this 
not-yet, this non-being which could be, this nothingness 
without which man as a free being, as a human being, could
What man is, in the present, is not 
Man is best defined in terms of possibility,
He is more than he is, for 
As Sartre puts it, "Man is
hardly be conceived, 
all of man.
in terms of what he can become, 
he is also what he is not yet. 
not what he is, and is what he ist; not."
Roquentin asserts, "It seemed so stupid, so inap-
I was very well aware that it was the World, 
the naked World which had suddenly shown itself."
propriate • • • •
The word
What was it"naked" implies that previously it was clothed.
It was clothed in order, the order and logicclothed in?
of systems. Roquentin, in a moment of profound importance, 
discovers that underneath the protective clothing of logic,
This is not the question of whetherlife is really absurd, 
there is ultimately order on a cosmic scale so much as wheth-
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er life as it is existed by a human being is logical* 
is the assertion that the situation in which the individual 
finds himself is absurd and illogical*
It
This absurdity of 
life is not, for the authentic man, necessarily bad, but a
condition which must be recognized* Logic presents a closed 
system; absurdity makes one aware—through dread—of the
openness and plenitude of solutions and possibilities which 
have not even come into existence* This plenitude of pos- 
is the positive way of stating nothingness* A 
closed system makes freedom merely a choice among existing 
possibilities; nothingness gives one a creative freedom to 
forge unanticipatable possibilities. Nothingness, freedom, 
absurdity, and dread, then, all are interrelated.
The horror with which the Anglo-American reader may 
greet this assertion that life is absurd is merely an in­
dication of the tenacity with which we cling to a belief in 
logic. To the French Existentialist, this merely states a 
self-evident fact: that life is basically not logical, that
sibilities
the important aspects of it escape and transcend all logic 
Either life is right,logical, harmonious—or it is absurd* 
To the French Existentialist, the assertion that life is 
absurd is much more tenable even from the point of view of 
reason than the denial of reality implicit in the assertion
Nothingness, for instance, is illog-that life is logical# 
ical; as Arland Ussher notes, the very fact that nothingness
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transcends the logical negative is a measure of the inade­
quacy of any logic-based concept of life:
Sartre draws up a list of "negativities" which in­
clude absence, alteration, otherness, repulsion, * 
distraction, etc. All these perceptions inspire si 
feeling akin to dread. [See Heidegger’s treatment of 
nothingness as the foundation for hate, destruction, 
and so forth, esp. p. 1443 My friend’s absence from 
the cafe haunts it like a ghost. This distinguishes 
positive negation (so to call it) from mere logical 
negation. All of which seems to me [Ussher] to be 
true; and the difficulty of stating it without (ap­
parent) absurdity, a measure of the failure of mere 
"abstract” thought. When French Existentialists 
speak of the "Absurd," they mean the insufficiency 
of the logical explanation. Nations which have be­
lieved less in logic are less likely to be perturbed. 
[Ussher, p. 105, footnote]
Thus, the Existentialists do not use the word "absurd" in 
a necessarily pejorative sense, but contrast it to "logical." 
Remember, too, that Kierkegaard asserted that many of the 
basic Christian beliefs were absurd, that the Incarnation
regret,
was absurd-meaning merely that logic broke down, failed,
No "rational" explanation couldin trying to explain them, 
be adequate or they would lose their super—rational charac€er.
For the Existentialist, then, to say that life is
To imprison it with an in­absurd is to give it freedom, 
adequate "logical" explanation is only to put it in a closed
to creative possibilities.system, to destroy its openness 
Paradoxically, then, the Existentialist asserts that if life 
is absurd there is hope—hope for becoming what one is not,
and not remaining what one is.
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In following out the implications of Roquentin* 
experience in the park, we have encountered many of the 
basic concepts in Sartrefs philosophical thought: 1) We 
noted that viscosity symbolizes manfs involvement in the 
world# 2) In viscosity was discovered the appropriation 
against onefs will which is a part of life. The "fear of 
appropriation" is basic in Sartre; the appropriation may 
be either by the en-soi or, as will be seen, by the "other 
All the Existentialists jealously guard the self 
against appropriation by the lower self and by the world#^ 
3) We noted that viscosity is analogous to consciousness, 
and we noted that Sartrefs basic concern is with conscious­
ness; we noted too the relationship of viscosity and con­
sciousness as illustrated by Sartre in the final pages of 
Being and Nothingness. 4) Enlarging upon the analogy of 
viscosity to consciousness, we found that Sartre asserts 
that consciousness may tend in one of two direction-com­
plexes: a) to be more opaque, solid, and inert--toward the 
en-soi—that is, toward being other-directed through con­
ceiving of oneself as object of the gaze of another; or b) 
to become more fluid, flickering, translucent, mobile—to­
ward the pour-soi—that is, toward being inner-directed, 
ceiving of oneself in terms of freedom and potentiality#
s
person."
con-
^The unhappy love affairs of Kierkegaard and Rilke 
may be seen as a product of "fear of appropriation," that 
love had to be sacrificed to the realization of the self*
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5) Sartre tries to achieve a unity of these two tendencies 
which does not seek to deny or cancel one through the other 
but to realize each through the aid of the other. The unity 
to be sought for is a combination which Sartre calls the ”en- 
soi-pour-soi.” Sartre combines these two factors in his 
famous definition of man: nMan is not what he is (en-soi. 
merely), and is what he is not (pour-soi. or what he can be­
come) .” Man is defined in terms of what he is and what he
lacks, or is not: man is defined, in other words , in terms
6) Thus, one comes to speak of 
consciousness in terms of nothingness and the projection of
This is Sartre’s version of tran-
of Being and nothingness.
the self into nothingness.
Consciousness transcends the here in knowing and 
the now in willing; in knowing one’s potential and in willing
scendence.
one is projecting oneself into a lack, what is lacking now. 
This lack is ”not-being” or non-being; it is a nothingness.
Thus, the existence of nothingness is the very condition of 
transcendence, and transcendence is a projection of the pres­
ide realization of thisent being into this nothingness.
’’lack” is not like the selection of a possibility in a closed
system; rather this "lack” is nothingness, pure non-existence
accurately, is creation, byprior to its realization, or more 
the free individual. 7) These facts led us to a definition
Sar-of freedom as the creative realization of potentiality, 
tre’s definition of freedom goes far beyond this, in fact,
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but this aspect shows the close relationship of freedom to 
nothingness, as well as to consciousness, the pour-soi. 
transcendence, and creative realization of potentialities.
S) The pour-soi. then, is the instrument of existential free­
dom and transcendence. (The en-soi represents the inert 
facticity of involvement in the world.) 9) It was also noted 
that the use of the word "absurd” in Existentialism is taken 
more calmly in countries that have believed less in logic.
Absurdity refers to the failure, indeed the intrinsic in-
10) Finally, theadequacy of logical explanation of life, 
relationship of the dread before the absurdity of life to 
the possibility of freedom,was noted, and thereby the re­
lationship of absurdity, dread, and nothingness, 
consciousness, the pour-soi. freedom, transcendence, ab­
surdity, dread, and nothingness—all are interrelated, all 
are related in a complex concept of the way in which the 
self pro.iects itself into the future: consciousness being
And so
the condition of it; pour-soi being the personal instrument
; nothingness rep-of it; freedom being the possibility of it 
resenting the present non-being of it; and transcendence
the act of achieving it.
With all these 
concept of the self
The self as a projective structure.
considerations, then, there emerges a 
as a forward-projecting being, whichclearly reveals a debt
Yetto Heidegger's concept of the "geworfene Entwurf.
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Sartre has given this concept a different emphasis. 
Heidegger's consideration did not emphasize 
but assumed it.
consciousness
His concern was with being-in-the-world, 
the structure of dare, the personal structure of time, the
way in which the individual reacted to his possibilities 
and to death. Sartre, on the other hand, makes conscious- 
The reality is not so much a mysterious 
Sein sverstSndnis (understanding of Being) as merely individual
ness central.
consciousness, translucent and pre-reflective. Thus, before 
Sartre begins his consideration of the questions of Being 
and nothingness, he adds a compact introduction which asks 
essentially, "How is it with consciousness?” This intro­
duction summarizes and presumes some of his previous writing
Although thison, and generally deals with, consciousness, 
introduction- is titled "Pursuit of Being," the territory
through which Being is pursued and the true subject of the
For Sartre, Being and nothingnessessay is consciousness.
are no longer mysterious, but matter-of-fact aspects of exss--
Thus, althoughistence with which consciousness must deal.
Sartre’s analysis of being-in-the-world seems similar to
Heidegger’s, the "world" itself seems altogether different. 
Part of this difference is the threat in the gaze of the 
"other person"; this aspect will be considered subsequently.
V: ■
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Freedom. Freedom has been discussed above as an 
attribute of the pour-soi, as future-oriented in its tempo­
ral structure, and therefore related to the realization of 
what is presently non-being, "lacking,” nothingness, poten- 
Certain other implications of freedom may be con-tiality.
sidered.
Freedom is intentional. This means that it involves 
decision, and, of course, action. It also means that action 
is projective, that it points into the future. If a person 
throws away a lighted cigarette which happens to set off a 
fuse, which in turn produces an explosion, he has not acted. 
On the other hand, the worker who sets off the charge as 
part of his work has acted. [EN, p. 50S; BN, p. 433] He 
has acted intentionally, and therefore exercised his free­
dom. If he had had no freedom, no action would have taken 
place. As Sartre- puts it, "the fundamental condition of 
action is the freedom of the acting being." [EN, p. 511; BN,
P. 436]
Because man has theMan is "condemned to be free." 
property of intention, the ability to look forward, he is
"We are not free to cease being free."forced to be free:
By the sole fact that I am conscious of the causes 
which inspire my action, these causes are already tran­
scendent objects for my consciousness; they are outside. 
In vain shall I seek to catch hold of them; I escape 
them by my very existence. I am condemned to exist for­
ever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of 
I am condemned to be free. This means that no
be found except freedom itselfmy act. limits to my freedom can
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^ mOU Pre^er> that we are not free to cease being 
free* To the extent that the for-itself wishes to hide 
its own nothingness from itself and incorporate the in- 
lt-self as its true mode of being, it is trying also to 
hide its freedom from itself. [EN, p. 515; BN, pp. 439-40]
Freedom is based on the conception of man as nothing— 
• Freedom is only possible because the pour-soi is negv 
ative, that is, that the pour-soi is always other than what 
It is, itself, the Existenz that precedes the essence; 
for essence is of what ij3, and pour-soi is the nothingness 
of all that is presently not, most especially the future. 
Hegel said this in his famous saying, "Wesen ist was gewesen 
istfTI essence is what is and has been; existence is con=
ness
is.
tained most authentically in the exercise of freedom in the 
free act, the introduction of what was negative, 
"introducing" consumes itself in the act and is gone, for 
it has no essence: it is existence: it is freedom; it is 
consciousness; it is nothingness:
But this
if negation comes into the world through human- 
reality, the latter must be a being who can realize 
a nihilating rupture with the world and with himself;
the permanent possibility of this rupture is the 
same as freedom. ...this permanent possibility of 
nihilating what I am in the form of "having-been" 
implies for man a particular type of existence 
For the for-itself, to be is to nihilate the in-it— 
self which it is. Under these conditions freedom 
can be nothing other than this nihilation. It is 
through this that the for-itself.escapes its being 
as its essence; it is through this that the for-it­
self is always something other than what can be said 
of it. [EN, pp. 514-5; BN, p. 439]
...
....
Because man contains this for-itself which is always ne­
gating the present state of man, man brings nothingness in—
• j .
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to the world. As Sartre puts it, ’’human reality is its 
nothingness.” [Same]
Freedom is situational. The fact that the pour-soi 
is more than future,
own
is temporality (that is, it could 
not conceive of itself without a past and present), means
that even the pour-soi itself is, in a sense, situational. 
The pour-soi. after all, expresses itself in situation, but 
the situation itself is much more than merely pour-soi. for 
pour-soi is consumed in existing the situation. The fact 
that there is a situation also implies that other pour-sois 
are also in the situation and the situation becomes the 
"world.” One is, it is true, thrown into the world; one 
does not choose his situation,nor is the situation a sub­
jective projection, but a "given," a resisting "given” on
(Like Heidegger, Sartre seeswhich the individual may act. 
the resistance of the objective world as proof of the fact 
that it is not a projection of the human subject, but ob­
jectively present and real.) Freedom does not lie in any 
ability to select which thrownness one will be the object
of, but in viewing the techniques of the situation into
which one is always already thrown as things which can be
-1
One then becomes masterfreely appropriated or rejected, 
of the situation. One appropriates the techniques of one* s
configuration through a free act of 
thrown into the world, one also
world into a meaningful 
choice. Thus, while one is
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founds one’s own world, and chooses oneself in the world; 
this is what it means to be free:
ijs is by choosing itself and by historicizing it— 
self in the world that the for-itself historicizes the 
world itself Henceforth, precisely because the 
techniques appear as objects, the for-itself can choose
This historicization, which is 
the effect of the for-itself’s free choice, in no way 
restricts its freedom; quite the contrary, it is in this 
world and no other that its freedom comes into play; it 
is in connection with its existence in this world that 
it puts itself into question. For to be free is not 
to choose the historic world in which one arises—which 
would have no meaning—but to choose oneself in the 
world whatever this may be.ITEM, p. 604; BNj?.521. Under­
score in final sentence is my own.]
• • • •
to appropriate them • • • •
Freedom, then, is a choosing of oneself, 
jectively defined quality of a situation, but a structure of 
the individual consciousness, an ontological structure of 
existence and a prerequisite of meaningful and creative 
Freedom is not an abstraction in a political or 
economic system; freedom is the supreme quality of the au­
thentically existing self.
Freedom involves ffappropriation.11 
priation of experience is a basic aspect of SartreTs thought. 
While one is always in a situation, one appropriates from 
it what one chooses and thus one constitutes a situation.
It is not an ob-
action.
The free appro-
Because of freedom, one can appropriate; because of con-
Sartre puts it, freedom (by 
through consciousness) ”adds
tingency there is choice; as 
rising above the situation 
nothingness to things”:
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The project of my freedom adds nothing to things:
°®u®es ^-efe p. be things.... It is because freedom 
is condemned to be free-i.e., can not choose itself as 
freedom that there are things; that is, a plenitude of 
contingency at the heart of which it is itself contin­
gency. It is by the assumption of this contingency and 
by surpassing it that there can be at once a choice and 
and an organization of things in situation: and it is 
the contingency of freedom and the contingency of the 
m-itself which are expressed in situation by the un­
predictability and the adversity of the environment. 
Thus I am absolutely free and absolutely responsible 
for my situation. But I am never free except in sit­
uation. [EN, p. 591; BN, p. 509]
One can never be free except in a situation, but one must 
also be above and outside the situation in order to be truly 
free in Sartre’s sense of the word.
Psychologically, appropriation is a basic motivation 
of human action. Thus, Sartre asserts that the "final dis­
coveries" of his ontology become the'Yirst principles of 
psychoanalysis." [EN, p. 664; BN, 575] He spends the final 
portions of Being and Nothingness elaborating on the ways
in which ontology forms the foundation for an adequate psy-
Indeed, Sartrechoanalysis of the phenomenon of possession, 
views appropriation or possession as the basic mode of human
existence:
to the extent that I appear to myself as creating 
objects by the sole relation of appropriation, these 
objects are myself. The pen and the pipe, the clothing, 
the desk, the house—are myself. The totality of my 
possessions reflects the totality of my being. I am 
what I have. It is I myself which I touch in this cup, 
in this trinket. This mountain which I climb is myself 
to the extent that I conquer it; and when I am at its 
summit, which I have "achieved" at the cost of "this 
same effort, when I attain this magnificent view of 
the valley and the surrounding peaks, then X am the
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view; the panorama is myself dilated to the horizon, for 
it exists only through me, only for me. [EN, pp. 630-1; 
BN, pp. 590-1]
Thus, existence itself is a form of creative appropriation.
The central aspect—the creative aspect—of appropriation is
that it reveals itself only through movement and transition.
It is defined in terms of the transition it effects:
; Creation can be conceived and maintained only as a
continued transition from one term to the other. As 
the object rises up in my world, it must simultaneously 
be wholly me and wholly independent of me. This is 
what we believe that we are realizing in possession.
The possessed object as possessed is a continuous cre­
ation. [EN, p. 681; BN, p. 591]
Thus, creative possession is the way in which the pour-soi 
appropriates the objects in its world, transforming them,
Butas Heidegger would say, from Vorhandene to Zuhandene. 
appropriation is more basic than that, for in Sartre every­
thing seems to be engaged in appropriation; The pour-soi 
seeks to appropriate the body to its purposes as well as 
the external environment; the en-soi tries to absorb the
pour-soi: the en-soi-pour-soi has to face the threat of
The ''techniques” tryappropriation by the "other person."
to absorb the pour-soi. try to absorb those who use then 
while the existing individual struggles to master them for
Possession is a foundation of desire and 
the basis on which the in-
his own purposes, 
the threat of appropriation is 
dividual existing human being must face all other individ­
uals and their appropriating gazes.
1*5
Appropriation, however, can never be complete, and 
the story of man's life is one of frustration. Love, for 
instance, is a passion for possession, yet the mark of pos­
session is not clear on the thing possessed. If appropri­
ation is complete then the object is enslaved and the re­
sponse either denied or meaningless because what is really 
desired is the impossible possession of the freedom of the 
other, which, possessed, is no longer free. The loved one 
cannot be loved as both subject and object, for the freedom 
of the other is the foundation of my being, 
becomes object, I shatter my own freedom, for it is always 
through the other that my freedom is determined, [EN, p. 433] 
It is impossible to possess a freedom as freedom, then, CEN, 
p. 434] Love is innately paradoxical and ultimately must 
end in frustration.
If the other
Appropriation is aThe Look of the "Other Person."
basic motive of the self, but the self soon learns that
sort of motivation. Asthere are other selves with the same 
one looks around himself in an endeavor to appropriate the
encounters the glance of thesurrounding environment, one
Suddenly one realizes that he is
longer subject, but
of the environment of some- 
longer the center of the uni- 
Yet the very existence
"other person," 1’autre.
being watched; he realizes that he is no
One is being made a partobject.
one else, and is therefore no 
verse but only a mere planet.
186
of the other functions to give me an outside, to give me 
an objective identity.
This situation creates a particular type of fear, 
the fear of appropriation—or, to put it another way, fear 
of the loss of freedom. Thus, the basic emotion in many 
relationships between individual consciousnesses is fear.
and the basic mode is conflict. Sartre states that nThe 
essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not 
Mitsein, but conflict.” [EN, p. 4S4] This conflict may not 
materialize into action, but it remains conflict, the flight 
from the eve of the other. Sometimes the best way is to
try to appropriate the other, making an attack as the best
On the first level this turns into a duel
On other levels,
sort of defense.
between etre-regardant and etre-regarde. 
it may take other forms depending on whether the self wishes 
to appropriate the other-through love, desire, sadism, or 
hate—-or to become an object for the other—in masochism 
or whether the state of the self is unconsciousness of the 
significance of the other person—indifference.
A combination of the concept of appropriation and
the significance of the look, for Sartre, ten* to explain
;l) love, 2) desire, 3) sadism, 4) masochism,
Sartre's explanation of the
the nature of:
5) hate, and 6) indifference, 
underlying reasons for 
one of/^st brilliant and original parte of his analysis.
these different states constitutes
1S7
1) Love is the effort to possess the freedom of the 
other, which, being possessed, is no longer a freedom, thus 
rendering the object sought unseekable. 
a freedom as a freedom.
One cannot possess
2) Desire is always sexual desire, 
attempt to undress the body of its movements as of its 
clothes and to make it exist as pure flesh; it is an attempt 
at incarnation of the body of the Other.” [EN,
p. 459] This ’’incarnation” of the body of the Other is 
accomplished through the caress, which Sartre describes as 
a ’’shaping” through which I make the flesh of the other be 
’’born.” [Same] But what desire wants is not merely the
’’Desire is an
possession of the body; rather it also wants the transcend-
As Sartre notes, this is thegnce of the other person, 
desire for true possession, possession of what in tradi­
tional terminology is called body and soul:
It is certain that I want to possess the Other’s 
body, but I want to possess it in so far as it is itself 
a "possessed”; that is, in so far as the Other’s con-^ 
sciousness is identified with his body. Such is the im­
possible ideal of desire: to possess the Other’s tran­
scendence as pure transcendence and at the same time as 
body f to reduce the Other to his simple facticity. because 
he is then in the midst of my world but to bring it about 
that this facticity is a perpetual appresentation of his 
nihilating transcendence. [EN, pp. 363-4; BN, p. 394]
satisfied; it remains a paradoxDesire, then, can never be 
and an impossibility.
3) Sadism is also an expression
, n other—through the infliction ofpossess the freedom of the ouner 6
of the desire to
It is at the same time a desire to use one's own 
body only as an instrument:
in sadism the emphasis is put on the instrumental 
appropriation of the incarnated-Other. The "moment" of 
sadism In sexuality is the one in which the incarnated 
for-itself surpasses its own incarnation in order to 
appropriate the incarnation of the Other. Thus sadism 
is a refusal to be incarnated and a flight from all 
facticity and at the same time an effort to get hold of 
the Other's facticity. [EN, p. 469; BN, p. 399]
4) Masochism is the inverse of sadism. The desire
pain.
of the masochist is to become purely an object for the Other. 
The shame of being an object of the gaze of another is not
The masochist loves to feel this shame.fled but sought.
But even the masochist is doomed to frustration and failure;
and, as Sartre observes, the repeated experience of this 
failure to annihilate one's subjectivity by having it ab­
sorbed into the Other is always "accompanied by the ex-
of failure so that fi-hausting and delicious consciousness 
nally it is the failure itself which the subject ultimately 
seeks as his principal goal.” [EN, p. 447; BN, p. 379]
"Even the masochist who pays a woman to whip him is treati g 
her as an instrument and by this very fact posits hirase
in transcendence in relation to her." [Same] Thus, the de­
sire to become encarnated solely as an object, masochism, is
doomed to fail, as is its opposite, sadism, the desire to
the freedom of theresist this type of encarnation and ruin 
The masochist's desire to enslave his freedom andOther.
enslave the freedom of the Other arethe sadist's desire to
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both doomed to ultimate dissatisfaction and failure.
5) Hate is the attempt of the self to avoid being an
object for another by wishing the extinction or destruction 
of the Other. Hate is a negative sort of recognition of the 
power of the freedom of the Other. Yet, of course, the ex­
istence of the Other is a necessary aspect of one's own
freedom, so that the extinction of the Other is only an in­
direct extinction of the very thing one is trying to protect. 
Thus, the effort of hate to extinguish the Other and the op­
posite effort to preserve and possess the freedom of the
The Other must exist,Other in love are both equally futile, 
yet existing as a freedom, he must inevitably exist as a 
threat and as a thing to try to appropriate.
6) Indifference is "blindness" to the gaze of the
Other; it is the state in which one is unconscious—of the
In this state one could not possibly
This is the state of
gaze of the Other.
feel, say, the shame of the masochist.
"bad faith," the lack of the realization that there are
Thus, what Heidegger calls das Manother subjectivities, 
reappears in Sartre:
In this state of blindness I conc^rently ignore
the Other's absolute subjectivity as the-£ SJtic-
my being-in-itself and my being-for-othe , Epassured
ular of my "body for others. In a ®®n ^ f Vprf alien!.r+.Mc o Rpruhieung in the state of Veriaiienj,
I am self-conlfSJt; that iSTT am in no i'SaSbiliSiS- 
the fact that the Other's looktJfv£y opposite of what
I am at ease; I am not em- 
outside; I do not feel
I am in a stateand my body. _
we call shyness or timidity, 
barrassed by myself, lor I am
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myself alienated. This state of blindness can be main­
tained for a long time, as long as my fundamental bad 
faith desires; it can be extended—with relapses—over 
several years, over a whole life; there are men who die 
without—save for brief and terrifying flashes of illu­
mination—ever having suspected what the Other is. [EN. 
p. 449; BN, p. 381]
Sartre singles out the feelings which he sees as important 
to the authentically existing person and presents their nega­
tion in the "indifferent” man: I do not feel embarrassed by 
myself; I am not alienated; I am not outside; I am in no way 
conscious, conscious that the Other's look can fix me, much 
as a pin can fix an insect on a board to leave it to struggle 
in vain for freedom. The authentic man (and the Existen­
tialist in philosophy or literature) feels this loss-of-free- 
dom-on—account-of-being-with-others and being-in-the-world; 
he feels that man has become fully and thoroughly problemat­
ical to himself; he feels an alienation from himself and
from those around him—from the systems and values under
and self-realization.which he struggles to gain some meaning
This complex feeling of alienation and the accompanying con-
the "indifferent," whotempt for the masses of those who are 
do not feel this alienation, are 
Exist entialisra.
basic characteristics of
Sartre succeeds brilliantly, too, in presenting the
and from himself—the lonely
is essentially self-
victim of alienation from society 
individual. To say that Existentialism 
centered would be an understatement, but the self is a lonely
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self, a lost creature in an alien and adverse world. The
individual discovers only threat from his body, the world 
of objects, and from other people. For all his individualism, 
the individual does not seem, in Sartre, to have much inner­
ness. His motivation hardly rises above appropriation, and 
the ultimate questions so central to Heidegger are meaning­
less to him. The pattern of relationships to nature and to 
other people has no positive aspect in Sartre; there is only 
the negativity of the threat to the self. Small wonder the 
individual is lonely; on the outside he can find only threats 
and on the inside of himself he is a translucent void, a 
nothingness.
Conclusions Sartre was a student of Heidegger but
his master rightly does not recognize his philosophy in the
Sartre’s contribution was to translatewritings of Sartre.
and unfortunately transform some of the most pregnant as­
pects of Heidegger's analysis of existence into something
In Sartre,not too distant from an existential psychology.
too, the dominating, even unifying, concern with conscious-
with Being as such,ness and freedom replaces the concern 
that is, Being as a mysterious ontological ground of all
Nothingness is translated frombeings and all things.
Heidegger, but the emphasis is not metaphysical but a very
’’lack": Pierre is not here; man is whatrealistic idea of a 
he is not. revelation ofDisclosure, which is a mysterious
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Being through existence and the Seinsverstandnis of*, 
becomes in Sartre merely the process of consciousness# 
Heidegger’s philosophy evolves into poetry and 
ticism, and even the idea that ultimately all is determined 
in Being. Sartre could never take this direction because 
his view is realistic (an historical tendency of the French) 
and eschews mystery; Sartre moves into psychoanalysis and 
psychoanalytical-philosophical plays and novels. Sartre 
views poetry as merely a sort of playing and reveling in 
sensations for their own sake (this inadequate view of po­
etry is a revealing fact); Heidegger regards the function 
of the poet as akin to that of the thinker in revealing the 
nature of Being, for both dwell reverently near the essence 
Heidegger is oracular, inconsistent, occasionally 
obtuse; Sartre is not oracular but rather uses rational per­
suasion on the basis of clear, tight, and systematic expo­
sition. In dialectical skill, indeed, the French have at
man,
mys-
of Being.
last found a rival to Hegel.
Both Heidegger and Sartre, then, have made original
Existentialism; indeed, theircontributions to the theory of
emphases tend to balance each other, for where one wanders
the revelation of Being, the oth- 
pure pre-reflective conscious- 
One has metaphysical depths, the
off into an exploration of 
er presents a concept of man as 
ness empty of all content• 
other has dialectical clarity and realism.
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Unfortunately, a philosophy of an empty consciousness 
endowed with freedom and a body to implement that freedom is 
more an expression of the modern predicament than an anal­
ysis of it. Possessiveness, threat, conflict, fear, and 
loneliness as the basic aspects of human interrelationships 
only express the modern problem but do not provide any 
basis for hope that things will ever be otherwise. Sartre 
merely reduces international power politics to the level of 
personal interrelationships, and in these power interrela­
tionships man is hardly a noble creature, the noblest of 
GodTs creation, but an animal endowed with higher conscious­
ness. Sartre1 s world of freedomism, threat, fear, and pos-
a
sessiveness is/grey, empty world devoid of any spiritual con- 
tent—a world far different from that envisioned by Kierkegaard,
Finally, Sartre presents aMarcel, Jaspers, or Heidegger, 
picture of man as naked and fearful, yet daring heroically to
act to fulfill a self which is, inside, only a translucent
void, an emptiness.
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THEMES AND VARIATIONS IN EXISTENTIAL THOUGHT
One of the most central concerns of existential 
philosophers is the self, 
of the self in his world.
Their analysis is largely that 
In seeking to understand the 
nature of the self, the analysis is not of what the self
is but rather how the self is, and how he relates himself 
to his world, his freedom, and his potentialities, 
of the emphasis on how one exists, Existentialists consider 
that they are contributing to the theory of "being" on the 
In dealing with being—human being in the
Because
human level.
world—the fundamental dynamics of human life seem to become
One might call their in­central elements under scrutiny, 
vestigations "existential dynamics of human life" as meaning­
fully as existential "philosophies" or "ontologies," for
they explore the dynamics of human life—as experienced by
This approach is thean individual existing human'being.
Existentialist’s contribution to the quest for a genuine
Man is not aIt is also his definition of man.reality.
static substance-that-thinks, but a dynamic, existing human
of the dynamics of hisbeing. Man is best defined in terms
existence—the dynamics of the existing self.
valuable approach to the themes andThus, the most
variations of existential thought is a presentation of the
from the simple andgeneral concept of the self, proceeding
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primary aspects of self-awareness to the more complicated 
relationships to time, other selves, and so forth, 
such an approach, the dynamics of the existence of the self 
may, perhaps, be presented more coherently and comprehen­
sibly.
With
The Self. In analyzing the self, the first consid- 
Next is consciousness of con­
text is the more specific consciousness of
eration is consciousness, 
sciousness.
being a self in a body, 
in-a-body-in-a-situation. 
of other consciousness, the consciousness of other beings. 
The self, then, is consciousness in a body and in a situa­
tion and with others.
Next is the consciousness of being-
And then comes the consciousness
The self soon becomes consciousThe Becoming Self.
of the fact that he is a temporal creature, that he exists
He becomes conscious that he isin the dimension of time, 
not a static thing, but a constantly becoming creature.
With this consciousness of becoming comes the consciousness
of the fact that what one is about to become is contingent,
that there are a number of possibilities; one then becomes
ability to change orconscious of a certain power to be» 311 
influence one’s future. One becomes conscious that
makes it, that one ’’founds"certain extent life is what one 
a world. But with this power comes 
the power is not absolute, that
the consciousness that 
the will cannot merely by
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willing bring something into being. There is a coefficient 
of adversity, a resisting force which makes one know that
one is not a power in a powerless universe, but a power a-
The resisting force is often somewhat passive, 
that is, it is constituted by the existing pattern in which
mong powers.
the individual finds himself and the tendency—which 
might call the inertia. of motion and of rest—of the pattern 
to remain fixed and unchanged.
The consciousness of the pattern into which one natu­
rally falls and the consciousness of the power to surpass and 
transcend it create the basic situation in which man finds
one
himself: the situation of the possibility of choosing to re-
Thus,main in the pattern or the decision to transcend it. 
man is always confronted with the possibility of choosing 
between a higher or a lower self, choosing to be a passive 
object moved by the powers which create the pattern, or an 
acting, self-directed subject who chooses freely whether he
will remain meaningfully in a pattern or meaningfully tran-
here studied assert tha€scend it. All the Existentialists 
man is the creature who chooses 
the need for decision.
to the future, man is future-oriented, 
man is a projective structure; man is a 
himself into the future.
Entwurf aspect of man's manner of exis g
what he will be; all assert
Because decision is always directed
In existential terms, 
creature who extends 
what Heidegger calls theThis is
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Thus, man is not merely a con­
scious self and a becoming self; man is a chosen self, for 
he has chosen to be what he is. Another way of saying this 
is to say that man is free.
The Chosen Self.
But the self who chooses him­
self authentically is the self who affirms himself "in spite 
In spite of others, in spite of the inauthenticity of 
the world, in spite of the nothingness within himself, the
of."
authentic self affirms his value, his freedom, his power.
As Tillich has put it, the authentic man has the "courage to 
be."^ The world of Verfallenr-that is. the world of "decline" 
—confronts the self with a threat to his powers. Likewise,
the necessary contingency of life, of fate and death,
Thus, the existing
con­
stitutes a threat to the power to be.
self must choose to be, must affirm himself in spite of the
threats of non-being in the forms of fate, death, meaning—
The self mustlessness, emptiness, guilt, and condemnation.
choose to be and make a "leap" from anxiety to affirmation. 
This leap is, in a sense, irrational and a leap into nothing-
existential necessity,ness, but in another sense it is an 
a mark of courage and good judgment 
The Appropriating Self.
function of the self in his world as "appropriation." 
self tends to appropriate experience, to make it his own.
in the larger sense. 
Sartre has described a basic
The
1See Courage to Be (New Haven, 1952).
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He attempts to make life his own by controlling it. 
self must maintain his selfycenteredness by making his world 
be in relationship to himself.
The
Unfortunately, the self soon 
learns that there are other selves in his world operating on
the same principle. This leads to a fear of appropriation by 
other selves. And the fear of appropriation is not limited 
to other selves, but for the existing self is a fear of the 
loss of control in general, that is, a fear of appropriation
by his world and by the facticity of his own body.
Awareness. Facticity. Situationalitv. and Freedom. 
One may say, then, that four basic aspects of man’s mode of 
being-in-the-world are consciousness, facticity, situation-
ality, and freedom. 1) Consciousness is the first attri-
2) Facticity is the inescap-
3) Situation-
bute of the existing being.
able fact of being fastened in one’s own body, 
ality is the equally inescapable fact of always being in a
it and always havingsituation and never being able to escape
to find one’s realization through it.
a free agent.
4) Freedom refers to 
One is not only
the future).
the power to act on life as
intois intentional (which pointsconscious; one is 
One has, in other words, the power of intentional action.
SituationalitvFacticityConsequences of Awareness*,
means that 
of a situation,
of consciousness1) The existence 
one is, by the very fact 
somehow above it, transcending
and. Freedom.
of being conscious
. One transcends the hereit
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now in the act of willing.
Consciousness, like electricity, eludes definition, 
sense,
in the act of knowing and the
In a
it is not a thing or substance at all, but a trans- 
lucence. It projects the self into the future and 
it the self points toward the future.
through 
Since it is so much
concerned with what is not-yet, what will be, its nature is 
essentially to negate the present for the future, 
in a sense, nothing at all—a nothingness.
It is,
It is the way,
to put it otherwise, in which nothingness is presented to
the existing self. Thus, consciousness implies the exist­
ence of both nothingness and transcendence. Consciousness 
has, in a sense, created nothingness and transcendence.
2) Facticity. The existence of facticity creates
Facticity fastens the conscious­
ness to a specific body in which it must reside and find 
its expression. Facticity creates a force which acts as a 
coefficient of adversity or resistence against the conscious­
ness. It is, indeed, a force trying to appropriate con­
sciousness and thus to make it adjust to being fully deter
of facticity, then,
of self to realize that
the need for incarnation.
mined by pure facticity. The consequence
is the need for the pure awareness 
its realization must come through incarnation in the body.
of expression of con-The body is the instrument and means
sciousness.
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3) Situationality. Situationality creates a similar 
need in reference to time and space; the consciousness which 
is encarnated in a body must also find expression in a given 
time and space, a time and space not generally chosen by it, 
any more than it chose its body. Similarly, too, situation- 
ality exerts a force tending to make the individual conform 
to an already existing pattern, to become a part of a mass, 
a movement, and age, and thereby relieving him of the need 
to form his own pattern of self-realization. Situationality 
creates the ground, in other words, for what Existentialists 
call "inauthenticity."
4) Freedom. Freedom, on the other hand, creates 
the possibility of "authenticity," for it creates the demand
on the existing being to rise above both facticity and sit-
realization that, as a temporal being,uationality through a
become other than he is, and that in a thousand dailyhe can
Freedomchoices, a man chooses for or against himself.
of decision and the fact
make life meaningful, appropriate
makes man realize the importance 
that he must, in order to
(Kierkegaard pictured the appro-
Truth in its most 
of an objective 
the self.)
The
experience to himself.
Priation process in reference to truth. 
Profound sense is actually the appropriation
inwardness to
it can be lost..
Thus, freedom creates both the
uncertainty held with passionate
this meansFreedom is free, however; 
self can be appropriated.
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power to be and the fear of appropriation. In Sartre, it
creates another kind of fear, too: the fear of freedom.
Thus, the inauthentically existing being fears freedom; the 
authentically existing being fears appropriation.
After this brief introductory relating of some of 
the basic existential concepts to the self, this chapter will 
attempt to abstract some of the basic themes from the thought 
of the five philosophers characterized in the first half of 
this dissertation.
The factTemporality: Man as a Protective Structure, 
that man operates in the dimension of time is a concern of 
all the Existentialists, but perhaps Heidegger enlarges on 
this aspect to the greatest degree in his concept of Zeitlich- 
keit. and of Dasein as a temporal structure comprised of
Time,three "ecstasies" of time: past, present, and future.
existential reality, a basic struc-in Heidegger, becomes an 
ture of the self. In the identification of Verfalien with
FaktizitSt with the power 
with the authentic realization 
himself into the
compromise with present existence,
of one’s past, and Existenz
of one’s potentialities as one projects
fVnrlaufen) in thought towardfuture, extending himself out
man as primarily,death (Sein zum Tode), Heidegger presents
or at least most meaningfully a temporal
oriented and his best
And
further, man is distinctly future-
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potentialities are realized when he emphasizes his Existenz. 
Man is defined by Heidegger as both "thrown" upon the world 
and the being who "projects" himself into the future by his
Man is, then, a "thrown project," a geworfeneown decision.
Entwurf.
Another consequence of the emphasis on temporality is
the tendency of all Existentialists characterized to think 
of man not as a static structure, such as a physical sub­
stance, but somehow as something like pure "becoming." 
is his many modes of existing.
Man
The definition of man which
has meaning is not the one which scientifically tells what 
man is and of what he is composed, but rather the one which 
describes the mode of his being, the way he can become, the
he finds himself of the earth and at the
In short, the
situation in which
"a little lower than the angels."
fact that man is conceived as a 
bo the consistent definition of man by the Existentialists in
same time
temporal structure is related
terms of modes of being.
As man exists, the nature of his being
would say) to him.
through the under- 
. Understanding mysteriously lets
it discloses to 
time his 
instrument
Disclosure.
is "disclosed" (erschlossen, as Heidegger
Two important ways being is disclosed are
standing and through anxiety 
man know what he is and what he can become;
facticity and at the same 
Anxiety is also an
him his situation and his 
potentialities and his freedom.
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of disclosure, for it makes man conscious of the threats 
to his existence in death, meaninglessness, and guilt* 
none of these can be avoided, neither can anxiety, 
fear, anxiety (Angst) has no object and cannot be done away 
Anxiety is therefore an underlying constituent mood
Anxiety characterizes the frenzied and meaning­
less activities of the inauthentic man (das Man) :the authentic 
man also knows anxiety, but does not turn from the nothingness 
which anxiety reveals, but dares to face it and to accept it
Since
Unlike
with.
of all life.
into his world.
Thus, disclosure is an important aspect of man's mode 
Disclosure is the process by which man in existingof being.
has the nature of his own being revealed to him.
of finitude is, according toFinitude. The sense
Tillich, "the most fundamental and never missing concept in
o" Logically, the agonized sense of
conceived of 
The existing
than finitude and yet
that the sense
existentialist thought, 
finitude would have no meaning unless it were
finitude in contrast to something else.as
subject is conscious of being more
being surrendered to it; this is the reason
of finitude is that of agonized finitude.
-all disclose man's 
ultimate expression
Facticity, sit- 
finitude to him. 
of finitude,
nationality, temporality- 
And death, of course, is an
2, The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist » Journal of Philosophy. LII (November S, 1956), 742.
Thought
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a phenomenon before which Heidegger shudders, and which, he 
asserts, casts a shadow of death-anxiety over the whole lives 
of all who exist. Anxiety at death, then, is a part of all 
existence; it is an ontological structure. The inauthentic 
man suppresses it; the authentic man extends himself in 
thought out towards death—but no man is without anxiety- 
over death, says Heidegger. (Sartre makes his anxiety a 
shudder before the look of the other person and a fear of 
freedom, and he rejects Heidegger’s special emphasis on the 
importance of death.)
Guilt. Guilt, too, is related to finitude, and is
also a major aspect of the analyses of man by Kierkegaard,
It is defined somewhat dif-Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre, 
ferently in each of them, however, 
is associated with man's fallenness; man 
guilty on account of original sin.
Guilt, in Kierkegaard,
is essentially 
In Jaspers, guilt stems
if one does strivefrom failure to realize one's Existenz; or
of living actively creates a
or rather
to realize it, the very fact
(Schuld) to other people because of taking up
fact of living ac-By the veryfrom their living room, 
lively one takes life away 
°ne can live without guilt, 
with "bad faith." 
a°d no~one can escape his facticity.
Therefore, no­
guilt is connected 
bad faith 
is intrin-
from other people.
In Sartre,
live without some 
Again, man
No-one can
sically guilty.
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Continuing a considerationNothingness and Anxiety, 
of finitude and guilt, one discovers that finitude is also 
intimately related to nothingness and with the anxiety which
comes with nothingness. Nothingness (or non-being) makes
finitude what it is. It is the nothingness in death that 
creates the anxiety and the sense of man’s essential finitude.
Likewise, the nothingness in moral self-affirmation is what, 
according to Tillich, is responsible for guilt:
In every act of moral self-affirmation man contributes 
to the fulfillment of his destiny, to the actualization of
But however the norm is formu-what he potentially is.... 
lated man has the power of acting against it, of contra­
dicting his essential being, of losing his destiny. And 
under the conditions of man’s estrangement from himself 
this is an actuality. Even in what he considers his best 
deed non-being is present and prevents it>from being per­
fect. A profound ambiguity between good and evil permeates 
everything he does, because it permeates his personal being 
as such. Non-being is mixed with being in his moral self- 
affirmation. The awareness of this ambiguity is the feel­
ing of guilt, rCourage to Be, p. 52]
Non-being is in the best act, keeping it from perfection.
This sense of imperfection and ambiguity is called guil
for this imperfection.And non-being is the root and reason 
Thus, the concepts of finitude, nothingness, guilt, and anx-
the nothingness in finitudeiety are all interrelated: It is
which induces the form of anxiety called guilt.
all existential thought, is
It is the reaction of
Anxiety, then, in nearly
Produced by non-being, or nothingness.
to put it
finitude, the non-being
more positively, the 
in one’s being.
the self to nothingness, or 
nothingness in one's
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The nothingness which threatens being and produces 
anxiety has been valuably divided into three levels 
being*-the ontic, the spiritual, and the moral*-by Tillich:
I suggest that we distinguish three types of anxiety 
according to the three directions in which non-being 
threatens being. Non-being threatens manfs ontic self- 
irmation, relatively in terms of fate, absolutely 
in terms of death. It threatens man’s spiritual self— 
affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolute­
ly in terms of meaninglessness. It threatens man’s mor­
al self-affirmation relatively in terms of guilt, abso­
lutely in terms of condemnation. The awareness of this 
three-fold threat is anxiety appearing in three forms, 
that of fate and death (briefly, the anxiety of death), 
that of emptiness and loss of meaning (briefly, the anx­
iety of meaninglessness), that of guilt and condemnation 
(briefly, the anxiety of condemnation). In all three 
forms anxiety is existential in the sense that it belongs 
to existence as such and not to an abnormal state of mind 
as in neurotic (and psychotic) anxiety. [Same, p. 41]
Anxiety is a basic aspect of the thought of all the Exis­
tentialists, and in this brief analysis Tillich has inte­
grated some of the most dominant and fundamental concerns 
of existential thinkers: death (especially central in Heideg-
of many’s
ger), meaninglessness (central in Sartre, but perhaps less
Existentialists),a cause for anxiety as such than in other
in Kierkegaard).And guilt (especially prominent
This triumvirate of death, meaninglessness, and gu' ,
dominant aspects of the situationconstitutes three of the 
in which modern man 
that
Tillich asserts, however, 
seems to predominate 
Our period, he says, is 
-being in the
finds himself.
the other of these anxieties 
according to the historical period, 
one of an encounter with spiritual non
one or
two
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forms of the anguished sense of spiritual 
meaninglessness.
emptiness and
Modern man is confronted, then, as never before with 
the threat of meaninglessness. This is the threat with
which he must come to terms if he is to achieve any self- 
Another way of saying the same thingrealization at all. 
is to say that modern man must come to terms with a disin­
tegrating reality« a reality losing its spiritual content—— 
meaning. This is the reason that modern man has become 
problematical to himself and the reason that his world, for 
all his increasing "knowledge” of it, has not become more 
but rather less stable. Meaning has somehow come loose from
our world and gotten lost. God is dead.
Immediacy. An outgrowth of this anxiety at meaning­
lessness is an increased importance placed on immediacy. In
a larger sense, Existentialism itself is a philosophy of im-
In the facemediacy—indeed, the philosophy of immediacy.
of a disintegrating reality, Existentialists turned in quest
They asked,for a dependable reality to concrete experience.
"What constitutes the experiential (existential) reality of 
80 individual, existing human being?" They sought to start
abstract, eternal verities or&gain without dependence on 
essence philosophies. They 
subjectivity is the starting point 
ophy. In such an approach, immediacy
started with themselves; thus,
of all existential philos- 
took high and "eternal
20 8
verities” low priority.
But the immediacy of the Existentialists is not to 
be confused with the shallow immediacy of the impressionist 
or positivist. Rather it must be remembered that immediacy 
is part of the larger structure of existential reality, a 
reality in which the moment is not all-important, but:-rather 
the self is always future-oriented, conscious of his possi­
bilities, of the need for action and decision, of the need 
to choose between authentic and inauthentic existence. It
is, therefore, perhaps advisable to substitute the phrase
” Existentialists"experiential reality" for "immediacy.
placed a great importance on experiential reality, but to
immediacy might imply 
the mere sensations
say they place a great importance on
that they lived solely and completely in 
of the present. Nothing could be less accurate than this
exists primarily in the 
to all of the
assumption, for the Existentialist
future, and reflection is of great importance
characterized in this dissertation.existential philosophers
.,up self, but not the self The Existentialists started with
This con-self of subjectivity.
immediacy that the inter­
secondary or
of mere sensations, but the 
cept of the self so far transcends
sense becomes aest in immediacy in the narrow 
even tertiary consideration 
they would say, can be illusory, 
reality on which an existing
immediacy,The reality of mere
searching for a; we are
can depend.human being
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Isolation, Alienation, and Loneliness: Individualism. 
There is a double edge to a consideration of individuality
Kierkegaard and all subsequent Existen­
tialists pointed to the loss of individualism with dismay.
Yet the very victims of this loss were losing their spiritual 
lives and losing meaning-as-such with a fair degree of equa- 
Their anxiety was suppressed, their isolation denied, 
and their alienation unrecognized until the multiple changes 
in the structure of society would allow them to be concealed
in Existentialism.
nimity.
no longer.
The double edge is that the Existentialists themselves
were the anxiety-stricken and isolated, the lonely and alien-
the inherent individualism of Exis-ated. The fact is, that 
tentialism doomed its adherents to the isolation of solipsism.
marked merely "That Individual,"
and Sartre,
Kierkegaard wanted his grave
Existentialists, especially Heideggerand the other 
have been conscious of being the exceptions, the out
from the self; itExistentialism startsWhy is this? 
is a self-centered philosophy, even if the term "self-cen-
Also, by making 
individual
sense.tered" is not taken in any pejorative
a distinction between the authentically exi
existing people, theinauthenticallyand the great mass of 
Existentialist cuts 
thinking person has always been 
manity. The inherent solips^sm
, just as the 
the rest of hu-
himself off from humanity 
cut off from
of Existentialismof much
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is perhaps its crowning defect, for this fact tends to 
vitiate its significance as a philosophy having social value. 
It is ethical in its emphasis on integrity and decision, but 
it is unable to deal with (indeed, is unconcerned with) ethics 
on the super-personal level, 
tentialism in immature and half-comprehending hands can be­
come from the social point of view pernicious and decadent.
Sartre's system of threat is also an isolating factor.
He is con-
This is the reason that Exis-
The self is isolated, threatened and fearful, 
stitutionally and by nature engaged in trying to appropriate
The self, there-experience, his body, and other people.
fore, is by nature of his function cut off and even at odds
the final consummation ofThis iswith all other people, 
a self-centered philosophy, a self in an alien and adverse
world, a world peopled by other selves also bent on appro-
In Sartre, the individual is,priating and controlling.
in the final analysis, empty and alone.
, Sartre'sFortunately for existential philosophy 
Point of view—realistic as it may be, and consistent as it
of existential philosophy—may be with the other assumptions
who have here been
this weak-
is not shared by other Existentialists
characterized.
have perceivedThe other thinkers 
nes Existentialism and have
Porated elements not 
thought in an effort to repair
success, incor—, with varying
istentialisra into theirinherent in Exis
inherent in anthe soliPsism
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approach whose starting point is the self. Kierkegaard
put in the crucial phrase, "before God,” and thus created 
an external absolute outside the self which gave perspective 
to the self. Marcel explored the "I-Thou" relationship and
posited inter—human relationships as ontologically grounded 
in love. Tillich’s "ultimate concern" and self-affirming 
courage tend to balance the anxiety and loneliness in Exis­
tentialism. Jaspers sets forth his doctrine of "philosophi­
cal faith" based on encompassing Being which puts the indi­
vidual in a perspective which encompasses him, and Jaspers 
wishes to base interhuman relationships on "loving communi­
cation." For Heidegger, man is gradually dwarfed by the
importance of Being, and interhuman relationships are based
Yet,on a rather vague and mystical conception of Mitsein. 
with all these additions, Existentialism remains severely
weakened by reason of its being inherently a self-centered 
On the other hand, this very fact is perhapsphilosophy.
a source of its greatness and its strength in comparison
with other more academic philosophies.
Authenticity: the Transits to Authentic Ea=tSB£e-
Existentialism may be 
ticity, for its program is 
inauthentic existing to existing as an
considered the philosophy of authen-
invariably the transition from
authentic human being
has the possibility 
involves the act of
with power to be and to become what one
invariablyto become. This transition
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self-affirmation in the face of adversity; thus, courage, 
the courage to make a decision for authentic 
a basic existential virtue, 
pect of authentic existence-struggle. One needs not only 
to have the courage to make the "leap” from anxiety at noth­
ingness to self-affirmation in spite of nothingness, one 
must also struggle constantly with the fact that one is 
"thrown” and with one's facticity. The self is in a con­
stant struggle with facticity and situationality.
existence, is 
Courage indicates another as-
Thus, the
transition to authenticity brings out other existential dy-
, the need for decision, struggle, self-af- 
thrownness, facticity, situationality, nothing- 
and the "leap" from anxiety into affirmation. 
Condemnation: the Gegendenker Complex, 
gained a reputation as a Gegendenker.
namics: courage
firmation,
ness,
Heidegger has
Superficially, it
He is againstseems that he is against (gegen) everything.
sll the traditional metaphysics, the technological domina-
all western civi-even against
. He has, consequently,
tion of man, and in a sense, 
lization since the pre-Socratics 
been rewarded with nearly everybody of Y authority except
he did not flee 
did not tend to
Unlike Jaspers, 
with them
Hitler being against hi§* 
the Nazis, and his association 
bring him any widespread populari y 
Indeed, all the 
by their tendency to reaction
after the war. 
have been distinguished
They are
Existentialists
and condemnation.
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often more aware of what they 
nature of what they are for. 
to both idealism and realism; they 
both totalitarianism and 
against forms of positivism and
are against than the exact
They are opposed, for instance,
are generally against 
capitalistic democracy; they are
against naturalism; they are 
opposed to excessive abstraction, essentialistic philosophy,
and intellectualizing.
This "anti-" character makes it a popular procedure 
with those seeking to explain the nature of Existentialism
to begin by telling what it is not. Ulrich Sonnemann, in 
his Existence and Therapy, follows this pattern:
- a rough and preliminary characterization
h r*?1® dorninant and common trend, we may say that it 
aecidedly steers away from positivism, functionalism, 
instrumentalism, pragmatism, and operationalism and to- 
a rediscovery of spontaneous man in his world: in 
this process, such older metaphysical beliefs as *’ra- 
tionalism" and "empiricism," "complementary errors" to 
the phenomenological glance, are analyzed and rejected. 
Also rejected are the newer metaphysics in disguise 
which, ever since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
have prevented man’s understanding of himself in his 
world from keeping pace with his growing power of and 
interest in, ob.iect-manipulation. impeding the inner 
growth of what, somewhat inadequately is called the 
"social" sciences.*
Thus, Existentialism attempts to distinguish itself fro
thought, and toother currents of philosophical (and other) 
determine its own identity. For this reason there dae an
Al-be mentioned.
on action, it
abundance of other oppositions which 
though Existentialism places a heavy.- stress
3 (New Yorkj 1954)> P« 99*
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opposes mere vitalism,and although there is much that is 
irrational in Existentialism, Existentialists 
irrationalist metaphysics.
oppose an
They are opposed to logic and 
logical explanations of life—for life is absurd—but they
do not wish to think of their philosophy as a form of irra­
tionalism. They are opposed to forms of biological and oth­
er determinism and assert that man is a free agent. They 
oppose abstraction and the intellectualization of reality.
They are quick, in other words, to reject any "system" which 
will explain man or world-hi story. They oppose any system 
which is based on logic as not adequate to explain man.
They reject any effort to make a part of man or an analysis 
of a part of man—for instance the biological part—to apply 
to the whole man or to seem to explain the whole man. They 
are opposed to evolution and the concept of progress, asserting 
that the events of history and the development of man are 
created by man and cannot possibly be logically anticipated, 
that man's development does not show continuity but radical
discontinuity at every important juncture.
The opposition to the depersonalization and the de-
Man isspiritualization of man has been discussed earlier, 
not a mere thing steered by inner instincts and drives nor 
the external forces of race. moment, and milieu, but is a
He is a human being. Exis-free and self-determining agent, 
tentialism protests the inroads made on the personality of
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man by technological advances and the consequent changes 
in social structures. In short, Existentialism has in various 
ways and at various times bitterly objected to the dehumani­
zation of man.
The opposition to so many aspects of modern culture
makes Existentialism seem essentially negative, and its 
critics are quick to discount it as a passing form of nihil­
ism brought on by the despair of the wars. Its emphasis on
non-being and nothingness only increases the ease with which
Existentialism can be attacked and characterized as a form
of anarchism and decadence. Thus, Existentialists may even 
seem reactionary, for they appear constantly to be negating 
the present and to point to the superiority of man "before 
the (industrial or essentialist) revolution." Or they may 
harp on the inferiority of the present in comparison with 
the brave new future kind of man they advocate. In any case, 
the Jeremiah complex seems to be a dominant strain in Exis­
tential philosophy.
A word must be said in defense and explanation, how- 
One must bear in mind that the Existentialist isever.
making a sincere effort to rid himself of all "bad faith"
Theand to arrive at a genuine and dependable reality, 
fact that he starts from the self and the immediate expe­
riences of the self entails an initial rejection of all ab-
One should be careful to weigh the valuestract systems.
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not of their rejections only, however, but of what they 
themselves propose. One cannot fairly appraise the contri­
bution of Existentialists merely by what they are against, 
by
but rather/what they are for and the basic validity of their
own analysis of existence. The condemnation of systems is 
a prominent aspect of Existentialism, but it is only the
negative part of a much larger structure which must be under­
stood and appreciated before a valid judgment may be made as 
to the adequacy of this way of thought.
Absurdity. Life is not adequately described by logic; 
indeed, logic can never explain or speak to experiential re­
ality. Life does not function according to some set of log­
ical rules in the sky, but absurdly takes what form man 
gives to it. The concern with absurdity began with Kierke­
gaard and figured importantly in later existential thought. 
Absurdity, one must remember, is not viewed with our horror 
in countries which worship logic and reason less. Absurdity 
is not to be taken in a necessarily pejorative sense, but as
an objective statement that life does not function according 
to an outside teleological scheme, but just goes where man
Kierkegaard, for instance, asserted
This did not mean that 
This meant that
chooses to push it. 
that the Incarnation was ’’absurd.” 
he did not believe in it; he did, in fact, 
man’s reason is intrinsically incapable of accounting for it,
that it was contrary to all logical explanation.
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Absurdity, indeed, is the condition of man's free­
dom* To assert that the world is logical is to circum­
scribe it; to assert that it is absurd is to make it 
to all the infinite possibilities which man can create him­
self. Instead of being locked in a logical Garden of Eden, 
man is open to nothingness and the world; as Milton has put 
it, "The world was all before them where to choose/Their 
place of rest." [Paradise Lost. XII:646-7] To the authen­
tically existing individual, the world is all before him, 
to appropriate and to found as he will.
Extremes and ultimate situations. Existentialism is 
marked by a passionate and agonized search for reality. In 
seeking to analyze man's situation, Existentialists search 
for constants, which they dignify with the name of ontolog­
ical structures of existence. These structures are not
open
what a man can choose, but what all men face—they are part
All men must die, must suffer.,: mustof his mode of being.
be always already in situation, must bear guilt, must strug-
These aspects of existence are constantsgle , and so forth, 
in the equations of man's existence and therefore are. a basic 
part of the nature of man's being-in-the-world. 
this still another way and say they are the expression of
One may put
man's finitude, the fundamental quality of man's being.
the reefs of this finitude; thus (according 
basic aspect of man's existence.
Man founders on 
to Jaspers), foundering is a
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Man is essentially a foundering being, a being with immortal 
longings in him who is surrendered to finitude.
Transcendence, 
existential philosophy, 
aim of all existential thought.
Transcendence is fundamental to all 
One might even call it the basic 
Historically, Existen­
tialism has revitalized and given new meaning to the con­
cept of transcendence.
If finitude is a key problem for man, transcendence 
of this finitude is a corresponding aim. Although transcend­
ence takes on different forms in the different existential 
thinkers, it is equally basic in each of them. In Kierkegaard, 
transcendence of the finite is a gift of God, like grace, 
and takes the form of the final leap of faith in which only
the active extension by God of grace enables the existing
In Jaspers, the act of 
"Transcendence
individual to transcend himself, 
foundering is the gate of transcendence, 
through shipwreck" is a phrase generally used to designate
In Heidegger, the Dasein projects himself 
into the not-yet, into non-being, that is, into nothingness. 
In this interaction of the existing Dasein with his possi-
this process.
bilities in non-being, the Dasein escapes his finitude into
Thus, heof bringing being out of nothingness, 
than his finitude in a given situation and a given 
body; he is a Dasein projecting into nothingness, 
stitutes transcendence in Heidegger.
a process
is more
This con-
In Sartre, consciousness
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itself is in essence 
for it is itself a nothingness.
a form of transcendence of the body,
By the mere act of knowing
one transcends the here, and by willing one projects him- 
self into the future and thus transcends the Thus, innow.
whatever philosopher the concept of transcendence 
it is of central importance.
Communication problems.
appears,
Kierkegaard noted not only 
the inadequacy of systems to express existential reality, 
but the inadequacy of language itself.
gaard, was inner and subjective; it could not be communi-
Reality, for Kierke-
cated to another person. He regarded life as a secret* a
A word, onesecret one could not tell if he wanted to.
must admit, is even at its precisest an abstraction; in 
forming an experience into words, the uniqueness is lost, 
for the words name what has already been experienced by oth-
Likewise, the abstraction involved
The
ers and been given a word.
in language removes the immediacy of the experience, 
existing individual must face the fact that the uniqueness 
and immediacy of his experience is forever locked within
him and cannot be communicated.
This sense of incommunicability of experience creates 
another isolating factor in the existence of the individual. 
And the existential emphasis on subjectivity and meaningless-
heightens the consciousness of this barrier——the com—
Communication has always been a problem,
ness
munication barrier.
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birt here it may be seen in the context of existential sub­
jectivity.
A barrier to an existential thinker like Jaspers, for 
instance, is something to be transcended. One founders on
the reefs of incommunicability, but not absolutely.
For this purpose, Jaspers intro­
duces one of the most important aspects of his philosophy: 
’'loving communication.” 
way one transcends subjective isolation and the communication 
barrier to make oneself understood in love that conquers the
One
must transcend this reef.
This type of communication is the
weakness of words. This brings us to one of the most impor­
tant "problems" in Existentialism, a problem that several 
of its leading thinkers have wrestled with—intersubjectivity.
Intersubjectivity. Existentialism bases its entire 
structure on the self and its orientation to reality.
Heidegger constructed a rather half-hearted and sketchy con­
cept of Mitsein. but it was little more than a sense of to-
Sartre asserted that Mitsein wasgetherness given a name, 
not ontologically real, that conflict, not Mitsein, was the 
basis for human interrelationships. [EN, p. 4^4] Thistrue
is a crucial and basic aspect of Sartre’s thought and his
psychological theory, and it further isolates and alienates
Any edifice of intersubjec-the self from all other selves, 
tivity that might be erected on it would be rather negative
if such an edifice were possible at all.
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Sartre’s ’’realistic” (if it may be so called) point 
of view is not shared by Heidegger, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, 
Marcel, or, for that matter, Tillich, Buber,
Marcel creates his valuable concept of the ”I-Thou” rela-
or Maritain.
tionship which distinguishes between third person, which is 
used in reference to an object, and the second person, which 
is used in reference to a subject. The factor of ’’response” 
is crucial in this relationship, for one uses ”Thou” when
one can expect a response—even if it be only meaningful
Using the third-person does not ask for a response; 
the third-person is used in scientific investigation, and 
in reference to objects or people with whom one is not in a 
personal (that is, a "response”) relationship in which both 
give and take.
silence.
Marcel’s "I-Thou" relationship and treatment of 
intersubjectivity are related to his doctrine of "incarna^
tion," where one seeks to achieve the intimacy of the "Thou"
To a certain extent, one seeks to extendeven with objects, 
the relationship one has with one’s own body to one’s world
This is true incarnation.and even to the people in it.
Thus, Marcel attempts to overcome the isolation of
subjectivity by establishing the ”1—Thou” relationship, 
Heidegger proposes Mitsein. and Jaspers submits his idea
Whether these ideas representof "loving communication." 
something not inherently in the methodology of Existentialism
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or not, the fact that intersubjectivity is keenly felt as 
a problem in man’s mode of being-in-the-world shows its 
importance to existential thinkers.
Reintroduction of Mystery# Just as Existentialists 
revitalized the concept of transcendence and gave it a true 
existential justification when the old transcendence was
losing meaning, so also the Existentialists have reintro­
duced—with their idea of a reality that transcends words, 
with a nothingness that is always coming into being, with 
a concept of man as always more than the mere "given,” with the 
idea of Being as constantly undergoing revelation in truth 
(as per Heidegger)—a renewed sense of the role of mystery
A mystery is distinct from a mere problem, for a
(Thus a "mur-
in life#
mystery can never be pierced by manfs reason# 
der mystery” is not a true mystery but merely a problem to
be solved.) Truth emerges into the light from darkness,
and that darkness can never altogether be known, for that
The light of logic can neverdarkness may be nothingness.
plumb the depths of reality and the native stuff of life
rational explanation (will be "absurd”)#will always escape
Although the element of mystery is most prominent in Heideg- 
and Marcel, it is also a basic assumption in Kierkegaard,
The great existential thinkers, 
conscious of the ultimate mystery
ger
Jaspers, and even Sartre, 
then, have again made us
of man’s being.
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And Being as such is shrouded in mystery and is an
ultimately rather mysterious concept—the "emptiest" of con­
cepts, Heidegger has said. After all, the very elusiveness 
of Being was what turned the ontologists to a study of the
nature of the being of man. And the investigation of the
being of man has involved dealing with the mysterious workings, 
the "dynamics," of man’s mode of existing. Small wonder,
then, that Marcel called a series of lectures he gave in
England "The Mystery of Being."
Concluding this consideration of the themes and 
variations in existential thought, one may note that these 
last themes—transcendence, intersubjectivity, incoramuni- 
cability, mystery—are hardly what one would associate with 
a shallow definition of Existentialism, for they do not sniff 
of scandal, morbidity, or the graveyard.
fleet the attitude of youthful and defiant freedomism as-
Yet they are intimately and insepa-
Nor do they re-
sodated with Sartre.
rably built into the basic structure of existential thought. 
They stress the need to withhold judgment and delay defining 
Existentialism until an adequate understanding of existential
Existentialismthinkers other than Sartre has been gained.
than (and hardly identical with) theis, after all, more 
philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.
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Existentialism has 
many sides and many facets and may be understood—indeed, 
must be understood—on a number of different levels and in 
a number of different ways before a coherent configuration 
even begins to emerge.
Existentialism must be understood as a response to 
a spiritual anxiety, 
self-affirmation in the face of non-being, especially in 
such existentially real forms as fate, death, spiritual 
emptiness, meaninglessness, guilt, and moral condemnation. 
It must be seen as an effort to return to a valuation of 
life based on experiential realities, to an inner honesty 
and spiritual genuineness, to a self with dignity, value,
Understanding Existentialism.
It must be understood as an effort at
and self-determination. In spite of overwhelming loss of 
reality and freedom, the self is seeking to affirm itself 
and its ability genuinely to be as a self.
Existentialism must also be understood as an effort 
at Existenzerhellung—the "lighting up” of Existenz, that is,
It must be seenof man's real1possibilities to be himself.
effort to analyze the very dynamics of human life— 
not abstract "human life'^as a concept, but life as an ex-
as an
periential reality which we all must face.
must be understood as a protest—which 
expression of anxiety—against 
It was not just a protest against Descartes
Existentialism
is another way of saying an
the status quo.
225
or Hegel, or against the philosophical forms of essential- 
ism; it was a protest against the unconscious essentialism 
at every level of human endeavor, against becoming a sub­
ject for scientific observation, an object to used by tech­
nology , against stripping man of his personality, his unique- 
his individuality, against, in short, a depersonalizedness,
Existentialists look around them and keenly perceive 
that spiritual values are losing their basis and their power, 
that man is no longer a spiritual being, but a thinking, 
functioning thing; man has been despiritualized, dehumanized, 
and is alienated from himself as a human being.
In the abstract and intellectualized conception of 
man in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries they perceive 
the deadly enemy of authentic existence for a human being.
man.
The abstract morality, the abstract goodness, the abstract 
problem, the distancing of everything from the man of flesh 
and blood—all create the illusion that one is not dealing
World-historywith human beings but with inanimate objects, 
reduces man to ant-size; determinism makes man the helpless
of forces outside himself—both reduce man to an object
Abstraction and
pawn
and see him essentially from the outside.
the immediacy of life and makec itsystematization destroy
static and lifeless; life, as Kierkegaard asserted, is not
Philosophy must belogical, but paradoxical and illogical.
personal,practical, and meaningful for particularmade to be
cases.
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Existentialism must be understood as more than an
expression of anxiety at spiritual emptiness, and as more 
than merely an historical protest against the dehumaniza­
tion of man. Existentialism is a way of philosophizing 
and a way of thinking about life, a way that conceives of
as a becoming being, as a being who is defined not in 
terms of qualities (as a substance would be) but in terms 
of modes of being and the extent to which authentic exist­
ence is realized.
man
While Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, 
Marcel, and Sartre all have their distinctive emphases,
the tendency to use the same way of thinking about man, 
the same preference for defining man in terras of what he
can be and in terms of his inner relationship with himself
Existentialism will never be ade-is found in all cases.
quately defined precisely because it can only be understood
And a ’'way" isas a way, a way of thinking about being, 
difficult to put into words.
Existentialism must be understood as a quest; but it
is more than just any quest, for it is the essence of the 
modern quest for a more genuine reality, an experiential 
existential reality for existing beings, 
this reality it rejected the accepted and tradi-
Inreality—an- 
arriving at
tional reality whose signs of decay were becoming only too
advances of technology and the ensuing rad-obvious with the 
ical shifts in social, economic, and political organization
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or a reality 
systems of fixed
one generation to another. To the Exis- 
a reality based on eternal verities
longer acceptable, and "essences" were meaningless abstrac-
. and
tions. Meaning itself must be reconstructed/based
perience.
and structure. It rejected a derived reality, 
based on abstract and intellectualized
values passed from 
tentialist, was no
on ex-
Meaning must have existential reality. 
Existentialism, then, is not merely a philosophical 
protest, or a fad, or a passing historical expression of
spiritual anxiety about the advance of technology and the 
retreat of manfs spirit, nor is it just analysis—analysis 
of manTs predicament—nor a descent into irrationalism 
brought on by despair and alienation, 
ample of a spirited protest against all forms of pretences 
it is a way of thinking and a way of going from inauthentic 
to authentic existence, an effort to sort essential from 
inessential knowledge, an effort to be as concerned about 
the T,how,r man is as about the ,fwhatlf man isj it is a re­
jection of abstract play for actual, concrete existence, 
fruitful effort to revitalize manfs relationship to tran-
Rather it is an ex-
a
scendence, to give man back his freedom and self-determina­
tion of his life, to reconceive truth as a subjective reality 
rather than an abstract and meaningless concept, to restore
conscience and individualism to man, to let man see his in-
that he is more thanfinite possibilities, to let him 
he is.
see
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Finally, Existentialism represents a reassertion of 
human value and dignity, and can be seen as the odyssey of 
the self seeking the self, 
roots of the nature of the being of man. 
for a dependable and real analysis of the nature of man, 
an analysis which takes account of the battle which man 
must wage with nothingness, meaninglessness and spiritual 
Thus, it is a quest for both a dependable re­
ality and a real and genuine self, 
ilous by a disintegrating reality, but the story is one in
This search goes to the very
It is a quest
emptiness.
The voyage is made per-
whibh the basic dynamics of the human situation are laid
This odyssey, in short, is the spiritualopen and tested, 
quest of modern man.
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THE DUINO ELEGIES
Introduction. The Duino Elegies are among the great 
poems with deep philosophical content in the German language. 
The Elegies present a poetic picture of the nature of man. 
And they present a picture of his predicament—a predicament 
due partly to man’s nature and partly to the nature of his
situation.
Existentialism, too, presents a picture of the nature 
of man and of his predicament—but in conceptual rather than
Since Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1927) and 
the Duino Elegies (1912-22) came to completion in the same 
decade, it is hardly surprising that these two documents 
which attempt to deal with the condition of man should re­
semble each other in basic and profound ways, 
philosophical and the other a poetical presentation of the 
condition of man, or to put it in another way, the nature of 
man; but the striking and significant fact is that both ex­
press a common point of view—an existential point of view.
This dissertation has presented in some detail the 
conceptualization of the nature and condition of man as it
poetical terms.
One is a
is embodied in the thought of Several existential philos-
Now it will turn to three of the Duino Elegies andophers.
explore the poetic images and meanings to determine whether 
the point of view and conception of man expressed there is 
related to that of the existential thinkers, and if so, to
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what extent Rilke may be said to express points of view 
characteristic of existential thinkers.
Method of Analysis. The Duino Elegies are subject to 
considerably varying interpretation, and have been called 
"one of the most difficult texts in all German literature."^
For this reason, any analysis of Existentialism in the 
Elegies must first make clear the elementary and basic as-
Therefore,
this dissertation will consistently present a Textdeutung2 
prior to any comparisons with elements in existential 
thought.
pects of the meaning of the poem—line-by-line.
The analysis, then, will follow a pattern involving 
three general stages: First, a line or group of lines will 
be quoted and a first-level meaning presented. Second, the 
implications and presuppositions of this meaning will be ex­
plored and developed. Third, the essential aspects of the 
above will be summarized and contrasted and paralleled with 
existential conceptions. When this has been done for a num­
ber of successive groups of lines, a summarizing statement
Occasionally the meaning of a strophe ormay be inserted.
^"Heinrich Kreutz, Rilkes Duineser Elegien (Munich,
1950), p. ix.
^In the Textdeutung I am especially indebted to 
Kreutz, above, and to Else Buddeberg, Die Duineser Elegien 
R. M. Rilkes (Karlsruhe, 194^). Also of great helpwas the 
older and more dated little book by Werner Wolf, Rainer 
Maria Rilkes Duineser Elegien: Eine Textdeutung (Heidelberg, 
19371. Hereinafter, "Kreutz," ^Buddeberg," and "Wolf" will 
refer to these three books respectively.
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two may be so unitary as to suggest the reservation of 
comment on existential implications until after the meaning 
of the whole unit has been set forth, 
viated or larger form the basic general pattern remains the
But in the abbre- '
same.
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THE FIRST ELEGY
1 Wer, wenn ich schriee, horte mich denn aus der Engel
2 Ordnungen? und gesetzt selbst, es nShme
3 einer mich plotzlich ans Herz: ich verginge von seinem
4 stSrkeren Dasein
These famous opening lines present the basic stance 
of the poet in the Elegies: that of addressing the angel.
The essential locus, then, is on the highest edge of the hu­
man, the boundary line between the human and the angelic.
The poet is seeking to pierce with his voice, his sight, his 
understanding, the invisibility of the angelic realms—the 
realms and mysteries of Being.'*'
But the opening lines show much more than the essen­
tial locus of the action and the basic stance of the poet.
2A fundamental mood of the Elegies is presented—anguish.
• • • •
This anguish is two-fold: an anguish at the inaccessibility
Ultimately,of the angel and at man's existential situation, 
the anguish is at man’s finitude, his essential limitedness.
The anguish expresses itself in the desire to cry out, to
The genesis of the actionexpress something that is within, 
would be inner, then, and the true arena the heart of the poet.
Lawrence A. Abler, "The Idea of God in the Works of 
Rainer Maria Rilke,” unpubl. diss. (Occidental College, 1958), 
p. l£6, calls the angel ”a symbol for the realm of Being.”
A valuable treatment of the development of the concept of the 
angel is in Eva Cassirer-Solmitz, ”Die Duineser Elegien,” ch. 
Ill in her Rainer Maria Rilke (Heidelberg, 1957). Also see 
R. Guardini, Zu Rainer Maria Rilke's Deutung des Daseins (Bern, 
1946).
^See Fritz Klatt, Sieg fiber die Angst (Berlin, 1940).
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These opening lines, then, reflect the essential 
dilemma of man, his longing for completion yet his anguished 
consciousness of finitude. Yet there is a note of affir­
mation of the very finitude that generates the anxiety, for 
the poet will not allow himself to be absorbed into the 
stronger being of the angel. Man is looking for help from 
the angel, but not complete absorption by the angel.
How are these aspects of the meaning of the opening 
lines related to Existentialism? Basically, one may say 
that they reflect the two basic concerns of all existential 
thought: anxiety at man’s situation and the desire for tran­
scendence. Man longs for transcendence, but fears the loss 
of the self. Significantly, the first lines posit the fact 
that absorption of the self into this sort of nabsoluten is 
not to be sought. This means that man is regarded as some­
thing intrinsically valuable and worth preserving. Man is 
worth keeping separate from the angelic orders; man has a 
separate identity—perhaps even a mission, but this will 
come later.
too, this same value on man is 
implicit in its self-centeredness and fear of the appro-
The fear of appropriation by the
In Existentialism,
priation of the self, 
angel in Rilke is just as much an affirmation of the value 
of the self as the fear of appropriation by the ’’other per­
son” which is so conspicuous in the thought of Sartre.
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Implicit in the first four lines is the problem of
There is the suggestion that man cannot com- 
In existential terms, the communi­
cation with Being is either impaired or intrinsically im­
possible.
communication.
municate with the angels.
Summarizing, one may note in the first four lines,
1) the anguish of man in his situation, 2) the basic inner­
ness of this anguish of man reaching out for the angel,
3) difficulties of adequate communication with the angel,
4) an assumption of the value of man implicit in the fear of 
being absorbed by the angel and therefore the assumption of 
a distinct and separate role for man, and 5) a basic locus 
on the edge of man's being, a stance looking into the realm 
of the angels which is an expression of man's desire for
These correspond to basic aspects of exis­
tential thought: 1) anguish, 2) innerness, 3) communication- 
problems, 4) fear of appropriation, and 5) desire for tran­
scendence.
transcendence.
Denn das Schone ist nichts
5 als des Schrecklichen Anfang, den wir noch grade ertragen
6 und wir bewundern es so, weil es gelassen verschmSht,
7 uns zu zerstoren. Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich.
As early as the fourth line of the Elegy, one en­
counters "das Schone." What has beauty to do with the prob­
lems of the first four lines? Is not the introduction of 
beauty at this point somewhat extraneous? The clue to the 
answer to these questions lies in the use of the connective;
i
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"denn " indicates a relationship with what has gone before. 
It indicates that the beautiful is to be related to the 
angel.
The element common to beauty and to the angel is 
holiness. The "holy" is an expression of Being, and is 
therefore to be conceived as the "holy” which Rudolf Otto 
has famously characterized as "fascinosum et tremendum."^ 
These two aspects are united into one word by Rilke—das 
Schreckliche. "the terrible." The angel is terrible and 
beauty is the beginning of the terrible; the same destruc­
tive danger lurks in both. And what we admire in beauty, 
as a matter of fact, is this destructive element—the ter­
rible. Rilke asserts that we adore beauty precisely because 
it deigns to destroy us. The terrible is the underlying
dynamic of beauty—and the angel.
In existential terms the terrible represents the
Just as man cannot see God and live, somystery of Being, 
also man can bear only so much reality, so much understanding
As with a blazing torch, which provides the bene-of Being.
fits of light, one may come only so close and no closer.
"das Schreckliche" is the blinding light of the angel 
toned down to possible human consumption as beauty, as a mere
Thus,
It is Being—in a form."fearful beginning."
3The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (London, 
1923), pp. 12-41."n;First publ. in German as Das Heilige, 1917J
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8 Und so verhalt ich mich denn und verschlucke den Lockruf
9 dunkelen Schluchzens. Ach, wen vermogen
10 wir denn zu brauchen? Engel nicht, Menschen nicht,
11 und die findigen Tiere merken es schon,
12 dass wir nicht sehr verlasslich zu Haus sind
13 in der gedeuteten Welt,
The poet must dwell in nearness to Being without 
calling out, must extend his hand, but, as in the last lines 
of the Seventh Elegy, not in expectation or pleading. The 
poet must restrain himself, must stifle his anguish. The 
mood of anguish and of wanting to call for help which char­
acterized the opening lines of the poem is now represented, 
but as something which must be stifled.
Clearly, the poet longs for some sort of aid. But 
for what does he heed help? Angels, men, and animals cannot 
help him with the problem; but what, precisely, is the prob­
lem? Only thirteen lines have been presented and the problem 
unfolds as the Elegies progress and only becomes fully apparent 
in all its complexity with a consideration of the meaning of
all of the Elegies, yet some of the problem is hinted at in
Part of the problem is man'seven these few opening lines, 
situation, his desire for transcending his sense of finitude. 
And part of the problem is the very fact that in his loneliness 
he has no-one on whom to lean; men and animals cannot help,
and man cannot establish contact with the angels.
An aspect of the problem is, then, poignantly embodied
in the question, "Ach, wen vermogen wir denn zu brauchen?"
The word "brauchen" carries the connotationof lines 9 and 10.
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of being "required,” thus making the question one of a 
need to be in contact, to stand in a certain relationship. 
Man has lost contact with other men and with animals. What 
is the reason for this loss of contact? Rilke asserts that 
man is not at home in this "gedeutete Welt." He has lost
contact with other men and with animals, and he can make no 
contact with the angels. His essential realm has become 
the grey world of meanings, of interpretation. But this 
interpreted world is somehow sterile and inadequate, and 
the less sophisticated perception of the animals does not 
miss man's pervasive sense of anguished lostness in his in­
terpreted world.
Existential thinkers, too, have had this anguished.
wish to escape from a world of systems and abstractions—the
interpreted world. Too, the first thirteen lines of the
poem express the spiritual sense of Diirftigkeit of modern
man—the state of needing help. Existentialists in the same
situation are also quick to point to the lack of any direct
contact with genuine reality, and to assert that precisely
is
the misinterpretation which/inevitably the product of the 
sort of abstraction which characterizes modern life is the 
basis for a multiplicity of forms of inauthenticity.
Es bleibt uns vielleicht
14 irgend ein Baum an dem Abhang, dass wir ihn tSglich
15 wiedersShen; es bleibt uns die Strasse von gestern
16 und das verzogen Treusein einer Gewohnheit,
17 der es bei uns gefiel, und so bleib sie und ging nicht.
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What is there left for modern man, to help him and 
to reassure him? There remaiisthe seeing daily of the same 
street and the same tree on the slope. The repetition of 
these experiences is the element that is reassuring, com­
forting somehow, for it assures us of the reality of this 
world around us, the tree and the street. Repetition is 
also shown on the personal level in the clinging loyalty 
of habits. Poetically, habit becomes so very strong that 
it seems to have an independent life of its own, having the 
power to control man. Thus, for some reason pleased with 
us, it settles down to stay; it "moves in," Perhaps habit 
has perceived the spaciousness of the vacuum left by man’s 
absence of communication with angel and animal. In any 
event, a vivid sense of the spiritual poverty of man is 
suggested in the presentation of a man to whom habit, only 
habit—clinging and loyal—remains.
Heidegger parallels Rilke’s presentation of the power 
of habit with his idea of the pull of the pattern, the mag*r 
netic power of the world around the existing being. Heideg­
ger’s model of the public man, the epitome of inauthenticity, 
that is, "das Man." is dominated by habit. In his state of 
Verfalien (decline), habit, as in Rilke, is a consolation 
(Beruhigung) and tends to appease man and allow him to move
Man is oriented to the past; he reliesinto further decline.
*
repeats it, is reassured by it.on it,
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Existentially, habit, repetition, the power of the 
pattern—all are aspects of man's situation, his being-in- 
They represent something from which man seems 
unable ever to completely escape, 
authentic type of engagement of man with his world, 
makes man's relationship to his world (situationality) and 
his body (facticity) even more repulsively real than Rilke
A
in the final portions of L'Etre et le Neant, where he shows
the-world.
They represent the in-
Sartre
man as stuck in a situation and a body much in the way that 
a hand is stuck in a sticky, viscous substance from which it 
can never be disengaged and torn free. True, le visqueux 
(this viscous substance) may be characterized by a greater 
or lesser degree of viscosity, but it cannot be sloughed 
off.
In Rilke's presentation, man has become the co-exister
with habit, and habit has the power to settle down and stay,
This implies a personal surrender to 
In Sartre, the tendency to wish to sur-
that is to dominate.
a certain pattern, 
render to a pattern is identified with the desire to become
a lifeless thing, an in-itself(en-soi). which is acted upon 
and guided by the pattern and other outside forces rather
One may say, then,than projecting himself into the future, 
that Heidegger and Sartre provide a conceptual structure, 
even an ontological structure, of a man in a world having 
to face the fact and power of the pattern and the tendency
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to surrender to passivity and repetition. Rilke, on the
other hand, presents an actual poetical image of an anguished 
man, lost and alone, consoled by repetition and habit for
the breakdown of an adequate contact with the being of the 
things around him. Man, lost in his self-created "gedeutete 
Welt" is somewhat consoled and reassured by the apparent re­
ality of a street that is the same as it was yesterday and a
tree on the slope—still there.
Existentially, perhaps the most significant aspect 
of the whole first strophe is its richness in ontological
The strophe not only presents the anguish of mod­
em man, but also makes clear that man's mode of existing
Rilke
content.
is basically different from that of animal or angel, 
has contributed significantly to a definition of man by use
Through these contrasts between 
the mode of being-in-the-world of animals and that of man 
and the mode of being of angels and that of man, a certain 
structural relationship seems to emerge.
Significantly, man's mode of being has attributes 
which belong to him alone and not to either of the other
The way in which each of these three modes
of his device of contrasts.
realms of Being.
of Being participate in time reveals much about the unique 
way in which man's manner of existing in time stands in con-
Heidegger suggests, astrast to that of angels and animals.
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a basic idea in his Sein und. Zeit, that man exists as much 
in time as in space, and more uniquely in time than in
Man and animals exist and take up space; but the 
way in which man stands in relationship to time is different 
from animals—and angels, 
of death because they do not project themselves into the past 
or the future, but rather live in "openness" to Being; angels 
have outgrown man’s Zeitlichkeit and live in a realm which 
is infinite and eternal, 
an acute reality.
control him, fill him with anguish.
consciousness of the realm of the angels (and of animals), 
man’s finitude becomes an anguished finitude—aware both of 
the absolute freedom of eternity and the blissful innocence 
of the animal.
space.
Animals live with no consciousness
Man, however, experiences time as 
Both the past and the future trouble,him,
Indeed, because of his
The realization, then, that one must choke back the 
anguished call to the angel reveals the poet’s perception 
that the loss of the very thing that causes much of the 
anguish—that is, finitude—would also be a loss of the 
element which constitutes the basic uniqueness of man, his
Man may long fcr the state of the angel or 
the state of the animal but must restrain himself in order 
not to lose his identity, for finitude—especially in the 
form of Zeitlichkeit—is the distinguishing mark and destiny 
of man.
Zeitlichkeit.
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Man, then, is the creature who, conscious of the 
other realms of being, reaches out in longing and anguish. 
Just as from the point of view of the structure of man’s 
manner of existing man is the creature who exists in a 
unique way in time, so also from the point of view of the 
underlying mood of man’s manner of existing, man is the 
creature who—unlike angel or animal—exists in anguish and 
longing. This anguish and longing are an indirect conse­
quence of the way in which man’s consciousness grasps the 
angelic and the animal; they are, in a way, the price of 
consciousness of time.
The existential significance of the criticism of 
the ’’interpreted” world in which man lives can hardly be 
overestimated. Man’s anguish is not only because of his con­
sciousness of his own incapacity in the realm of angel or
animal, but also because he cannot even communicate with
Man has surrounded himself with a fog of his 
This is the reason that even within
those realms.
own interpretations, 
our own realm of being, ”wir nicht sehr verlasslich zu Haus
sind.” This world of interpretations and meanings is not 
the realm of the angel or the animal; it belongs distinctly 
to man.
This "gedeutete Welt” is not only a world of inter-
an in-pretation (even the etymological meaning suggests 
sertion between) but also of misinterpretation. In other
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words, it is a world of the genuine and the false, the 
slaved and free, the possible and the impossible, the past 
and the future. It is a world set against the double back­
drop of death in the future and pattern in the past—and 
the power of primeval urges surging up in the blood, if 
one may anticipate a little. The world is the world of 
man and is the province of neither angel nor animal. Its 
dynamics are not those of the angel—perhaps they even es­
cape the understanding of the angel, who may have forgotten 
his visible past. And they are not the dynamics of the ani­
mal, who lives in innocence and openness to Being. Rather 
they are the dynamics of a life into whose basic fabric is 
knitted the tension of an underlying anguish.
Existentially, this interpreted world is a central 
factor in inauthenticity. The world of meanings and inter-
en-
pretations is the world that gives man his freedom—and in­
herent in the nature of any meaningful freedom is the pos-
The world of interpretation,sibility of being enslaved, 
then, is the world of freedom and slavery, or right and 
wrong interpretation, of authenticity and inauthenticity.
One might call these necessary antitheses "polarities."
Authenticity has no meaning without inauthenticity, freedom
no meaning without the possibility of slavery, right no
So also the world of interpretation
The under­
meaning without wrong, 
requires the possibility of misinterpretation.
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lying factor in the negative polarities here presented
In its most primary form, the antithesis 
is that of Being and non-being; Being has no meaning with­
out non-being.
is non-being.
What does this mean to man's interpreted world?
It means that without the possibility of non-being in the 
form of death, meaning would lose much of it's power. We 
strive for meaning because of death; death gives meaning 
urgency. Death gives meaning power. For man, time is not 
Zeit, but Zeitlichkeit—something personal that comes to an 
end: death. Death, then, is the key to the life of man.
The reassurance that man finds in repetition is the decep­
tion that time is not really passing. This anguished con­
sciousness of death (which is a consequence of the fact of 
man's time-consciousness as he extends himself into the 
future in interpretation towards death) is sensed by the 
animals and makes them suspicious. They have no conscious­
ness of death, nor do angels.
In existential terms, the very act of interpretation 
is a form of transcendence, for as Sartre notes, we transcend
By interpre-the here in knowing and the now in willing, 
tation man extends himself in time into both the past
It holds aand the future. The future is contingent.
Some of the possibilities are 
better than others. The possibilities of making a choice
variety of possibilities.
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which is better involve the question of authenticity and 
inauthenticity, of spiritual sufficiency and spiritual 
Durftigkeit. Indeed, the whole problem of freedom and what 
to do with it unfolds. Finally, there is a problem which 
contains a paradox: man lives in an interpreted world, yet 
he is losing contact with angels and beasts; he is, in other 
words losing his ability to communicate. Paradoxically, then, 
the arch-interpreter finds himself unable to communicate—or, 
in Rilke’s terms, even to commune.
Man is needy and alone, without help from animals, 
angels, or other men. 
on the slope, yesterday’s street, the clinging loyalty of 
habit, and another important thing—the Night:
0 und die Nacht, die Nacht, wenn der Wind voller Weltraum
19 uns am Angesicht zehrt—,wem bliebe sie nicht, die ersehnte,
20 sanft enttSuschende, welche dem einzelnen Herzen
21 muhsam bevorsteht.
All that remains for him is the tree
For man, the arch-interpreter, there does remain the uninter- 
The street by day is contrasted with the obscurity 
Out of the oblivion of night, out of the dark,
pretable, 
of the night.
far reaches of world-space comes the wind—the very breath
In the night the aloneness of man, the loneliness,
Yet this solitude
of night.
the infinite longing become apparent.
which is so longed-for and held with such difficulty is sub-
The uninterpretable, the meaning beyondtly disillusioning, 
meaning seems to disintegrate into mere meaninglessness; and
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the infinity of night becomes only nothingness and emptiness.
But is it any easier for the lover, who has the 
stant companionship of his beloved, to dispel this aloneness, 
longing, and infinite nothingness?
con-
Ist sie den Liebenden leichter?
22 Ach, sie verdecken sich nur miteinander ihr Los.
Weisst du’s noch nicht? Wirf aus den Armen die Leere
24 zu den R§umen hinzu, die wir atmen; vielleicht dassdie Vogel
25 die erweiterte Luft fiihlen mit innigerm Flug.
No, it is not easier for lovers, for the presence of the oth­
er only accentuates the realization in each that he is alone, 
and together they only find their own emptiness again. Each
23
must face his own nothingness—his own fate, Verlassenheit. 
No-one can face it for him; he is alone.^
The adjuration to fling the emptiness from one’s arms
The lovers
and death.
comes directly after the reference to the lovers, 
were conceived of as in each other’s arms, and the command to
fling the emptiness from one’s arms inevitably connects with 
a rejection of even the most promising prospect of aid from
Thus, Rilke has elaborated on his state­
ment in lines 10 and 11 that neither angels, animals, nor men 
Angels would absorb and destroy; animals shy 
away in suspicion at our ’’gedeutete Welt”; and other humans, 
even the most close in love, cannot help us.
another human being.
can help us.
^For an article on loneliness in Rilke, see Andrew _ 
0. Jaszi, "Rilkes Duineser Elegien und die Einsamkeit," Uni­
versity of California Publications in Modern Philology., Vol. 
36, not 7, pp. 185-1921 Unfortunately the article is short 
and exploratory, and little mention is made of the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Elegies.
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Existentially, the second strophe (lines 18-25) adds 
the dimension of nothingness to the ontological structure 
of man1s being-in-the world. 
progression of the thought is traced.
This becomes clear when the
The first portion of 
the strophe describes the individual in the infinite reaches
of night, the second portion his loneliness and longing as 
unabated even by the greatest intimacy of contact with anoth­
er human being, and third, there is the frank admission of
emptiness as a part of one’s being, as something one wishes
The progression isto take in one’s hand and fling away, 
from aloneness in the night, to aloneness in the arms of
one's beloved, to flinging the emptiness from one's arms; 
that is, the progression is from Einzelheit, to Einsamkeit, 
All three of these stages receive definitionto Leere.
through their essential relationship to the existential con-
Finitude is fundamentallycepts of non-being and of finitude. 
related to non-being, because it is the consequence of the
existence of non-being in our lives.
First, the infinite reaches of night-space stand in 
oppressive contrast to the finitude and limitation of man. 
This is the very nature of the consciousness one has in
standing solitary in night-space and the reason for the
The night represents both infinitylonging and loneliness.
and nothingness, or perhaps the infinity of nothingness, 
night is deceiving because nothingness basically has no content.
The
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It gnaws at us like the night wind at our cheek and takes 
away our flesh just as nothingness eats away at our lives— 
and yet we sigh and long for its subtle deception.
The second factor is hardly separable from the first. 
The first was solitariness in world-space; the second is the 
aloneness of man even in love. Thus, loneliness is added to 
solitariness. Yet the second factor heightens the first be­
cause the individuality and separation and aloneness of man 
are given further definition in the second stage. For in­
stance, a person may sense his aloneness in the great world 
of night-spaces—and welcome it; but Rilke shows man as an­
guished and lonely. There is an inseparable union between 
aloneness and anguish. Lovers only conceal from each other 
(and preserve) this loneliness.
Indeed, from an existential point of view, this lone-
In an important sense, man’sliness can hardly be overcome, 
life is essentially solipsist; each man is always alone be-
One cannot face thesefore fate, contingency, and death, 
even for those he most loves, nor can anyone else relieve
As Jaspers observes, each man must 
In a profound and basic way (in an onto­
logical way) man must always be alone; loneliness is a basic
someone of his own dying.
die his own death.
part of man’s existence, a dynamic of life which limits and 
delimits him.
Fate, contingency, death, meaninglessness, and spiritual
250
In loneliness,
one comes closer to non-being—and paradoxically, to Being. 
Fate, meaninglessness, emptiness—these are names for forms 
of threat to being, forms of non-being that man must con-
In existential terms, man is always face to 
face with nothingness—all alone, 
lover one cannot escape nothingness.
Indeed, this nothingness was found in the first 
strophe as the ontological basis for the anguish which gener­
ated the question, ”Ach, wen vermogen wir denn zu verbrauchen?” 
as well as in the second strophe where it is the basis for 
the loneliness of the individual even in the arms of his be-
emptiness are basically forms of non-being.
stantly face.
Even in the arms of one’s
loved.
In the third stage, then, of the thought, it is this
very nothingness—which is a part of the individual and can­
not be flung away, just as being can never be separated from 
non-being—that the poet longs to fling back into the other
In terms of poetic im-realm of nothingness, night-space.
the existential concept of anguish has in the Elegyagery,
become that indescribable sense of incompleteness which 
lovers in each other’s arms conceal from each other, and the
concept of nothingness has become poetically the emptiness
These two exampleswhich one would fling from his arms, 
show the way that Rilke transforms an existential-ontologi­
cal concept into poetic image.
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As Rilke begins the next strophe, the original ques­
tion of who man can find to help him is inverted to "Whom- 
can man help?”:
26 Ja, die Friihlinge brauchten dich wohl.
27 Sterne dir zu, dass du sie spiirtest.
28 sich eine Woge heran im Vergangenen, oder
29 da du voruberkamst am geoffneten Fenster,
30 gab eine Geige sich hin. • Das alles war Auftrag.
Now the question is given a different turn by the assertion 
that things need us: Spring spreads out her brilliance to 
attract us, stars wait expectantly to be perceived, memories 
rise up asking to be recalled, music prostrates itself to be 
enjoyed. Music is perhaps the most effective and exact image, 
for music is produced specifically to be heard. It is for 
the ears of man and is not seen, but seems to exist in the 
ear itself. Since it is invisible and since it does appear 
to exist only in the ear, it needs man in order to be at all. 
Without the ear of man, music could not be. Music needs us.
Succinctly and with emphasis, Rilke sums up what he 
is trying to suggest in his reference to the efforts of things 
to communicate with man: "Das alles war Auftrag.” 
is a decree and command of nature, a mission for man. 
is somehow related to things, and things seem to need him.
The Ninth Elegy develops this theme further and asserts that 
the things of the earth, too, long for invisibility. They 
rely on man for transformation; this is the reason they ask 
in countless ways to be perceived—so they can be transformed.
Es muteten manche 
Es hob
All this
Man
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"Erde i unsichtbar j/ Was, wenn Verwandlung nicht, is dein 
drSngender Auftrag?” [IX, 70-1]
The significance of the t,Auftrag,f question should 
not be underestimated. Earlier in the Elegy, man’s basic 
need for help was presented, as well as the fact that ani­
mals, angels, and other human beings cannot or will not
In delineating this need for help in lines 
1-25, the basic situation of modern man was presented—the 
situation of existing in a particular realm of being which 
involves anguish, loneliness, finitude, and an interpreted 
But lines 26-30 mark a decisive and significant 
turn from the anguished question of who can help man, to
give this help.
world.
the equally significant question of man’s essential role and
These lines assert that man can helpmeaning on this earth, 
things, that just as he cries out to the angel for transforma­
tion so also things beckon to him to fulfill his mission.
These lines assert that man must necessarily help things,
Thus, the ’’Auftrag” questionthat they are relying on him. 
suggests Rilke's interpretation of man’s mission; it suggests
Rilke's interpretation of the very meaning and proper mode
Compared to the question of the situationof man’s existence.
of man, this question is even more significant, for it sug-
Man has a mission.gests the very meaning of man's existence.
Everything in nature seems to beckon to him to fulfill this
mission.
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31 Aber bewaltigtest du’s? Warst du nicht irmner
32 noch von Erwartung zerstreut, als kiindigte alles
33 eine Geliebte dir an? (Wo willst du sie bergen
34 da doch die grossen fremden Gedanken bei dir
35 aus und ein gehn und ofters bleiben bei Nicht.)
P
Does man respond to this effort on the part of things 
to communicate with him? Here again the problem of man as 
impervious and separated from nature appears; man remains 
unfortunately in the world of his own creation—his abstract 
world of meanings, his ’’interpreted world.” Even when man 
allows his glance to come to rest on something in nature, he 
is not free of his world of preconceptions, of interpretations. 
He brings expectations to nature, and thinks that some omen 
may be seen in nature portending future turns in his love life.
The phrase, ”als kiindigte alles eine Geliebte dir
an,” (lines 32-3) is a telling description of the weaknesses
It reveals, as a mat-of man’s interpretive view of nature.
ter of fact, a romantic view of nature—the view that nature,
This attitude, for in-all nature, speaks of his beloved, 
stance is embodied in Keat’s famous lines, "A theme’ A
theme !/ Great Nature give a theme l/ Let me begin my dream 1”
Indeed, the phrase itself was taken by Rilke from Goethe.
”im Archiv las ich einen herrlichenRilke states in a letter,
Brief Bettinens und fand jenes Blatt, auf das Goethe in so 
wundervoll plotzlicher Stromung '’Alles kundet Dich an’ ge-
schrieben hat (14.9.11)" [Kreutz, p. 26 from Br. 07/14, Nr.6lJ
In this view, nature is a source of inspiration, a starter
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for thought about the beloved. To do something for nature, 
however, does not typically occur to the romantic mind.
Within the parentheses, the poet asks the question, 
"How can you possibly explain to the beloved—now that you 
have her—how the longing and loneliness are not gone, but 
still are present in strange thoughts that come and go and 
stay through the night?” This is a recurrence of the same 
underlying thought as that which generated the anguished 
observation of line 22: ”Ach sie verdecken sich nur mitein- 
ander Los.” However, in the space between these two ex­
pressions of the same experience, the poet has inserted his 
thoughts on man’s mission. Therefore, the strange thoughts 
can be ascribed to one of three possible sources: the in­
finity-nothingness-loneliness complex, the primeval surgings 
of the blood, or the call for man to fulfill his mission.
36 Sehnt es dich aber, so singe die Liebenden; lange
37 noch nicht unsterblich genug ist ihr beriihrates Gefuhl.
38 Jene, du neidest sie fast, Verlassenen, die du
39 so viel liebender fandst als die Gestillten. Beginn
40 immer von neuem die nie zu erreichende Preisung;
41 denk; es erhalt sich der Held, selbst der Untergang war ihm
42 nur ein Vorwand, zu sein: seine letzte Geburt.
43 Aber die Liebenden nimmt die erschopfte Natur
44 in sich zuriick, als wSren nicht zweimal die KrSfte,
45 dieses zu leisten
’’Those—thou almost enviest them—the forsaken, whom 
thou foundst so much more lovable than those whose love was
• • • • *
satisfied#Tf Rilke would sing the lovers, but most especially
For Rilke,those whose love never experienced satisfaction.
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consummation is the top of the hill; the rest is downhill. 
Love drives to consummation in a fierce crescendo; it strug­
gles against obstacles; it expends tremendous effort. The 
consummation brings peace and rest as part of its reward.
But the forsaken do not find the end of the crescen- 
do~at least not in the peace of actual consummation. The 
forsaken, rather, experience the constant intensification 
of feeling. Nature’s powerful creative force is allowed to 
drive and drive but never reach fulfillment. Rilke's admi­
ration for living, loving, and feeling with the greatest • 
possible intensity is shown in his obvious preference for 
the unrequited lover.
Rilke contrasts the hero—also the subject for songs 
of praise (see the Sixth Elegy)—with the forsaken lover.
The point of comparison is obviously the issue of consum­
mation. Rilke asserts that although the hero would seem 
also to have been wronged by fate, his situation is not com­
pletely comparable to the forsaken lover. Both have been 
wronged by fate, but the hero achieves an ultimate consum­
mation while the forsaken is completely denied it. 
there is the implication that after the lover is forsaken, 
there is an intensification in the face of the impossibility 
of consummation, which cannot be experienced by the hero, for 
the hero has always before him the possibility of ultimate 
consummation in the rebirth resulting from noble action.
And
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(Whether this is true as a fact or in literary theory is 
beside the point; this is Rilke's distinction between the 
hero and the ..forsaken lover.) The implied intensification 
in the case of fforsaken lovers is made specific in lines 43-5, 
where the creative energy released by them is so strong that 
they are taken by Nature back to herself.
Rilke makes his point more personal.'and concrete by 
asking the question,
Hast du der Gaspara Stampa
46 denn geniigend gedacht, dass irgend ein Madchen,
47 dem der Geliebte entging, am gesteigerten Beispiel
4# dieser Liebenden fuhlt: dass ich wiirde wie sie?
The forsaken lovers long to be like Gaspara Stampa, the 
"Sappho" of that passionate and sensuous time to live, the
They long, like her, to redirect the 
drive they feel so strongly into the creation of form, to 
transform what is essentially a creative drive on the bio­
logical level to artistic creativity.
This is, indeed, a form of transcendence of the 
physical, where the object which originally inspired the 
feeling of love is no longer necessary—is transcended and 
made artistically fruitful:
5Italian Renaissance.
^Kreutz furnishes the following illuminating footnote: 
"Gaspara Stampa, Dichterin aus edler Familie, geb. 1523 zu 
Padua, gest. 1554 zu Venedig, von gelehrter Bildung. Ihre 
ungliickliche Liebe zu dem Grafen Collaltino di Collalto, der 
sie nach kurzer Zeit verliess, fand in ihren Sonetten leiden- 
schaftlichen Ausdruck. Gaspera [sic] Stampa, Sonette. Uber- 
tragen von Leo Graf Lankoronski. Frankfurt/M. 1935.'' 
p. 2d, fn.
Kreutz,
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49 Sollen nicht endlich uns diese Sltesten Schraerzen
50 fruchtbarer werden? 1st es nicht Zeit, dass wir liebend
51 uns vom Geliebten befrein und es bebend bestehn:
52 wie der Pfeil die Sehne besteht, um gesammelt im Absprung
53 me hr zu sein als er selbst. Denn Bleiben ist nirgends.
The bow-string and arrow is the central image of the 
above passage. The arrow achieves its essential nature, its 
reason-for-being only in motion—,fDenn Bleiben ist nirgends.” 
To be shot from a bow is a shattering sort of experience; yet 
in order to realize one’s reason-for-being one must endure 
this experience, just as the arrow endures the snap of the 
string in order to achieve its meaning and become more than
arrow qua arrow.
The snap of the string that sends the arrow into 
flight is the same snap that the foresaken lover feels when
The crescendoing feeling changesdeserted by the beloved, 
complexion but not intensity; rather the intensity rises as
the lover is freed from the beloved in the shattering ex­
perience of the snap of the string.
Existentially, the arrow-snap image is the perfect
What Heidegger calls the ”Entwurf-
The projective
nature of man has been presented in existential conceptuali­
zation as a ’’projective structure,” and Rilke feels into the 
essence of man’s nature intuitively and presents it poetically 
in the image of the bow-string and arrow, and^fehe snap that 
sends the arrow into flight corresponds to transcendence.
image of transcendence, 
struktur” of the Dasein is called the arrow.
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Rilke, however, adds an element which is not present 
in the existential concept—the driving force which motivates 
the transcendence: the river-god of the blood. The fact 
that Rilke is consciously referring to transcendence is clear 
from lines 50-1, where the beloved is to be gotten free of, 
and from lines 52-3, where the very purpose of the ”Absprung” 
mehr zu sein als er selbst.” The Existentialists 
assert that man is more than himself, that man must try con­
stantly to transcend himself in existing, must project him­
self into his highest possibilities, must realize his Exis- 
tenz. To do this involves the shipwreck, the shattering, of 
the snap of the bow-string that liberates one from the physical 
object. This is the shipwreck of which Jaspers speaks which 
is the gate to transcendence.
In reviewing the whole third strophe (lines 26-53)» 
several other remarks may be made relative to existential 
thought. The contrast of the hero with the lover is signifi­
cant not only from the point of view of their distinct re-
"urais • • •
lationships to consummation, but also because the lover is
The lover experiences the exis-
The lover
more existentially-real.
tential reality of the river-god of the blood, 
is closer to nature, to mother Earth, and is a symbol of an 
intenser, more primitive, more genuine and ultimately an un-
The experiences of love and forsaken-
the other hand,
assailable reality, 
ness are undeniable existential experiences; on
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the hero's experiences are praisable, but are of a less 
intense degree of immediacy, 
a lover is close to the earth.
As in the first strophe, a "field theory of man," in
A hero is close to heaven, but
which man is a pole around which the world clusters in cer­
tain relationships, is implied. In this case, man's founded 
world—the world of meanings—is interfering with the proper
relationship with things. Man should commune with things, 
but he walks in a distant world of meanings, impervious as 
the absent-minded professor to the world around him, and gives 
things meaning only as they relate to his own preconceptions.
In man’s relationship with things, this represents a 
serious breakdown of contact. Heidegger, just as he defines 
time in relationship to its meaning to man, defines the ob­
jects of man’s world in terms of their relationship to man. 
Heidegger regrets the breakdown of the close relationship of 
man to the things he uses, the intimacy with the "Zuhandene." 
He asserts that man should not see the world as objects—ob­
jectively—but rather be as close to things as a carpenter
The ''tool’’ relationship is one of inti-is to his hammer.
macy, one of close and affectionate relationship to the es­
sence of the thing which is viewed as a tool, 
things in the world is rather like an intimatized pragmatism.
Rilke, too, wishes man to commune with the essence 
the being—of concrete things, and asserts that man should
This view of
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cultivate an intimate and affectionate relationship with 
things. But he transcends Heideggerian pragmatism. The 
things in nature are not tools, although they depend on man 
in a strange way to attain their meaning and transformation. 
Rather they are realities with valences in their own right. 
Things are mysterious and, in their own way, have power, per­
sonality, and desire for transformation—they have being.
More recently, Heidegger (perhaps under the influence of 
Rilke) has come nearer to giving nature a significance inde­
pendent of man, and both Heidegger and Rilke assert that man 
must commune with the being of things and that modern man is 
increasingly failing to come into nearness to Being—failing to 
live in the neighborhood of Being.
Existentially, man is most man when he is fulfilling 
his function—transcendence. Animals do not transcend them­
selves because they do not stand in man’s unique relationship
to time; angels cannot transcend themselves in any human sense. 
Rilke and the Existentialists, then, take the functional 
definition of man and say man is most man when he is transcend-
But Rilke does not use the mundane.ing and transforming.
word ’’function," but ”Auftrag," which implies a mission, a 
command to be carried out, a decree for man. 
whether one speaks in poetical terms of man’s ’’mission,’’ or
Nevertheless,
in philosophical terms of man’s"meaning,” or in objective 
terms of man's function,” the fact remains that in existential
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thought and in Rilke’s poetry man’s mission, meaning, and 
function is transformation. And this transformation is a 
form of transcendence.
Finally, the problem of intensity and fulfillment 
is common to : Existentialism and to Rilke. Rilke is asking 
the famous existential question about the ”Sinn des Daseins.” 
He is asking: ”Should we not strive more for heightened in­
tensity than for fulfillment?” As desirable as fulfillment
may be, do not ”diese altesten Schmerzen” of unfulfilled
1 "" _
love also bear the fruit of transcendence? Should we not 
’’rejoice in tribulation” and try to overstep what we are? 
Fulfillment marks the end of striving, but the experience 
of desertion is the snap of the bowstring which frees us 
from the object of the striving and shocks us into transcend­
ence. Above all, man must abjure the snare of easy and ef­
fortless fulfillment, for the price is a loss of intensity 
of feeling. Man should, like Faust, defy fulfillment if he 
is to realize intensity.
The significance of intensity is that it represents
The state of inauthenticity soheightened consciousness, 
stringently criticized by the Existentialists and by Rilke 
is always connected with an essential loss of consciousness. 
Das Man in Heidegger’s portrait is the creature who uncon­
sciously falls into the pattern to lead a life of unthinking 
adherence to the pattern, a life of drifting and floating
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along on the stream of history. In Rilke, a similar criti­
cism is made of the mechanical smile of the jugglers, and the 
mechanical skill which has replaced struggle and error (an
example of easy and effortless fulfillment—skill) and brought 
with the ease of movement a loss of feeling. One can say, 
then, of Heidegger’s das Man and Rilke’s jugglers that they ■ 
are awake, but not very conscious. They cannot feel any more, 
but live on and continue to perform their mechanical tasks.
Thus, the significance of intensity is that it rep­
resents one pole of the conscious-unconscious polarity which 
in Existentialism is associated with the larger polarity of 
authenticity-inauthenticity. The reason that so many fore- 
saken lovers might say of Gaspara Starnpa, ’’Oh that I were as 
she J” is, then, not only because she had the genius to make 
love-creativity into art-creativity, but also because she 
represents—coming from the Italian Renaissance—great in­
tensity of feeling; and intensity of feeling, in itself, has 
a positive value in contrast to a lack of intensity.
Thus, Rilke establishes the value of singing the
In the nextpraise of the intensity of the foresaken lover, 
strophe the poet opens himself to commune with the young
dead. He hears their voices calling to him:
54 Stimraen, Stimmen. Hore, mein Herz, wie sonst nur
55 Heilige horten: dass sie der riesige Ruf
56 aufhob vom Boden; sie aber knieten,
57 Unmo'gliche, weiter und achtetens nicht:
58 So waren sie horend.
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The poet bids his heart listen, just as the kneeling holy 
ones listened for the tremendous Call, to listen so intently 
that if the call literally lifted him from the earth, his at­
tention would be so fixed on the listening that he, like the 
holy ones, would not notice his having moved.
Not that the poet could endure the voice of God. 
Rather the contrary, if one is to believe the opening lines
The poet, however, is listening for something 
different yet still from the beyond; he is listening for the 
uninterrupted tidings from the young dead, tidings in the 
silence:
of the Elegy.
Nicht, dass du Gottes ertriigest
59 die Stimme, bei weitem. Aber das Wehende hore,
60 die ununterbrochene Nachricht, die aus Stille sich bildet.
61 Es rauschet jetzt von jenen jungen Toten zu dir.
The poet presents a picture of where the voices come from and 
takes the reader into the silent, cool tombs in the churches 
in Rome or Naples:
62 Wo immer du eintratst, redete nicht in Kirchen
63 zu Rom und Neapel ruhig ihr Schicksal dichan?
64 Oder es trug eine Inschrift sich erhaben dir auf,
65 wie neulich die Tafel in Santa Maria Formosa.&
The inscription is elevated in two ways, physically and in
What does the message on the tombthe tone of its content.
’’Santa Maria Formosa, Kierche in Venedig. Die In­
schrift, die Rilke meint, befindet sich links vom Portal und 
lautet: ’Vixi aliis dum vita fuit/post funera tandem/Non peril, 
at gelido/in marmore vivo mihi;/Helmanus Gulielmus eram/me 
Flandria luget;/Hadria suspirat;/pauperiesque vocat./ Obiit
Kreutz, p. 32.XVI Kal. Octob. MDXCIII.’”
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require of the poet? It requires nothing in the way of 
changing his way of existing, but merely requests that the 
poet with his art should remove the appearance of unjustness 
which the early death seems to give,
66 Was sie mir wollen? Leise soil ich des Unrechts
67 Anschein abtun, der ihrer Geister
68 reine Bewegung manchmal ein wenig behindert.
The coming of death in onefs flower seems a gruesome 
and unjust stroke of destiny. This erroneous impression some­
what hinders the pure, free movement of these young dead.
This impression they commission the poet to correct. Rilke 
fulfills this commission not only in the Elegies but in the 
Sonnets to Orpheus (TfGeschrieben als ein Grabmal fur V/era 
Ouckama Knoop,,f a young dancer). Even in the next strophe 
the poet begins to fulfill this high commission, for he pic­
tures the realm of the young dead. So well has Rilke com-
to
muned with that realm beyond that he seems able to go /the 
other side of life and know their very musings: Strange it 
is no more to inhabit the earth, to practice no more the pat­
terns scarcely learned, not to see the meaning of mortal 
future in the language of things, and to put aside oneTs name 
like a broken plaything
69 Freilich ist es seltsam, die Erde nicht mehr zu bewohnen,
70 kaum erlernte GebrSuche nicht mehr zu iiben,
71 Rosen, und andern eignes versprechenden Dingen
72 nicht die Bedeutung menschlicher Zukunft zu geben;
73 das, was man war in unendlich angstlichen Handen
74 nicht mehr zu sein, und selbst den eigenen Namen
75 wegzulassen wie ein zerbrochenes Spielzeug,
• • • •
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76 Seltsam, die Wunsche nicht weiterzuwunschen.
77 alles was sich bezog, so lose ira Raurae
76 flattern zu sehen. Und das Totsein ist miihsam
79 und voller Nachholn, dass man aEmahlich ein wenig
80 Ewigkeit spiirt.
The poet is fulfilling his mission to portray the 
passing of the young dead by showing them not sobbing in 
anguish and regret at the loss of earthly life, but musing, 
detached, over the whole business of life. In this musing 
man receives something of a negative definition—a definition 
in terms of the things that man puts aside in becoming one of 
the realm of the dead. The "uses of this life” are one by 
one brought before the poet in a certain crescendo. First, 
not to inhabit the earth; next, not to practice the customs 
of the earth; next, the leaving off of thinking about a 
future; not to be what one has with such anxiety sought to 
be; to put aside one’s name; to wish no more; to have all 
that was formerly woven together in relationships now floating 
in space. And to have to begin again on another level to 
make the long transition into eternity—this is the arduous 
task. Like man, it would seem, those pilgrims in the realm 
on the other side of life face some difficulties.. Perhaps 
we human living beings make the error of distinguishing too 
sharply between life and death, for angels, they say, often 
scarcely notice which side of life they are on:
Aber Lebendige machen
81 alle den Fehler. dass sie zu stark unterscheiden.
82 Engel (sagt man) wiissten oft nicht, ob sie unter
Seltsam,
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83 Lebenden gehn oder Toten. Die ewige Stromung
84 reisst durch beide Bereiche alle Alter
85 immer rait sich und uberto'nt sie in beiden.
The angels, then, are of neither realm, the realm of the 
living nor the realm of the dead. And they often scarcely 
feel a difference. After all, the deafening eternal roar
1
of what encompasses both realms sounds above both of them 
through the ages.
The dead have put away mortality and mortal trappings, 
and in their pilgrimage into eternity they can hardly find 
us of any help; but we need them:
86 Schliesslich brauchen sie uns nicht mehr, die Friiheentruckten,
87 man entwo'hnt sich des Irdischen sanft, wie man den Briisten
88 milde der Mutter entwachst. Aber wir, die so grosse
89 Geheimnisse brauchen, denen aus Trauer so oft
90 seliger Fortschritt entspringt—: ko'nnten wir sein ohne sie?
We need their mighty secrets, the mighty secrets of the young 
dead, the ones who know the secret of living life intensely.
The secret they hold is the ability to experience life in 
all the glory of its intensity; this ability we need. There 
is, then, an implied criticism of the lack of intensity of
modern man in the very fact of turning to the young dead.
The secrets the young dead hold also involve the fact
They havethat they know what is on the other side of life, 
passed into the beyond and transcended (or outgrown) the mor­
tal; they retain the essential, what is left to be retained.
The question, nCould we be without them?11 seems to point to 
both their knowledge of these essentialities which survive
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mortal death and their knowledge of the secret of intensity.
The Elegy ends on a note of affirmation, even though 
in the form of a rhetorical question. The final image, 
drawn from mythology, provides a highly poetical closing
which is actually an illustration of what had been noted in 
lines 69-90: " out of grief is often generated happy prog- 
To this thought Rilke attaches the mythological pic-
• • •
ress.
ture of the death of Linos. Just as progress is generated 
out of grief, so in the anguished void left as Linos steps
into the realm beyond is music first vibrated into being— 
music, which ravishes, consoles, and helps:
91 1st die Sage umsonst, dass einst in der Klage urn Linos
92 wagende erste Musik diirre Erstarrung durchdrang;
93 dass erst im-erschrockenen Raum, dem ein beiiiah. gott-
licher Jungling -
94 plo'tzlich fur iramer enttrat, das Leere in jene
95 Schwingung geriet, die uns jetzt hinreisst und tro'stet
und hilft.
Thus, the sadness generates healing music.
The last strophe suggests an answer to the question 
of line 9- ”Ach, wen vermSgen wir denn zu brauchen?” The 
young dead do not need us, but thqr can help us. Indeed, we
And grief helps,have great need of their mighty secrets.
for it generates spiritual progress and the music of conso- 
Thus, animals, angels and men cannot help, but the
That grief is in-
lation.
young dead can help us and grief helps, 
directly creative one might well illustrate by pointing to 
the ”creative anguish of a modern poet" which generated the
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music of the Elegies which ravishes, consoles, and helps.
Existentially, the significance of the last two 
strophes lies in the relationship of the living to the young 
dead in the realm beyond, in the value on intensity, and in 
the question, ’’Could we be without them?” There is in this
query the implication of the necessary existence of another 
realm in the very mode of being of man. 
out this other realm.
Man cannot be, with­
in a sense, this realm represents tran­
scendence. [See Buddeberg, pp. 3-20, 187-202.] Man cannot
live, suggests Rilke^ without a relationship to transcendence.
forsaken lovers and the young dead for 
eminently existential reasons: The young dead and .forsaken 
lovers are those in vital contact with life, with mother 
Earth, those to whom immediacy has undiminished reality.
Their modes of being represent the highest degree of conscious-
Rilke admires the
ness.
Reviewing the whole Elegy, let us examine 
first the ontological structure which Rilke presents in the 
work and then the essentially existential concerns as they 
relate themselves to this structure.
Summary.
The effort to define man’s ontological structure is
In the first place, man is be-approached in several ways, 
tween angels and beasts—that is between the infinite and the 
purely finite, between two modes of being for one of which
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time is meaningless because death does not exist, and for 
the other of which time consists essentially of the present 
Then, focussing on the one realm of being—man’s— 
Rilke asks pertinent questions about the dilemma in v/hich 
man finds himself and in doing so suggests the essential dy­
namics of man's mode of being.
"existential" dynamics of man’s being.
These very dynamics which Rilke presents poetically 
were formulated as concepts by the existential philosophers 
of Rilke's own country and in the decade following the pub-
In putting these into a system of 
sorts, Heidegger and the other Existentialists suggest the 
framework of interrelationships between the various concerns 
presented unsystematically and poetically by Rilke.
moment.
These one might call the
lication of the Elegies.
According to existential thought, certain factors
In a sense, the triadcharacterize man's being-in-the-world. 
of concepts, Sein, Zeitlichkeit. and Nichts, are the founda­
tion on which the other concepts are built into a structure
The existence of non-being (Nichts) 
Non-being implies the pos-
of interrelationships.
in man's life is unique to him. 
sibility of death (non-being of the body), condemnation (non-
being of the moral part of man), and meaninglessness (non-be-
The absolute non-being ofing in the realm of the spirit), 
death may become the relative non-being of contingency and 
fate; the non-being of condemnation may be mediated to guilt;
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the non-being of meaninglessness may be mediated to 
spiritual emptiness—but the existence of the threat of non- 
being is a very real dynamic of man’s life.
The reaction of the human being to the threat of
mere
non-being is anxiety, even when it is suppressed anxiety. 
Another way of saying that man is subject to non-being is to 
say he is finite, for finitude implies that man must die, man 
must suffer under the contingency of fate, man must struggle
The nature of man’s conscious-*to create and preserve meaning, 
ness and the fact of finitude induce in man a special way of
existing in time and of regarding time: Zeitlichkeit. Now 
Zeitlichkeit implies that man is conscious that his life will 
eventually end. This consciousness and the anxiety produced 
by it induce roan to extend himself into the past in search of 
what may be preserved and to extend himself into the future 
to discover what his potentialities are. Man, then, exists 
in the past, present, and future—all at the same time. As 
the Existentialists put it, man ’’stands out from Being" in
three ecstasies of time: past^ present, future.
The sense of finitude equally induces a desire for
Man is doomed to be the crea-transcendence of this finitude. 
ture who constantly strives to transcend finitude and, indeed, 
must strive to do so—that is his very mode of being—and yet
the creature who is intrinsically unable to transcend it ab- 
Finitude always makes itself felt not only in thesolutely.
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more abstract forms of threat, but in the very clinging of
facticity and habit——the ,,viscosity,, of the world surrounding
man, that sticks to him and from which he can never disengage 
is
himself. This/the magnetic power of the inauthenticity of 
dailiness (AlltSglichkeit) which draws man into the deadening 
state of decline (Verfallen) in which man performs his me­
chanical tasks but does not make of himself anything more 
than what he is made by the powers outside of himself. As 
Sartre puts it, man longs for the passive state of being a 
thing, which is acted upon and determined by outside forces, 
instead of grasping his ability to live creatively within the 
limits of his finitude.
These opening paragraphs have presented the complex 
of concerns and the definition of man associated with the 
Existentialists. Below, are presented the complex of con­
cerns in the First Elegy and the conception of man which 
they suggest. Let us see, if possible, how they parallel 
the existential concerns and whether they may be integrated 
into the existential-ontological structure and definition 
of man.
1) Anguish. The opening lines are pervaded by a sense 
This anguish proceeds from the predicament in 
which man finds himself on account of his different mode of 
existence from animals and angels, his faulty communication 
with things, his essential lostness, his longing for completion,
of anguish.
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and his vivid sense of isolation and emptiness, 
these different aspects of man's anguish are also reflected 
in existential thought.
2) Diirftigkeit.
All of
"need." This complex of isolation, 
emptiness, incommunicability, finitude, and so forth, above,
bring
gives a certain amount of definition to the nature of the 
anguish.
into vivid relief the sense of Diirftigkeit which
3) A special mode of being, 
inescapable sense that man has a special, unique mode of 
being.
In the Elegy there is an
It differs from that of angels and animals and further 
has dynamics which furnish much of the basis for the sense of
anguish and Diirftigkeit felt by man. Although the existen­
tial philosophers are much more specific in making time and 
nothingness the mainsprings of this mode of existing, Rilke's
The index ofpresentation implies them, as has been shown, 
time radically distinguishes man's mode of being from that of
Also, the index of nothingness makes 
equally clear that man's mode of existence relates itself 
to non-being in a way that angel or animal could not. 
whole of the Elegy seems to focus on this point and to try 
to show in a variety of ways that man has a special mode of 
being, a mission to fulfill.
4) Man as a self. Equally, one may say that the 
focus of the Elegy is on man himself, as, a self—as a self in
angel or animal.
The
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a world, as a self in anguish, as a self wanting to cry out 
for help, as a self communing with things, as a self isolated 
from ainimals, angels, things, and alone in the night, as a 
self longing for completion, as a self longing for transcend­
ence. But always the focus is on man as a self. And the 
arena is in most cases only ostensibly exterior, but really 
interior—within the self. This innerness is more than the 
innerness of feeling; it is existential subjectivity, the 
subjectivity of Kierkegaard, of Heidegger, of Marcel. As 
Sartre says in his famous definition of Existentialism, “sub­
jectivity is the starting point." The self as subjectivity
is not the self of feeling only, but the whole innerness of
And,the individual—wissen, wollen, sollen, and fuhlen. 
in a twist which would please any Existentialist, Rilke over­
comes the subject-object dichotomy, for in the Elegy man is
both object and subject.
The value of man. In Existentialism, man is onto-
His mode of being is distinct from otherlogically unique, 
modes of being and he is at the very center of reality; for
the Umwelt is Zuhanden or Vorhanden as it relates to man. 
that
Rilke implies/a similar centrality belongs to man, that man
is worth preserving from absorption into the all (of Being
The fact of the value of manas represented by the angel), 
may also be seen in the fact that man has a mission, a high
purpose to fulfill.
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Communication difficulties. In Existentialism, the 
inherent solipsism which results from the emphasis on the 
self creates difficulties in communication. Complicating 
the issue still further is man's tendency to give abstractions 
an excessive amount of reality. Kierkegaard criticized in- 
tellectualizing and abstraction, and rejected Hegel's ab­
solute idealism. Since that time, experiential reality has 
consistently been the theme of existential thinkers and sys­
tems have consistently been rejected. Rilke, too, in his 
poetic terms criticizes the tendency to live in a world of 
abstractions—the "gedeutete Welt," the interpreted world.
A fabric of interpretation blocks the communication from a 
rose, and transforms its message into some portent of a 
turn in romance. This interpreting function creates the 
world of "illusion" in which man finds himself. Soon man 
discovers that he is without help, alone in a world of illu­
sion.
Rilke, like the Existentialists, asserts 
that man is intrinsically alone because his nature is dif-
The interpreted world
Isolation.
ferent from that of animal or angel.
only makes impossible the communion with the few sources 
which could somewhat relieve this loneliness, 
ceive help from certain sources, but he cannot eliminate al­
together his loneliness, just as he can receive help to face
Man can re­
death but cannot eliminate the fact that he must die.
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Appropriation. Fear of appropriation of the self by 
the world and by other human beings is basic in Existential­
ism, especially in Sartre’s shudder before the appropriating 
glance of the "other person." The basis of this fear of ap­
propriation is the concern for the preservation of the integ­
rity and self-determining nature of the self. In Rilke, man
is, as has been noted, considered worth preserving in sepa­
ration from the angel. The poet must stifle even the call 
for help directed at the angel for fear of being appropriated 
and absorbed by the stronger being of the angel. In the Ele­
gy and in Existentialism, the effort is both positive and. 
negative: the positive suggestion of intensifying the exist­
ence of the self, and the negative fear of appropriation and 
further loss of the self.
Borderline man. In Rilke, man is shovnas—at his best— 
existing on the border of the finite and infinite. Man is 
looking into the angelic realms, or into the infinite reaches 
of the night, or into the realm of the young dead. The in­
fluence of these non-finite realms should permeate man's ex­
istence. In the existential concern with transcendence there 
is the recognition that man’s existence at its best is a con­
stant interaction of finite and infinite. This, especially in 
Kierkegaard and Jaspers, is a prominent part of existential 
thinking. Even in Heidegger and Sartre, who deny the infi­
nite, the concept of the infinite is replaced by "timeless
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presence,” that is, "Being.” But whether the super-finite 
realm is called finite Being or infinity does not alter the 
importance of transcendence of finitude through interaction
with a realm which is distinct from human finitude.
Facticity is given a special meaning in 
existential thought. It refers to inescapability, the ines- 
capability of the self from its body and from its world. Fur­
ther, it refers to the consequent power of the body and the 
world to exert pressure on the individual. Rilke presents 
this problem in poetical form in the description of the 
clinging loyalty of habit which is so real and determinative 
that it seems to have a life of its own, seems to decide for 
itself that "here is a being with'whom I should like to set­
tle down.” The consolation of repetition, too, is a shallow 
consolation, corresponding to Heidegger’s concept of the 
feeling of Beruhigung (appeasement) which deceives the in- 
authentically existing person into thinking that all is well.
FaktizitSt.
Repetition is a standard aspect of the jugglers and other in-
Only here inauthentically existing people Rilke presents.
the First Elegy does the positive value—the consolation—
And even here, it only ac-of repetition receive attention, 
centuates the spiritual poverty of man .to whom only repeti-
Repetition is translated into exis­
tential terms by the term ”AlltSglichkeit,” for this daili- 
ness implies the adherence without resistence to a pattern,
tion and habit remain.
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a pattern established and strengthened through repetition. 
Rilke's assertion that little but habit remains to modern 
man would only strengthen Heidegger's assertion of the state 
of decline (Verfalien) of modern man, the fundamental in­
authenticity of his present manner of existing.
Rilke's criticism is not, however, without implica­
tions of positive values and of implied courses of action 
and modes of being which would lead to a more authentic man­
ner of being. The three basic suggestions would seem to be 
communion, intensity, and transcendence. Significantly, 
these are three basic suggestions of existential thinkers 
as well.
Communion. Rilke seems to discredit interpretation 
as such (although he sets himself up as an interpreter) and 
essentially recommends communion rather than communication. 
Even though Rilke's medium is communication through words, 
his communication is praise and as such it tends to be a one­
way matter. Thus, this praise is better understood as a form 
of expression rather than communication among men. 
distinction is a difficult one, for art is a form of communi­
cation. To clarify this distinction, one may observe that 
communion, too, is a type of communication—but a special 
type. This special type of communication is to be contrasted 
with the type of communication in which man daily indulges in 
this "interpreted" world. This special type is communication
This
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raised to the level of communion. Yet this communication 
is not the silent, super-verbal, loving communication be­
tween man and man envisioned by Jaspers and Marcel, but a 
silent, super-verbal loving communication with things, and 
with the realms beyond. In Existentialism, Heidegger comes 
closest to this concept when he says that man is getting
far away from Being. He says that man should try to come 
to live in nearness to Being; man should become the "shepherd 
of Being." Just as, in Rilke, things seem to beckon to, 
strangely concern, and even depend on, man, so also in 
Heidegger Being seems to beckon to, strangely concern, and 
even depend on the guardianship of man. The interaction
between man and Being in Heidegger and between man and the 
being of things in Rilke does not undergo the distortion
Even Rilke's praiseinevitably involved in verbalization, 
is a form of verbalization which comes primarily after com­
munion.
Rilke's admiration for the young dead is 
to a large degree due to the fact that they represent in-
Intensity.
tensity, heightened consciousness, undiminished by the ero-
This intensity and consciousness represents 
an unmediated, naive, direct contact with a genuine experien-
doubt and
sion of time.
tial reality—a reality about which there is no 
in which there is no marring aspect of illusion or misinter-
This is one reason we so need their mighty secrets.pretation.
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We need the secret of living confidently, fully, joyously, 
in direct contact with what it means to be alive.
Existentialists, too, seek a genuine reality based 
on experience—an nexistential” reality. They, too, would 
prefer the existential intensity of the lover to the heroic
type of intensity. They, too, would say that the moment of 
intensity is a moment of subjective power, of greater free­
dom for self-realization. The inauthentic life is the life 
deadened by repetition, by communication that has degener­
ated to chatter, by unconsciousness even in the waking 
state. The authentic life inevitably involves intensity 
and heightened consciousness. Thus, in both Rilke and in 
Existentialism, intensity has a positive value.
Transcendence. The image of the bow-string and arrow 
and the image of the generation of music are both primarily 
transcendence images. They show, as Heidegger would say, 
that man is essentially a projective structure, 
express poetically Jaspers’ concept of transcendence through 
shipwreck. In both of the images, the situation might be 
called a ’’boundary situation’’ and a shipwreck situation, for 
both involve shattering and transcendence: the shock of the 
snap of the bow-string shoots the arrow into flight, and the 
shock of Lihos stepping into the realm beyond wrenches the 
silence and generates music. Both, then, are poetic symbols 
of transcendence. In conceptual language, Heidegger says
And they
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that man is TTgeworfenerEntwurf<T:
Rilke shows man as an arrow that achieves its raison-d’etre 
in motion. Jaspers asserts that man transcends through 
Scheitern (shattering, shipwreck); Rilke captures the essen­
tial relationship of shipwreck to transcendence in an image 
of the shattering shock of the bow-string and the arrow 
it leaps forward into flight.
in poetical language,
as
Thus, both positively and negatively, Rilke and the 
Existentialists are making not only similar analyses of the 
condition of modern man, but similar positive recommendations 
about the direction towards authenticity. They agree about 
man’s anguish and Durftigkeit. that man exists in a special 
mode of being, that man is conceived basically and primarily 
as a self, that man has communication problems, that part of 
man’s problem is his existence in a fog of his own abstractions 
and systems, that man is spiritually isolated and alone, that 
man is in danger of being appropriated, that man is on the 
borderline of the finite and the infinite, that man is in the 
power of habit and facticity, and that ultimately man is in a 
state of decline. On the positive side, their three-point 
recommendation is basically the same—to return to a communion 
relationship with things and thereby a nearness to Being, to 
strive for a greater intensity and consciousness and a more 
genuine reality, and finally, to experience transcendence 
through the snap of the bow-string—that is, through shipwreck.
2S1
THE FOURTH ELEGY
1 0 BSurae Lebens, o warm winterlich?
2 Wir-sind nicht einig. Sind nicht wie die Zug-
3 VSgel verstandigt. Uberholt imd spat,
4 so drangen wir uns plotzlich Winden auf
5 rind fallen ein auf teilnahmslosen Teich.
The first line is not to be taken as praise, as 
meaning "Oh wondrous life so ever green,” but in relation­
ship to the lines that follow. This gives quite the oppo­
site meaning, essentially "Why is our existence not inti­
mately related with what is around us?" The fact that die 
BSume Lebens do not become "wirrterlich" is meant as a criti­
cism. The trees of life do not relate themselves to nature,
to the seasons, and this leads to trouble.
As early as line 2, the significant word "wir" ap- 
The trees of life are to be construed as "unsere."
Our existence is
pears.
and more specifically, our existence, 
not at one with our world and its changing seasons.
Immediately after stating this opening thought, the 
poet proceeds to develop it in much the same way as the First 
Elegy presented an opening wish to cry out to the angels and
then developed the contrast between man's mode of existence
In the first strophe of theand that of angel and animal.
Fourth Elegy, man's existence is compared with that of birds,
plants,and a kingly animal.
Man's manner of existence is, in lines 2-5, compared
The migratory birds live into that of migratory birds.
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deep DaseinseinverstSndnis with the wind. Their manner of
In-der-Welt-sein is in distinct contrast to that of man,
who if seen as a bird is "uberholt und spat.n abruptly-
throwing himself into the wind, failing and falling into
ponds which to birds who know them seem to co-operate;- -but 
to man, who communes neither with wind nor pond, they are 
merely "unsympathetic ponds." Our being-in-the-worId is 
not naive like migratory birds'; we decide for ourselves
without consulting nature; we equivocate, doubt; we are not 
prepared in deed or thought for what comes, and we fall in-
9
to a lifeless mire. When we do decide to act, our abrupt­
ness ruins everything; we let the right moment pass, then 
frantically—uberholt und spSt—try to catch up. Breath­
lessly we overexert ourselves to catch up with those who 
threw themselves into the wind at the right moment and 
seemed to be effortlessly borne away.
Like the evergreen tree, we stand apart in our cycle 
of being from the rest of nature, which feels the joyful 
ascendency of spring and which fades, gold-vermillion, in
the fall. Rather, man is conscious of blooming and fading
%
at the same time:
6 Bliihn und verdorrn ist uns zugleich bewusst.
We are conscious of the unfolding of life and the passing 
of life. Somehow, doubts and weaknesses seem to mar what 
for flowers and birds is the unfolding of life, the joyful
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contact with the living waters of existence. And the 
naive nobility and power of the lion seem to make more 
clear the painful contrast between his existence and that 
of man:
7 Und irgendwo gehn Lowen noch und wissen,
8 solang sie herrlich-sind, von keiner Ohnmacht
The lion, the migratory bird, the flower that blooms and 
fades, all are at home in this world; only man is homeless. 
Man is not at one with nature, and he is not "unyerlasslich 
zu Haus" even in the world in which he chooses to live, the 
interpreted world.
The dynamics of life are polarities; but man can never
seem to achieve one pole without the taste of the other. As
Keats has said in his famous "Ode on Melancholy":
Ay, in the very temple of delight '
Veil'd Melancholy has her sovran shrine
We do one thing but always feel the tug of the opposite:
9 Uns aber, wo wir Eines meinen, ganz,
10 ist schon des ander Aufwand ftihlbar.
11 ist uns das Nachste. Treten Liebende
12 nicht immerfort an Rander, ein im andern,
13 die sich versprachen Weite, Jagd und Heimat.
Even lovers who in each other see the promise of spacious-
• • •
Feindschaft
ness, the glorious excitement of pursuit, and the familiarity 
of being at home, find the bitter experience of the opposites. 
Instead of spaciousness and scope, they find themselves cir-
Instead of finding the joy of the
Instead
cumscribed, walled in. 
chase, they find themselves held down, possessed.
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of finding themselves at last at home (being at home neither 
with nature nor the interpreted world), they discover that 
they only remain strange to each other, concealing their 
loneliness from each other, hiding the thoughts that come 
and go and often stay the night, 
perience what Rilke described in the First Elegy; 
verdecken sich miteinander ihr Los.'* [line 22]
And the lovers discover the strangeness of the inner 
jungle of feeling, stirrings from a primeval past, the fear­
ful river-god of the blood. They find anything but the fa­
miliarity of home. This dark jungle of feeling eludes the 
light of understanding, which serves only to light up the 
exterior of feeling and leave its interior dark and myste­
rious. Just as light is such only because of darkness, so 
also love generates and even requires hostility: ’’Feind- 
schaft/ ist uns das NSchste.” We do not know the true na­
ture of feeling but only some external contours projected 
against their opposites and made painful that we might see 
them:
To their sorrow, they ex-
"Ach, sie
14 Da wird f(ir eines Augenblickes Zeichnung
15 ein Grund -von Gegenteil bereitet, muhsam,
16 dass wir sie sShen; denn man ist sehr deutlich
17 mit uns. Wir kennen den Kontur
18 des Fiihlens nicht: nur was ihn formt von aussen.
Thus, Rilke seems to present what would constitute 
a sort of existential dialectic of feeling. Even further, 
there is a suggestion that this dialectic is part of man’s
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basic manner of existence, that is, that it is an ontological 
Polarity, Rilke asserts, is an underlying onto­
logical structure of life; for this reason, man's search for 
chase, and home, and scope, often generate their opposites— 
limits, possessiveness, strangeness, loneliness, and mystery.
structure.
The underlying significance of the first eighteen 
lines is found in the terse statement in line 2: "Wir sind 
nicht einig."
in ways that develop the sad contrast between man as an in­
habitant of this world and the other inhabitants—bird, lion, 
flower—in ways that show man in the pathos of his malad­
justment to this world, 
unity, by alienation and by contradictions; man is presented 
in all his brokenness and despair.
not fly but falls pathetically into unconcerned ponds, 
is the being who even when he has his mind wholly devoted 
to one thing, feels the tug of the other.
whose blooming is marred by a simultaneous consciousness of 
fading away—a consciousness of finitude, of the fact that
Hostility is never far away, 
liberation of love is not free of enslavement, nor its inti­
macy free of strangeness, concealment, and loneliness.
Thus, in the first eighteen lines, Rilke establishes 
a picture of man which is marked by an unmediated pessimism. 
Life is fragmentary, disunified, alien, replete with painful
This thought is spun out in the other lines
Man is presented torn by inner dis-
Man is a bird who can-
Man
Man is the being
Even thehe as a man must die.
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contradictions and difficulties. Man is puzzled, broken, 
in despair. In Heidegger's terms, this would be called the 
spiritual Diirftigkeit of modern man. But the reason for 
this state of needfulness is distinctly Rilke’s 
as Buddeberg puts it, ”der Mangel an HingabefShigkeit cin das 
eigne Gefiihl.” [Buddeberg, p. 55] The reason for man’s
It is,own.
plight, his desperate "Gespaltensein." that is, his desper­
ate dividedness, is his failure to be direct, his incapacity 
to give himself wholeheartedly and unreservedly to his heart. 
Man is not directly in contact with the wind like the birds;
He does nothe does not commune with what is around him. 
bloom naively like the flower, but with consciousness of
Thus, the native hue of his resolution is, as Hamlet 
might say, ’’sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought."
This painful desperation and dividedness expresses 
itself in the form of a poetic image: that of the poet before 
the curtain of his heart:
19 Wer sass nicht bang vor seines Herzens Vorhang?
Here the dividedness takes the form of a division between
fading.
the observing consciousness of the poet before the stage of
Consciousness is distancedhis heart—separated by a curtain, 
from the heart, and the poet sits distractedly before the
rising curtain:
20 Der schlug sich auf: die Szenerie war Abschied.
21 Leicht zu verstehen. Der bekannte Garten,
22 und schwankte leise: dann erst kara der TSnzer.
2S7
The scene was set for parting, 
was the familiar garden.
This was obvious, and there 
The wings avung slightly, showing 
perhaps the movement of someone behind them about to enter.
Then came the dancer, who, according to Professor Kreutz, 
ordinarily represents to Rilke the ’’gultiger, gelungener Aus- 
druck des Seelischen im Leiblichen zu sein, die geschlossene, 
runde Einheit von beiden: Daseins- und Lebensfiille.’’ [Kreutz, 
p. 63] But the dancer that appears is, rather, a painful 
spectacle, overweight, the half-filled mask creating no 
illusion whatsoever. In anguish the poet shrieks, "Not he I”
23 Nicht der. Genug! Und wenn er auch so leicht tut,
24 er ist verkleidet und er wird ein Burger
25 und geht durch seine Kiiche in die Wohnung.
However lightly the dancer may move and however much he
would like to represent the complete, genuine, fulfilled ex-
Brutally the poet un-istence, he remains poorly disguised, 
masks the dancer as a coarse Burger who in entering his own
house goes through the kitchen.
With the same shrill denunciation of the world of 
illusion as the Existentialists, the poet grimly asserts he 
would prefer puppets, whose strings that give them lightness 
can be seen, to Burger pretending a lightness that is not 
theirs:
26 Ich will nicht diese halbgefiillten Masken,
Ich willDie ist voll.27 lieber die Puppe.
2B den Balg aushalten und den Draht und ihr 
29 Gesicht aus Aussehn.
These bitter words underscore the poet’s fierce distaste for
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pretence of any kind. Rather than the pretence of the 
Burger, the poet will see the puppet—without any illusions.
He wants to see the husk, the wire, the hard and lifeless 
immobility of the face. Rather than the insufficiency of 
the human, he prefers the lifeless, mechanical completeness
of the puppet. In the last lines of the strophe, the poet 
impatiently calls for a drama on the stage of his innermost 
being (his heart), a drama without pretense or illusion.
Even if the grim emptiness drives all others from the audi­
ence—man cannot bear too much reality—the poet determines 
to stay, and to stay even if the stage turns out to be full
He gestures that he is ready, that the showof emptiness.
must go on:
Hier. Ich bin davor.
30 V/enn auch die Lampen ausgehn, wenn mir auch
31 gesagt wird: Nichts mehr—, wenn auch von der Biihne
32 das Leere herkommt mit dem grauen Luftzug,
33 wenn auch von meinen stillen Vorfahrn keiner
34 mehr mit mir dasitzt, keine Frau, sogar
35 der Knabe nicht mehr mit dem braunen Schielaug:
36 Ich bleibe dennoch. Es gibt immer Zuschaun.
The show may be over, and he may be told that there is nothing 
more to be seen, but stubbornly the poet will remain, 
always something to be seen even when the stage is empty.
There is
In a 15-line aside addressed to his father, Rilke 
reflects on the consequences of his attitude (an attitude 
partially expressed in the previous strophe) and his mission 
as a poet, and he attempts to justify himself:
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37 Hab ich nicht recht? Du, der um mich so bitter
38 das Leben schmeckte,- raeines kostend, Vater
39 den ersten triiben aufguss raeines Miissens,
40 da ich heranvmchs, iraraer wieder kostend
41 und, rait dem Nachgeschmack so frerader Zukunft
42 beschaftigt, priiftest mein beschlagnes Aufschaun,—
43 der du, mein Vater, seit du tot bist, oft
44 in meiner Hoffnung, innen in mir, Angst hast,
45 und Gleichmut, wie ihn Tote haben, Reiche
46 von Gleichmut, aufgiebst fur mein bisschen Schicksal,
47 hab ich nicht recht?
And then he turns to others who have loved him:
Und ihr, hab ich nicht recht,
4# die ihr mich liebtet fur den kleinen Anfang
49 Liebe zu euch, von dem ich immer abkam,
50 weil mir der Raum in eurem Angesicht,
51 da ich ihn liebte, ttberging in Weltraum,
52 in dem ihr nicht mehr wart........
These lines give some indication of the extent to which 
Rilke regarded sacrifice as necessary to art, and also in­
dicate his view of art as his "Schicksal.” The poet sacri­
fices himself to his art, and at the same time brings puz­
zlement and pain to those who love him. Yet the poet must 
”ubergehen in Weltraum,M leaving behind the preciousness of 
the direct contact with those he loves and who love him.
After this brief aside to his father and those who 
have loved him, the poet, seated before the stage of his 
heart, continues to wait, the puppets crumpled lifelessly 
on its floor. Yet the poet, if his gaze is strong enough, 
will cause another force as if to counterbalance his gaze, 
to appear above the husks and raise them up:
wenn mir zumut ist,
53 zu warten vor den Puppenbiihne, nein,
54 so vollig hinzuschaun, dass, um mein Schauen
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55 am Ende aufzuwiegen, dort als Spieler
56 ein Engel hinmuss, der die Balge hochreisst.
Now the play fulfills the conditions the poet has insisted 
upon. Now, finally, the play can begin:
57 Engel und Puppe: dann ist endlich Schauspiel.
5S Dann kommt zusammen, was wir immerfort
59 entzwein, indem wir da sind. Dann entsteht
60 aus unsern Jahreszeiten erst der Umkreis
61 des ganzen Wandelns.
Lines 59-61 are translated by Harry Behn as, "At last, out
7
of the cycle of spinning years, the whole design takes form."
\
One might translate the passage more literally as, "Then is 
generated from our round of seasons at last the cycle or 
circle that comprehends all changes." At last a pattern 
emerges:
.
Uber uns hinuber
62 spielt dann der Engel. Sieh, die Sterbenden,
63 sollten sie nicht vermuten, wie voll Vorwand
64 das alles ist, was wir hier leisten. Alles
65 ist nicht es selbst.
The image of the angel over man is subject to a double 
interpretation: First, that the puppets on the stage of the 
heart of man are raised up by the flying over of the angel; 
second, the sentence can be interpreted as meaning that we 
are the puppets over which the angel hovers, that the flesh 
and spirit—that are constantly separated in daily life—are 
joined and now there can be a play.
?The Duino Elegies. 
N. Y., 1957)i unpaginated.
trans. Harry Behn (Mt. Vernon,
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If only we knew how full of pretense is all that we 
do here! Even the dying do not realize it. This is one of 
the most telling and memorable lines in Rilke, M 
sie nicht vermuten, wie voll Vorwand/ das alles ist, was wir 
hier leisten." Masterfully Rilke sums up the problem in a 
terse pronouncement: "Alles/ist nicht es selbst." In five 
short words Rilke presents the experience of the pretense, 
disillusionment, pessimism, and despair of man displaced in 
the modern world. The line seems to balance and echo the 
initial four-word pronouncement: HWir sind nicht einig." 
Thus, in nine words much of the thought of the Fourth Elegy 
can be summarized by the two statements: "Alles ist nicht 
es selbst." and "Wir sind nicht einig." One presents man's 
disharmony with nature, with what is around him, his des­
perate dividedness and inability to be at one with himself.
sollten• • •
The other presents the problem of illusion and pretense.
"Alles ist nicht es selbst" also suggests a problem
If all is not itself, 
If seeming
related to illusion: meaninglessness, 
then the meaning of life is seriously impaired.
replaces being—that is, the world of seeming replaces the 
world of reality—then a serious problem is posed in the
Soon the world of seeming is a world with-area of meaning, 
out meaning: and if one lives in this world, one lives in a 
world of meaningless meanings—in a world of meaninglessness. 
Thus, "Alles ist nicht es selbst" reflects a pessimism in
■
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the face of meaninglessness.
Just as Rilke set man*s lostness in bold relief at 
the beginning of the Elegy by means of contrast with the 
lion, the bird, and the flower, so also Rilke sets manfs 
world of illusion in contrast with the naive world of the
The contrast becomes that between man, who lives in 
a world of illusion, pretense, and interpretation, and the 
child, who lives in the purity of the present, 
around and always taking leave, and at his back is only a 
future in which he will also only be taking leave of the past. 
For the child, the future is not an oppressive reality, and 
the figures on the dial of the clock are much more than the
child.
Man is turned
past; the clock points vividly to the present:
0 Stunden in der Kindheit,
66 da hinter den Figuren mehr als nur
67 Vergangnes war und vor uns nicht die Zukunft.
The child grows to maturity without realizing that those who
But the childare already there have only this maturity, 
presses on, half for the sake of these lonely ones.
63 Wir wuchsen freilich und wir drangten manchmal,
69 bald gross zu werden, denen halb zulieb,
70 die andres nicht mehr hatten, als das Grosssein.
But the real basis for the contrast between the maturity of
illusions, pretence and interpretations and the vivid pres­
ent-tense existence of the child is summed up in the last 
five lines of the strophe:
71 Und waren doch, in unserem Alleingehn,
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72 mit Dauerndem vergniigt und standen da
73 im Zwischenraume zwischen Welt und Spielzeug,
74 an einer StelleA die seit Anbeginn
75 gegrundet war fur einen reinen Vorgang.
In solitude, the child may find a moment in which 
duration ceases, a moment in a realm not of world nor of 
plaything, at a spot which from the beginning of time has 
been established for the occurrence of the pure event.
This pure event is the difference between man and 
child. (The adjective “rein.” is, in Rilke, a positive term, 
and the adjective "leer11 a negative one.) Lovers are in 
their mode of existence marked by intensity: children by 
purity. For the child, the present can be pure; for the 
adult, the present is alloyed with future and past. The 
pure event can occur for the child but not for the adult.
Like the bird, the lion, and the flower, the child is 
in direct contact with nature, in direct contact with reality, 
without the need for interpretation. Like an animal, a child 
exists in purity and openness to Being. (This, perhaps, is 
a basic reason for Rilke’s admiration for children and ani-
Thismals—and his acute embarrassment in their presence, 
embarrassment was, I believe, not unalloyed with fear—fear
of appropriation by child or animal.) This purity is hardly 
graspable by an adult, escapes all description, is impossible 
to measure.
The occurrence of death in this state of purity is
impenetrable to the understanding, “ist unbeschreiblich.*even more
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This is the thought that dominates the last strophe. First, 
who can show a child—he who, between world and plaything
fur ednen reinen Vorgang"—where he 
stands? (Here one may translate two ways: "Who can portray 
a child who is standing in a place we cannot understand...* 
or "Who can show a child where to stand who is already on 
the place established as the ground for the pure event 
And who can place him in his proper constellation and give 
the measure of distance into his hands?
76 Wer zeigt ein Kind, so wie es steht?
77 es ins Gestirn und giebt das Mass des Abstands
78 ihm in die Hand?
And if this is so impossible, how much more impossible is 
it to portray the death of a child!
is on the very "Stelle • • •
")• • •
8 Wer stellt
Wer macht den Kindertod
79 aus grauem Brot, das hart Wird,—oder lasst
80 ihn drin im runden Mund, so wie den Grops
81 von einem schonen Apfel?
Compared to the indescribability of the death of a child, 
murder is easy to understand:
• • • •
Morder sind 
Aber dies: den Tod,82 leicht einzusehen.
83 den ganzen Tod, noch vor dem Leben so
84 sanft zu enthalten und nicht bos zu sein,
85 ist unbeschreiblich.
But this, to face the end in all its completeness and not
^Regarding the significance of the unconscious pu­
rity of the being of a child, see Eberhard Kretschmar, 
"Das Sein als menschliches Leben," Chapter 3 of his Rilke 
als Dichter des Seins (Dresden, 1934), especially Part 1, 
entitled "Unbewusstes Menschsein," pp. 42-46. The final 
strophe of the Fourth Elegy receives comment on p. 44-
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to become bitter, this is indescribable. (Here again the 
translation may be: “But this: Death the whole of Death, 
to hold it so gently before Life has been—and not for the 1
!child to be bitter (at Death) is incomprehensible." Of,
to witness the death of a child and not to become bitter—ii ■• • •
is indescribable.") The extinction of the purity of a child 
is indescribable. In this sense, Rilke’s attempt to describe 
it, then, is a logical impossibility in his own terms.
Existentialism in the Fourth Elegy, 
is a ruthless delineation of the Durftigkeit of modern man. 
Its criticisms are as pointed as those of the Existential­
ists and their content is essentially the same: man’s mode 
of being-in-the-world is inauthentic; he is displaced and 
homeless in his world; inside he is a chaos of disunity and
The Fourth Elegy
despair, of futility, contradiction, irony, and dividedness; 
he moves in a man-created world of pretense and illusion;
Their program of recommenda-man is estranged from Being, 
tions for the repair of thfc situation has the same essential 
note: 1) admission of error and of need; 2) a determination
to rid oneself of mauvaise foi: and 3) openness to, and
All three represent a search for acommunion with, Being, 
genuine reality, and 1 and 2 express the will-to-honesty. 
These points have been brought out in connection
They maywith the examination of the meaning of the Elegy, 
now be discussed in connection with the relationship between
:
i
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the concepts in Existentialism and the corresponding images 
in the poetry.
The first concepts fall under the heading of the 
statement, "Wir sind nicht einig."
1) Not in harmony. The first strophe presents a vivid 
image of man as not in harmony with nature. Man's mode of 
being-in-the-world is not in harmony with the world. A 
series of contrasts—with the migratory birds, the flower, 
the lion—makes painfully obvious the fact that man's mode 
of being-in-the-world is far inferior to that of the other 
living things to which man is compared.
I
This image is paralleled in Existentialism in Heidegger's 
assertion that man is not in harmony with Being. Indeed, Rilke
is saying the same thing in poetic language! man is estranged 
from the ground of his existence—Being, 
and birds live naively, in direct contact with Being.
Man is separated from the
Plants, animals, 
Man,
however, interprets, decides, 
kind of nearness to Being possessed by animals, separated by
Migratory birds livea wall of interpretation and illusion, 
in deep Daseinseinverstandnis with the winds; man makes the
wind and the pond an object, an instrument to be thought 
about and used for the sake of going somewhere—just as the
Thus, man norose is used for fortune-telling purposes.
longer communes with the wind, but even as he flies is think-
Birds "exist" their flying joyfullying of something else.
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and commune with the nature of the wind; man has lost con­
tact with the nature of the wind, that is, the being of the 
Man lives in an interpreted world.wind. His mode of in- 
der-Welt-sein does not represent a communing with Being,
but rather the making of the world around him into lifeless 
objects, the mere raw material for the process of abstraction 
involved in thought.
2) Displaced and homeless. The fact that man is not
in harmony with his world relates itself further to the fact
%
that man is at home neither in the world of nature nor in
the "interpreted world."
He feels lost in an alien world, a world in which the other 
beings are adapted to nature and "well-adjusted", while 
man’s relationship to the world is the picture of maladjust­
ment .
Man feels displaced and homeless.
Both Rilke and the Existentialists submit this inter­
pretation of modern man, and stress his inferior or “inau­
thentic" manner of being-in-the-world. 
down of intimate contact with things as a factor in the
Both assert that
Both note the break-
deterioration of this being-in-the-world. 
the major factor in man’s predicament is that he no longer
stands in nearness to Being.
3) Inner disunity and despair. The lack of harmony
with one’s world is inevitably paralleled and reflected in
Rilke’s analysis doesa lack of unity in one’s inner world.
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not stop with an assertion that man’s relationship with 
his world is deficient, but relentlessly exposes an inner 
world of disunity, despair, pretence, and illusion. A pri­
mary factor in this inner disunity and despair, Rilke suggests, 
is the operation of an existential dialectic. This dialectic 
means that even when we try to concentrate wholly; on one 
thing, we feel the faint tug of its opposite. Even as we 
seek scope, running space, familiarity, we find limits, 
hobbles, strangeness, and concealment. It is a dialectic 
of irony, of achieving the opposite of what was anticipated, 
a dialectic of contradiction and futility. The opposite of 
inner unity is splitness, dividedness; this is the essential 
inner condition of modern man. He can never be wholly.1 one 
thing, can never feel wholly/ one way, can never do wholly, 
as he anticipates; always there is that inner splitness 
which frustrates man’s desire for unity.
In Existentialism, one finds a similar analysis of 
the splitness of man. Man exists dialectically, and the 
process of transcendence is often described in dialectical 
terms, in terms of "transcendence through shipwreck." In 
Sartre, one finds abundant polarities, the most basic being 
between the en-soi and the pour-soi.
divided between en-soi and pour-soi and can never altogether 
escape this splitness, can never wholly,' become one or the 
In Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel and Tillich, man is
Man is essentially
other.
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split between the finite and infinite and can never be com­
pletely finite or completely free of finitude. This, too,
is essentially a dialectic of contradiction and futility, 
if one wishes to see it in those terms—that is, if one
will not accept the dimension of finitude and joyfully 
“exist”—exist, especially, in nearness to Being.
Thus, one may say that the dialectic of inner split­
ness and dividedness which Rilke submits, is paralleled in 
Existential thought by a similar assertion of man’s essential 
splitness, a splitness which is ontological and therefore 
not to be overcome.
Durftigkeit.
tion of this insurmountable splitness is prominent in exis­
tential thought as well as in this Fourth Elegy, 
tential thought, the recognition of this Durftigkeit is a
This
The despair resulting from the percep-
In exis-
prerequisite to aiming toward authentic existence. 
Durftigkeit. however, also involves the recognition of the 
world of illusion and pretense in which man is living.
Rilke’s antipathy to pretensePretense and illusion, 
and illusion is seen in the rejection of the dancer and the
remark that the dying ought to suspect how full of pretense
The rejection of the dancer (and 
the contempt for the bourgeois) is paralleled in Existen­
tialism in Sartre’s rejection of “mauvaise foi." 
faith® represents the bourgeois world of illusions and, on
is all that we do here.
“Bad
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the more subjective level, pretenses, which have infiltrated 
our existence and which block the possibilities of realiza­
tion of the self. Kierkegaard's feeling for this world of 
pretense is also very close to Rilke’s thought; in his con­
tempt for the Burger’s living in a world of abstractions 
(the "nineteenth century," the worker, the husband, etc). 
Kierkegaard’s conception of the world of abstraction and 
systems corresponds to Rilke’s “gedeutete Welt."
The common determination of both Rilke and the Exis­
tentialists is to be rid of all pretense and illusion. Both 
seek a genuine reality, a reality on which an existing being 
can depend—a reality free from pretense ("bad faith") and 
illusion (Uneigentlichkeit). Illusion is related to the 
problem of meaninglessness. for illusion is supposedly 
deficient (by definition) of meaning. The quest for a
reality free from illusion, then, is a quest for meaning.
The Mystery of Being, 
characterization of Existentialism, existential thinkers 
attempted to reintroduce "mystery" into existence (in oppo­
sition to the “objective” view of life and nature which 
asserts that everything is understandable with the light of 
In Kierkegaard, subjectivity contains a reintro­
duction of the mysterious, and religious truth is mysterious,
In Jaspers,
As has been noted in the
reason).
even absurd—impenetrable by human reason, 
the infinite is ungraspable and every attempt to characterize
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Being reduces it to finite terms and thereby distorts it.
In Heidegger, Being is a "constant presence" which is 
mysteriously revealed by truth. (Truth, then, is a revela­
tion of Being.) Nothingness is its necessary and equally 
incomprehensible complement. In Sartre, life is impenetrable 
to reason because it is ultimately not reasonable at all, 
but absurd.
Rilke, like the Existentialists, tries to reintroduce 
the element of mystery in existence. The being of animals 
is mysterious, the singing currents of the blood are chant­
ing primeval melodies, and the communion with nature is 
mysterious. Man looks within himself and finds a jungle of 
mysterious feelings; he looks outside himself and finds 
that things seem strangely to concern him, to beckon him to 
the mysterious process of transforming the visible into the 
invisible. Ultimately, one may say that Rilke sees exis­
tence against the backdrop of the mysteriousness of Being. 
Being is a constant presence whose depths can never be
plumbed.
Nothingness, too, is mysterious—impenetrable to 
As has been noted earlier, spiritual emptiness is 
a form of non-being or nothingness which threatens Being.
In spiritual emptiness, non-being threatens Being; in mean­
inglessness, non-being threatens the very life of the human 
being; in death, non-being vanquishes the life of the human
reason.
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bsing. There is no rational explanation of death nor of 
meaninglessness; it is the intervention of nothingness. Our 
lives are shot through with relative forms of nothingness; 
in death nothingness becomes absolute.
The threat of nothingness in Rilke takes the form of 
emptiness, contradiction, and death. The stage of one’s 
heart is not free from emptiness, and Being is always accom­
panied by its dialectical opposite. The desire to realize 
Being through love is painfully shot through with the restric­
tions and limitations and threats to the expansiveness of 
Being which accompany the actual realization of love. These 
threats to Being are indirect forms of non-being, of inau­
thentic in-der-Welt-sein. Nothingness is a polarity of Being 
in the dialectic of existence, the process of being-in-the- 
world. The ultimate mystery and inexplicability of nothing­
ness is made vividly clear in the final strophe of the Elegy, 
which deals with the death of a child. Here the inexplica­
bility of nothingness is accentuated by its being shown 
acting on the purest and highest form of human being. that 
of a child.*
This intervention of nothingness is the very basis
of the tragic—the breaking through of a moment of chaos
Yet in the workingsinto a world of order and regularity.
of the polarity of the genuinely tragic, the system is ulti-
But in the Fourthmately questioned and ultimately affirmed.
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Elegy (taken as a self-contained entity) there is not affir­
mation, but an ever rising negation. The final death is 
not brought about by necessity, nor is it an atoning death 
(as in tragedy), but is only the negative side of the tragic, 
the breaking through of chaos into man’s world. It is mean­
inglessness untempered by meaning.
In the progress of the Fourth Elegy, the negation 
first indicates man’s external disharmony and maladjustment. 
It then exposes man's internal splitness and the inescapable 
dialectic. Next, it lashes out against illusion and pre­
tence. Finally, it makes a momentary affirmation of the 
pure mode of being of the child only to cap it with ultimate 
negation by showing the death of the child. The Elegy as a 
whole assumes the form of a crescendo of the ultimate 
Fragwiirdigkeit of human existence. It marks the nadir of 
pessimism of the whole cycle, for in the Fifth Elegy the 
genuineness of a momentary smile breaks through and the final 
note, the "second ending," is a subjunctive positing of 
another realm. But the Fourth Elegy is a crescendo of pessi­
mism, broken by a glimpse of the positive value of the mode 
of being of the child only to be reintroduced as the being 
of the child is extinguished by nothingness (or, if you wish, 
an irrational, meaningless force).
inwardly divided, victimized by meaninglessness in the form 
of illusion. The inroads of nothingness on the existence
Man is frustrated, lost,
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of man are presented in various relative forms and finally 
in the absolute form of death.
But criticism, however negative, cannot fail to imply 
a value-structure. One cannot criticize meaninglessness 
without positing the value of meaning; one cannot criticize 
death without valuing life; one cannot criticize pretence 
and illusion without valuing genuineness and honesty; one 
cannot criticize estrangement from Being without implying 
the value of nearness to Being. Thus, there seem to emerge 
from the pessimism of the Elegy values of meaning, life, 
genuineness and honesty, nearness and communion with Being. 
In the admiration for the openness of animals to Being is 
a further positive element, as well as the depiction of 
the mode of being of the child who does not see the ominous­
ness of the dial figures of the clock. Thus, for all the 
pessimism and criticism of man's mode of being (Elegy Four 
is dominated by pessimism and Elegy Five by social criti­
cism) , Rilke's Fourth Elegy is not without a positive 
program. This program involves the admission of sins and 
of the need for a genuine reality; it involves a determin­
ation to rid oneself of pretence and illusion; it involves 
developing the openness to Being and the nearness to Being 
of the flower, the bird, the lion, the child—like them, 
man should establish contact with, and commune with Being.
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This is the way out of man*s homelessness, lostness, des­
perate dividedness, his artificial world of illusion and
In a sense, Rilke has not only presented the exis­
tential predicament of modern man, but has suggested directions 
in which man may move to face this predicament properly.
pretence.
The Existentialism in the Fourth Elegy is clear, 
shrill denunciation of modern man which the Existentialists 
have presented in conceptual form is here painstakingly and 
elaborately delineated in poetical form, 
fusion, the outer maladjustment, and the inauthentic world 
of pretence and illusion—these are the recurrent themes in 
existential philosophers, and these are the themes master­
fully presented in the Fourth Elegy.
The
The inner con-
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THE FIFTH ELEGY
1 Wer aber sind sie, sag mir, die Fahrenden,
diese ein wenig
2 Fluchtigern noch als wir selbst • • •
This opening question may be answered both literally 
and symbolically. In the literal sense, these traveling 
people are the acrobats in Picasso’s famous painting, "Les 
Saltimbanques.” This fact is important to the interpreta­
tion of the Elegy, because the six figures described in the
first seventy-two lines of the poem are the six figures in 
othe painting.
On the symbolic level, these acrobats are a represen­
tation of the inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world which 
characterizes modern man. This is clear even as early as 
the second line, where the acrobats are described as "ein 
wenig/Fliichtigern noch als wir selbst.” The significant 
thing is not that they are more transient than we, but that 
they represent in an exaggerated form our own inauthenticity 
and Fluchtigkeit.
^Rilke first became acquainted with this painting at 
the home of Frau Hertha Koenig in Munich, 1915 or 1916. (See 
Dieter Bassermann, Per Spate Rilke (Munich: Leibniz Verlag, 
1947), P* 417•) A black and white reproduction of this 
picture may be found facing the title page of Wolf.
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In the next lines, the acrobats are set in motion 
like a mechanical toy, and a picture is presented of skillful 
artists moving with amazing ease—as if the air had been 
oiled where they are performing—on a rug worn with use:
die dringend von friih an• • •
3 wringt ein wem, wem zu Liebe
4 niemals zufriedener Wille? Sondern er wringt sie,
5 biegt sie, schlingt sie und. schwingt sie,
6 wirft sie und fangt sie zuriick; wie aus geolter,
7 glatterer Luft kommen sie nieder
6 auf dem verzehrten, von ihrem ewigen 
9 Aufsprung dunneren Teppich, diesem verlorenen
10 Teppich im Weltall.
11 Aufgelegt wie ein Pflaster, als hatte der Vorstadt-
12 Himmel der Erde dort wehe getan.
As if the air had been oiled, they seem to defy the
force of gravity and return to the tattered carpet only to
Indeed, they seem to be drivenbe thrown into the air again, 
by a power over and above that in their muscles, a power of
This gives them their re-a “niemals zufriedener Wille 
markable skill and ease, their "Konnen.*
Yet this Konnen is not to be admired, but disparaged, 
for it is a “leeres Zuviel ." an "empty, too-much." 
paragement is mildly suggested in the initial reference to 
the Fahrenden and their Fliichtigkeit. but is reinforced by
This dis-
the observation that they seem to be the mechanical pawns
It is explicit in the descrip-
im Weltall."
of a never-satisfied will, 
tion of the carpet as "thin" and "verloren 
(lines 9-10) The fact that the carpet has no place in the
• • •
universe is even further emphasized in the assertion that
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it was laid down like a plaster or a pavingstone which 
covering a wound in the earth.
was
The carpet is so little a 
part of the earth and so offensive to it that the carpet
seems not to rest comfortably on the earth but on a wound 
Significantly, the acrobats do not return to the
Professor Heinrich Kreutz, in 
his valuable book on the interpretation of. the Elegies. puts 
this interpretation of the basic Bodenlosigkeit most force­
fully:
in it.
earth but to a tattered rug.
Der Boden, auf den die Fahrenden dann nieder- 
kommen, vom Griff des Willens scheinbar entlassen, 
ist nicht Heimat, Grund, Geborgenheit, sondern neue 
Trostlosigkeit, die Bodenlosigkeit ihres Daseins. 
Der/'Teppich*'
Schabigkeit nicht wie auf der Erde, sondern wie auf 
einer Wunde der Erde. So unheil, so bodenlos, so 
“verloren im Weltall” ist das Dasein der Fahrenden.
[Kreutz, p. 76]
liegt da in seiner verbrauchten• • •
Und kaum dort,
13 aufrecht, da und gezeigt: des Dastehns
14 grosser Anfangsbuchstab..., schon auch, die starksten
15 Manner, rollt sie wieder, zum Scherz, der immer
16 kommende Griff, wie August der Starke bei Tisch
17 einen zinnenen Teller.
They are scarcely ever allowed to remain upright, but 
rather are rolled and twirled as Augustus the Strong is said 
to have twirled a tin platter.
18 Ach und um diese
19 Mitte, die Rose..des Zuschauns:
20 bluht und entblattert.
This is the way the world runs down; around this center 
the rose of the performance of the acrobats blooms and blows. 
Just as around the center of a rose, the encircling petals
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lie, so are these performers ringed about by spectators.
The spectators come and go, and so "bliiht und entblattert” 
the "Rose des Zuschauns ." Yet this apparent fruitfulness 
is essentially sterile and artificial, as will be noted.
In the reference to "diesen/Stampfer. den Stempel" 
the symbolic level of the previous lines is incorporated 
with what appears to be a pointing to the first acrobat:*
Urn diesen
21 Stampfer, den Stempel, den von dem eignen
22 bluhenden Staub getroffnen, zur Scheinfrucht
23 wieder der Unlust befruchteten, ihrer
24 niemals bewussten,—glanzend mit dunnster
25 Oberflache leicht scheinlachelnderi Unlust.
The pistil (first acrobat), fertilized by the dust-pollen of 
its own blooming, bears fruit again and again. But the fruit 
is not the product of desire or pleasure (Lust) but rather 
of a mechanical, unconcerned,listless, functioning process. 
For this reason it is not genuine fruit, but "Scheinfrucht • • •
der Unlust"—born again and again without even being con-
This whole falseness, sterility, andscious of the process, 
lack of feeling is summed up in the smile of the acrobat— 
that fixed and feelingless "ballerina smile," one might call 
it, whose thinness hardly covers the disinclination, the 
"dunnster/Oberflache leicht scheinlachelnden Unlust" (lines
*Werner Wolf, Rainer Maria Rilkes Duineser Elegien 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universitatsbuchhandlung, 1937), 
p. 27, asserts that the word "Mitte" refers to the group 
of acrobats and "den Stampfer" refers to the first acrobat, 
reading from left to right in the painting.
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24-5), of its owner.
In existential terms, the first twenty-five lines 
represent what may be called the inauthenticity of easy and 
effortless fulfillment. In the First Elegy, the unfulfilled 
were preferred to those whose loves were consummated. Here 
a consummation is present, but the accomplishment is made 
stale by its being performed over and over again. In both 
cases the actual consummation per se does not seem to possess 
the value that the striving for it represents; in neither 
case is consummation a gate to greater authenticity, but 
rather a falling away from it.
In the Fifth Elegy, the Konnen of the acrobats sug­
gests a contrast with the Konnen of the Burger in the Fourth 
Elegy. The Burger-dancer became ludicrous in trying to
cover up his coarseness and to aspire to a fineness he did
Perhaps he also represents for Rilkenot truly understand, 
the man who aspires to the infinite instead of perfecting 
his finitude and realizing that "Hiersein ist herrlich.” 
In contrast to the inadequacy of the Burger is the over­
adequacy of the acrobats, their "empty too-muchness." 
art of the acrobats has become skill without art, a skill
The
The true artist iswhich has become false and mechanical, 
replaced by a merely facile, empty, false technician.
The existential significance of this picture is in 
the fact that the acrobats—being "nur ein wenig Flvichtigern
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noch als wir selbst"—represent an exaggerated form of the 
same shortcomings as we have, only perhaps a "little more 
than we." Here are beings in a world of appearance who are 
highly accomplished—too highly accomplished. Here is the 
ease of technology so often criticized by the Existential­
ists, now translated into poetic terms, but also into terms 
that point to the essential separation from the earth, the 
subjection to another force (a "niemals zufriedene Wille"). 
the uselessness, the sterile fruit, the pretence, the lack 
of and loss of feeling, the disinclination and basic inhuman­
ness which has been a legacy of technology.
Rilke presents the ultimate in Konnen. and shows at 
the same time its spiritual emptiness and inauthenticity— 
the emptiness and inauthenticity of modern man. Heidegger 
echoes this criticism of the slavery of modern man and his 
spiritual poverty even among all his technological advances, 
in his Einfuhrung in die Metaphvsik:
When the furthermost corner of the globe has 
been technologically conquered and opened to eco­
nomic exploitation, when any event whatsoever in 
any place whatsoever at any time whatsoever has 
become accessible with any speed whatsoever, when 
we can "experience" simultaneously an attempt on 
the life of a king in France and a symphony con­
cert in Tokyo, when time is no longer anything but 
speed, momentariness and simultaneity, and time as 
history has vanished from all the life of all the 
nations, when the boxer passes as a great man of 
a people, when the millions numbered at mass meet­
ings are a triumph—then, yes, then, the question 
still grips us like a ghost through all these 
phantoms: what for?—where to?—and what then? 
f Einfuhrung, p. 2E, quoted in Grene, p. 95}
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Like the acrobats, modern man has succeeded in conquering 
time and space—has acquired a sort of Konnen—but like the 
acrobats, he remains spiritually inadequate and empty. He 
has skill (Konnen) in overcoming obstacles, but his basic 
mode of being-in-the-world remains artificial and inauthentic. 
With all his Konnen. the question will not cease to haunt him 
like a ghost: what for?
The Elegy continues and the focus shifts from one 
figure to the other. The second figure is a wrinkled, 
withered, once-strong man, now in skin so shrunken that it 
gives the illusion of having formerly housed two men his 
present size, the other occupant having gone on to the 
churchyard leaving the old man puzzled in his widowed skin, 
and now so weak he is only good for drumming:
26 Da: der welke, faltige Stemmer,
27 der alte, der nur noch trommelt,
28 eingegangen in seiner gewaltigen Haut,
als hatte sie fruher
29 zwei Manner enthalten, und einer
30 lage nun schon auf dem Kirchhof, und er uberlebte
den andern,
31 taub und manchmal ein wenig
32 wirr, in der verwitweten Haut.
The third figure is a young man who could pass for
the son of a rogue and a nun:
33 Aber der junge, der Mann, als war er der Sohn
eines Nackens
34 und einer Nonne: prall und stramming erfullt
35 mit Muskeln und Einfalt.
From his father he gets his strength, from his mother his
In three short lines we learn hispurity and simplicity.
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descent, his physical form, and his inner life: "Son of a 
rogue and a nun, filled with muscles and with simplicity."
The next four lines are highly difficult to interpret:
36 Oh ihr,
37 die ein Leid, das noch klein war,
38 einst als Spielzeug bekam, in einer seiner
39 langen Genesungen
Professor Kreutz contends that these lines are an
aside, a backward glance on the part of the poet, toward
his childhood. In his childhood,
als "Belohnung". etwa fur eine gut iiberstandene 
Krankeit oder fur ein Schmejjzaushalten beim Arzt 
hat die Mutter das#>Kind Rene Rilke in den Kleinen 
Vorstadtzirkus gefilhrt, mid die Fahrenden wurden 
zum Spielzeug, uber dem man die Schmerzen, das 
kleine Leid vergass. [Kreutz, p. 80]
• • • •
This, Kreutz contends, also is an expression of disdain for 
the acrobats, for it reduces them to the mere playthings for
[”Dass die Artisten als Kinderspielzeug 
benutzt werden, ist freilich eine neue Entwertung ihres 
Daseins." Same.]
Professor Wolf, on the other hand, paraphrases the 
lines to mean that the poet turns to address the never- 
satisfied will which now swings them and slings them and
a convalescent child.
observes that in his childhood this will, this destiny, was
His paraphrase of thea plaything in a long convalescence, 
four lines reads as follows:
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0 ihr, ruft der Dichter aus, die ein Wille, ein 
Schicksal, ein Leid, das noch klein war, in einer 
seiner langen Genesungen als opielzeug erhielt; doch 
dann wuchs es und liess euch nicht los, noch iramer 
mit seinem ewig kommenden Griff euch rollend!
[Wolf, p. 28]
Both of the above interpretations make the initial 
"0 ihr" a sort of aside, a turning away from the acrobats 
themselves to reflect on the action or to plunge into memory. 
Else Buddeberg, however, interprets these lines as addressed 
to the acrobats themselves. They are, she asserts, an answer 
to the question which opened the Elegy: "Wer aber sind sie, 
die Fahrenden " The answer is that these Fahrenden are• • • •
those, "die ein Leid, das noch klein war, einst als Spielzeug 
" This interpretation involves an intricate read­
ing of the pronouns for antecedents and a close examination 
of the syntax in its justification. Yet this interpretation 
makes the four lines crucial to the meaning of the whole 
Elegy. It is therefore advisable to quote her analysis here:
Wer bekam hier etwas und was bekam er? Das 
Subjekt des Satzes wird gesucht: es ist "ein Leid".
Wer aber ist der Trager dieses Leides? Offenbar 
die Fahrenden, die ±m Anruf des "0 ihr" angeredet 
wurden. In dem darauffolgenden "die" sind sie 
gleichzeitig Objekt des Satzes. (Waren sie das 
grammatikalische Subjekt des Satzes, so musste es 
nachher heissen: bekamen). Als Trager des Leides 
bekamen sie also sich selbst—nun als Artisten— 
zum Geschenk. 
geworden.
das Tun ihrer Kunst, die sie zu Artisten machte, 
geschenkt. Dem Sinn nach fallt nunmehr auch das 
Pradikat mit dem Subjekt und Objekt zusammen: Das 
Leid, das einst Menschen beherrschte, loste in 
denen, die es litten, ein Tun aus. In diesem Tun 
wurden sie zu Artisten, den Fahrenden heute, die
bekam • • • •
Subjekt und Objekt sind eines 
Das heisst: Als Leidenden wurde ihnen
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ihr Leid mit ihrer Kunst beschwichtigen. Auch vor 
der Schaubude des Jahrmarktes steht der Mensch im 
tiefsten Ernst seiner Existenz. Die erhaltene 
Antwort zeigt es an, wenn auch ihre tiefere Bedeutung 
noch nicht klar geworden ist.
[Buddeberg, pp.74-5]
In this interpretation, pain, which once wholly, governed 
man, confers something on the sufferer to alleviate the 
pain: art. This art, or skill, becomes a plaything and 
thus reduces the consciousness of pain. This interpretation 
makes the four lines a pronouncement on the relationship of
art and pain.
Im Spiel wird der Mensch mehr oder weniger frei von 
dem, was ihn qualt; Spiel kann zur Kunst werden 
Der Ursprung der Artistik wird in feme Zeiten zu- 
riickverlegt;. "einst", heisst es. Die Unsicherheit 
des Lebens der Fahrenden verbindet sich mit der 
Unbestimmtheit ihrer Herkunft und der Unerkennbarkeit 
eines Zieles zu dem dichten Bild der Geworfenheit in 
die Fragwurdigkeit menschlichen Schicksals. So vage 
die ganze'Antwort auch bleiben mag,##eines ist in ihr 
deutlich: Das Leid erscheint abgelost von seinem 
Trager; der Leidende steht dem Leid 'gegeniiber und 
tut etwas mit ihm. Dieses Tun ist ein Spiel; es 
ist mehr als Spiel, es will zur Kunst werden. Sie 
mag primitiv sein, aber sie strebt danach zu leisten, 
was Kunst immer wieder leistet: eine Uberwindung des 
Leides, ein Hineinverwandeln des Leides in Gestalt.
fSame. p. 75]
The occupation of the acrobats is the basic process 
of art—that of using art to transform inner pain into outer 
form. Yet it implies an indirect criticism of the acrobat 
as separated from the earth. This interpretation of the 
artist is hardly consistent with the idea that the artist 
is close to nature, communes with things, and communes with 
Being before plying his magical art of transformation. The
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problem is that there is something missing from the art of
This missing element becomes clear in the last 
strophe and is hinted at earlier.
the acrobat.
The things that are mis­
sing from this art are: effort, intensity, and love. The
true artist has these; the inauthentic artist lacks them. 
These three cardinal elements are missing from the art of 
the acrobats.
After this four-line intermezzo (lines 36-39), the 
poet resumes his characterization of the acrobats. Three 
of them have been described: the man, the old drummer and 
the young man who looks like the son of a rogue and a nun. 
Three others remain: a boy and a girl, and their mother.
The poet turns to the boy:
40 Du, der mit dem Aufschlag,
41 wie nur Fruchte ihn kennen, unreif,
42 taglich hundertmal abfallt vom Baum der gemeinsam
43 erbauten Bewegung (der, rascher als Wasser, in wenig
44 Minuten Lenz, Sonaner und Herbst hat) —
45 abfallt und anprallt ans Grab:
A hundred times daily the boy plunges, green and heavy like
Death for the unripe isunripe fruit, toward the grave.
With the swiftness, mobility, and detachmentalways near.
of water he seems to pass through spring (rising), autumn 
(hovering), and winter (falling), in minutes, 
this very unripeness which makes the risks of the heights
And it is
It isa real experience instead of a mechanical routine, 
this very unripeness that makes him human, that is the 
purity carried over from youth, that is what shines in the
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timid, half-ventured glance at his mother, and that bursts 
through the smile coming from within. This unripeness is 
humanness, purity, spontaneity, genuineness. The smile of 
this unripe boy is in the face of death and in the zest of 
a feat that is still an effort. not a mechanical routine. 
When the feat has become effortless, the spontaneity of the 
smile will vanish with it.
In a half-pause (there is no time in the rush of the 
routine for a whole pause) a tenderness momentarily breaks 
through:
46 manchmal, in halber Pause, will dir ein liebes
47 Antlitz entstehn hiniiber zu deiner selten
48 zartlichen Mutter; doch an deinen Korper verliert sich,
49 der es flachig verbraucht, das schuchtern
50 kaum versuchte Gesicht
But he is interrupted by the clasp of a hand, the time to 
leap:
• • •
Und wieder
51 klatscht der Mann in die Hand zu dem Ansprung,
und eh dir
52 jemals ein Schmerz deutlicher wird in der Nahe
des imraer
53 trabenden Herzens, kommt das Brennen der Fussohln
54 ihm, seinem Ursprung, zuvor mit ein paar dir
55 rasch in die Augen gejagten leiblichen Tranen.
56 Und dennoch, blindlings,
57 das Lacheln........
Anticipation, pounding heart, soles tingling, the rush of 
tears, and then—blindly—the smilet Overcome, the poet 
turns and lyrically addresses the angel:
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58 Engel! o nimms, pflucks, das kleinbliitige Heilkraut.
59 Schaff eine Vase, verwahrs! Stells unter jene,
uns noch nicht
60 offenen Freuden; in lieblicher Urne
61 riihms mit blumiger schwungiger Aufschrift:
"Subrisio Saltat."
This smile is the first spontaneous, genuine, human
Small wonder, then, that the poet 
would make it a gift to the angel, would have the angel pre­
serve and protect it and inscribe it with the soaring words, 
"Subrisio Saltat" ("the smile dances," or, assuming the in­
scription to be a short form of "Subrisio Saltatoris" or 
"Subrisio Saltatorum," "The smile of the dancer"), 
poet contemplating the anguish and barren inauthenticity of 
modern man, the smile seems a healing herb, a joy which we 
are not ready for.
This address to the angel marks a significant point
For
thing in the whole Elegy.
For the
in the progress of the whole cycle of the ten Elegies. 
the first time in the whole cycle, the angel is addressed
Here, at the midpoint of the cycle,with exuberance and joy.
the manifold negations and pessimism are briefly interrupted
Admittedly, it is a "kleinblutiges
Much that is
to suggest a healing herb.
Heilkraut." but significantly it does heal.
negative about the acrobats is presented, but this smile is
It is noteworthy thatsomething positive, a healing agent, 
this smile does not come from the seasoned acrobat but from
• the heart of a child, from the purity of one to whom the 
feats had not yet become a mechanical routine. This is not
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glanzend mit diinnster Oberflache leicht 
scheinlachelnden Unlust," but a spontaneous (“blindlings- 
implies spontaneity) expression of joy breaking through 
"leiblichen Tranen” and coming from the heart, 
it is a healing herb because it comes from the heart.
Rilke employs a triple contrast in using the smile. 
One contrast is between the transience of the smile and the 
permanence of the inscription, another contrast is between 
the true and the inauthentic smile, and the larger contrast 
is between the joy of the smile and the manifest joylessness 
of the manner of existing which is limned in the Fourth and
This larger contrast is well stated by Else
the "Scheinfrucht • • •
Significantly,
Fifth Elegies.
Buddeberg:
Wir hatten^soeben in der vierten Elegie den 
Abgrund der volligen Verneinung durchschritten und 
uns schon einen langen Web mit den Fahrenden in der 
Freudlosigkeit und Vergeblichkeit ihres Weges bewegt. 
Jetzt aber ist Heilung in Aussicht gestellt; das 
kleinblutige Heilkraut verspricht sie, sooft auch 
noch Ruckschlage eintreten werden.
[Buddeberg, pp. 78-9]
Another way of stating this contrast is by noting that the 
in the Heilkraut (the smile) stands over against allHeil
the great Unheiligkeit of what precedes it.
A technical and artistic problem presents itself to
#
the poet in the need to find a strophe which can appropri­
ately and adequately follow the mountain-top lyrical burst 
of enthusiasm with which the poet addresses the angel. A 
bitter denunciation could follow, but Rilke presents an
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infinitely superior turn. He uses this address to the
angel in a way that heightens the poignancy of his address 
to the young girl. One traces in the next lines not only 
the reverence which Rilke consistently felt for children, 
but also an infinite tenderness and regret.
62 Du dann, Liebliche,
63 du, von den reizendsten Freuden
64 stumm Ubersprungne. Vielleicht sind
65 deine^Fransen glilcklich fur dich—,
66 oder uber den jungen
67 prallen Briisten die grune^metallene Seide
68 fiihlt sich unendlich verwohnt und entbehrt nichts.
Rilke sorrowfully considers how the girl is “von den 
reizendsten Freuden/ stumm Ubersprungne." This significant 
phrase brings home all the pathos of the Freudlosigkeit 
which characterizes the mode of being-in-the-world of the 
acrobats. And the pathos is only accentuated in lines 
64-68, by her unconsciousness of the loss. Without a trace 
of regret she has sacrificed the "reizendsten Freuden" (des 
Madchenlebens) for the shallow externality of applause as 
she is publicly exhibited like a piece of marketfruit:
69 Du,
70 immerfort anders auf alle des Gleichgewichts
schwankende Waagen
71 hingelegte Marktfrucht des Gleichmuts,
72 offentlich unter den Schultern.
The description of the Dasein of the acrobats is at
The remainder of the Elegy is a com-this point complete, 
ment on and elaboration of this manner of being-in-the-world,
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but there is no further description of the acrobats, 
any direct reference to them.
nor
For this reason it is logi­
cal that, for the sake of clarity, the existential criti­
cism in the first 72 lines should be discussed before the 
remainder of the work is dealt with.
Existentialism and "les Saltimbanques ." The Fifth 
Elegy again demonstrates Rilke’s startling ability to 
focus in a poetic image the deficiencies of modern man’s 
mode of being-in-the-world. In developing this image in 
the first 72 lines of the poem, Rilke presents in poetic 
form the same concerns about man’s being-in-the-world which 
are presented conceptually in the trenchant criticisms of 
the leading existential philosophers. The deadening of 
routine, the emptiness of Konnen. the externality and 
emptiness and falseness of all we perform, the surrender 
in skill to a never-satisfied Will, our thrownness, our 
Bodenlosigkeit, the rush and activism that stifles spon­
taneity in mechanical routine—all these are common concerns 
of Existentialists and are expressed in the Fifth Elegy.
The Surrender to "Konnen.11 The essential theme of 
the first 72 lines may be regarded as the surrender to 
Konnen and the consequences of this surrender. The word 
“Konnen" does not have an adequate English equivalent, so 
the German word must be used in the interest of accuracy.
The English word "skill” comes close; the word "facility,"
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in a sense, or the “capacity to do something,* also approach 
Konnen but are not adequate equivalents, 
ability to do, and implies that there is little difficulty 
in the doing. The acrobats possess this Konnen. this skill. 
They have had the skill from almost the dawn of their life’s 
day, “von fruh an.“ They are master technicians. Indeed, 
they seem to make their Konnen the very center of their 
lives, their livelihood, their manner of being. They are 
the very incarnation of Konnen
Rilke’s concern is with the consequences of this 
Konnen for the acrobats as human beings. With the perfec­
tion of their skill, comes the end of striving—and, as 
Existentialists would say, the beginning of an inauthen­
ticity of easy and effortless fulfillment. Just as in the 
First Elegy the poet found the foresaken and unfulfilled
als die Gestillten," so here the poet 
finds fulfillment to be a roadblock to the attainment of 
one’s self as a human being with a heart. The skill soon 
becomes a matter of routine, becomes joyless and mechanical.
Existentialists, constantly seeking a genuine and 
dependable reality and a mode of being-in-the-world which 
is ’’authentic,’’ also are quick to note the deadening effect 
of routine and the inauthenticity of falling into a pattern 
and repeating it over and over again. Existentialists can 
see no end to striving, for man will always be estranged
Konnen is the
“so viel liebender • • •
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from Being, will always be finite but with a certain degree 
of freedom. The acrobats, too, represent inauthenticity in 
other ways, as will be seen, and possess the publicity, the 
externality, the thrownness, and so forth of the mass main.
The mass man, the slave of routine and the slave of his own 
limited skill at one task—these are seen by Existentialists 
as the models of inauthenticity, as examples of a manner of 
being-in-the-world which discourages rather than promotes 
the realization of one’s human potentialities, one’s authen­
tic Existenz. It is this inauthentic manner of existing 
that permits man to be considered as an object, as a machine, 
as a cog in a more important wheel, rather than as a human 
being, the center of a world, the possessor of potentiali­
ties. Thus, the Dasein of the acrobat represents an incom­
plete, imperfect, inferior manner of being-in-the-world; it 
represents, in short, inauthenticity. This inauthenticity 
will be discussed under the heads of four major consequences 
of the surrender to Konnen: 1) Thrownness and determined­
ness; 2) Publicity and emptiness; 3) Bodenlosigkeit and 
abstraction; and 4) Unconsciousness and activism.
1) Thrownness and determinedness. Rilke presents 
the acrobats as the pawns of a **niemals zufriedener Wille** 
which “wringt sie,/biegt sie, schlingt sie und schwingt sie, 
/wirft sie und fangt sie zuruck
even "die starksten/Manner, rollt sie wieder, zu Scherz,
" This force affects• • • •
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der immer/kommende Griff, wie August der Starke bei Tisch/
Tools of a never-satisfied will,
They seem to move more 
easily—as if the air had been oiled—than humanly natural 
(again the Unheiligkeit). but the underlying reason is that 
they are not fundamentally under their own power any more; 
they have surrendered to Konnen.
Existentially, this manner of being represents a 
surrender to man’s essential ’’Geworf enheit.” his thrownness. 
Man allows himself to be thrown by a never-satisfied will,
einen zannenen Teller." 
they give their impersonal performance.
rather than be a self-determining, self-propelled, human 
being. To be a human being requires effort; it involves 
bucking the stream, resisting the power of the pattern in 
deference to one’s own potentialities, one’s own self-
realization. Part of the effortlessness and magical ease 
of the acrobats derives from the fact that they are not 
resisting the pattern for the sake of their own self- 
realization but on the contrary are moving with the flow 
of the stream, cooperating with this Geworfenheit. sacrific­
ing themselves for the mere entertainment of others, sub­
mitting and moving with the “niemals zufriedener Wille.” 
Instead of being inner-directed, they are other-directed; 
they are passive objects rather than active subjects. In 
Sartre’s terminology, they have surrendered to the en-soi 
and denied the pour-soi: they have surrendered to the
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longing to become a thing—something determined and moved 
completely from the outside, 
mastery and control for the state of being “thrown” and 
externally determined—this is the first consequence of the 
surrender to Konnen.
To lose one’s essential self-
Publicitv and emptiness. The acrobats have given up 
their own wills. They have also given up their own happi­
ness to the eternal, mechanical, joyless performance of 
feats for the entertainment of others. They have lost their 
inwardness of heart and depth of being; they are given up 
to “Oberflache.* “Offentlichkeit.* "Scheinfrucht—super­
ficiality, publicity (the state of being always in public), 
artificiality, falseness, and ultimately emptiness. In 
place of true joy, they have only the Freudlosigkeit of 
their Konnen. The young girl is by the deeper, more rav­
ishing joys of life mutely eluded (von reizendsten Freuden/
The old man, his Konnen gone, is
The acrobats!
stumm Dbersprungne.”)
withered and wrinkled, ready for the grave, 
smile is a “Scheinlacheln.” their performance “Scheinfrucht”—
Their goal is external; toartificial, external, false, 
be observed and inspected like market-fruit, and applauded. 
They have no inwardness (except that from which the boy’s
smile originates, the purity and spontaneity of youth);
All they have is their publicity, 
Thus, the loss of inwardness and heart, the
inwardly they are empty, 
their skill.
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condemnation to a life without the depth of genuine sorrow 
or true joy (rather a life dominated by Freudlosigkeit), 
the shallow existence in the realm of externality, artifici­
ality, and falseness-these are consequences of the surrender 
to Konnen.
Heidegger, in his Sein und Zeit. presents the incar­
nation of inauthenticity in the figure of das Man. Das Man 
is the subject in such phrases as "man sagt." which we 
translate into English as "one says." This "one" is nobody 
in particular and everybody in general. Heidegger's das 
Man leads a life of shallow publicity, of conformity to the 
public pattern. He not only performs all the externalities, 
but is all the externalities, for he has no inner-directed- 
ness. He is the completely other-directed man, the man 
without identity or individuality, the man one would not 
notice in a crowd. He is man without a face, or rather
his face reflects nothing from the inside, for there is
He may be unlike the acro-nothing individual to reflect, 
bat in that das Man has nothing which would attract atten­
tion to himself, but in most ways he is the counterpart of 
Like the acrobat, he is other-directed; like 
the acrobat, his life lacks the depth of either genuine joy 
or sorrow; like the acrobat, his life is public, external, 
artificial; like the acrobat, routine has deadened his 
inner being and instead of inwardness and heart there is
the acrobat.
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only emptiness, Freudlosigkeit. and futility.
Groundlessness and Abstraction.
Bodenlosigkeit of the acrobats in the stress he lays on the 
carpet, which he refers to as "diesem verlorenen/Teppich 
im Weltall.”
Rilke shows the
And the carpet is not laid on the ground, but 
appears to be laid like a patch on a wound in the earth.
The very occupation of the acrobats is to defy gravity, 
to stay in motion and away from the earth. And their art, 
therefore, is not an expression of the message of things 
(as would be the mission of the artist in Rilke’s view) 
but is an indirect expression of anguish and pain, a 
channeling of this pain into art, the functioning of which 
temporarily acts like play and distracts them from the pain. 
Their Konnen. then, is anguish-generated, and an expression 
of pain, not aesthetic pleasure. Their art represents a 
loss of contact with the earth, which to Rilke is a ground 
of man’s being. This loss of contact with the earth is 
also a loss of contact with ultimate reality, with Being.
It represents the failure of the inauthentic man in his 
mode of existence to live in nearness to Being.
In Existentialism, the criticism of modern man’s 
mode of existence is that he no longer dwells in nearness
to Being, but rather moves into an abstract world, a world
It is precisely thenot based on experiential reality, 
dissatisfaction with this abstract and groundless world
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that spurs the Existentialist to search for the dynamics 
of man*s being-in-the-world, to search for a genuine and 
dependable reality—a reality with experiential validity. 
Thus, the dissatisfaction with a groundless and abstract 
manner of being-in-the-world which obsesses the Existen­
tialist is precisely the same dissatisfaction which moti­
vates Rilke to present his highly critical depiction of 
the mode of being of the acrobats. And, of course, the 
mode of being of the acrobats is a symbol and extreme case !
of the manner of being-in-the-world of modern "mass man," 
the man deadened by routine, surrendered to the pattern, 
artificial and empty, abstracted and divorced from the earth, 
rushing and activistic, but ultimately without genuine con­
sciousness.
4) Unconsciousness and Activism. Rilke shows the 
boy as having no time for tenderness, rushing, rising and 
falling with the slickness and rapidity of water. He 
passes through spring, autumn, winter—all in a few minutes.
(Indeed,
death is the dynamic that attracts the audience, for the 
risk is important.) Yet, ultimately, the art of the acro­
bats is a form of play designed to transform pain into form; 
that is, their art is a form of activism generated by pain. 
But it is the very activism which acts as a narcotic on the 
consciousness, deadening it; the rush and speed of the
He comes near to death a hundred times daily.
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routine leave scarcely even a half-pause for the boy to 
glance at his seldom tender mother. The bustle and rush 
leaves no time for consciousness in a larger sense, no time 
for the expression of innerness. Eventually the routine 
will deaden even the slight innerness the boy now has (due 
to his youth) and shape him in the pattern of his older 
fellow acrobats until he is like the old man, only capable 
of drumming, ready for the grave.
Even the genuine smile is the result of the newness, 
the risk, the effort—all these contributing to heightened 
consciousness. But as the newness wears off, as the risk 
is replaced by sureness and the effort by ease, the height­
ened consciousness is replaced by boredom, but the routine 
and mechanical performance, by reduced consciousness. Repe­
tition of the feats, year in and year out, deadens and 
deteriorates the quality of the consciousness. The exis­
tential intensity of heightened consciousness is no longer 
a part of their being-in-the-world. Or. the contrary, 
they perform the mechanical feats and depend on the public 
applause, but fundamentally their manner of being has no 
innerness, no intensity, no heart. Its contact with the 
earth is defective; it does not commune with the outside, 
with things, with other beings. It is marked, in short, 
not by the heightened consciousness which characterizes 
authenticity, but by the deteriorization of consciousness,
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a degeneration into mere activism.
With the pathos of all this inauthenticity laid be­
fore the reader, Rilke meditates on the state of the acrobats 
before they had acquired their ease and skill:
73 Wo, o wo ist der Ort—ich trag ihn im Herzen—,
74 wo sie noch lange nicht konnten. noch von einander
75 abfieln, wie sich bespringende, nicht recht
76 paarige Tiere;—
77 wo die Gewichte noch schwer sind;
78 wo noch von ihren vergeblich
79 wirbelnden Sthben die Teller
80 torkeln........
That was the better time, the time when they did not have 
this skill, when they fell away from each other like wrongly 
paired animals, when the weights were heavy, when the sticks 
resisted the effort to make them whirl in time. Here they 
at least had the virtue of poverty and Durftigkeit. the 
Rilkean virtue of Armsein. But from the purity of this 
state of being "not enough" (Zuwenig) they seemed to jump 
into a state not of rightness but of the emptiness of *Zuviel .**
81 Und plotzlich in diesem muhsamen Nirgends,
plotzlich
82 die unsagliche Stelle, wo sich das reine Zuwenig
83 unbegreiflich verwandelt—, umspringt
84 in jenes leer Zuviel.
85 Wo die vielstellige Rechnung
86 zahlenlos aufgeht.
Suddenly the pure “too-little" is transformed into the empty 
"too-much," where the content of their being when reckoned 
up comes out to nothing.
Thus, after the description of the acrobats, Rilke
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has taken the reader to two places; one might be called
"der Ort des Ungenugens" and the other "der Ort der Schein- 
erfullung.” Finally he takes the reader to the "unendlicher 
Schauplatz" where death, in the form of Madame Lamort, reigns:
87 Platze, o Platz in Paris, unendlicher Schauplatz,
88 wo die Modistin, Madame Lamort.
89 die ruhlosen Wage der Erde, endlose Bander,
90 schlingt und windet und neue aus ihnen
91 Schleifen erfindet, Ruschen, Blumen, Kokarden,
kiinstliche Fruchte—, alle
92 unwahr gefarbt,—fur die billigen
93 Winterhute des Schicksals.
94
A new and apparently unrelated theme now seems to 
enter the symphony of the Elegy: death or fate, in the form
Yet, on closer examin­
ation, this theme relates itself to what has gone before. 
The busy and industrious Madame Lamort is seen with her 
hands on the restless material paths of our individual 
lives, and she twists and winds them and clips them off 
for ribbons to decorate the articles she is sewing, 
“schlingt und windet" of line 90, too, inevitably calls 
back the "schlingt sie und schwingt sie" of line 5, and 
thereby suggests that the "niemals zufriedener Wille" to 
which the acrobats have surrendered themselves and which 
"wringt sie,/ biegt sie, schlingt sie und schwingt sie,/ 
wirft sie und fangt sie zuruck" is this busy Madame Lamort. 
And the "kiinstliche Fruchte—. alle/ unwahr gefarbt" of 
lines 91-92 recall the false and artificial blooming of the
of the seamstress, Madame Lamort.
The
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"Rose des Zuschaunsthe "Scheinfrucht.. .der Unlust.11 And 
death has already been implied in line 45, where the young 
man a hundred times a day "abfallt und anprallt ans Grab 
Professor Kreutz contends that the Dasein of the 
acrobats has so lost meaning that death is their only goal, 
and their lives are controlled by "die Macht, die hinter dem 
•leeren Zuviel* des routinierten Konnens steht,"[p. 87] 
the power that swings and slings and throws them, the power 
behind the empty too-muchness. Thus, Kreutz asserts,
a• • • •
Er [der Tod ] ist das einzige Ziel diese flachigen 
Daseins, gleichsam seine Entelechie. Er treibt es 
zu seiner ruhelosen Geschaftigkeit von einer Nummer 
zur andern. Doch es ist nicht der grausige Tod, 
sondern Madame Lamort, die voll Charme diesem 
fluchtigen, gekonnten Dasein immer neue Reize zu geben 
weiss. [Kreutz, p. 87]
Death is their “Entelechie," that is, the fulfillment of 
their purpose, the achievement of their essence. Death is 
the end and meaning of their existence. Poetically they 
become the artful fruit, all artificially colored, of the
cheap winter hats of fate.
The existential conception of death as a form of 
nothingness or non-being sheds light on the significance
As has beenthat this strophe has for the whole Elegy, 
noted earlier, nothingness can be relative (as contingency)
On the spiritual plane it can be 
seen in the relative form of spiritual emptiness and in the
or absolute (as death).
It is death in the largerabsolute form of meaninglessness.
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sense of nothingness which underlies and permeates the Elegy. 
It is seen in the emptiness and meaninglessness of the mode 
of being of the acrobats and finally in the form of Madame 
Lamort. Rilke does not speak in the conceptual terms of 
nothingness and its relative and absolute forms, but per­
ceives intuitively and poetically the relationship between 
death and the mode of existence of the acrobats. Instead 
of speaking in the philosophical terms of the relative forms 
of nothingness, he uses poetical terms—softens the character­
ization of death, makes her a seamstress who busily swings 
and slings the paths of our lives around like ribbons in her 
putting together of the hats and ribbon-bedecked dresses of 
Fate. Thus it is forms of non-being (which in existential 
thought are always prominent in inauthenticity) which the 
Elegy shows making inroads on the Dasein of the acrobats. And 
the Dasein of the acrobats is our own Dasein, writ large.
Although line 9k clearly marks the first ending of 
the Elegy, Rilke does not choose to close here, but adds 
what might be called a "vision," or an "epilogue in Heaven." 
This coda (like the other closing strophe) also sums up and 
incloses all of the Elegy, but from another point of view.
It presents a contrast to the essential mode of existing
Thus, the tour of "places" which began 
with the "Ort des Unvergnugens" and jumped to the "Ort des
of the acrobats.
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Scheinerfullens” and finally to the “unendlicher Schauplatz" 
of Madame Lamort is not over. One other "Platz" remains:
95 Engel!: Es Ware ein Platz, den wir nicht wissen,
und dorten,
96 auf unsaglichem Teppich, zeigten die Liebenden,
' die’s hier
97 bis zum Konnen nie bringen, ihre kuhnen 
96 hohen Figuren des Herzschwungs,
99 ihre Turme aus Luste, ihre
100 langst; wo Boden nie war, nur an einander
101 lehnenden Leitern, bebend,—und konntens.
102 vor den Zuschauern rings, unzahligen lautlosen Toten:
103 Wiirfen die dann ihre letzten, •immer ersparten,
104 immer verborgenen, die#wir nicht kennen, ewig
105 giiltigen Munzen des Glucks vor das endlich
106 wahrhaft lachelnde Paar auf gestilltem
107 Teppich?
Like the first ending, this strophe seems to sum up 
the whole Elegy, and even to reply to it. The three ’’places’* 
in the existence of the acrobats are now contrasted with a 
fourth place, "den wir nicht wissen."
This fourth place is almost a parody (in reverse)
on the acrobats, for the essential elements of the descrip­
tion of the acrobats are retained, but transformed—by love. 
The carpet is still there, the subject is still Konnen. and 
the audience is still there to toss coins of approval, 
the Konnen is that of "die Liebenden, die’s hier/ bis zum
" Thus, the contrast is between the
But
Konnen nie bringen 
"Konnen" of acrobats which is "Getriebensein," mechanical
• • • •
repetition, superficiality, and "leere Zuviel* and the 
"Konnen” of the "Liebenden," which is free, ever towering
The "Konnen” of the acrobats repressesupward, and genuine.
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tenderness and is primarily generated by pain; the Konnen 
of the lovers creates "hohen Figuren des Herzschwungs" and 
their performance is for themselves not dull and painful 
but exciting and full of towers of pleasure, "Turme aus 
Lust," where their ladders, leaning only on each other 
tremble with excitement. And the sterile blooming and 
"scheinlachelnde Unlust1* of the "Rose des Zuschauns" of 
lines 13-25 is contrasted with this exciting, fertile, 
pleasurable performance. The spectators of the nameless 
public in lines 18-25 who ring about the performance like 
the petals of the Rose have now become the "unzahligen 
lautlosen Toten.” These cannot be impressed by superfici­
ality because they have put off all the superficialities 
of life in death, but even this difficult audience—if the 
performers really could transmute this pleasure into the 
form of their performance—would be completely overcome, 
would fling their last, ever saved-up, ever carefully hidden, 
eternally genuine coins of Joy onto the carpet of this 
"wahrhaft lachelnde Paar."
Love is eternal; love transmuted into form is eter­
nally genuine; love never is over-sated.
behind the lines, "Whether there be prophecy, it shall fail
One seems to hear
* Prophecy, knowledge, empty skill—these will fail;
Love goes to the very center of Being.
The intensity of
• • • •
love endures forever.
Love is experientially real and genuine.
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love is nearness to Being.
Among the most significant aspects of the Elegy is 
the prominence given to death in the first ending and the 
prominence given to love in the second ending, 
tential terms, the first ending shows nearness to non-Being 
and the second, nearness to Being; or, in other words, there 
is the contrast between inauthenticity and authenticity.
In Rilke's terms it is the contrast between empty "Konnen” 
and echtes"Konnenthat is, "das Konnen der Fahrenden" and 
“das Konnen der Liebenden.”
In exis-
!
But in any case, this contrast 
between love and death, authenticity and inauthenticity, 
Being and non-Being, or "das Konnen der Liebenden" and "das 
Konnen der Fahrenden.” adds a new dimension to the Elegy.
By the addition of this contrast the meaning of the 
smile of the boy is further illuminated, the relationship 
to Being is made clearer, the function of form is related 
to love, time, and intensity, and the natures of authen­
ticity and inauthenticity are put in bolder relief through 
the contrast with each other.
There are three smiles in the Elegy: the artificial 
smile of the dancer (lines 22-25), the spontaneous smile of
;■
the boy, and the smile of the "wahrhaft lachelnde Paar auf
The false smile is that of the dancergestilltem/ Teppich.” 
to whom the performance is no longer expression but routine.
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The smile does not show feeling, but is painted on, so to 
speak, for the benefit of others. For the false smiler, 
the performance of the routine no longer represents the
overcoming of difficulty but the mere monotonous and effort­
less repetition of a function. The smile of the boy, however, 
does come from within. And the routine has not become com­
pletely mastered; it still poses difficulties and requires 
effort. The smile, then, is the true result of effort over­
come and this effort is aimed at the production of form.
This is the smile that comes, then, with creation of form, 
with the accomplishment of form. It is, in this respect, 
similar to the third smile, which is the product, too, of 
transmuting love into form. This is the ultimate and 
genuine smile. The smile of the boy was genuine (and 
human) and worthy of preservation by the angel, for it radi­
ated the pleasure of the creation of form, but the form 
itself was in the realm of Madame Lamort and not in the 
realm of the undying. It was ultimately generated by 
anguish and pain rather than pleasure and love.
Most essential, perhaps, to the understanding of the 
Elegy is the relationship which form seems to have with 
time and intensity, as well as with the related concepts of 
death (related to time through finitude) and of love (re­
lated to intensity, consciousness, and contact with Being). 
The “Konnen11 in both the authentic and inauthentic modes
!
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is a "Konnen” to produce form, 
way of overcoming time.
Form, in a sense, is a 
In the inauthentic mode, however, 
it does not overcome time, but becomes a falsely colored
decoration (superficially artistic as it may be) for the 
cheap winter hats of Fate. Why is this? It is because the 
form lacks two things: intensity and love.
Intensity and love, too, tend to overcome time. In 
existential terms they tend to transcendence of time. The 
Konnen of the acrobats does not create a form that has 
transcendence, that can transcend—death. This is another 
reason why it is inauthentic Konnen: it does not relate it­
self to the infinite, or, in Heidegger*s terms, to Being. 
Love and intensity, on the other hand, do dwell in nearness 
to Being. Love*s intensity is a form of heightened con­
sciousness (in contrast to the deadened consciousness of 
the acrobats) and represents a deepened being (not Ober- 
flache). a greater closeness to the ground of all being, 
das Sein.
Thus, intensity and love as transmuted into form 
represent not only that satisfaction which can be the ground 
of the true smile, nor only the closeness to Being that 
distinguishes authenticity, but also the requisites for 
transcendence of time through form—not the inauthentic form 
of the acrobats which is in the realm of death, but the 
authentic form which comes with effort, intensity, and love.
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The short coda of the vision, then, sheds light not 
only over the content of the whole Elegy, but over Rilke’s 
conceptions of inauthenticity, authenticity, death, time, 
love, intensity, consciousness, and form. The description
of inauthenticity is, as has been demonstrated, thoroughly
The description ofexistential in emphasis and content, 
authenticity is existential primarily in its emphasis on
i-intensity and closeness to Being.
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BAUDELAIRE
Introduction. Baudelaire may be considered one of
In an era of Darwinists, positiv- 
industrial planners, communists, universal religion­
ists, and prophets of science, Baudelaire expressed his op-
the first '’modern” poets, 
ists,
position to scientific progress, materialism, natural good­
ness, and social meliorism. His poetry, taken as a whole, 
is an expression of the spiritual and emotional frustration
of modern man. There is a desperate search for reality in 
his poetry, and equally a sense of desolation, void, and
spiritual emptiness. While Baudelaire was not a moralizer, 
his poems time and again serve as an indictment of a corrupt 
society, a society which in Baudelaire’s view was as sterile, 
futile, and damned as Delphine and Hippolyte in his famous 
poem, ’’Femmes Damnees.”
Because of this spiritual exasperation, this sense 
of the inauthenticity of the growing optimistic materialism 
of his day, because of his sense of a yawning abyss (nothing­
ness) precisely when the very existence of evil was being 
denied, and finally because he was basically and profoundly
i
an outsider in an alien world, Baudelaire has much in common
with those who made similar protests in the twentieth cen- 
When Baudelaire refers to "la vaporisation et latury. • • •
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he is anticipating 
the existential concern with the loss of the self, and the
centralisation du Moi. Tout est la • • • •
desire of the Existentialists to make the self a "centered” 
self.2 To Baudelaire, there seemed to be all around him— 
and within himself—evidences of the progressive "vaporisa­
tion" of the self. When Baudelaire speaks of spleen and 
ennui he is expressing his anguished consciousness of a 
spiritual emptiness which is echoed in T. S. Eliot's The
And when Baudelaire presents the image of theWaste Land.
swan beside a dry gutter bathing its wings in the dust, he 
is presenting more than a .-‘homage to Victor Hugo; he is pre­
senting the spiritual plight of modern man.
The presence of certain elements in Baudelaire which 
resemble elements in Existentialism is a matter of uncon­
scious anticipation, an evidence of Baudelaire's remarkable 
sensitivity to the same inadequacies in society which were 
to be more exhaustively criticized by the Existentialists.
In a sense, Baudelaire bears the same historical relation-
■i
~*~Journaux intimes. Edition critique etablie par Jacques 
Crepet et George Blin(Paris, 1949), P* 51»
2This concern in Existentialism reaches an admirable 
formulation in the part of Tillich's theology in which he 
defines faith as "a centered act of the whole personality." 
[See esp. Dvnamics of Faith (New York, 195&)*3 This is the 
goal toward which the insights of the Existentialists have 
pointed—a self which is not divided and fragmented,_but a 
unified fullness of consciousness, a centeredness which 
unites the whole personality.
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ship to later literature as Kierkegaard does to later exis­
tential thought. The two men were similar in their condemna­
tion of a corrupt society; both wrote diaries of seduction
in which the actual seduction became secondary to erotic 
titillation; both carried the same passionate predilection 
for self-torture; both concealed a strange kind of religious 
orthodoxy; both were isolated and alone in alien and unap­
preciative societies; and, finally, both possessed that self- 
consciousness, that inhibiting and self-defeating lucidity 
which is at once the basis for their suffering and the source 
of the particular insight and genius of each.3
Baudelaire was, on the other hand, in many ways pro­
foundly un-modern.
reactionary, that he accepted his values without question:
Or, pour celui qui examine d'un peu pres la vie et 
les oeuvres du poete, ce qui frappe cTest qu'il a re9u 
d'autrui ses notions,morales et qu'il ne les a jamais 
remises en question.^
Indeed, Sartre asserts that he was merely
^This lucidity is dealt with in Sartre's book on 
Baudelaire. [Immediately below] One might add that this 
lucidity, which consisted in a certain self-consciousness 
that always rose above the self and was watching the self, 
is the same sort of partitioning of the ego which was taken 
by romantic authors from the philosophy of Fichte and made 
into the concept of "romantic irony," in which the author 
rises above himself in the act of creating and makes jests 
about himself, even comments on his own depicted demise.
In Existentialism, this idea serves as the basis for Sartre's 
reflective and pre-reflective cogitos. One might also ob- 
that this "lucidity" is present in great satire and
such as Byron, Sterne, Swift, Cervantes, and Rabelais.
^•Baudelaire (Paris, 1947), P* 50.
serve 
satirists,
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Sartre’s criticism, however, that Baudelaire chose to be 
miserable because he refused to renounce the moral values 
he had learned in his youth and to found a system of values 
of his own, is made from the vantage point of a time in 
which such a course would be appropriate. At bottom, Sartre 
regrets again and again that Baudelaire is not an Existen­
tialist, a man who accepts his own freedom, creates his own 
values, founds his own world. The result of M. Sartre’s 
disappointment that Baudelaire was in so many ways ’’inau­
thentic” is a book-length portrait that is penetrating and 
brilliantly sarcastic, but actually a caricature of the 
poet—a picture that is more like a character from one of 
Sartre’s novels than the historical Baudelaire.
While it is true that Baudelaire is in many ways not 
a revolutionary but reactionary, it is significant that his 
acute and critical mind did not accept the morality of his 
time, nor uncritically accept the style and ideas of his 
literary contemporaries. Even Baudelaire’s dandyism (which 
Sartre interprets as an effort to be different in a conven­
tional and socially acceptable way rather than any revolu­
tionary tendency) may be interpreted as an effort to resist 
the new middle class which issued from the Revolution, to
.
protest against the rise of the masses and all that it sig- 
Baudelaire’s conception of man was not bold and 
but represented a rejection of the prevailing romantic
nified.
new,
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idea of natural goodness and human perfectibility in favor 
of a conception of man as not naturally perfectible, 
sentially a fallen creature, subject to the power of evil 
and passion.
as es-
It was, in short, close to the classical con­
ception of man and bears similarities to the views of Racine
and Pascal.
Stylistically, too, his mastery of the alexandrine 
and his rejection of the vagueness of Musset align him with 
classicism. Paradoxically, however, Baudelairefs anti-ro­
manticism and his spiritual return to the seventeenth cen­
tury do not merely look backwards—they are anticipatory. 
They anticipate the reaction against romanticism in the 
twentieth century and the rise to popularity of the English 
metaphysical poets. Finally, one may remark that T. S. 
Eliotfs famous "objective correlative" is essentially a 
translation and adaptation of Baudelaire*s famous doctrine 
of "correspondencesa conception which was the foundation 
of French symbolism.
For the purposes of this dissertation, however, 
Baudelairefs importance lies in the fact that in a period 
of objectivity, abstraction, scientific optimism, and hu­
manitarian programmes, his central theme was self-loss.
He anticipated the sense of the loss of spiritual unity, 
the breakdown of fundamental relationships, the loss of re­
ality, the boredom and emotional frustration, and finally
i
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the basic emptiness and sterility, which have come to char­
acterize modern man—and which have come to concern such
poets as Rilke and Eliot, and such thinkers as Heidegger 
and Jaspers. In a time preoccupied with externalities, 
Baudelaire perceived that the real problem was one of sin
and regeneration, that the real task is sincerity, on the
Les Fleurs du Mai is fromlevel of personal experience, 
beginning to end dominated by these concerns, by a vivid 
sense of sin and self-loss and by a terrible sincerity.
1
;
!
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f,LE CYGNEw
1 Andromaque, je pense h vous I Ce petit fleuve,
2 Pauvre et triste^miroir ou jadis resplendit
3 LTimmense majeste de vos douleurs de veuve,
4 Ce Simois menteur qui par vos pleurs grandit,
5 A feconde soudain raa memoire fertile
6 Comme je traversais le nouveau Carrousel.
The first six lines show rather clearly that the
poem is to be a creation of memo ire involontaire in much the
%
same way as Proust’s A la Recherche du Temps Perdu (espe-
!
cially in the vividness of the famous ’’petite Madeleine” epi­
sode) . This technique is similar to that in "La Chevelure.” 
where the odor of the thick, black hair of Jeanne Duval calls
!up vivid pictures.
This memoire involontaire is actually intimately con­
nected with Baudelaire’s so-called "symbolism,” for the op­
eration of this memoire furnishes the poet with an image
!
that is an "objective correlative" of his inner state of
As he strolls across the new Carrousel,soul—Andromaque.
the changed surroundings make him feel like an exile, an 
Suddenly there flashes into his mind the image 
of noble Andromaque, Hector’s widow, weeping beside a painted
This image embodies and
outsider.
river that has no real substance, 
sums up his state of mind.
Andromaque, too, is using memoire involontaire. for 
she uses the painted river to call up memories of herself 
and Hector, no doubt, standing beside the true, the Trojan
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Simois. This second level of the action of memory is later
paralleled by the swan recalling the waters of his native 
lake. Still another level is added when the negress carries 
in her memory "Les cocotiers absents de la superbe Afrique."
Thus, in all four of the major exile images of the poem, 
memory is an important factor, for all four are limned in 
the act of recalling. In each case, the eye is also fixed 
on some aspect of the present and that aspect is superimposed 
on a better past that is lost, that ’’ne se retrouve/ Jamais,
jamais !" [lines 45-6]
For the poet, the bitter present is a Paris that has 
changed—alas, faster than a human heart—and this is seen 
against the past of a marketplace with piles of shafts and 
rough hewn cornices ("tas de chapiteaux ebauches et de futs’’), 
of grass and huge stone blocks stained green in puddles of 
water (’’les herbes, les gros blocs verdis par l'eau des
flaques”). The cornices showed the personal touch of human 
hands, the grass, the water, showed the naturalness of the
But the old Parispresence of nature, its water, its grass, 
is no more:
7 Le vieux Paris n’est plus (la forme d’une ville
8 Change plus vite, helas J que le coeur d’un mortei>,
9 Je ne vois qu'en esprit tout ce camp de baraques,
10 Ces tas de chapiteaux ebauches et de futs,
11 Les herbes, les gros blocs verdis par l’eau des flaques,
12 Et, brillant aux carreaux, le bric-a-brac confus.
This was the Paris before the ’’palais neufs, echafaudages,
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blocs," new palaces, scaffolding, blocks of stone.
But even in old Paris, Baudelaire perceives the image 
of an exile, the swan. He recalls when a menagerie was 
there in the marketplace and a swan got loose:
13 Lei s'etalait jadis une menagerie:
14 La je vis, un matin, a l'heure ou sous les cieux
15 Froids et clairs le Travail s'gveille, ou la voirie
16 Pousse un sombre ouragan dans l’air silencieux,
17 Un cygne qui s'etait 6vad4 de sa cage,
18 Et, de ses pieds palmes frottant le pav£ sec,
19 Sur le sol raboteux trainait son blanc plumage.
20 Prfes d’un ruisseau sans eau la bete ouvrant le bee
21 Baignait nerveusement ses ailes dans la poudre,
22 Et disait, le coeur plein de son beau lac natal:
23 "Eau, quand done pleuvras-tu? quand tonneras-tu, foudre?"
24 Je vois ce malheureux, mythe Strange et fatal,
25 Vers le ciel quelquefois, comme l'homme d'Ovide,
26 Vers le ciel ironique et cruellement bleu,
27 Sur son cou convulsif tendant sa tete avide,
28 Comme s'il adressait des reproches & Dieu I
One morning, about the time the sombre hubbub of street- 
cleaners generally breaks the silence, Baudelaire (evidently 
up early) came upon a swan padding down the dry pavement 
with "ses pieds palmes" striking the pavement and his white 
plumage dragging pathetically over the uneven (raboteux) 
ground. Beside a dry gutter the bird opened his beak, 
bathed his wings nervously in the dust, and cried—his heart 
full of his native lake—"Rain, when wilt thou fall? Thun­
der, when wilt thou roll?" That unhappy creature, his avid 
head distended on a convulsive neck and pathetically im­
peaching "le ciel ironique et cruellement bleu," seemed al-
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to be reproaching God for the absence of the living 
waters of his native lake.
Androraaque is a symbol of the unchanging sense of 
exile which remains in the human heart in spite of the 
changes that may take place in the various forms of exile. 
The essential outlines and character of the exile as such 
are present in Andromaque—the anguish, the pathetic use of 
a false present, "Ce SimoTs menteur,” to call up memories 
of that which is lost forever. Her majesty and restraint 
mark her as a symbol of the classical exile.
The swan, on the other hand, points distinctly to 
the modern exile. There is little majesty and restraint in 
the swan, as the webbed feet pad the dry pavement, as the 
once-splendid plumage drags the ground, as the cruel oppres-
most
sor is mirrored in the ironic and cruelly blue sky, and as 
the bird bathes nervously in the dust, stretching "son cou
The unrest of the modern exile isconvulsif" in reproach.
felt in the words associated with the swan—"nerveusement,"
Significantly, the swan is es-"convulsif." "malheureux." 
caped from his cage—only to discover himself still dis-
One can, if one wishes,placed, still in an alien world, 
interpret the cage from which the poet escaped as the cage 
of aristocratic patronage, while the "ruisseau sans eau,w
the dry gutter, may be taken as the symbol of what spiritual 
nourishment this modern civilization (symbolized by the
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changed Paris) offers those who walk its streets.
As the poet continues his stroll, the new Paris that 
is going up "pour raoi devient alle'gorie." The old Paris is
no more, just as the lake is no more for the swan, Hector and 
the Trojan Simois are no more for the "veuve d’Hector." and 
the coco-palms of splendid Africa are no more for the Negress.
29 Paris change I mais rien dans ma melancholie
30 N’a bouge ! palais neufs, echafaudages, blocs,
31 Vieux faubourgs, tout pour moi devient allegorie,
32 Et mes chers souvenirs sont plus lourds que des rocs.
Professor Martin Turnell considers that lines 29-30,
"Paris change] mais rien dans ma melancholie/ N’a bouge I" is
- • •«.
taking up the same thought as lines 7-8, "la forme d’une ville/ 
Change plus vite, helas l que le coeur d’un raortel." The
crucial point is whether the reference to the human heart in 
lines 7-8 is to be taken as meaning that the human heart
Initially, the meaning would seem 
to be that the human heart changes quickly, alas, but the 
form of a city seems to change even more quickly—that is,
On the other hand, Turnell asserts 
stands for something perma­
nent, for something that belongs to the human condition; ’la 
forme d’une ville* stands for the impermanent, the transi­
tory.’’^
changes quickly or slowly.
before one realizes it.
that ’”Le coeur d’un mortel’ • • •
The human heart changes but slowly; but, alas, a
^Baudelaire: A Study of his Poetry (Norfolk, Conn.,
1954), p. 182.
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Icity does not change so slowly. With the slowly changing 
heart interpretation, one can parallel the change from the
i
more majestic classical symbol of exile to the nervous mod­
ern symbol with the change of Paris from the majestic or at 
least genuine "Vieux faubourgs.n to the slabs of stone, the 
new "palaces," the artificial and tacked-on scaffolding, of 
the new Paris.
With this interpretation, one may see a triple con­
trast: the unchanging core—as represented by the human 
heart—compared to the external changes in form—the form 
of a city; the restrained, archetypal exile—as represented 
by the classical Andromaque beside the false Simois—com­
pared to the modern form of exile—as represented by the 
swan "pres dfun ruisseau sans eau"; and finally the con­
trast between old Paris and this new Paris in which the 
scaffolding and slabs of stone in the midst of the old quar­
ters of the city only reveal too clearly the confusion, 
irony, and cruel indifference of the modern city—the same 
irony and cruelty of "le ciel ironique et cruelleraent bleu" 
to which the swan turns his avid head on his convulsive neck.
Further, because of the contrast of the changing city 
and the unchanging heart of lines 7-&» the poet can assert 
that Paris is changing, but nothing in his melancholy has
stirred, that his memories are heavier and more permanent
The fact that Baudelaire chooses rocks to sym-■ than rocks.
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bolize his memories carries the connotation of their fig­
urative and physical heaviness as well as their 
a good example of wcorrespondence.”
permanence— 
Turnell does not note 
the connotation of the heaviness of the rocks, but does ob­
serve that the rocks are "another symbol of sterility and 
frustration.” [Same]
In the succeeding lines, Baudelaire makes explicit 
the "allegorie" of the relationship of old and new Paris to 
Andromaque and the swan. The poet pauses before the Louvre:
33 Aussi devant ce Louvre une image m'opprime:
34 Je pense a mon grand cygne, avec ses gestes fous
35 Comme les exiles, ridicule et sublime,
36 Et ronge dTun desir sans treveJ et puis k vous,
37 Andromaque, des bras d’un grand epoux tombee,
3& Vil betail, sous la main du duperbe Pyrrhus,
39 Auprfes dfun tombeau vide en extase courbee;
40 Veuve d'Hector, helas l et femme d’HelenusJ
The poet thinks this time of the swan first, with 
its frayed nerves and crazy motions, fallen from sublimity 
to ridiculousness, "ronge dfun desir sans treve" for the 
cool waters of his native lake which do not flow in this
Then he thinks of exiles in general, creaturesdry gutter.
made ridiculous like the swan yet retaining a certain essen­
tial nobility that cannot be lost, creatures gnawed by a
The pathos of the 
situation, then, lies in this fall from a once noble and sub­
lime state to the humiliation and ridiculousness of exile.
truceless desire for what has been lost.
And this pathos seems to burgeon as the poet turns to
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Androraaque, fallen from the blissful embraces of noble Hec­
tor to be the slave, the chattel, the beast of amusement 
for a proud conqueror. All this is behind the superb and 
wistful line, "Veuve d'Hector, helasJ et femme d’HelenusJ"
Then the poet turns to the last full-dress portrait 
of an exile: the Negress, trudging the streets of Paris, her 
mind's eye fixed on the native splendor and appropriateness 
of the coco palms of her native Africa.
41 Je pense & la negresse, amaigrie et phthisique,
42 Pietinant■dans la boue, et cherchant, l'oeil hagard
43 Les cocotiers absents de la superbe Afrique
44 Derribre la muraille immense du brouillard;
The Negress was tall, noble, healthy, in her natural 
But transported and transplanted to Paris, she is 
wasted away (amaigrie) and diseased ("phthisique;" consump-
habitat.
tive), no longer noble but rather pathetic as she trudges
She is a tropical plant that does not 
thrive in the sterile and frustrating environment of the
She is also the only image in the poem of
the muddy street.
city of Paris.
a human being on the streets of Paris—except the meager- 
looking orphans drying up like picked flowers, 
and the orphans anticipate the withered old men and women 
presented in some of the other poems in this, the "Tableaux
Earlier in the
The Negress
Parisians" section of Les Fleurs du Mai.
poem, the coldness and superficiality, the heartless indif-
The images ofference, of the modern city were symbolized.
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the Negress and the orphans show the effect of the city on 
human beings.
In the modern city, with its building programs in 
progress, in the process of erecting "new” palaces, in the 
constant concern with externalities, in the hardness and in­
difference of the new blocks of stone, one senses a "lack" of 
something. Because of this "lack” the human beings who live 
in this deficient world become withered and die. Physically, 
both the Negress and the orphans are withered and meager.
In the case of the swan and Andromaque, the absence of water, 
the sense of dryness and thirst describe this lack. One 
senses the dryness of the modern city (contrasted with the 
grassiness and water of the old Paris) in the picture of new 
Paris. Indeed, one senses a lack of water, of life-giving 
water, in all four of these major images—Andromaque, the 
swan, changed Paris, and the Negress. In all four cases, 
the water is the life-giving waters of spiritual nourishment.
The poem concludes with several other images of ex­
iles, for the poet now seems to think of "whoever has lost 
that which is never found":
45 A quiconque a perdu ce qui ne se retrouve
46 Jamais, jamais i & ceux qui s'abreuvent de pleurs
47 Et tettent la Douleur comme une bonne louve !
4B Aux maigres orphelins sechant comme des fleurs !
49 Ainsi dans la foret ou mon esprit s’exile
50 Un vieux Souvenir sonne a plein souffle^du cor !
51 Je pense aux matelots oublies dans une ile,
52 Aux captifs, aux vaincus I ...k bien d’autres encor !
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In the case of these final images, one senses the vivid 
feeling of separation and denial built up in the earlier 
images of Andromaque, the swan, and the Negress now applied 
to the "orphelins sechant comme des fleurs," the sailors 
forgotten on an island, the captives who long for home, the 
snuffed out hopes of the vanquished, and nk bien d’autres 
encor !"
The dynamics of the conclusion of the poem deserve 
some comment, as the final line does not end on a restful 
cadence, but rather one feels a mounting intensity as the 
images pile up more and more quickly and reach their peak 
of feeling in the "autres" of the final phrase of the poem.
Even the final word, "encor." acts as a repetition of "autres" 
at the same intensity. Thus, the poem seems to crescendo 
from the sound of a solitary hunting horn in the forest of 
memory to a whole chorus of horns in the intensity of the 
final line:
k bien d’autres encor IAux captifs, aux vaincus ! • • •
This discussion of 
Existentialism in the poem will fall into two major sections: 
A general discussion of the image of inauthentic man in an 
inauthentic world, and a more specific discussion of the 
personal fallenness of modern man as presented in the poem 
and as it relates to existential views on this subject.
Existentialism in "Le Cygne."
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Inauthentic Man. Inauthentic World. 
sents a vivid picture of the inner Durftigkeit of the
,fLe Cygne" pre­
swan,
but more than this it suggests a certain lack in the world
itself. Not only is the being-in-the-world of the swan in­
authentic; the world itself is inauthentic.
The swan is a symbol for man, and his significance 
as a symbol is not as a swan, per se. but as a swan in a 
particular stance and in a particular situation. The sig­
nificance of the swan, in other words, lies in his manner of 
being-in-the-world. It lies in his being an exile, in his 
fallen grandeur, in his pathetic nervous bathing of his 
plumage in the dryness that has replaced his "beau lac natal."
in his convulsive neck, in his avid head limned against "le 
ciel ironique et cruellement bleu." It is significant, too, 
that his escape from a cage (paralleling man’s escape from 
certain restrictions) turns out to be no true escape; and it 
is significant that, with his heart full of the memory of his 
native lake, the swan senses the ironic and cruel discrepancy 
between the plenitude of water of his native lake and the 
present lack of water—and addresses the cruel heavens with 
his "’Eau, quand done pleuvras-tu? quand tonneras-tu, foudre?’"
The Durftigkeit of the modern .world as a home for 
human beings is evident in the inanimacy and dryness of 
of the rocks of which man constructs his modern cities, 
swan escapes from surroundings which were primarily animate
The
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and natural to an inanimate and unnatural world of stone 
streets and stone buildings. The deserted time of day also 
tends to strengthen the impression of the' lifelessness of
the street and buildings. The swan is, then, an animate 
creature strayed into an inanimate world which cannot sup­
ply or even understand his needs. Indeed, water is unwel­
come in this world. The stone is not the damp stone which 
is found among the grass or damp soil, but a dry stone, 
baldly facing the sun, surrounded only by other stones. Even 
the occasional rain is quickly ushered away by the gutters, 
unused by the sterile rocks.
Animacy is a basic concern of Sartre, who considers 
the polarity between the animate and inanimate to be the 
basic polarity of man's consciousness. Either man strives 
for higher and intenser consciousness (animacy) or he strives 
for the state of a lifeless thing, a solid object which is 
manipulated and controlled from the outside. The authentic 
man, who senses his lostness and lack and who is trying to 
transcend it, is constantly surrounded by a world of men 
who feel no lostness and no lack, who only wish to remain 
in or approach the state of a thing.
animate being in an inanimate world (a world of inanimate 
human beings) is the essential "situation" of the authentic 
man. The swan, then, is an apt symbol of the spiritual 
aloneness, lostness, anxiety, restlessness, longing, and
In other words, the
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inner Durftigkeit of modern man in an alien world.
New Paris essentially represents an externalization 
of the inner inanimacy and spiritual dryness of the majority 
of the men living in this modern world, 
ly vital, their creations would reflect it; but modern man 
is inwardly inauthentic and sterile, and this sterility is 
represented by the dryness and stoniness of the confused 
and unbroken expanse of stone, this interminable waste land 
of pavement and blocks of buildings that are new Paris.
If men were inward-
This stone waste land may also be taken to symbolize 
the modern tendency toward abstraction—a favorite theme for 
existential criticism. Abstraction always involves distancing 
and separation from the concrete referents, and therefore a 
consequent loss of existential reality, of vitality, of life. 
(This distancing and separation is also present in exile as 
such.) When these abstractions have abstracted the essence 
and excluded the particularities which belong to life they 
have also excluded the vitality belonging to life and become 
empty generalizations. They may be co-ordinated into a high- 
flown system, but the system will not correspond to life. In 
much the same way, stones are ’'distanced'’ from animacy, are 
indeed empty of life and (like many modern systems) are co­
ordinate, juxtaposed, and plastered together to comprise the 
modern city. And just as man finds that abstractions are 
ultimately distant, impersonal, lifeless, and empty, so also
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is the modern city. The modern city is abstract, turns out 
to lack something, to be unfit for human life in its native
fullness and abundance.
Professor Joseph D. Bennett succinctly presents the 
idea of the swan in this waste land of stone and correctly 
grasps the significance of the inanimacy and abstraction of 
He identifies this swan’s need for life-giving 
rain with a similar need in T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land:
his world.
We realize that the swan is the emblem of man alone 
among the abstractions and inanimate objects to which 
his fellows have given their devotion. Preoccupied with 
the arrangement of their physical cosmos, they are dead 
in life, inanimates caught in a rigorous chain of cause 
and effect which determines them to erect their grace­
less polylithic structures. Represented as a swan, the 
man who seeks life finds no water in their desert, 
must come in the form of rain and thunder, bringing with 
it the wisdom of the fruitful expense of the self. 
Baudelaire’s swan presents the same theme developed by 
T. S. Eliot's Death by Water motif and presented in "What 
the Thunder Said."°
But in Baudelaire the rain does not come, nor the thunder 
sound. There is no positive message of "give, sympathize, 
and control." There is no wisdom of the fruitful expense 
of the self. There is only the pathetic symbol, the poign­
ancy of a swan lost in a stone world, bathing in dust, suing 
the cruel heavens for rain.
Life
Characteristics of the Fallenness of Modern Man. The
following characteristics will be discussed in connection
1) the humiliation andwith the fallenness of modern man:
^Baudelaire: A Criticism (Princeton, 1946), pp. 103-4.
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bestialization of the human being, 2) isolation and alone- 
ness, 3) anxiety, 4) sterility and falseness, and 5) the 
sense of separation and loss.
1) The humiliation and bestialization of man. The 
humiliation and bestialization of man is most vividly felt 
in the lines,
37 Andromaque, des bras d'un grand epoux tombee,
3# Vil betail, sous la main du superbe Pyrrhus
Andromaque has fallen to the state of being little better
than a domesticated animal, a spectacle for public gaze, an
animal in a cage.
• • • •
The swan, too, is humiliated to the state 
of being a caged animal, deprived of its birthright of a
compatible habitat.
Existentialists have been among the modern protesters 
against the bestialization of man, the reduction of man to
a certain horsepower, his humiliation to the role of being
This, they assert, hasonly a part of a large machine, 
brought a gradual reduction of the respect and value placed
on human life and individual human beings. Man has become 
little better than a beast. An animal is a thing of value 
if it can do work, become food, or if it is exotic enough 
to amuse others. Its value is external and pragmatic; it 
operates in a world of physical rather than spiritual values, 
and its life revolves around largely physical matters. On
the other hand, Existentialists assert that man is unique
He is not determined \-jand himself the source of values.
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by pleasure values or a valuation on this or that aspect of 
life; he gives the valuations. While Baudelaire would never 
be so bold and positive as to make man self-determining in 
the existential sense (to the everlasting chagrin of Sartre), 
he and the Existentialists would both join in the negative 
protest against man becoming a beast, a "slave of a slave," 
as Baudelaire puts it in "Le Voyage." (The meaning of the 
"slave" to which man is a slave is animal pleasure; thus, 
the protest against the reduction of man to being a "slave 
of a slave" is a protest against reducing man to his in­
stincts, that is, to animality.) Baudelaire and the Exis­
tentialists, then, join in protesting the bestialization of 
modern man.
2) Aloneness and isolation. The swan is the only 
animate thing in an inanimate waste land of stone pavement 
and buildings. Purposely Baudelaire depicted the street as 
empty and deserted in order to show the aloneness of the 
swan. This aloneness has been described earlier as the 
isolation of the authentically restless man in an inau-
This, then, is existential 
aloneness, and it has the accompanying characteristics of 
existential loneliness—the restlessness, the anxiety, the 
mental image of a better state, the falseness and spiritual 
barrenness of the surrounding world.
thentic and sterile world.
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3) Anxiety, 
these characterize the swan.
Anxiety, nervousness, restlessness—
They do not characterize Andro-
maque; she is not nervous in the modern sense, nor victimized 
by the spiritual anxiety and Durftigkeit of the Here,
again, the frayed nerves and the anxiety mark the swan as a
swan.
symbol of modern man. The picture is essentially an antici­
pation of the same characterization in the criticisms of exis­
tential thinkers.
4) Sterility and falseness. The world of stone that
is new Paris symbolizes sterility and falseness. The inanimacy 
of the stone represents the inner inanimacy of the human 
beings who are erecting them. The stone city shows the mod­
ern depersonalization of man so protested against by Exis­
tentialists, and it shows the lack of innerness and inner 
genuineness and vitality which invariably accompany this de­
personalization. The life-giving rain that falls here falls 
on sterile rocks and is not absorbed, but quickly slides 
away over the surface of the rocks leaving them as dry as 
before. Thus, the stone buildings suggest the sterility and 
falseness, the impersonalness and frustration, the inner 
emptiness and inanimacy of both modern man and the world he 
has created out of himself.
5) Separation and loss. In the major images of the 
poet one cannot escape a vivid sense of separation and loss.
The important question isi What has been lost? Professor
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Bennett rightly calls what has been lost a "birthright" that 
is bartered away in the emptiness and materialism of the mod­
ern city:
The ecstasy of heroic gesture—ecstasy even beside 
the tomb—the refreshing beauty of the living bird, and 
the fleshly rhythm of untamed continents are sold in the 
city.... The victim asks for bread and the city hands 
him a stone. Now the swan and the negress chew on stone 
and are crazed by the juice of stone, as stricken mariners 
are crazed by drinking salt water. The negress has bar­
tered and lost forever the suppleness of her savage body; 
the swan wallows in filth; Andromache, widow of Hector, 
is the slave and concubine of a proud conqueror. [Bennett, 
P. 105]
And even the fourth major image has suffered a loss, for Paris 
has lost its humanness to become stony and impersonal.
Essentially, then, the loss is a spiritual loss.
Heroism, beauty, nobility, humanness—these are the things 
on which the human spirit is nourished, they are the living
In all four cases, the loss is a loss
With
waters of the spirit.
of nourishment, especially the refreshment of water, 
the loss of nourishment, comes the physical loss of animation 
(animus, spirit), the loss of life. This is illustrated by
the inanimacy of the stone of the city, the nervousness, 
avidness, and convulsiveness of the swan, and in the meager­
ness and consumptive unhealthiness of the Negress, 
of inner vitality is shown as a loss of physical vitality.
In existential terms the loss of vitality is described
This loss of self is en-
The loss
as the loss of the potential self, 
tirely distinct from the loss of the body, in the sense that
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it can occur prior to it. The sense of separation, too, 
is essentially a separation from the self, conceived as the
potential self. Although the separation is made physical 
in the poem and symbolized by the native lake of the swan, 
the coco-palms of the Negress, and the true Simois and tomb 
. of Hector in the mind of Andromaque, the separation is 
still ultimately from the potential self, for it is in these 
settings that the self could be realized. Exiled and sepa­
rated from these settings, one can only suffer a lack of 
nourishment and a loss of self.
In Heidegger's thought, this concept of nearness and 
separation is in terms of nearness to Being. He who dwells 
in nearness to Being realizes himself, but he who does not 
is in inauthenticity and Verfalien (decline). Inauthenticity 
is consequently both a loss of self and an estrangement from 
Being. Inauthentic modern man is estranged from Being and 
characterized by an inner Dffrftigkeit. Thus, the loss of 
self involved in exile and the separation from home may be 
considered analogous to the existential loss of self and the 
idea of separation from Being.
Summary. In conclusion, one may say that the poem 
anticipates aspects of Existentialism in the following re­
spects: That the swan is an existential symbol of the alone- 
ness, anxiety, and spiritual Diirftigkeit of man in the modern 
worldj lihat man is conceived as essentially fallen from a
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better state, and that man now dwells in separation from 
himself as a true and authentic expression of his potential 
tJhat the image of new Paris superimposed on the 
image of old Paris suggests that man creates his world, 
whether authentic or inauthentic;
with the rearrangement of manrs physical cosmos reflects
nobility;
that the preoccupation
a concern with externalities, and the graceless polylithic 
world man has created shows that the reorganization of his 
inner cosmos is truly what deserves attention and concern; 
that the stone world emphasizes the inanimacy and spiritual 
dryness and deadness of the modern world which surrounds 
man** that modern man is nervous, anxious, degenerating—is,
And that, finally andin short, in a state of decline; 
above all, modern man is exiled from something, is sepa­
rated from something, has lost something, that now he is 
as pathetic and ridiculous as a strayed swan in a stone 
world eyeing the heavens for signs of life-giving rain, as 
spiritually withered and consumptive as the Negress is 
physically as she trudges the muddy streets of Paris, and 
as artificial, indifferent, and sterile as the slabs of 
stone making up the new Paris.
Man, then, is lost and separated from something and
To say that what is lost isanxiously feels this lack, 
nourishment, the spiritual nourishment of life-giving water, 
is to say that what is being lost is the self. For nourish-
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ment has no meaning without the self, is in reality a trans­
lation of that something which enables the self to become 
what it can potentially be. 
in the poem, then, is ultimately existential loss and sepa­
ration, and the symbol of the swan in a world of stone is 
ultimately an existential symbol.
The theme of loss and separation
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LE GOUT DU N^ANT
Morne esprit, autrefois amoureux de la lutte, 
L’Espoir, dont l’eperon attisait ton ardeur 
Ne veut plus t'enfourcher2 Couche-toi sans pudeur, 
Vieux cheval dont le pied 4 chaque obstacle butte.
Resigne-toi, mon coeur; dors ton sommeil de brute.
Esprit vaincu, fourbu 2^ Pour toi, vieux maraudeur,
L*amour n'a plus de gout, non plus que la dispute; 
Adieu done, chants du cuivre et soupirs de la flute ! 
Plaisirs, ne tentez plus un coeur sombre et boudeur 2
Le Printemps adorable a perdu son odeur I
Et le Temps m'engloutit minute par minute,
Comme la neige immense un corps pris de roideur;
Je contemple d’en haut le globe en sa rondeur,
Et je n’y cherche plus l'abri d’une cahute I
Avalanche, veux-tu m'emporter dans ta chute?
TASTE FOR NOTHINGNESS
Gloomy spirit, formerly enamoured of struggle,
Hope, whose spur used to stir your ardor,
No longer wants to sit astride you! Lie down without shame^ 
Old horse whose foot stumbles on every obstacle.
Heart, be resigned; sleep the sleep of the brute.
Conquered, foundered spiritl For you old marauder,
No longer does love have savor, no more than disputation; 
Adieu then, songs of brass and sighs of the flute 2 
Pleasures, tempt no longer a somber sullen heart 2 ■
The lovable springtime has lost its odor 2
And Time swallows me minute by minute,
As the immense snow swallows a body frozen stiff;
I contemplate from above the globe in its roundness, 
And look no longer for the shelter of a hovel 2
Avalanche, will you sweep me away in your downfall?
[Trans, in Bennett, p. 138]
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LE GOUT DU NEANT
"Le Neant" is an important word in Existentialism, 
and a poem by Baudelaire entitled "Le Gout du Neant" must
necessarily appear to be an obvious example of an antici­
pation of Existentialism. In a sense it is, for in exis­
tential thought a conscious encounter with nothingness is 
a basic and prerequisite experience of the authentically
existing being. One might almost call the encounter with 
nothingness a "sine qua non" of Existentialism.
But in an important sense, the poem is a clear ex­
ample of pre-existential decadence and points in the oppo­
site direction from modern Existentialism. The difference 
is that the poem points essentially toward nothingness, 
while modern Existentialism points essentially from nothing­
ness to transcendence, or perhaps through nothingness to 
transcendence. In this poem, as in*l;e Cygne" and "Le 
Voyage." the absence of transcendence or of any program 
or effort toward transcendence is a crucial difference from 
the emphasis on transcendence in Existentialism. Baudelaire's 
vivid sense of the sterility, inauthenticity, and nothingness 
around him marks him as a precursor of Existentialism, but 
the absence of transcendence differentiates his thought 
sharply from that of later Existentialists.
In Norberto Bobbio’s delightful little book, The 
Philosophy of Decadentism: A Study in Existentialism [cited
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in chapter I], Existentialism is considered as a last dis­
mal gasp of decadence, a philosophy which takes nothingness
as its center, a philosophy which finds its literary expres­
sion in the novels and plays of Sartre. Indeed, in an ap­
pendix to his book, Bobbio deals devastatingly with Sartre
as the perfect and illustrative, example of the decadent 
intellectual. Sartre, he asserts, is the perfect illus­
tration of the weaknesses of Existentialism. If man is a
fallen creature, full of weaknesses, sin, and despair, the 
attitude of a decadent philosophy, Bobbio says, is not to 
oppose this weakness and despair, but to revel in it, to 
study it, to become fascinated with sin, nothingness, des- 
Sartre is the very incarnation of the decadent in­
tellectual because he is fascinated with nothingness, revels 
in it, and then spins out his decadent, nihilistic philosophy. 
Unfortunately, Bobbio's brilliant criticisms of Existential­
ism often miss the point, because of his major concern with 
the social, ethical, and political implications and inade­
quacies of Existentialism, and because of his overemphasis 
upon and misunderstanding of the role of nothingness.
Signor Bobbio's conception of Existentialism as a 
philosophy of decadentism has been mentioned here because 
"Le Gout du Neant” may be considered as an illustration of 
Bobbio's version of Existentialism—but not the version of 
Existentialism presented by this dissertation.
pair.
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nLe Gout du Neant" is a poem about ennui, the most 
"immonde" animal in the infamous menagerie of our vices, as 
the MAu Lecteur” puts it. It represents a longing not for 
transcendence of nothingness, but for the unconsciousness 
and extinction in nothingness. The poem points not in the 
direction of the authentic realization of the self in higher 
consciousness and actualization of potentialities, but in 
the direction of inauthenticity, the desire for annihilation, 
death. This is the opposite of a fearful, anxious, intense 
being-toward-death; this is the passive acceptance of, and 
longing for, extinction.
There is a distinction between despair and ennui.
Hope and despair are related in that both involve a vision 
of what has been lost. Hope bestrides us, as the poem pic­
tures it, spurs us on with a vision of peace, salvation, 
realization. Despair is excruciating; it, too, taunts and 
torments us with a vision of what has been lost, makes us 
miserable. But absolute ennui has no vision and no hope, 
for ”L’Espoir, dont l’eperon attisait ton ardeur,/ Ne veut
plus t ’enfourcher J” Hope will not mount us, will not spur
• • *
us on, and the unstraddled horse stumbles on every obstacle*
Ennui, on the other hand, is the state in which 
nothingness has become absolute* There is no dread; there 
is only weariness, the weariness of desirelessness* 
negative Nirvana, the victim can say, nI do not desire good
In this
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nor evil, pleasure nor pain, life nor death." With infinite 
lassitude, the victim observes, "How absurd! I am lost!"
Life has become pointless, leaden, blank, and tasteless. One 
feels the weariness of an bid,: worn-out horse who stumbles 
on every obstacle, falls, and finally just remains on the 
ground: "Couche-toi sans pudeur," says the poet, "Lie down 
without shame,/ Old horse who stumbles on every rut." The 
poet feels the weariness and torpor of the brute animal who 
knows nothing of sin and salvation, good and evil; the animal 
knows only the infinite weariness of creeping age and sleeps 
the calm sleep of blissful ignorance. It is precisely this 
sleep that the poet longs for, that marks the line:
R4signe-toi, mon coeur; dors ton sommeil de brute.
The first quatrain describes the weariness and loss
of ardor and finally the longing for the sleep of the animal
which dominates the poet. The single line above sums up
the feeling. The second quatrain begins,
Esprit vaincu, fourbu !^ Pour toi, vieux maraudeur,
L’amour n'a plus de gout
and then presents the pleasures that have lost their savor: 
Love, disputation, music, amusement, and spring, 
gone stale and tasteless.
The significant thing is that the emotion which ac­
companies the relinquishing of these pleasures is not anguish 
and despair, for behind the whole poem there is a disillusion—
• • •
All have
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ment with "volupte" as such. In the architecture of Les 
Fleurs du Mai this poem is in the cycle of "Spleen" and
appropriately expresses a disappointment at the inadequacy 
of the experiences in the earlier cycles of platonic and 
physical love and in the experience of beauty. Thus, the
regret which the poet is expressing is not regret at the
loss of voluptl. but infinite regret and disappointment in 
volupte as such. This is the reason that he longs for the 
sleep of the brute, that his heart is sombre and sullen:
Plaisirs, ne tentez plus un coeur sombre et boudeur I 
Le Printemps adorable a perdu son odeur !
The third quatrain, coming after the "Couche-toi." 
"Resigne-tol." and "Adieu done" of the earlier lines, seems 
to be neither looking into the past, nor commanding, nor
bidding good-bye, but rather seems to describe the present, 
as minute by minute time, like falling snow, imperceptibly
In the lassitude ofengulfs the poet's stiffening body, 
ennui, time is no longer something to be exhausted, van­
quished, transcended, but something which itself exhausts,
In the detachmentstiffens, and ultimately conquers man. 
of"ennui (which is not entirely unrelated to scientific de­
tachment, aesthetic detachment, and ethical objectivity, all 
of which are sharply criticized by the Existentialists) the 
poet contemplates the roundness of the globe (for lack of 
something better) and does not try to resist the stiffening
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that the coldness of the snow has been Inducing, but seeking 
the shelter of a hut:
Je contemple d'en haut le globe en sa rondeur 
Et je n'y cherche plus lfabri d'une cahute.
Objectively and detachedly, he watches the roundness of the
globe from on high; he does not seek to preserve his self
by taking shelter. What for, after all?
The tragedy of an avalanche in these circumstances, 
and for such a one as this, is no real tragedy, for the loss 
of the self is no true loss. The individual values nothing, 
desires nothing, will not regret the loss of his life, 
melodrama of the final question is diminished to a disinter-
The
ested whisper, a sigh:
Avalanche, veux-tu m'emporter dans ta chute?
The poem as a whole, then, hardly represents the 
existential attitude towards nothingness. Rather, it repre­
sents the opposite, the very indifference which renders 
nothingness ineffectual in spurring the individual to the
The object of the poem is not therealization of Being, 
realization of potentialities, but the realization of non- 
Nothingness is embraced rather than faced with fear 
and trembling for the fate of the self, 
going beyond existential despair into ennui and nothingness;
being.
It represents a
it is past despair.
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Existentialism, one must remember, is as much a 
philosophy of hope as despair. Even hope represents a con­
sciousness of the inadequacy of the present and the possi­
bilities of the future. Hope has a vision of the future 
and a recognition of the inadequacy of the present; in this 
sense, Existentialism is eminently a philosophy of hope 
rather than despair. In every major existential thinker, 
one finds this pointing jaway from the inadequacy of the 
present into the future, and Marcel even goes so far as ex­
plicitly to call his thought a "philosophy of hope."
"Le Gout du Neant" contains existential disenchant­
ment and limns the state of unconsciousness and ennui—of 
spiritual non-being—so much dreaded by Existentialists.
The poem is a valuable presentation of the extent to which 
non-being in the form of meaninglessness and spiritual emp­
tiness and lassitude can invade and vanquish the human spir­
it. But this non-being is presented calmly and without 
dread—in fact, as something sought after as all other in­
terest fades. There is no swan scanning the heavens for 
signs of rain, nor any voyager in search of something "du 
There is only a disillusioned acceptance of
This is the nadir of pessimism from 
which Existentialism had to shy away in order to have a place 
to stand at all.
nouveau."
weariness and ennui.
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Sartre would explain this poem as the ultimate con­
sequence of the fact that Baudelaire refused to found a world 
of his own, to evolve his values from himself. Baudelaire 
accepted a seventeenth century Jansenist universe rather 
than Sartre’s radical atheism; now the only possible con­
clusion within the confines of his own theological presup­
positions is the desire for annihilation.
Norberto Bobbio would explain the poem as a type of 
anticipation of nihilistic and decadentistic Existentialism. 
He would say that volupte has in.decadence become a negative 
value and the logical outcome is this poem. He would say 
that Baudelaire is anticipating Sartre. Indeed, one senses 
thffc inversion of reaction to one's world when Baudelaire 
says in his diary that the sky and the sea do not so much 
please as revolt him, that is familiar to readers of Sartre;
It is a great delight to drown one’s sight in the 
immensity of the sky and the seal Nevertheless, these 
thoughts, whether they proceed from me or rush from 
things themselves, soon become too intense. Energy in 
volupte creates an uneasiness and positive suffering 
And now the profundity of the sky dismays me. 
sensibility of the sea, the immutability of the spec­
tacle, revolt me.... [Quoted in Bennett, p. 137]
This revulsion with the immutability and insensibility of 
sky and sea anticipates similar reactions to nature in Sartre, 
most notably, perhaps, in La Nausee. This inversion of sen­
sibility in which natural pleasure becomes revolting and the 
revolting pleasurable is characteristic, Bobbio would say,
The poem is the logical consequence of the
• • • •
The in-
of decadence.
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decadent sensibility. Likewise, Existentialism is also a
form of decadence, Bobbio claims, since it revels in nothing­
ness in the same way as the poem. In short, there is con­
siderable Existentialism in the poem—if Bobbiofs definitions
of decadence and Existentialism are accepted.
But, as has been stated before, precisely because 
Existentialism is'not a decadentistic philosophy and precise­
ly because this poem is an expression of decadence, one must 
speak of Existentialism in the poem with greatest care that 
Existentialism as a philosophy be not misrepresented. While 
there is embodied in the poem a vivid picture of the inau­
thenticity induced by an overdependence on pleasure values 
(and a disillusionment in pleasure), and while there is a 
representation of the sterility and nothingness of the vic­
tim, there is no opposition to nothingness, no hope or recog­
nition of a better state, no suggestion of transcendence.
There is only unbridled pessimism and longing for extinction. 
The poem, in short, represents a moving from despair in the 
wrong direction—toward nothingness—while Existentialism 
represents precisely the opposite, a moving from despair in 
the direction of hope. wLe Cygnew is in despair but looks 
in the direction from which rain might come. "Le Voyage" 
represents a continuing search for authenticity from begin- 
"Le Gout du Nlant" represents no hope and no 
movement toward authenticity. It does not dread the sterility,
ning to end.
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the spiritual deadness of the modern world as do the other 
two poems by Baudelaire treated in this dissertation; rather, 
it seeks a state of deadness, of unconsciousness, of ennui. 
Thus, while the poem presents an encounter with nothingness, 
the reaction to nothingness is exactly the opposite of that 
recommended in existential thought.
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"LE VOYAGE"
"Le Voyage" is the concluding poem in Les Fleurs du 
Mai and is, as Martin Turnell observes, "an allegory of 
man’s life from the cradle to the grave." [Turnell, p. 88]
It begins with "1'enfant, amoureux de cartes et d’estampes" 
and ends with the disillusioned and exhausted voyagers 
ready for death-hoping that at least death will reveal 
something that is not permeated with ennui, something "du 
nouveau":
137 0 Mort, vieux capitaine, il est temps! levons l’ancre!
138 Ce pays nous ennuie, 0 Mort! Appareillons !
The poem will be significant to this dissertation as a sym­
bolic picture of the futility and emptiness of life in the 
modern world.
The basic contrast in the poem is between aspira­
tions and reality, between hopes and disillusionment, an-
It presents the difference be­
tween the infiniteness of the imagination and the disappoint­
ing finiteness of reality, the world of imagined places and 
the "Eldorado banal" that is encountered in actual experience:
1 Pour l'enfant, amoureux de cartes et d'estampes,
2 L’univers est Igal A son vaste app6tit.
3 Ah I que le monde est grand a la clarte des lampes !
4 Aux yeux du souvenir que le monde est petit!
guish, and condemnation.
The first four lines, then, present the fundamental
The world of stamps iscontrast and situation of the poem.
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the world of imagination, of abstraction, of anticipation.
It is the world towards which transcendence points, the world 
which Sartre would call the world of the pour-soi—the self 
that projects itself into the future, into possibilities.
But this world of aspiration and imagination stands in pain­
ful contrast to a remembered actual reality.
The third and fourth lines seem to capture the begin­
ning of the poera~the greatness of the world in the clarity 
of lamplight—and the very end of the poem in all its dis­
illusionment as one remembers the actual experience—the 
littleness of the world in the eye of memory. The signif­
icance of line four, then, is not in the inevitable attri­
tion of memory with time, but in the fact that the world is 
small indeed when one recalls the disappointment of the 
actual experience. (And part of the disappointment which 
accompanies the experience is its failure to measure up to 
one’s hopes.) But let us begin the voyage.
. 5 Un matin nous partons, le cerveau plein de flamme,
6 Le coeur gros de rancune et de desirs amers,
7 Et nous allons, suivant le rhythme de la lame,
6 Beryant notre infini sur le fini des mers:
Following the rhythm of the sea, they are buoyed up and slip 
down. Their brains are hot with anticipation and high hopes, 
and their faces bear the marks of past bitterness and disap­
pointment from which they think they are escaping on this voy­
age. Who are these people whose hopes are so dashed by reality,
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and what are the sources of this immense bitterness?
9 Les uns, joyeux de fuir une patrie infame;
10 D’autres, l’horreur de leurs berceaux, et quelques-uns,
11 Astrologues noyes dans les yeux d’une femme,
12 La Circe tyrannique aux dangereux parfums.
13 Pour n’etre pas changes en betes, ils s’enivrent
14 D’espace et de lumi&re et de cieux embrases;
15 La glace qui les mord, les soleils qui les cuivrent,
16 Effacent lentement la marque des baisers.
There seem to be three classes of people who are em­
barking—some flee an infamous wpatrie." some the horror of 
their birthplaces, and some the eyes (Sartre would make much 
of these eyes) of a tyrannical lover. They flee country, 
home, or love. They have found these disillusioning; these,
they have found, are trying to transform them into something
The actual kisses bruised,lower than they are—into animals, 
tyrannized, and ultimately disappointed them.
Significantly, "not to be changed into beasts," they
seek the ungraspable—space, light, skies—and just as the 
night bites the cheeks of the poet in Rilke’s First Elegy,
They go toso here the ice bites and the sun burns them.
extremes to prove they are not animals; they exasperate their
They abuse themselvessenses with exposure to light and sun.
This is the model of Baudelaire’s masochism—andwith them, 
the reason for it. 
of the disappointment which the poet found in reality, and, 
not to be changed into a beast, he resorts to the excruci­
ating bite of ice and burn of sun.
The mark of the kisses is the evidence
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Existentially, the key to this problem lies in the 
. meaning of line 6:
Bezant notre inf ini sur le fini des 
Basically the encounter is between the infinite in human 
beings and the finitude in the world of reality, 
counter is essentially a surrender of infinity to finitude, a 
sort of shipwreck against the nature of actualization. This 
disappointment and fear of further surrender is shown on
mers • e • •
This en-
three levels of reality—the abstract (la patrie), the local 
(leurs berceaux), and the intimately personal (les veux d'une 
femme)• But the reality of abstractions, of the daily world,
and of personal sensations, is illusory and, though it will
it is
appropriate and tyrannize,/incommensurate with one's hopes,
not "egal k son vaste appetit."
The desire to flee is a desire to preserve the self;
it is an expression of a fear of appropriation of the self
isThis/explicitly stated in the reference
Thus, the signif-
by outside forces.
to lovers who flee a tyrannical Circe, 
icance of the Circe image is not so much disillusionment
with animality and bestiality in love as it has to be ex­
pressed in actuality, as rather it is the fear of domination, 
of the power of this "Circe tvrannique." From the intimacy 
and immediacy of this domination they flee and become as­
trologers, star-gazers, bathers in space and light.
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The fact must be recognized, however, that the voy­
age does not represent transcendence of the situation, but 
flight from it. The course of action embodied in flight, 
nevertheless, is more authentic from an existential point
of view, than continuance in the situation, unconscious of 
its bestiality, banality, inauthenticity. A consciousness 
of the inadequacy of country, home, and love is at least 
the prerequisite of any effort towards authenticity and 
transcendence. The nearest that Baudelaire comes to tran­
scendence is his recognition that those who leave do well:
17 Mais les vrais voyageurs sont ceux-lk seuls qui partent
l£ Pour partir; coeurs legers, semblables aux ballons,
19 De leur fatalite jamais ils ne s’4cartent,
20 Et, sans savoir pourquoi, disent toujours: Allons I
21 Ceux-lA dont les desirs ont la forme des nues,
22 Et qui-revent, ainsi qu'un conscrit le canon,
23 De vastes voluptes, changeantes, inconnues,
24 Et dont 1*esprit humain n'a jamais su le nom !
The true voyagers are those who leave to be leaving, 
who do not call up some imagined El Dorado to poison every 
experience of reality. But they are not unconscious of the 
inauthenticity of what they are leaving; rather they accept 
nothingness into themselves: "De leur fatalitl jamais ils
they never turn aside from their fatality 
and the possibility that they may pop. Professor Turnell 
correctly observes that this line shows that "in the last 
resort it is not the horrors of contemporary civilization, 
but an inner spiritual malady which drives them on.n[Turnell,
ne s,4cartent • • •
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P» 64] Turnell also considers that lines 17-24 describe 
another class of travelers on the boat. [Same] This inter­
pretation is a little shaky, for the text itself does not 
make clear whether these "vrais vovageurs" are to be imagined 
as actually on this nineteenth century Narrenschiff. or 
whether they are an allusion to a type of traveler who is 
not on this sterile voyage, a type of traveler whom the 
poet wishes to contrast to these disillusioned embarkers.
Unfortunately,, we are not like the airy balloon; we 
are like the heavy, mechanical, lifeless ball, or the top 
that is spun around by an outside force:
25 Nous imitons, horreur ! la toupie et la boule
26 Dans leur valse et leurs bonds; meme dans nos sommeils
27 La CuriositS nous tourmente et nous roule,
26 Comme un Ange cruel qui fouette des soleils.
Even in sleep, we are tormented and rolled around, the tools 
of a never-satisfied will—like the will in Rilke1 s Fifth 
Elegy. In Rilke,"La Curiosite" becomes "Madame Lamort"; 
both roll and control the lives of men, spinning them around 
like tops, as Augustus the Strong twirled a tin platter.
The same inauthenticity and aimlessness which charac­
terized the existence of the acrobats in the Fifth Elegy is 
found expressed here, where "le but" of Destiny moves about 
and man can find no aim, nothing solid on which to place his 
hopes:
29 Singuliere fortune ou le but se deplace,
30 Et, n'etant nulls part, peut etre n'imports ouJ
3 $4
31 Ou 1’Homme, dont jamais l'esperance n'est lasse,
32 Pour trouver le repos court toujours comrae un fou!
Next, Baudelaire translates this thought of man ever running 
(paradoxically) to find rest into the terms of the voyage:
Our soul is a three-masted vessel seeking the utopian island
of Icarie;
33 Notre ame est un trois-mats cherchant son Icarie;
34 Une voix retentit sur le pont: "Ouvre l'oeiU”
35 Une voix de la hune, ardente etfolle, crie: --
36 nAmour...gloire...bonheur I” Enfer I cfest un ecueil I
"Keep your eyes peeled I" shouts a voice from the bridge, and 
in the "hune" at the top of the mast comes back, "I see love
and glory and happiness—Hell, it’s only a shoal I" And every
• ••
tiny island is sighted as the promised land, the El Dorado 
promised by Destiny:
37 Chaque flot signals par l’homrae de vigie
38 Est un Eldorado prorais par le Destin;
39 LfImagination qui dresse son orgie
40 Ne trouve qu’un recif aux clartes du matin.
By the light of day, the promised El Dorado turns out to be
The optical illusions which play upon the hopesonly a reef.
of the voyagers as they watch on the deck through the night 
are dispersed by the clear light of day, and only a reef re­
mains, an obstacle to steer clear of if one is to avoid ship-
The word "clartls" recalls the
What was infinite to the child
wreck and annihilation.
"clartl des lampes” of line 3» 
in the Clartl des lampes"—the artificial light of lamps—turns
Theout in the "clartes du matin” to be a disappointment. 
real light of morning reveals no promised El Dorado.
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With this spectacle of the repeated hopes dashed in 
disappointment, the poet meditates on these poor, seekers of 
chimerical countries:
41 0 le pauvre amoureux des pays chim4riques 1
42 Faut-il le mettre aux fers, le jeter h la mer,
43 Ce matelot ivrogne, inventeur d'Am4riques
44 Dont le mirage rend le gouffre plus amer?
45 Tel le vieux vagabond, pietinant dans la boue
46 Reve, le nez en l'air, de brillants paradis;
47 Son oeil ensorcele d4couvre une Capoue
48 Partout oh la chandelle illumine un taudis.
Again in line 44 the essential message of the poem 
is presented as the poet asserts that "le mirage rend le 
gouffre plus amer. And then the picture of modem man 
is vividly symbolized in the old vagabond, tramping along 
in the mire, his nose in the air, dreaming of brilliant and 
gleaming paradises, his deceiving eyes telling him that the 
light of a poor and miserable hut is the delightful city of 
Capua in Italy. (This picture is reminiscent of the image 
of Don Quixote, who in imagination changed the humblest sur­
roundings into glorious medieval castles. Baudelaire may be 
picturing the romantic who creates a reality which does not 
correspond to actuality. Kierkegaard ridiculed Hegel as 
the man who built a beautiful castle of logic, but went to
• • •
live in a hovel outside its gates in his actual life.)
The mirage renders the abyss more bitter, because
This is one ofthe mirage asserts that there is no abyss.
Baudelaire's basic concerns. With the concept of natural
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goodness, it was difficult to account for evil in man.
Little compatibility could be found between contemporary 
meliorism and the view of man as imperfect and fallen in 
his basic nature. The illusion of goodness, truth, and 
light only serves to make the reality of the gulf, the evil, 
the weakness of man, when discovered, all the more bitter.
Existentially, the mirage symbolizes abstraction, 
the closed and optimistic little world of a system which 
accounts (seemingly) for man. But as Kierkegaard and the
later Existentialists maintain, a system is not a world 
that an existing man can live in. 
then, the weaknesses of bourgeois idealism could be seen by
As early as Baudelaire,
a perceptive and critical mind. The belief that improving 
man’s physical surroundings will bring about spiritual prog­
ress was seen by Baudelaire as a mirage. The El Dorado of 
scientific progress, of utilitarianism, of humanitarianism, 
of communism, and of the hundreds of other panaceas of 
Baudelaire's day did not deceive him, just as they did not 
deceive Kierkegaard who detected behind the self-importance 
of his age "a sense of despair over being human":
Everything must attach itself so as to be a part of 
some movement; men are determined to lose themselves in 
the totality of things, in world-history, fascinated and 
deceived by magic witcheryj no one wants to be an indi­
vidual human being. [CUP, p. 317]
This world of illusion is not unrelated to Rilke's "gedeutete
Welt," that is, the fog of interpretation and misinterpretation
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with which man surrounds himself. Baudelaire's mirage rep­
resents essentially the Existentialists' idea of the fallacy
of abstractions and idealistic systems. It veils reality 
and deceives man, but it has no correspondence to reality, 
and when man discovers the abyss of nothingness~or in 
Baudelaire's terminology "evil"—opening before him, it is 
all the more terrible aid bitter and disillusioning.
After this brief meditation on the spectacle of the 
seekers of chimerical countries, the stay-at-home poet turns 
to address the travelers as they pull into port, returning 
from the voyage. Eagerly, yet sarcastically, he asks them 
to describe the sights they have seen:
49 Etonnants voyageurs I quelles nobles histoires
50 Nous lisons dans vos yeux profonds comme les mers
51 Montrez-nous les ecrins de vos riches memoires,
52 Ces bijoux merveilleux, faits d'astres et d'ethers.
53 Nous voulons voyager sans vapeur et sans voile 1
54 Faites, pour 4gayer l'ennui de nos prisons,
55 Passer sur nos esprits tendus comme une toile,
56 Vos souvenirs avec leurs cadres d'horizons.
57 Dites, qu'avez-vous vu?
There is a pause. Then, one is given the full damaging 
report in stanza after stanza of disillusioning experience. 
Generally, they were as bored as at home, and the reality 
abroad was as exasperationg as that at home:
"Nous avons vu des astres
58 Et des flots; nous avons vu des sables aussi;
59 Et malgrl bien des chocs et d'imprevus desastres,
60 Nous nous sommes souvent ennuyes, comme ici.
3 SB
Even the first four lines carry the disappointment, the 
boredom, which the travelers found* They saw many, many
stars, many waves, much sand—all things that the stay-at- 
home could experience on the shore. One seems to gain a 
sense of their weariness, a picture of their scanning the 
horizon and constantly being greeted with stars and waves* 
The stars, the sand, the waves—these are the monotonous, 
the obvious things; and one is hardly surprised when they 
remark that, as at home, they were mostly bored* 
the lines themselves show this weariness as lines 5$ and 60
And even
peter out with an "aussi" and a ”comme ici."
But then the travelers turn to the more colorful 
part of the journey—only to say (lines 65-7) that the real 
never approached the ideal:
61 La gloire du soleil sur la mer violette,
62 La gloire des cites dans le soleil couchant.
63 Allumaient dans nos coeurs une ardeur inquiete
64 De plonger dans un ciel au reflet alllchant*
65 Les plus riches citls, les plus grands paysages,
66 Jamais ne contenaient l’attrait mystlrieux
67 De ceux que le hasard fait avec les huages,
68 Et toujours le d£sir nous rendait soucieux!
The clouds on the horizon always took shapes more attractive 
and mysterious (as food for the imagination) than the finest 
landscapes and the richest cities they saw.
And man’s desire only made him more avid, more in­
satiable. The pleasant satisfaction of the desire for pleas­
ure only increases desire, only fertilizes, as Baudelaire
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puts it, the old tree of desire and makes it more hardy, 
more immediate than the tree of death, the cypress:
69 --La jouissance ajoute au desir de la force*
70 Desir, vieil arbre a qui le plaisir sert d'engrais,
71 Cependant que grossit et durcit ton Scorce,
72 Tes branches veulent voir le soleil de plus pres !
73 Grandiras-tu toujours, grand arbre plus vivace
74 Que le cypres? — Pourtant nous avons, avec soin,
75 Cueilli quelques croquis pour votre album vorace,
76 Frferes qui trouvez beau tout ce qui vient de loin !
However, they have brought back some colored slides for the 
greedy albums of those who find lovely all that comes from 
And they proceed to bring out their exotic pictures.
77 Nous avons salul des idoles & trompe;
78 Des trones constellls de joyaux lumineux;
79 Des palais ouvragls dont la flerique pompe
80 Serait pour vos banquiers un reve ruineux;
Si Des costumes qui sont pour les yeux une ivresse
82 Des femmes dont les dents et les ongles sont teints,
83 Et des jongleurs savants que le serpent caresse."
afar.
They have seen idols, and jewel-studded athrones, and pal­
aces of such fairy-like splendor as to be the ruination of
They have seen intoxicating costumes,a bourgeois banker.
women with dyed teeth and fingernails, and snake-charmers
But then the narrator breaksperforming dangerous feats, 
off, as if just before the peak of a crescendo. Anxiously
the poet bids him go on:
84 Et puis, et puis encore?
Then the voyager launches into twenty lines without a period, 
telling in all its sordid humanness the story of what was 
behind the idols, palaces, and thrones:
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"0 cerveaux enfantins I
85 Pour ne pas oublier la chose capitals,
S6 Nous avons vu partout, et sans l’avoir cherch4,
87 Du haut jusques en bas de lr4chelle fatale,.
88 Le spectacle ennuyeux de l’immortel peche:
89 La femme, esclave vile, orgueilleuse et stupide,
90 Sans rire s'adorant et s'aimant sans d4gout;
91 D’homme, tyran goulu, paillard, dur et cupide,
92 Esclave de l'esclave etruisseau dans l'4gout;
93 De bourreau qui jouit, le martyr qui sanglote;
94 Da fete qu'assaisonne et parfume le sang;
95 De poison du pouvoir 4nervant le despote,
96 Et le peuple amoureux du fouet abrutissant;
97 Plusieurs religions semblables k la notre,
98 Toutes escaladant le ciel; la Saintet4
99 Comme en un lit de plume un d4licat se vautre t 
100 Dans les clous et le crin cherchant la volupte;
101 D’Humanitl bavarde, ivre de son §4nie,
102 Et, folle maintenant comme elle etait jadis,
103 Criant 5 Dieu, dans sa furibonde agonie:
104 '0 mon semblable, 6 mon maitre, je te maudis I*
.»-•
105 Et les moins sots, hardis amants de la Demence,
106 Fuyant le grand troupeau parqui par le Destin
107 Et se rlfugiant dans lfopium immense I
108 —Tel est du globe entier lfetemel bulletin«n
w0h infantile minds! (Oh minds fixed on externalities!) Not
n The most importantto forget the most important thing*;.* 
thing is the nature and condition of man, and his manner of
This picture is not a pleasant, unu-existing in the world* 
sual, exotic one, for "from the bottom to the top of the fa­
tal ladder of life we saw everywhere without seeking it, the 
wearisome spectacle of sin, immortal sin*" The important 
thing is that modern man is in sin, hopelessly in sin*
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The description elaborates on man's being in sin as
it paints a dismal picture of human baseness, pride, cruelty, 
greed, and so forth. Woman is everywhere a vile slave, 
stupid and proud in her self-adoration, without laughter at
its ridiculousness nor disgust at her state. Man is a tyrant 
who is greedy, vulgar, hard, and grasping; he is the slave 
of a slave, the main gutter in a sewer. Existentially, 
this situation represents a surrender of the self to out­
side forces: the woman to her body without laughter or dis­
gust, the man to his instincts of greed and coarseness. It
represents a spiritual refusal to rise above nature, man's 
nature. Man's nature, if he surrenders to it, is not nat­
urally good, but depraved. This view stands in marked con­
trast to the romantic conception of the natural goodness of 
man; indeed, it looks back to Pascal—and forward to Heidegger. 
Heidegger's description of the state of Terfallen (decline) 
has much in common with the surrender to the power of out­
side forces depicted here.
This brings up the question: Is the existential view 
of man nearer that of the romantics (in many ways their an­
cestors) or the classicists; that is, is their view of man 
that of natural goodness, or that of natural depravity which 
must be overcome through a superhuman effort of the will? 
Initially, Existentialism would seem nearer to the classical 
conception, since it is keenly sensitive to the gulf, the
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presence of what amounts to a will to non-being within the 
find the need to rise above the natural* 
concept of SeinsverstSndnis (the intuitive natural
let, in the
sense
of the nature of man’s being and the expanse of man’s poten­
tialities) , in its tendency to revolt against the moral 
pattern rather than to accept it, it is romantic*
What is the solution to this question? Undeniably,
Baudelaire contains both of these elements—classical and
romantic• His view, in its condemnation of a social order 
but unquestioning acceptance of the theological order brings
him close to his classical ancestors in the seventeenth cen­
tury. The eighteenth century rationalists questioned the 
theological order, and the romanticists question the validity 
of the order of the eighteenth century rationalists. The
romantic conception in early German romanticism remained 
idealistic, but switched its emphasis from the reliability
The romantic emphasis onof law to the uniqueness of man. 
the centrality of man is precisely the theme of the Exis­
tentialists. Romanticists and Existentialists assert that 
man is the center of the universe; they assert that "sub­
jectivity is the starting point," as Sartre has put it. 
with the rise of scientific optimism and the conception of 
biological determinism and the consequent faith in physical 
progress, the elements which the early romantics had opposed 
in rationalism began to reassert themselves with increasing
But
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force, and the battle between rationalism and romanticism 
raged on—and rages on to this day. 
twentieth century form of certain elements in romanticism, 
as William Barret has ably pointed out in his Irrational 
Man [cited in chapter I], yet it is much more than this, 
for it has affinities with classicism and arose in reaction 
to a different form of rationalism.
With Baudelaire, one has the problem of fitting what 
is in many ways best described as a seventeenth century 
point of view (affinities with Descartes, Pascal, Racine) 
into the battle described above. There is no romantic ide­
alism in Baudelaire, nor any rationalistic meliorism. But 
there is the romantic emphasis on man and the classical 
conception of man as essentially fallen. And there is a 
perception of the nature of man that looks back to the
Existentialism is a
analyses of the seventeenth-century classical dramatists 
> and forward to the twentieth century preoccupation with
Finally, and most im-the psychological aspects of man. 
portantly, in an age in which the persona)., spiritual con­
dition of the self was being lost sight of in a world of
social programs and industrial progress, Baudelaire per­
ceived the spiritual emptiness and sterility of his age,
i
its basic failure to come to grips with greed and pride 
and lust on the personal level*
specifically classical nor romantic, but existential*
In this, he is neither
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The travelers saw, too, the hangman rejoicing in his 
legal murder, the pathos of the suffering martyr, the 
tacle of a festival of human existence perfumed with blood,
spec-
the despot poisoned with power, and the victims cherishing 
the whip that abused them. They saw several religions 
with their special saints moving out of the madding crowd
to seek their morbid pleasure on horsehair and nails. In 
short, they saw a babbling humanity drunk with its own self- 
importance, as ridiculous now as in the former times at 
which they laugh in scorn, always imagining God in their 
own ridiculous image and furiously blaspheming.
The less foolish (a group in which Baudelaire him­
self would seem to fit), those bold lovers of dementia, 
flee this great herd and take refuge in the immensity of 
an opium world. Such, the voyager concludes, is the un­
changing and eternal report of the entire globe. Baudelaire 
makes no proposals of reform; he only presents a picture of 
the "moins sots” (less foolish) fleeing into a world of 
opium. This is as far as Baudelairian decadence and its 
vision can go. It asserts the value of perceiving inanity 
and offers a program which is not positive but negative: 
flight.
There is a pause as the full weight of the report 
is felt. Then the poet begins his meditation on voyaging 
with the unforgettable quatrain which begins, "Bitter is
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the knowledge one gains from voyaging
109 Amer savoir, celui qu’on tire du voyage !
110 Le monde, monotone et petit, aujourd’hui,
HI Hier, demain, toujours, nous fait voir notre image:
112 Une oasis d’horreur dans un desert d’ennuij
In actuality, this world is monotonous and small; and yester­
day, tomorrow, always, it shows us our image~an oasis of 
horror in the vast wastes of a desert of ennui*
Here, in these four lines,-one finds meaninglessness 
in full dress. Ennui is the existential equivalent of spir­
itual emptiness and meaninglessness. This is the gulf; this 
is nothingness. Such pessimism is hardly matched in poetry 
until the waste land poetry of the twenties. Man’s fallen­
ness, his aloneness, his spiritual emptiness, all are ex­
pressed in "notre image": an oasis of horror in a desert 
of ennui. If there were ever a waste land image in poetry 
this is it. Bitter, indeed, is the knowledge gained from 
voyaging.
• • •
The twist of meaning involved in the use of the word
Oasis is traditionally a place"oasis" may be observed* 
one reaches after a long trek over the sands of a desert* 
After trudging over the desert of life and pulling into an 
oasis tired and thirsty, man finds an oasis yydlhorreur*yy
The larger voyage described in the poem and the voyage im­
plied in the oasis image both turn out to reveal manfs image, 
yesterday, tomorrow, and always, as ffUne oasis dfhorreur dans 
un d4sert df ennui J"
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Departing or remaining, one does not escape himself. 
One does not escape boredom and meaninglessness, 
does not escape time:
i
And one
113 Faut-il partir? rester? Si tu peux rester, reste;
114 Pars, s'il le faut. L'un court, et 1*autre se tapit
115 Pour tromper l’ennemi vigilant et funeste,
116 Le Temps! II est, helas! des coureurs sans repit,
117 Comme le Juif errant et comrae les apotres,
11S A qui rien ne suffit, ni wagon ni vaisseau,
119 Pour fuir ce rltiaire infame; il en est d’autres
120 Qui savent le tuer sans quitter leur berceau.
If one can stand to remain, then remain. If one must depart, 
then do so. In one case, one runs and in the other one hides; 
but both are equally futile ways of eluding time—as futile 
as the apostles trying to hide or the wandering Jew to flee. 
Yet some~those who neither hide nor flee—can vanquish him 
without ever leaving their birthplaces.
When time at last rests his foot on our backs, we 
can embark on that final voyage "sur la mer des Tenlbres."
121 Lorsque enfin il mettra le pied star notre echine,
122 Nous pourrons esperer et crier: En avant!
123 De meme qu*autrefois nous partions pour la Chine
124 Les yeux fixes au large et les cheveux au vent,
125 Nous nous embarquerons sur la mer des Ten&bres
126 Avec le coeur joyeux d’un jenne passager.-
Indeed, the poet seems to hear the entreaty of the Sirens 
to eat the enchanted lotus blossom:
127 Entendez—vous ces voix, charmantes et funfebres,
12S Qui chantent: "Par ici! vous qui voulez manger
129 Le Lotus parfuml I cfest ici qu*on vendange.
130 Les fruits miraculeux dont votre coeur a faim;
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131 Venez vous enivrer de la douceur Strange
132 De cette aprfes-midi qui nfa jamais de fin I"
•
The familiar accents reveal a spectre and Pylades stretches 
out his arms:
133 A 1*accent familier nous devinons le spectre;
134 Nos Pylades^lk-bas tendent leurs bras vers nous.
135 "Pour refraichir ton coeur nage vers ton Electre1"
136 Dit celle dont jadis nous baisions les genoux.
"Jump from the boat and swim to thy adored Electra I" the 
voice entreats, the voice of her whom we had adored and en­
joyed in other days.
But the voice, as one would expect in Baudelaire, is 
not a voice that is genuinely offering fulfillment, but the 
voice of a Siren, tempting but never satisfying. This ap­
parent oasis is in reality an "oasis d’horreur”—no true 
oasis at all.
The world is small and monotonous. Man is greedy,
lustful, cruel, tyrannical; spiritually, he is hopelessly 
His image is an oasis of horror in a desert of 
He hides from time, he runs from time—fruitlessly.
There is nothing 
Let us begin
in sin.
ennui.
•• 1
His life is basically empty and meaningless# 
left but death, the final voyage into death# 
that voyage, then, says the poet, and put an end to the bitter 
and disillusioning round of voyages that only reveal the in­
humanness of man# He turns to Captain Death and tells him
to weigh anchor:
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137 0 Mort, vieux capitaine, il est temps I levons l’ancre!
138 Ce pays nous ennuie, o Mort I Appareillons I
139 Si le ciel et la mer sont noirs comme de l'encre,
140 Nos coeurs que tu connais sont remplis de rayons!
141 Verse-nous ton poison pour qu'il nous reconforte !
142 Nous voulons, tant ce feu nous brule le cerveau, •
143 Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu’importe?
144 Au fond de l'Inconnu pour trouver du nouveau i ■
If the sky and the sea are black as ink, there are still 
rays of light filling our hearts. Death, pour out your venom 
that perhaps it may refresh us—we, who sought in vain for 
refreshment in an oasis of horror, in a desert of ennui.
The fire in our brains burns so fiercely that we care not 
whether the gulf of death holds hell or heaven. What does 
it matter? On, on into the unknown! Perhaps at last there 
we will find something new l
The "nouveau** should not be interpreted as merely
the final degeneration into an empty search for novelty at 
any price, although this is one level of its meaning, 
significant interpretation emerges when one considers that 
the "nouveau** is symbolic of the opposite of the monotonous, 
the greedy cruelity and repetitious avariciousness of man.
Then the
A more
Perhaps after death things will be different.
The sense in which "nouveau" im-monotony will be broken, 
plies "different" is the more significant sense, and the
sense with which the rest of the poem best harmonizes.
Certainly there is an existential pessimism in the "qu*imported 
attitude, but it is the outcome of an underlying anguish
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("ce feu nous brule le cerveau") and an exasperated sensi­
bility-exasperated at the condition and behavior of 
let the "nouveau" is the "nouveau" of the voyager, the hope 
that the monotony of his consistent disillusionment at human 
degradation in every land he has visited may at last be bro­
ken by the arrival at a country where the picture is dif­
ferent—new.
man-.
Existentialism in "Le Voyage": Affinities and Antici- 
Existentialism in the poem is largely a matter of 
certain affinities with and anticipations of later charac­
teristic concerns of existential thinkers.
pations.
Baudelaire also has affinities with the other two
poets studied in this dissertation, both of whom were in-
T. S. Eliot not only shows certain af-fluenced by him. 
finities with Baudelaire indirectly in the major concerns 
of his poetry and directly in specific quotations from such 
poems as "Au Lecteur" and "Le Cygne" in The Waste Land, but
has made his appreciation explicit in his two essays on 
BaudelaireRilke acknowledged as early as 1900 his ad­
miration for Baudelaire and more than a decade later declined,
because of his high regard for the poet, to attempt to trans—
Internally, perhapslate Les Fleurs du Mai into German.
^"Baudelaire in our Time," in Essays Ancient and 
Modern (London, 1936), pp. 63-75. Also ‘'Baudelaire,*^ 
Selected Essays: 1917-1932 (New York, 1932), pp. 335-345.
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the most obvious and striking affinity between Baudelaire 
and Rilke is the use of anguish as one of the major bases 
for poetical creation. In his valuable and definitive book, 
Baudelaire et R. M. Rilke: ftude d»influence et d’affinities
spirituelles. M. L. de Sugar notes this distinctive use of 
anguish in the two poets:
Baudelaire a 4te le premier pofcte moderne & se ser- 
vir de ltangoisse comme matiere poetique. Rilke a repris 
ce thfeme dans les Cahiers de-Malte.^puis a continue k le 
developper jusque dans ses Elegies.8
Indeed, this anguish alone would be nearly enough to justify
the assertion of an anticipation of the existential anguish
of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, one should bear in
mind that the study of Existentialism in Baudelaire is, and
must remain, a matter of affinities and anticipations—and
perhaps beginnings.
In the poem, images of mirage (line 44) and illusion
Indeed, a basic movement of theappear in different forms, 
poem is the movement (voyage) toward aspirations and hopes
which the travelers discover are only empty delusions that 
leave one ”ennuy4s, comme ici.” Reality does not measure 
up to the abstract world of the cards and stamps in the ar­
tificial light of the lamp, nor the real islands to the 
imagined ones in the clouds, nor the real cities to the hopes
8(Paris, 1954), p. 169.
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of an El Dorado, nor the real hut to the Imagined Capua, 
nor the woman actually possessed to the dreamed of Circe 
or Electra. Baudelaire presents a world of illusion and 
reality which anticipates the concern in both Eliot and 
Rilke with illusion and reality.
Behind the criticism of man for possessing these 
illusions is an opposition to externalities, to the exter- 
nalization and simplification of the conception of the na­
ture of man. Abstractions (such as nAmour 
heur” in line 36) turn out to be empty, not anything that 
one can encounter in real life. And their promises, like 
the promises of Circe and the Sirens, are essentially empty; 
delusions. The systems and organization of reality imposed 
by "patrie" (line 9)» "berceaux" (line 10), and "les veux 
d'une femme" (line 11), are all unsatisfactory~are, indeed,
gloire bon-• • • • • •
forms of human tyranny.
In Existentialism, for instance in Kierkegaard, one 
finds the same fierce, sarcastic, ironical tone used with 
reference to abstract essences, systems, and values—to
Both Baudelaire and Kierkegaardabstraction in general, 
would agree that the humanitarians and practitioners of con­
ventional religion are deceiving themselves in thinking they 
are authentic, for in reality there is something seriously
The high-sounding abstractmissing from their conceptions, 
schemes and systems involved in idealism, materialism, and
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melioristic social conceptions ultimately prove to be 
deceptions if, in all the bustle, man as an existing human 
being is lost.
The voyage of the poem is essentially an odyssey of 
the self seeking the self, seeking the authentic self, and 
a place in which authentic beings are existing and setting 
and example. The travelers find no such place. Lines 5-24 
deal with the reasons for the voyage, and there emerges from 
the lines the fact that an underlying dissatisfaction and
anguish, actually an existential anguish, drives them on. 
It is an anguish at a surrender of the self, at the loss 
of the self, the loss of control to outside forces—home, 
country, woman. The flight itself signifies an anguished
desire to preserve the self.
Existentially, the significant aspect of the situation
The basic theme of the poem
In a sig-
is the centrality of the self.
may be interpreted as the corruption of the self, 
nificant passage quoted earlier from Baudelaire’s Journaux
"la vaporisation 
Tout est la." The self 
Baudelaire in this poem, and
Intimes, the poet summarizes his concern: 
at ... la centralisation du Moi.
is being vaporized, corrupted, 
repeatedly through Les Fleurs du Mai makes the condition of
The very architecturethe self the central poetic problem.
of Les Fleurs shows the poet’s search for a dependable re—
Spleen, ideal, love, wine—allality, a respectable self.
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orbit around a central concern with the condition of the 
self. Indeed, this concern with the self is closely 
lated to the very genesis of *feymbolisme." which takes as 
its task the representation "de l’jbne humaine." In his 
indispensable book on symbolism in Baudelaire, Lloyd James 
Austin also notes this fact in connection with the meaning 
of Baudelaire’s symbolism:
re-
en realite, ni Satan ni Promithee n'ont un role es- 
sentiel dans la creation poetique de Baudelaire, 
dans la "symbolique" baudelairienne, la part du Diable 
est la part du lion. Mais il y a autre chose dans les 
Fleurs du Mai qu'une symbolique orthodixe manquee et 
une symbolique infernale plus rlussie: il y a un sym- 
bolisme humain, 1'expression lyrique d’une ame humaine. 
C'est ici que les correspondences, liees A la doctrine 
baudelairienne de 1’imagination, trouvent-leur appli­
cation la plus flconde. "Les correspondances poetiques, 
comma le rappelle Jean Prevost, ont tou.iours l’homme 
pour centre." L’unitA vers laquelle la poesie de 
Baudelaire nous ramene n’est ni 1’unite divine, ni_
1’unite satanique, mais 1’unite de l'ame humaine. “
Certes,
Symbolism is in essense the finding of an objective correl­
ative for a state or aspect of the human being. In "Irf5 Voy­
age .” the guiding state of the self and its most distinguish­
ing aspect is disillusionment. And the significant images 
are those which imply an illusion, as has been noted earlier. 
There is no mediation of the disillusionment; the pessimistic
The end of this odyssey of the self seek-tone hardly varies, 
ing the self is only disappointment and the question mark of
death.
^L’Univers Poetique de Baudelaire: Symbolisme et Sym­
bolique TParis, 1956)» pp. 134-5•
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The world of illusion and the vaporization of the 
self have been discussed. The reaction to illusion may vary 
intensity, as may be seen in a comparison of Baudelaire
to Rilke or T. S. Eliot. Of the three, Baudelaire's disil­
lusionment is the most bitter, perhaps because it is the
most unredeemable, the most untranscendable. Of the three, 
perhaps only Baudelaire may personally be described as "an 
embittered man,” although all three perceive the problem of 
illusion in the existence of modern man. Contempt and bit­
terness mark the whole course of "Le Voyage." It is the 
bitterness of disappointment.
Indeed, disillusionment runs through the pattern of 
the images in the poem and has been noted as its basic move­
ment. The world of the poem is one of aspirations that are 
not realized, a search for a utopia which ends in despair, 
a disappointment in home, country, and love, that ends in 
flight.
Ultimately this disillusionment implies a view of
For Baudelaire, man is a fallen creature, hopelessly
One may properly speak of the thrall
man.
in sin, naturally bad. 
of sin, for man is referred to as a "Esclave de l'esclave
et ruisseau dans l'4gout"—■-the slave of a slave and a gutter 
He is evil, depraved, greedy, vicious, base.in a sewer.
Existentially, this thralldom may be considered the
When Baudelaire states in line 25,equivalent of Verfallen.
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"Nous imitons, horreur 1 la toupie et la boule," he is ex­
pressing a basic existential experience—that of being 
stuck in the sticky, gluey, viscosity of inauthenticity 
and decline. This is the downward sucking force of manTs
It is the natural course, but one must
The bitterness and 
condemnation in the poem and elsewhere in Baudelaire are the 
result of the discovery that man is in fact not resisting 
his basic (fallen) nature.
world and his body, 
resist nature in order to be authentic.
Spiritual emptiness and sterility are a major theme 
of the poem. The man whose moral and spiritual conscious­
nesses are alive finds himself isolated and alone in an 
alien world. Over and over again, the "uses of this world" 
are found to be meaningless. All that remains is ennui.
The undercurrent of meaninglessness must be understood 
as a form of spiritual emptiness—a form of non-being in­
vading being. The complete domination of meaninglessness
would be absolute spiritual non-being, non-existence. 
Baudelaire's ennui is essentially existential emptiness
Since emptiness and meaninglessnessand meaninglessness, 
are grounded in non-being, ennui is also a form of anxiety
in Baudelaire. Ennui is, then, as much an evidence of spir—
l
itual and emotional frustration as it is of spiritual las­
situde. And when ennui is conceived of as lassitude (as in 
"Au Lecteur"). it is, significantly, seen as an evil to be
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avoided, a last consequence of, and evidence;of, spiritual 
sterility.
Thus, the emptiness—meaninglessness-nothingness 
plex repeats itself again and again in the poem in references 
which connote boredom, sterility, weariness, futility, deso­
lation.
com-
This presentation of sterility and futility is pecul­
iarly modern in spirit. It is the expression of the spir­
itual anxiety and frustration of modern man. The poem, then, 
is more than an indictment and condemnation of a corrupt
society; it is an indictment of the inner emptiness of mod­
ern man as an individual existing human being.
The Existentialism in the poem may be described in 
three words: shipwreck without transcendence. A picture of 
self-loss is presented, but no positive pcogramcis suggested 
for regaining the self. The closest that one comes to au­
thenticity is the realization of inauthenticity. The bal­
loons that the poet admires are admired because they do not 
turn aside from their fatality, but live in constant -danger 
of bursting. They may be considered a poetic image of 
Heidegger’s conception of being-towards-death. 
flee nor hide from their fatality. They live face to face
i.
with death. In existential terms, this constitutes the 
recognition and acceptance of nothingness in the form of 
death. Unfortunately, no existential affirmation accom­
panies the recognition of nothingness.
They cannot
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Flight as such is in the poem a physical evidence of 
the recognition of inauthenticity. Those who flee recog­
nize their emptiness and are seeking something better. They 
do not find it, but only human baseness:
—Tel est du globe entier l'etemel bulletin.
Thus, one may say that a truly existential picture 
of self-loss, inauthenticity, and shipwreck is presented in 
”Le Voyage." The shipwreck is basically that of modern man 
upon the reality of nothingness as it reveals itself in fini- 
tude. But there is no transcendence of the shipwreck. Only 
half the existential picture of man is present—the bitter 
half. But one must also observe that this is a requisite 
shipwreck, for there is, existentially, no true transcendence 
without shipwreck. Baudelaire presented the suffering in­
volved in standing face to face with nothingness, and recog­
nized—significantly—the basic value and necessity of suf­
fering and shipwreck for human beings. For, in all his bit­
terness and anxiety, he could write in his famous "Benedic­
tion":
—"Soyez beni, mon Dieu, qui donnez^la souffrance 
Comme un divin remade & nos impuretes "
Yet the nature of his system neither furnishes, nor permits, 
transcendence.
• • • •
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THE WASTE LAND
The Waste _L_and is an expression of the anxiety and 
restlessness of modern man, his sense of a need for spiritual 
regeneration, his vivid feeling of the inadequacy of his 
world and his inauthentic manner of being in that world.
In a s:ense, the poem unites Baudelaire's picture of man as 
a swan looking for life-giving rain in a world of stone 
presented by "Le Cygne" with the restless dissatisfaction 
with mere pleasure and the inauthenticity of the world pre­
sented by "Le Voyage."
were shown to contain elements of Existentialism, so also 
The Waste Land may be seen to reflect some basically exis­
tential points of view.
The basic theme of The Waste Land is death-in-life.
This is translated into a variety of images, 
tialists have concerned themselves with the problems of 
death and have noted that while death is the absolute form 
of physical non-being, there are other forms of non-being
Just as these two poems by Baudelaire
The Existen-
which are relative, such as the non-being involved in spir-
The same anxiety that one feels towarditual emptiness, 
death is felt towards the relative non-being of spiritual
The theme of death-in-life in The Waste Landemptiness.
represents the non-being of spiritual emptiness.
The anxiety at this death-in-life, this spiritual 
emptiness, is what impels the protagonist to ask the fortune-
As Professor Williamsonteller where this road is leading.
409
correctly notes,
Reduced to its simplest terms, The Waste Land 
is a statement of the experience that, drives a 
character to the fortune-teller, the fortune 
that is told, and the unfolding of that fortune.
The basic structural element is, then, the quest of this
one who seeks to know his fortune. This quest, as will be
shown, is basically the existential quest of the self for
the true self, and the anxiety which drives and motivates
this quest is essentially existential anxiety.
Indeed, existential concerns are seen throughout 
the poem: in the fact that the potential self is always in 
mind; that the self is the center of concern (this is indi­
cated by the fact that sin and expiation permeate the poem, 
both of which have no meaning except for the self as an 
existing being); that the major quest is the quest of the 
self for an authentic self; that man is seen as essentially 
fallen and imperfect; that abstraction is seen as an evil; 
that man is seen as shipwrecked on non-being, foundering 
against nothingness; that a vivid picture of contemporary 
Alltaelichkeit. Verfalien, and Uneigentlichkeit are presented 
in several different incarnations of what Heidegger would call 
das Man: that man’s dilemma is essentially interpreted as inner, 
subjective, a spiritual thirst in a desert of inauthenticity;
1G. Williamson, "The Structure of The Waste Land," 
Modern Philology. XLVII (February 1950) p. 197.
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and finally, that the world of illusion, abstraction, 
rialism, must be put aside if one is to find the Grail 
is seeking.
mate-
one
In many ways, The Waste Land is a conscious implemen­
tation of Eliot*s famous essay, "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent." In the face of the loss of reality and the loss of 
meaning which were invading modern life, the search for
reality turned to myth and tradition, the products of the col­
lective consciousness of generation after generation of man. 
Eliot is not content to talk of sin and regeneration in 
present terms, but returns to Shakespeare and Dante, and 
traces regeneration themes not only in Renaissance, Medieval, 
and Ancient Greek and Ancient Mediterranean forms, but in the 
final phases attempts to go to the very dawn of Aryan civi­
lization to the three staves of give, sympathize, and control.
This return to collect the best of what is known of 
human efforts at realization, authenticity, regeneration, is
Eliot*s attempt to recover meaning for lives from which mean-
Karl Jaspers, too, in his book on the origining has passed.
and scope of history, attacks the scientific view of history 
as mere factual past events, and suggests that the goal of 
history is really Selbstverstandnis. that true history is 
Geschichtsphilosophie—the understanding of which will lead
to the perception of the expressions of Existenz in finite
[See iPhilosophie. pp. 636-7.] Eliot’s use of myth andtime.
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tradition, then, is significant as a part of a search for 
spiritual nourishment, that is, meaning.
Jaspers look on history as a great canvas on which are found 
pointers evolved from man's higher consciousness (his Existenz) 
which will point the way out of the present waste land.
Yet the very presentation of these pointers is in it­
self a condemnation of the status quo. for a hope for some­
thing better betrays a dissatisfaction with what one has. 
Consequently, The Waste Land is an essentially negative work, 
an expression of dissatisfaction, a presentation of emotional 
and spiritual anxiety.
“Le Gout du Neant," ennui and indifference are far more dan- 
erous signs than anxiety and despair, for despair implies a 
clear and realistic view of the state of man and dismay at
Both Eliot and
But as one will remember from Baudelaire's
the disparity between this view and the vision of man as he
Ennui implies no such vision, nor does the failure 
to perceive the gravity of the lack of spiritual abundance 
imply any vision, 
there is little hope.
breast-beating sinner to the complacent Publican--vision is 
the key.
could be.
Where there is no vision and no grasp,
Small wonder even Jesus preferred the
The title of the first section is "The Burial of the 
Dead." Who is dead? The Hanged God, whom Madame Sosostris 
does not find, is dead, and the Waste Land is the product of 
He is also the source of its renewal, for anyhis death.
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change of state of the Waste Land is contingent upon his 
revival (and, of course, on the attitude of the people), 
haps one could suggest a literary analogue in the concept in 
Holderlin and Rilke that we live in a time of Durftigkeit 
because the old gods have died and the new have not yet been 
born. We live in a time of the absence of the gods. William­
son relates the theme of the dying god in this part of the 
poem to transcendence (a central theme in Existentialism):
The Fisher Kingfs role is to represent man*s 
fate as it originates in sex but cannot transcend 
it; without this transcendence, which is figured- 
in the Hanged God, he is doomed to death. The 
Fisher King is differentiated from the Phoenician 
Sailor by his awareness of the means of transcen­
dence. [Williamson, p. 196]
Thus, in the first part of the poem, the death theme is pre­
sented on the level of the god—the dying god—and on the 
level of man—“Fear death by water.* What is the key to 
transcendence? The key is in the three staves(“I have heard 
the key," line 412)—and all three staves imply the rejection 
of the present self in favor of something outside: give your­
self, sympathize (of) yourself, control (yourself).
Existentialists, such as Heidegger, posit a similar 
necessity and similar transcendence or lack of transcendence. 
The rejection of the present self in favor of the Existent- 
self which is implied in the view of man as a primarily 
projective structure at his most authentic moments may not 
be spelled out in explicit ecclesiastical terms of sympathy,
Per-
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etc., but the nature of its transcendence is still essentially 
like that described in Eliot: transcendence of self, the self 
of the present, the self of lust (and German Lust) without 
love. As in Existentialism, the transcendence is vividly 
presented in terms of a boundary situation—death.
But death is not to be taken in solely the literal 
sense, for it is also death-in-life, the death of non-being 
as it invades a human being even while still alive—physically. 
Thus, the regeneration which will represent a transcendence 
of death is not necessarily a physical regeneration (a "resur­
rection of the body" after death) but may be a spiritual 
regeneration which will represent a transcendence of death- 
in-life.
As in Existentialism, this spiritual transcendence is 
associated with a transcendence of the external and abstract 
and a return to the inner, the vital spiritual life which is
A new subjectivity is needed, say 
Eliot would agree, but would not approach 
subjectivity with the open arms and radical affirmation of
Eliot would set sharp limits on subjec­
tivity, for the self is still to be conceived in an ecclesi­
astical, political, and social order, 
context for Eliot’s transcendence.
Because there is always a context for Eliot’s trans­
cendence, the question arises as to whether the meaninglessness
free of externalities.
the Existentialists.
the Existentialists.
There is always a
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which is found in The Waste Land is the cosmic meaningless­
ness of the Existentialists. Obviously it is not. But the 
encounter with meaninglessness in the form of spiritual 
emptiness is nevertheless an existential encounter with
meaninglessness on one level. For Existentialists, subjec­
tivity is the starting point of all thought, and the self 
is the center of a subjective universe which constitutes
reality; reality is the self in a world of space and time, 
although subjective space and time. For Eliot, even in The 
Waste Land, however important the self may become, it is
never all-important. Thus, meaninglessness in the self is 
for an Existentialist almost cosmic meaninglessness; for 
Eliot spiritual meaninglessness is a Waste Land, but a Waste 
Land to be traversed, a circumscribed Waste Land. It is not 
a cosmic meaninglessness, but a valley of the shadow of death.
Despite this difference in orientation, the encounter 
remains the same with Eliot as with the Existentialists: an 
encounter with meaninglessness in the form of spiritual 
emptiness. (Existentialists commonly call this meaningless­
ness a form of non-being or nothingness on the spiritual 
level.) Indeed, the poem can be seen as a veritable reposi­
tory of modern experience—the fear in a handful of dust, 
the restlessness, the seeking, the fateful hesitancy, the 
yielding to lust without love, and so on.
experiences are those presented by the Existentialists, the
Because these
415
poem becomes a medium of expression of the same concerns 
which give definition to Existentialism! the encounter with
meaninglessness, the reaction of anxiety, the perception of 
surrounding inauthenticity, the sense of the need for regen­
eration.
Certain lines in the poem are particularly illustra­
tive of the experiences or of the perceptions of inauthen­
ticity which are associated with Existentialism. In the 
interest of clarity a few of these will be examined.
1 April is the cruellest month, breeding
2 Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
3 Memory and desire, stirring
4 Dull roots with spring rain.
5 Winter kept us warm, covering
6 Earth in forgetful snow, feeding
7 A little life with dried tubers.
Why is April the “cruellest month*? Because it is 
the month of awakening, the thing that the dead-in-life 
fear. The purity of living in the memory of the previous 
summers is sullied with desire, which brings one out of the
In a sense, desire 
Life-giving spring rain
past and into the present and future, 
tends to annihilate the past, then, 
only accentuates the senility of “dull roots* and "dead
land," can only herald the discovery of the unhidable ster­
ility of this Waste Land when all other land is responding 
April, then, is a cruel month compared to the 
winter months which can excuse hibernation and apparent
to the rain.
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The snow forms a protective blanket, a wall 
illusion, which covers up the barrenness of the land. 
Winter was kind; "Winter kept us warm." 
life with dried tubers."
death-in-life.
Winter fed "a little 
But this nourishment is just enough 
to maintain physical life, not the kind of nourishment which
causes spring flowers to burst into bloom. This is what the 
Waste Land wants—an eternal winter, a lasting death-in-life, 
just "A little life with dried tubers."
.he took me out on a sled, 
He said, Marie,
And down we went.
r
14 And I was frightened.
15 Marie, hold on tight.
16 In the mountains, there you feel free.
17 I read, much of the night, and go south in the winter.
Marie was frightened. If she had been alone, she 
would not have gone down at all, but he shoved off, "And 
down we went." Those were the days, the days of memory 
"when we were children, staying at the archdukefs." Now
she reads through the night and goes south in the winter.
In Existentialism, the authentic man fears death and 
exists in a state of being-towards-death; the inauthentic
Das Man lives in aman, das Man, fears life—and death, 
state that is neither life in any abundance, nor physical
The underlying fact of thedeath; it is death-in-life, 
above quotations is fear—fear in a "handful of dust," that 
is, man. This fear has no precise object which can be re­
moved; it is a generalized emotion, an anxiety that prefers 
to remain in death-in-life rather than be regenerated, or
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have its incapacity for regeneration revealed—for there is 
a reason for the incapacity.
The generalized fear which pervades the opening 
section, indeed the whole poem, is in essence existential 
anxiety. In the inauthentic form it is the fear of the 
dead-in-life about life itself. In another form, the fear 
of spiritual deadness, of death, is the spur of anxiety.
In either case, the two quotations express that pervasive 
and generalized anxiety without specific object, which is
characteristically existential anxiety. On the level of 
land and vegetation, it is the cruelty of April. On the 
human level it is the disturbing memories, a feared herald 
of the desire for regeneration, that is cruel and feared, 
that causes anxiety. This anxiety is summed up in the line 
which indicates that since the anxiety will not let Marie 
sleep, she plunges into the vicarious world of reading and 
concentrates on her physical comfort by going south in the 
cold season.
”1 read, much of the night, and go south in the winter.® 
Unlike Amy, in The Family Reunion, who will not go south in 
the winter but exists on her determination that Wishwood will
be kept ready for the coming of Harry, Marie is content to
She fears life in the form of abe moved by the weather, 
decision to act and go down on the sled, and she is moved
She is indecisive, anxious, conformist.by the weather.
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This pattern of indecision, fear, conformity is repeated 
in the fear and indecision of the Hyacinth girl scene, the 
suppressed anxiety of the pub scene, in the conformity and 
superficiality of the seduction of the typist.
19 What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
20 Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
21 You cannot say, or guess, for you know only
22 A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,
23 And the dead treee gives no shelter, the cricket no
relief,
24 And the dry stone no sound of wgter.
The rubbish is stony and sterile, and the roots clutch
rocks that are dry and give no moisture. The "broken images"
2remind one of Tillich’s “broken myth."
"graven images" of the Old Testament, but are like them in
These are not the
the fact that they are "broken" because they have lost a
The images are now only a mass of sterile, 
The word rubbish, too, means that the
former meaning, 
stony rubbish.
images were once things that were used for something, but
are now discarded, and useless.
The images of the sun, shadelessness, the dry stone, 
and the lack of water must be seen in the context of para­
lyzing fear, the disappointment of broken images, and the
The sun is not to be conceived as the cathar­
tic burning sun of the final lines of the sermon, but in 
terms of the burning of desire in human beings and the re­
turn of the sun’s warmth in the spring which causes the 
rejuvenation of nature.
Fire Sermon.
^Dynamics of Faith. Harper Paperback (New York:
1958) p. 51.
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But there is no water. 
The rock is dry.
The tree is dead and gives 
Relentlessly the sun beats on 
the rock, only to induce more sterility, only to dry up even 
“the roots that clutch•" Eliot1s point is that desire with-
no shade.
out love is sterile. He illustrates this in "The Fire Sermon" 
with the seduction of the typist, "so rudely forced." 
application of this phrase (originally referring to proud 
Philomela of Ovidfs Metamorphoses) to modern sex life is an
The
example of Eliot*s ironic contrast of the past to the present. 
The modern typist is not "rudely forced," for what had she 
to lose? And the poet goes to considerable pains to describe 
the surroundings of the untidy, littered, narrow apartment 
and the bored, tired typist. The considerable description 
of the room corresponds to the abundant description of the 
room which opened the section, "A Game of Chess." But what­
ever the setting and whatever the irony, the essential 
message is still the same: lust without love is sterile.
Love in its true form is creative, fertile, spiritual.
It transcends the present and transcends the physical; it
But lust without 
The sun represents the
only expresses itself in the physical, 
love is like body without soul, 
force of warmth and vitality that brings spring, but if the
land be stony and barren, if the land be without living 
water, then no vegetation issues forth in the spring, 
sun then becomes a malignent force beating on the stone
The
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unprotected by the tree above (the tree has died for lack 
of water).
down on the dry stone; there is no sound of water.
The dead tree gives no shelter; the sun beats
Just as
the fear of life was presented on the vegetable level in the 
opening of the poem and then presented on the human level, 
so also the lack of nourishment, the relentless sun beating 
down on the shelterless stone, is presented on the vegetable 
level (the level of the land that is become a "Waste Land")
and then on the human level in "A Game of Chess" and "The 
Fire Sermon" which follow. On the human level the vegetable 
sterility becomes physical and spiritual sterility; the lack 
of water becomes the lack of the living waters of the spirit; 
the relentless sun beating down on the dry rock becomes the 
burning of lust on the spiritless sterile human being. The 
Waste Land, in large, is the realm of the human spirit— 
which has become sterile and knows only the relentless burn­
ing of mere lust.
Just as a "waste land" is a perfect existential sym­
bol of the inner nature of modern man, so also is the chess 
game an existential symbol of the inhuman abstraction of
Eliot is careful to relate the chess game 
to the sex life, and the relationship would exist even with­
out the reference to Middleton’s Women beware Women. 
are two main scenes, in Part II, and these scenes serve to 
say the same thing--that sex has lost meaning.
the modern mind.
There
In the
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richness of "fruited vines," of glittering jewels reflected 
in mirrors, of exotic perfumes, or in the poor pub, the 
story is still the same: love is gone, 
mechanical game, like a game of chess.
. As Grover Smith points out, the essential differences 
between the picture of the sex life in "A Game of Chess"
(both rich and poor) and that of "The Fire Sermon" is between 
the married and unmarried state.
mon" is presumably both the burning which is referred to in 
the closing lines of the section and the burning of lust.
But sex in the married state is essentially the same, even
Sex has become a
The fire in "The Fire Ser­
if it is "A Game of Chess," that is, something to stave off
The protagonist, in marriage linkedboredom, an escape, 
with this rich Belladonna, finds himself joined to a neurotic,
shrewish woman of fashion, who is afflicted with boredom, 
exasperated and somehow possessed of the feeling of frustra- 
Even in her world of luxury where she feels frus-tion.
trated and cheated of the genuine, "strange synthetic perfumes, 
Unguent, powdered, or liquid—'troubled, confused and drowned
■ Somehow she feels that she, likethe sense in odours. . • •
Philomela, has been "rudely forced"—and indeed she has 
been, for sex without love is little better than rape, 
fact remains that she is cheated, frustrated, neurotic; 
she irritates her husband by expecting him to chatter, too;
that drove deserted Dido
The
she feels the same exasperation
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into the streets:
131 "What shall I do now? What shall I do?"
132 "I shall rush out as I am, and walk the street
133 "With my hair down, so.
134 "What shall we ever do?"
What shall we do to-morrow?
He replies wearily, or muses to himself:
The hot water at ten.
136 And if it rains, a closed car at four.
And then in significant lines that suggest that marriage is 
only a cover-up for a seduction, a rude forcing and violation, 
rape—the chess game:
137 And we shall play a game of chess,
138 Pressing lidless eyes and waiting for a knock
upon the door.
The lostness, aloneness, alienation, and meaningless­
ness of all that surrounds them is expressed in the lines,
115 I think we are in rats’ alley
116 Where the dead men lost their bones.
Life has become, even among perfume and gold, like existing 
in a rubbish-strewn alley, among broken images, among life- 
The experiences of alienation, of spiritual 
emptiness, of aloneness, lostness, meaninglessness—these 
are characteristic existential experiences and at the same
135
less bones.
time are the burden of the mood of the protagonist in his 
relationship with Belladonna, the "lady of situations."
mentioned earlier, is an essentiallyThe chess game, as 
existential symbol because it represents the inhuman abstrac­
tion of modern man, the breakdown of meaningful human rela­
tionships, and the reduction of what should be the expression
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of a spiritual relationship to mere lust, a mechanical game 
of sex.
In "The Fire Sermon," the picture only becomes 
depressing, as we are given a further delineation of lost­
ness, confusion, and sterility of this waste land that 
calls "modern man." The shallowness, the artificiality, 
the confusion of the handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, and 
cigarette butts, are all set in ironic contrast to the atmos­
phere of one of the most beautiful refrains in English poetry:
The nymphs are departed.
175 Sweet Thames, run softly, till I end my song.
176 The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers
177 Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends
17S Or other testimony of summer nights. The nymphs
are departed.
Professor H. H. Waggoner correctly characterizes these lines 
as "a reflection of the state of mind of modern dehumanized
more
one
174 • • •
«3man.
AThe scene where the “young man carbuncular 
small house agentfs clerk11 seduces “the typist home at tea-
One might perhaps add a
• • •
time" has been discussed above.
note on how repeatedly the mechanicalness and boredness of
She is "bored and tired" andthe whole scene is- stressed, 
in the scene she is all but a lifeless corpse: his caresses 
"unreproved" and "undesired"; she offers "no defence" andare
3*t. S. Eliot and 'The Hollow Men,'” American 
Literature XV (May 1943) 101-26.
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"no response1*; he makes a welcome of indifference; he bestows 
a kiss that only reveals the essential meainglessness and 
separation that exists between them, a kiss that in itself
tells the story that he has no more regard for her as a per­
son than she for him. As he gropes his way away, she turns 
and glances in the glass and the reference to "her departed 
lover" is full of the irony of how inapplicable the word
“lover" seems in reference to this young man. And, as me­
chanically as she performed the sex act, she smoothes her
hair “with automatic hand” and turns on—of course—a
machine; the gramophone. Everything is mechanical; feeling 
is gone. Even physical pleasure is not treated with rever­
ence and the anticipation of it stretched out, but rather 
made empty by rude forcing.
If the attitude of the typist is boredom, what is 
that of the “young man carbuncular"? Allen Tate correctly 
identifies the depiction as Eliot*s ironic presentation of 
the practical young man who has reduced sex to a matter of 
business, physical conquest, secular science:
The seduction scene is the picture of modern and 
dominating man. The arrogance and the pride of con­
quest of the "small house agent*s clerk" are the 
badge of science, bumptious practicality, overween­
ing secular faith. The very success of his conquest 
witnesses its aimless character; it succeeds as a ^ 
wheel succeeds in turning: he can only conquer again.
^Allen Tate, On the Limits of Poetry: Selected 
Essays, 1923-1948 (New York: The Swallow Press and William 
Morrow and Co., 194^), p« 346.
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Love has been reduced to sex by the practical and scientific 
points of view which dominate modern life. John Crow Ransom 
observes in his God without Thunder. "Love is the aesthetic 
of sex; lust is the science." Love has been violated by 
science. There is only lust left.
The meaninglessness of the act is perceived by the 
typist in her boredom; the young man is blind to his own 
inauthenticity. He will only continue in his own waste land, 
with one empty conquest after another. Existentially, the 
young man is the model of the modern inauthentic, mechanized, 
scientific, practical man to whom nothing inner has reality, 
who lives solely in an external world of illusion. Physical
pleasure, the pride of apparent subjection and conquest--
But he is content withthese are the dynamics of his life, 
mere external conquest, for
241 His vanity requires no response,
242 And makes a welcome of indifference.
He may achieve external mastery and conquest; but he will
He is blind,
Should April bring
not master himself, for he has a blind spot, 
or to put it otherwise, he lacks vision, 
a vision of himself as spiritually regenerated, should April
come to this waste land with more than the meager nourishment 
should April wake him up from his sleep of death-of a winter,
in-life—then April would seem to him, too, to be the "cruel-
the snow-blanket of
the sterility
April would then remove 
the illusion of mastery and conquest, and expose
lest month."
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and inadequacy of this death-in-life, this externalized, 
dehumanized existence.
Part IV presents the final chapter of one level of 
the story of the spiritual waste land. Paradoxically, it 
is “death by water,” an excess of water, death by drowning.
The image who acts out this part of the drama is Phlebas
The external and practical world (described 
above in connection with the young man carbuncular) is gone; 
forgotten is the daily world of gulls, sea swell, and the 
practical world of "profit and loss." 
section pulls the audience into the frame of reference with 
the quotation from Baudelaire, so also part IV closes with 
an admonition directed at the audience: "Consider Phlebas,
the Phoenician.
Just as the first
who was once handsome and tall as you.”
The end of Part IV marks the end of one order of ex-
But theperience, the order of the lost and without vision.
He is the one who has risenprotagonist, Tiresias, remains, 
above the waste land, who has recognized it as a waste land,
It is throughand further has experienced the wasteland.
the eyes and consciousness of Tiresias that the waste land
Eliot’s note makes this clear:is experienced and presented.
Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed 
a "character," is yet the most important personage in 
the poem, uniting all the rest. Just as the one-eyed 
merchant, seller of currents, melts into the Phoenician 
Sailor, and the latter is not wholly distinct from 
Ferdinand Prince of Naples, so all the women are one
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woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias. What 
Tiresias sees, in fact, is the substance of the poem.
Thus, Part V, which concludes the 
Tiresias.
(note to line 213)
poem, presents the fate of 
And, as Tiresias unites aspects of all the rest 
of the characters in The Waste Land. Part V turns into a
grand finale in which the themes of the other parts reappear 
and are set in the cruel contrast between the state of death- 
in-life and the possibility of regeneration through the three 
The three-fold test serves to show more vividly the 
pathetic sterility and inauthenticity of the Waste Land.
The Hanged Man reappears at Gethsemene, Golgotha, and the 
road to Emmaeus; the dry rock, waiting agonized for life- 
giving water is vividly presented; the cities of Europe are 
seen falling to pieces, unreal; tautness and frustration 
reappear in the image of a woman drawing out strands of her 
hair and playing to baby-faced bats to the accompaniment of 
upside-down towers tolling maternal lamentation; then Tiresias 
as the Knight of Faith of the Grail legend approaches the
But, alas, he has failed the test; the 
chapel is empty and "only the wind*s home,n the wind rat­
tling "Dry bones can harm no one." Dry bones can help no
The three-fold failure is, like Peter*s three-
staves.
Chapel Perilous.
one either.
fold denial, fatefully and ominously followed by the crowing 
The lightning flashes, there is a damp gust 
of wind, "Then spoke the thunder," revealing the tragic three
of the cock.
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ways that the protagonist has failed, has lost the regener-
ation: Datta? Dayadhvam? Damvata? What have you given? How 
have you sympathized? Have you controlled yourself?
There is a pause and a change of scene, 
picture is of the protagonist down on the shore with the 
arid plain (the Waste Land) behind him.
The final
In line 426, he 
asks, "Shall I at least set my lands in order?" recalling 
Isaiah 38:1: "Set thine house in order: for thou shalt die
and not live." The calm of this question is interrupted by 
the swift tempo of "London Bridge is falling down falling 
down falling down," and to the rubble of the bridge is added 
the ruined tower of the Prince of Acquitaine, as the protag­
onist shores against his ruins the possibility of purgation 
of the inauthenticity which weights him down: "Then he hid 
him in the fire which refines them. . .when shall I be as 
the swallow—0 swallow swallow." The poem ends in a frenzy 
of feigned madness, the three-fold staff, and a benediction:
431 These fragments I have shored against my ruins
432 Why then lie fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe.
433 Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
Shantih shantih shantih
The London Bridge image may be seen as an existential
It symbolizes the disintegration ofimage in two respects, 
an inauthentic order, and recalls the falling to pieces of 
the great cities of Western civilization of lines 373~7» And
it also symbolizes the disintegration of the individual per­
sonality, and the bridge as a pile of rubble (a heap of
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broken images?) anticipates the pile of rubble of the fallen
tower of the Prince of Aquitaine which occurs only three 
lines after the London Bridge image. Secondly, the associa­
tion with that other part of the song, "take the key and
lock him up, lock him up, lock him up," is also significant 
for the poem and as an existential symbol. In the poem,
the protagonist is caught and locked up by "my fair lady,"
as they call her in the song: Belladonna, the lady of situ- 
Existentially speaking, he is caught in the down­
ward spiral (the wheel in Eliot is a symbol of the temporal 
order) of Verfallen (recalling the whirlpool in Part IV).
He becomes a prisoner of his own failures and mistakes, and 
ultimately is doomed to death for having yielded to this
The image also expresses the watchfulness that 
the wayfaring Existentialist must have in order to resist 
the automatic yielding to the pattern or to the lusts of 
the present, in order that his potential self may be realized. 
"Take the key and lock him up" can be associated with lines
414-15:
ations.
Belladonna.
We think of the key, each in his prison 
Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison
Man is imprisoned by his lack of sympathy, his Coriolanus- 
This, too, reinforces the feeling of imprison-
This
like pride.
ment—that is, of powerlessness and helplessness, 
helplessness is present too in the question about setting 
one’s house in order, Hieronimo’s "Why then He fit you,"
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and in "Le Prince d’Aquitaine's la tour abolie" (the ruined 
tower may be associated with the tower of oneself and the 
tower of oneTs life, now rubble).
The three staves, which represent Eliot*s positive
suggestions with reference to regeneration go beyond the 
scope of existential thought. Indeed, they pose a keen set 
of questions not only for the protagonist but for existen­
tial thought. As in Existentialism, the emphasis is on the 
self and the sin and regeneration of the self; but unlike 
the Existentialists, Eliot views self-centeredness as some­
thing to be transcended and even condemned. There is an
almost unvarying agreement between Eliot and the Existen­
tialists in the analysis of the negative elements and failures 
of modern man, but Eliot supplies a positive program for the 
remedy of the predicament of modern man which is not to be
The negative presentation of the 
tragic picture of self-loss in modern man posits the posi­
tive value of the realization of the self, and there is 
agreement on this point; but Eliot goes to the dawn of Aryan 
civilization for his three-fold program, while the Existen­
tialists tend to feel too strongly bound to their own system.
found in Existentialism.
Indeed, in an ontology based on the self, the difficulty of
of the self becomes a major problemovercoming the confines 
in Existentialism despite the efforts in this direction in
basic need for "loving communication,"Jasper*s concept of the
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in Heidegger’s Mitsein. in Marcel’s concept of the "I-Thou" 
relationship, and in Tillich’s systematized Christianity.
But this is only to admit that Existentialism, 
valuable as it may be in the diagnosis of the shortcomings 
of modern man and modern society, is not without its own 
weaknesses and inadequacies. It goes far in diagnosing 
modern man’s lack of innerness, but its own program on the
as
positive side is tentative and skeletal and suffers from
The Waste Land, too is long on the negative and 
short on the positive prospects of modern man, but in the 
distilled wisdom of "give, sympathize, control" there is 
presented a three-fold positive standard which goes far 
beyond Existentialism—a standard indeed, by which both the 
protagonist and the Existentialist may be judged.
Conclusion.
solipsism.
The presentation of the being-in-the-
world of modern man in The Waste Land is essentially the
The work issame as the analysis of existential thinkers, 
a profound and moving expression of basic existential con­
cerns and is a validation of the existential analysis of
the deficiencies of modern man.
Both Eliot and the leading Existentialists present a 
vivid picture of the anxiety, restlessness, and frustration
connect/Nothing with nothing.7 lines 
and alienation (Man is in
of modern man. ("I can
Both note man’s lostness
. ."I think we are in rats’ alley/ Where the
301-2).
a waste land.
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dead men lost their bones.” (lines 115-6). Both emphasize
modern man’s spiritual emptiness, his inner Durftigkeit. 
his agonized longing for living waters (". . .for you know
only/A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,/And the 
dead tree gives no shelter. . " lines 21-3; "Here is no 
water but only rock/Rock and no water and the sandy road/
• •
The road winding above among the mountains/Which are moun­
tains of rock without water/if there were water we should
" lines 331-5)• Both stress the death-stop and drink. . 
in-life theme ("Winter kept us warm. . .feeding a little life 
with dried tubers." lines 5-7) • Both see man's life in terms 
of a quest, an odyssey of the self seeking the self, 
significance of fertility is in the fact that it indicates 
abundant life in the self. Fertility indicates self-
The meaning of the quest for fertility is that 
it is the quest of the self seeking the true, the potential, 
the abundant self.) Both Eliot and the leading Existential­
ists present a vivid picture of modern inauthenticity; both 
recognize that the real problem is inner; both see modern 
man as inauthentic, or in theological terminology, in sin , 
both stress the importance of transcendence and of regener- 
Both present a profound encounter with meaningless- 
of reality ("I can connect/Nothing
• •
(The
realization.
ation.
ness and with a loss
with nothing." lines 301-2.) Both Jaspers and Eliot use
and have the same respecthistory and myth in the same way,
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for tradition. Both Eliot and the leading Existentialists 
see man as imperfect, "fallen,11 foundering, 
vivid picture of modern man as inhuman, sterile, 
bored, confused; and both see the modern world as abstract, 
mechanical, inhuman, external, a world of illusion, 
chess game as an image shows the abstractness, mechanical­
ness, inhumanness of modern man and the modern world, 
is engaged in the 
escape from boredom.
Both present a
weary,
(The
Man
:ame of sex, but it is just a game, an 
The chess game may also be seen as a 
symbol of man as a pawn, wooden and without feeling or com­
prehension, moving in a drama he does not comprehend, assert­
ing himself for himself not at all. The mechanical sex act, 
automatic hand, and mechanical gramophone in the seduction 
of the typist also show the weariness, boredom, inhumanness, 
externality, and mechanicalness of modern love, even extra­
marital love.) Finally, in. the image of the bumptious 
“small house agentfs clerk," the “young man carbuncular,* 
as he enters, unceremoniously assaults, and leaves, Eliot 
presents an ironic condemnation of contemporary secular 
values. Allen Tate has characterized him well:
The arrogance and the pride of conquest of the 
“small house agent1s clerk" are the badge of 
science, bumptious practicality, overweening 
lar faith. [Tate, p. 346. J
secu-
Ironically, his success, his brilliant conquest, is an empty
The greater irony is invictory, even a meaningless one.
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the young man’s tragic blindness to his own situation. Inner-
is out of the question for the rigid objectivity of this 
young man who moves in an external world of practical values, 
a world of "profit and loss," of "observable fact" (a favor-
ness
ite scientific phrase). Love will never come to him; how 
could it? The nearest he will come will be lust and physical 
conquest. This is his waste land, the waste land of spiritual 
impoverishment and sterility. Existentially, the young man 
is the model of modern inauthenticity. He will be the young 
man who, unaccountably, will be by the true and deeper joys 
of life mutely eluded.
Eliot’s Waste Land people and Waste-Land world, then, 
are, in all essential respects, expressions of Existentialism’s 
"inauthentic man" and the inauthentic world he has created.
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THE HOLLOW MEN
"Perhaps all the wisdom, and all 
truth, and all sincerity, are just 
compressed into that inappreciable 
moment of time in which we step 
over the threshhold of the invisible."
Marlowe in "Heart of Darkness."
"Mistah Kurtz—he dead." Marlowe was there when 
Kurtz said his last words. And as this remarkable white 
god of the Congo stepped "over the threshhold of the invis­
ible," he looked into the beyond and back over his life and 
gasped, "The horrorl The horror!" Marlowe, too, seemed to 
share that experience with Kurtz, and returning to Brussels 
from this vision into the heart of darkness, the city seemed 
irritating and unreal, full of pretence:
“I found myself back in the sepulchral city resent­
ing the sight of people hurrying through the streets 
to filch a little money from each other, to devour 
their infamous cookery, to gulp the unwholesome beer, 
to dream their insignificant and silly dreams. They 
trespassed upon my thoughts. They were intruders 
whose knowledge of life was to me an irritating pre­
tense “ 5• • • •
"The Hollow Men" carries the epigraph, "Mistah Kurtz—
he dead!" the announcement by a black servant that the
" of Joseph Conrad’s "Heart of
are
remarkable "Dr. Livingstone 
Darkness" has expired, 
standing at the gate of that
Like Kurtz, the hollow men
"twilight kingdom" of death,
^Joseph Conrad. "Heart of Darkness," The Portable 
Conrad. ed. M. D. Zabel (New York, 1947), p. 593.
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and like him they have 
lessness of life.
The Waste Land is dramatic in structure and describes 
a quest for self-realization; "The Hollow Men" is essentially 
The poem assumes the form of an interior monologue, 
and if there is some slight psychological progression, 
there is nevertheless no action whatsoever in most of the
Indeed, its remarkable motionlessness is part of its
a vision of the pretence and meaning-
static .
poem.
effect.
The poem is significant in terms of Existentialism 
because it presents an existential encounter with meaning­
lessness . 
of reality.
And meaninglessness is always coupled with a loss 
(The question of which comes first is proble­
matical, or at least must vary from situation to situation.)
With meaninglessness and loss of reality comes the problem 
of those who do not feel the loss of reality, that is, the
problem of illusion and the world of illusion.
In The Waste Land, the reality-illusion-meaningless­
ness problem is presented in less pessimistic terms and 
related to the religious problem of the loss of belief and 
the consequent loss of confidence and ultimate failure.
This loss of belief is responsible for the frustration, 
futility, and failure, the sterility and dryness of The
But "The Hollow Men" presents the frustration,Waste Land.
futility, and failure, without indicating causes behind them.
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“The Hollow Men" is largely and essentially descriptive, 
while The Waste Land is dramatic. Both poems present a 
depressing picture of spiritual emptiness, and the images, 
as Frank Wilson points out, show borrowing from the earlier
work—the images of "rat’s feet," a tumid river, dead land, 
and so on.^
Thus, the underlying message and dynamic of the poem 
is the loss of self, loss of meaning, and loss of reality 
which produce that particular and inescapable feeling of 
being spiritually empty and condemned that Eliot sums up 
in his image of the hollow man, the stuffed effigy, 
device of interior monologue tends to bring the implied 
condemnation of The Waste Land down to a personal level in 
the shorter poem, and the unwillingness to endure the judg­
ing eyes in “death’s dream kingdom'* reinforces the feeling 
of personal condemnation.
The
The loss of self in the first section is traced
in the image of an effigy that is without insides, without
Consciousness has turned to ashes; the head-
piece is filled with straw:
We are the hollow men 
We are the stuffed men 
Leaning together 
Headpiece filled with straw.
6Frank Wilson, Six Essays 22 the Development of 
T. S. Eliot (London: The Fortune Press, n.d.J, p. 32.
innerness.
Alas!
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Our dried voices, when
We whisper together
Are quiet and meaningless
As wind in dry grass
Or rats1 feet over broken glass
In our dry cellar
Shape without form, shade without colour 
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;
The word "meaningless" is the key to the whole first part.
Meaning has gone, and one is left with shape but no form, a
black and white world of shadings, but no color; force seems
paralysed, and empty gesture replaces genuine motion.
voices are dry (sterile and lifeless), quiet, and meaning-
Further, the loss of true form and true motion renders
their actions futile, their passing untragic.
noble men brought low, for nobility has gone from modern
The hollow man is only pathetic; he is only a physical
object, a commodity, a thing about to be destroyed.
violence is empty and meaningless, simulated but not reals
Those who have crossed 
With direct eyes, to death1s other Kingdom 
Remember us~if at all—not as lost 
Violent souls, but only 
As the hollow men 
The stuffed men.
’’shape without form, shade without colour,/
The
less.
They are not
man.
His
Modern man has
gesture without motion."• • .
the dominant feelings in 
of the man condemned 
he has wronged and of those
Uneasiness and escape are
The uneasinessthe second section, 
who cannot meet the eyes of those
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who in the twilight kingdom see him, know him, and judge him.
Fortunately the eyes in death’s dream kingdom are not those
of human beings who haunt our nightmares, but take the comely
and relieving form of sunlight, tree, and singing wind:
Eyes I dare not meet in dreams 
In death’s dream kingdom 
These do not appear:
There the eyes are 
Sunlight on a broken column 
There, is a tree swinging 
And voices are 
In the wind’s singing 
More distant and more solemn 
Than a fading star.
The desire for escape takes the form of yearning for a dis­
guise that will make him legitimately supposed to be hollow 
and stuffed:
Let me be no nearer 
In death’s dream kingdom 
Let me also wear 
Such deliberate disguises 
Rat’s coat, crowskin, crossed staves 
In a field
Behaving as the wind behaves 
No nearer—
Not that final meeting 
In the twilight kingdom
The third section presents the sterility and longing
land of cactus and sand, and stone 
images to which the condemned man periodically directs his 
supplication:
theme. The land is a
This is the dead land 
This is cactus land 
Here the stone images
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Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a dead man’s hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.
Desire rises up only to be frustrated on broken stone:
Is it like this 
In death’s other kingdom 
Waking alone 
At the hour when we are 
Trembling with tenderness 
Lips that would kiss 
Form prayers to broken stone.
The fourth section is dominated by desertedness and 
loss and aloneness. Waiting on the bank to cross the river 
on the barge of Charon, they meet with no eyes to behold 
them, to judge them, or to save them.
that the eyes are associated with the eyes of Beatrice in 
the Purgatorio XXX-XXXI and that their possible presence
(Grover Smith asserts
on the other side of the river might portend salvation. 
See Smith, p. 106.) They are deserted and their kingdoms 
lost:
The eyes are not here
There are no eyes here
In this valley of dying stars
In this hollow valley
This broken jaw of our lost kingdoms
In this last of meeting places 
We grope together 
And avoid speech
Gathered on this beach of the tumid river
Sightless, unless 
The eyes reappear 
As the perpetual star 
Multifoliate rose 
Of death’s twilight kingdom
The hope only 
Of empty men.
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The only hope is the perpetual star, the multifoliate 
the Holy Virgin.
rose,
Abruptly, the fifth section jars the previous inert­
ness into the frenzy of apparent motion, 
the motion of the yielding to the flesh, the circularity 
of a frenetic five*<5*clock dance around the cactus. 
is Eliot's recurring image of the whole of human existence, 
the existential downward spiral of Verfalien.
Here we go round the prickly pear 
Prickly pear prickly pear 
Here we go round the prickly pear 
At five o'clock in the morning.
But the motion is
This
And above the melancholy, hum-drum hullabaloo of 
this dismal chorus comes the sober observation:
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow
Intention always falls short of its realization, 
a realm of essences, of potencies, of ideas; but the shadow 
of human finiteness and the difficulties in any actualiza 
tion fall between.
There is
For Thine is the Kingdom
Between the conception 
And the creation 
Between the emotion 
And the response 
Falls the Shadow
442
Life is very long
Between the desire 
And the spasm 
Between the potency 
And the existence 
Between the essence 
And the Descent 
Falls the Shadow
For Thine is the Kingdom
For Thine is 
Life is
For Thine is the
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
Not with a bang but a' whimper'.
In all three of the stanzas dealing with the fall of the
shadow the opening comparison stresses the differences be-
This is Eliot’s rationalizationtween intention and fact.
of the hollow state, his excuse—and perhaps the factor 
that will raise him from the condemnation on the other side 
of the fateful river to ultimate redemption, peace, beati­
tude. His other plea .- is that "Life is very long"; and
in the "For Thinethere is perhaps an ironic excuse 
is the Kingdom,” for the word kingdom recalls its repeated
This
even
use in the poem in reference to death's kingdom.
kingdom, too, is "Thine."
This is the way 
the way the world ends-not with a hang but a whimper. 
There is none of the violence of a tragic and explostve
the world goes round, and this is
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"bang!" but only the hollow whimper and then silence-- 
What else could come from those who will be remembered "not 
as lost/ Violent souls, but only/ As the hollow men/ The 
stuffed men."
Existentially, one cannot but feel the anguish of 
modern man from the opening declaration, "We are the hollow 
men/ We are the stuffed men 
and meaningless
Our dried voices are quiet
" to the frenzy, yet weariness and des­
pair, of the final "This is the way the world ends/ Not
• • • • • •
• • • •
This is the existentialwith a bang but a whimper." 
anguish which comes from the perception of inauthenticity 
and meaninglessness inside, the agony that is focussed in
the image of hollow man, the stuffed man, the man with
This is the experience ofheadpiece stuffed with straw, 
the loss of reality and the loss of meaning, as well as
Form, color, and motion—thesethe ultimate loss of self.
all that remain, ghostsare gone, and empty substitutes are 
and pretences of former realities.
Illusion, self-loss, anxiety--these are three basic
three of the basic 
True motion is gone; only the illusion
aspects of Existentialism and they are
aspects of the poem, 
of motion remains, 
dance around the prickly pear, but 
circular, futile, static-
of motion in theThere is the illusion
the motion is actually
-that is, confined to one place.
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There is no progression in the dance, only endless circu- 
larity.
Finitude and the problems of actualization 
perennial concerns of philosophy, and they are of central 
importance in Existentialism, for manfs limits in time and 
his always having to be in a situation and in history 
a basic aspect of the analyses of Heidegger, Jaspers, and 
Sartre. They would immediately identify the “Shadow” as 
the problem of becoming finite, of actualization. Toward 
an understanding of this “Shadow,11 this area of the prob­
lems of actualization and finitude,Existentialism submits 
some of its most important explorations and analyses.
are
are
Some of the characteristic experiences in Existen- 
anxiety, meaninglessness, emptiness,
in “The
tialism—finitude,
illusion, and self-loss—find vivid expression
The poem may be regarded, then, as a presen­
tation of a point of view and an experience which may 
legitimately be called “existential.”
Hollow Men-”
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THE FAMILY REUNION
In a world of fugitives
The person taking the opposite direction
Will appear to run away. _
[II, 2, p. 28l]7
The Family Reunion is a story of the working out
of a curse, a story of sin and expiation, a story of the
discovery of self-loss and of a quest for a true self.
In the scene in which Agatha reveals her true relationship
to Harry, she makes this explicit:
What we have written is not a story of detection, 
Of crime and punishment, but of sin and expiation.
[II, 2, p. 275]
And in Agatha’s speech which concludes the play, the theme 
of "the pilgrimage/ Of expiation” which Harry is embarking 
upon, his future of going round and round the wheel of pur­
gatorial suffering, is clearly stated:
This way the pilgrimage 
Of expiation
Round and round the circle 
Completing the charm 
So the knot be unknotted 
The cross be uncrossed 
The crooked be made straight 
And the curse be ended 
By intercession 
By pilgrimage 
By those who depart
to the Scene; the page is that 1202-1250 (New
T. S. Eliot, The Complete Foem_ .—
York, 1952)
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In several directions 
For their own redemption 
And that of the departed—
May they rest in peace.
[II, 3, p. 293]
Within the framework of this larger theme of sin and
cexpiation, one may say that more specifically, The Family
Reunion is the story of the coming of the consciousness of 
the need for expiation and then the story of embarking on 
a pilgrimage to remove the sin. This coming of a conscious­
ness of sin, then, is the central theme of the play, 
consciousness is emphasized in the crucial scene between 
Agatha and Harry, both when Agatha remarks, "It is possible/ 
You are the consciousness of your unhappy family,/ Its bird 
sent flying through the purgatorial flame," and when Harry 
replies:
This
Look, I do not know why,
I feel happy for a moment, as if I 
had come home.
It is quite irrational, but now
I feel quite happy, as if happiness
Did not consist in getting what one wanted
rid of what can’t be got rid of
This is like an end.Or in getting But in a different vision. 
AGATHA: And a beginning. [II, 2, p. 275] 
It is an end ofThis is the crucial moment in the play- 
the confusion, the darkened understanding, the running away. 
It is the beginning of assertion, of insight,of pilgrimage. 
It is the "moment of clarity" which makes all the deference
has discovered that happi 
can’t be got rid of/ But
Hein Harry’s quest for himself, 
ness is not "in getting rid of what
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in a different vision."
11A different visionw--this is the key to the play.
And it is also the key to the ways in which Existentialism 
is reflected in the play, for this vision is fundamentally 
an existential vision cloaked in terminology associated with 
religion. Is Harry’s purgation and expiation going to be 
under the aegis of any church? There is little explicit 
evidence to suggest that Harry is setting out for the near­
est Anglican Church. Indeed, the sin may be-conceived of as 
karma as easily as sin in the Christian sense, 
not basic similarities between the vision of authenticity 
in The Waste Land and Harry’s instinctive perception of the 
difference between his mission of self-purgation and the 
Alltaelichkeit of his family?
Are there
The Waste Land, one finds in The Family
Reunion the basic theme of a self in quest of a self, one
con-
Just as in
finds anxiety at spiritual sterility and deadnes ,
search for a moresequent disintegration of reality and a
, the inadequacy of abstraction, the fear of
break the pattern of 
finally the recognition of 
condition—all basic
genuine reality 
appropriation by others, the need to 
dailiness (Alltaglichkeitl, and
the prime importance of man’s inner 
attitudes of the existential point 
tant sense, The Family Reunion 
The quest for the
In an impor- 
with The Waste
of view.
is of a piece
earlier work is not aself in the
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narrowly Christian regeneration, but 
ation found in other traditions 
ning of Aryan civilization.
a concept of regener- 
as well, back to the begin- 
So also in The Family Reunion 
Christ is not central—indeed, is not mentioned—nor is the 
Atoning Death suggested as the quick and easy solution to
Harry1s problems. Rather, Harry has a load of karma which 
can only gradually be worked off, a karma from a previous 
incarnation (his father) and perhaps from his whole unhappy 
(This suggests the Old Testament idea that the sins 
of the father shall be visited upon the sons even to the 
third and fourth generations.) 
concepts of sin and expiation in The Family Reunion may be 
thought of in Dantean terms, but must also be viewed in the 
larger sense of spiritual regeneration in non-Christian
family.
Thus, one may say that the
terms as well.
Inauthenticity, as it is presented in the play, is
one of the basic underlying aspects of the relationship of
As in Existen-the work to the existential point of view.
tialism, lack of vision distinguishes the inauthentic from 
the authentic mode of being-in-the-world, and the inauthen
world of illusion, shielded 
reality he could not 
of authenticity and inau-
tically existing being lives in a 
by externalities and dailiness from a 
bear. This creates the dichotomy 
thenticity, with Harry, Mary, and Agatha ranged in one
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category and the -family"—Amy, Ivy, Violet, 
John, and Arthur—in the other.
Gerald, Charles, 
It is a basic pattern of
the irony of the play, that the standards and values of the
one orientation to life should be unintelligible and repellent 
to the other. Thus, precisely when it seems to the family
that Harry is deserting them, he has accepted the responsi­
bility for the family. 8 To the family, Harry's departure 
is a falling from purposeful living at Wishwood into direc­
tionless wandering; to Harry, the family are living aimless 
lives, "without purpose, and without principle."
This analysis will examine both the authentic and 
the inauthentic orientations to being-in-the-world and seek 
to discover in what ways these orientations are analogous to 
existential authenticity and inauthenticity.
A lack ofInauthenticitv: lack of consciousness. 
vision, insight, or consciousness is a characteristic of 
Eliot's inauthentic orientation, as evidenced by Harry's 
remark after arriving home and looking around himself; 
HARRY; You are all peopleTo whom nothing has happened, at most a
continual impact
You have gone throughOf external events.life in sleep,
Haver woken to ^night^re.J^elljou,
If you were wide awake • [I, 1, p. 234]
. . +y,a article by Roy W. Battenhouse, “This is noted in the arJjJ J Prophecy," Christen- 
“Eliot's The Family Reunion as Christian P *»
Aom X (Summer, 1945) 309*
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To say that they are not awake is clearly related to the 
assertion that nothing except external events has happened
to the members of the family. They live in another world, 
a world of externalities. Harry* s world is that of inner- 
and the inauthentically existing members of the family 
Charles illustrates this well when he
ness,
have no innerness.
remarks, "Of course we know what really happened, we read
it in the papers—" [I, i, p. 235] And Harry had earlier
stressed his value of the subjective over the objective in
his denigration of the importance of events:
And people to whom nothing has ever happened 
Cannot understand the unimportance of events
[I, 1, p. 234]
And Gerald’s reply is only an ironic revelation of his own 
blindness to the "unimportance of events":
GERALD: Well, you can’t say that nothing has
happened to me.
I started as a youngster on the North West 
Frontier—
[Same]
The chorus at the end of Scene I, in Part II, is also a
sarcastic continuation of the same point and shows that
this point of view is generally that of the whole family:
And now it is nearly time for the news 
listen to the weather report 
international catastrophe^. ^ ^We must And the
matter of abstraction, of interest in
nothing vital is "happen-
Life has become a 
international catastrophes because 
ing" at home.
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Even the family doctor is presented as essentially 
so concerned with physical preservation of the body 
is blind to anything but externalities.
that he
The caricature of
Warburton is also a caricature of much of not only medical 
science, but science in general. Science operates on the 
periphery of reality, with the physical part, the biological
substratum, of the human being, 
reality of anything else.
It has no grasp of the 
This attitude, when taken over 
by the general populace, results in a similar blindness, a
similar tendency towards a preoccupation with "observable 
fact."
One may find an apparent contradiction in the criti­
cism of both excessive concreteness and excessive abstraction
(that is, the abstractness of language and the abstractness 
of the news, weather report, international catastrophes),
but both the concrete and the abstract remain within the
The abstract-arena of the external, the observable fact.
ness of the international news is a matter of distance from
And the family*sthe event, but the event is still external, 
concern with weather indicates 
important to interest them, and 
the temperature and precipitation 
are living externally, rather 
ness) and lack of precipitation 
worlds.
that there is nothing more
that their concern is with 
of the world in which they 
than the temperature (cold- 
train) in their internal
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Pattern .§nd fear of appropriation, 
tain pattern which one falls into and which 
one without ever revealing its oppressive nature.
There is a cer- 
can imprison 
But to
the authentically existing self, it means a tyrannical 
domination to be feared. After Harry tells Amy he is going 
to leave, Agatha and Amy are left alone, and Amy uncon­
sciously reveals the domineering nature of her personality 
in the bitter recollection of all she has invested in Harry 
and his future:
Thirty-five years designing his life,
Eight years watching, without him, at Wishwood, 
Years of bitterness and disappointment.
[II, 3, p. 283]
But precisely because she is "designing his life," Harry 
must escape in order to avoid being appropriated by Amy and 
Wishwood.
In theExternal determination by circumstance.
final scene of the play, the family are making their plans 
for the funeral and wondering what time the trains run after
But we must adjust our-
must do the right thing." [II,3,p.292]
This is
the ceremony; they conclude: "ALL: 
selves to the moment: we
In other words, they must conform to the pattern, 
in contrast to Downing’s observation about Harry earlie
in the same scene,
— to live according to
ISTSTthere's something 
inside them
We most of us seem 
But with people
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That accounts for what happens to them.
You get a feeling of it. 
oo I seem to know beforehand, when something’s 
going to happen,
And it seems quite natural, being his Lordship.
[II. 3, p. 289]
Harry is, and paradoxically is not, the victim of circum­
stance, for he is not externally determined by unforeseen 
events, but is a self-determing individual who—because he 
projects himself into the future—is in some ways as pre­
dictable as the inauthentically existing members of his 
family.
Indeed,Automatism and lack of inner direction, 
the inner-directedness of Harry is in contrast to his own 
observation of the aimlessness and blindness (being in a 
fog) and endless circularity~the other-directedness—of
his family.
The sudden solitude in a crowded desert 
In a thick smoke, many creatures moving 
Without direction, for no direction 
Leads anywhere but round and round in that 
vapour—
, and without principle of 
conduct
intervals of light and darkness;
[I, 1, p. 235]
HARRY:
Without purpose 
In flickering
world of inauthentically exist-
round and
The “crowded desert'* is the
waste land, going 
, never
of clarity" which is
ln& human beings existing in a 
round in the wheel of physical existence
finding the
still point on the wheel, the “moment 
the key to Harry’s regeneration.
wood he is bound to this wheel
to Wish- 
because he
When Harry comes 
but there is hope
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is not blind to his own inauthenticity; the existence in 
waking sleep, the lack of true consciousness of which he 
accuses the others, is in him only a "partial anaesthesia"
and a partial observation of his own lostness:
The partial anaesthesia of suffering without 
feeling
And partial observation of one*s own automatism 
Tft/hile the slow stain sinks deeper through the
skin
Tainting the flesh and discolouring the bone— 
This is what matters, but it is unspeakable, 
Untranslatable • • • •
[Same]
Harry* s first reaction to coming out of this blindness and
realizing that he was caught in the wheel, imprisoned and 
unable to move, was marriage, 
imprisoned him in another world outside of Wishwood and made 
him feel guilty for leaving Wishwood. 
even greater violence, but brought him only the most momen­
tary rest on the turning wheel, for it did not move toward 
the still point at the center of the wheel but merely 
reversed the direction:
This proved futile and only
His next move was of
One thinks to escape 
Rv vi ol once but one is still alone 
In an over-crowded desert, jostled by ghosts. 
It was onlyReversing the senseless direction 
For a momentary rest on the burning £ 1
That cloudless night in the mid Atla 
When I pushed her over.
Harry is now returning to Wishwood to begin 
future upon a real past.
[Same]
to build a real 
will bring him theThis course
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"moment of clarity" (the still point at the center of the 
wheel) which will mark the beginning of his regeneration, 
the beginning of his pilgrimage of
In telling what he is attempting to
expiation.
escape from,
Harry furnishes further description of the nature of the
inauthentic orientation to life. "Crowded desert" is a 
reference to the sterility and the popularity of inauthen- 
"Thick smoke" asserts their essential blindness.ticity.
"Without direction Without purpose, and without principle 
of conduct" shows the lack of self-assertion, of direction.
• • •
"Partial anaesthesia" refers to the impaired consciousness 
of those who are fallen. “Slow stain.. .Tainting the flesh 
and discolouring the bone..." is the sense of guilt which 
is present in Harry and absent in most of his family, 
authenticity, then, is popular, sterile, blind, without 
direction, unconscious, and unguilty.
In-
If there is no consciousnessAnxiety and pretence, 
of guilt, there is still a certain suppressed anxiety:
We all of us make the pretension 
To be the uncommon exception 
To the universal bondage.
We like to appear in the newspapers
a as siss^gSTWe know about the sudden thrombosis
And the slowly hardening a y-
We like to be thought ^**$£5* 
So that we may think well ^selves
And any explanation wl^r®!tisfy*
We only ask to be reassured 
About the noises in 
And the window that
CHORUS:
the cellarshould not have been open.
[I, 1» PP* 242-3J
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But there are still "noises in the cellar" and there is
still the anxiety that something has gone wrong, that all 
is not as it should be. "We only ask to be reassured* illus­
trates the grasping at straws to preserve the illusion that 
inside all is well, for others think well of us—as long as 
we conform to the pattern, their pattern, 
is the uneasiness and dread, the suppressed realization that
But still there
this world is not ultimately real. The pretence only barely 
succeeds in hiding the loss of reality:
Why do we all behave as if the door might
suddenly open, the curtains 
be drawn,
The cellar make some dreadful disclosure, the
roof disappear,
And we should cease to be sure of what is real
or unreal?
Hold tight, hold tight, we must insist that
the world is what we have always 
taken it to be.
[I, 1, p. 243]
Pretence, illusion, anxiety, loss of reality—these, too, 
belong to the world of inauthenticity.
This is the psychology of Hemingway's "Clean Well-
Lighted Place,” that out of the oblivion of nothingness and 
loss of belief ("Hail nada, full of nada, nada is with nada!'), 
one finally carves a clean, well-lighted place that is some
But it is notconsolation in a world of meaninglessness.
It sums itself up in the frank 
admission by the chorus in the final scene:
so conscious and extreme.
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We understand the ordinary business of living, 
We know how to work the machine
• • • •
We know various spells and enchantments,
And minor forms of sorcery,
Divination and chiromancy,
Specifics against insomnia 
Lumbago, and the loss of money 
But the circle of our understanding 
Is a very restricted area.
Except for a limited number 
Of strictly practical purposes 
We do not know what we are doing
. •..
....
.. •.
What is happening outside of the circle?
And what is the meaning of happening?
What ambush lies beyond the heather 
And behind the Standing Stones?
Beyond the Heaviside Layer 
And behind the smiling moon?
And what is being done to us?
And what are we, and what are we doing?
To each and all of these questions 
There is no conceivable answer.
We have suffered far more than a personal loss— 
We have lost our way in the dark.
[II, 3, p. 290-1]
When Eliot asks what is beyond the Heaviside Layer, he is 
not wanting more astronomical data; he is looking for the 
cure for a decaying civilization, for the crowds of fog­
bound people milling in circles in the desert are representa­
tive of our civilization, caught in the wheel, and lost in
We know “an awful lot about a lot of things," but
We can work the machines
the dark.
not enough about important things, 
in our clean and well-lighted civilization, but the circle
Somehow we know,of our understanding is very restricted, 
too, that something has gone wrong, that we are in decline 
(Verfallen), but our tools and machines do not seem to reveal
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In a profound sense, we are the 
inauthentic men, the hollow men without innerness, the men 
who have lost their way in the dark.
The inauthentic orientation to being-in-the-world, 
then, is characterized by pretence, illusion, externality, 
abstractness, a certain unconsciousness and blindness to 
"the nightmare" of reality, yet an uneasiness, a suppressed 
dread and anxiety of something. It is characterized by a 
desire to conform to the pattern, to do "the right thing," 
yet by a lack of any real sense of guilt. It is the popular 
way, the way of the great majority, the way that displays 
the lack of direction and aimlessness of a milling crowd, 
the automatism of a clouded consciousness.
The inauthenticity of the family in The Family 
Reunion is essentially existential inauthenticity. There 
is the same picture of the public man without individuality 
and without innerness, the same suppressed anxiety, the same 
lack of vision and lack of inner-directedness, the same dis­
mal conformity, the same absence of guilt, the same concern 
with a world of practicalities and externalities, the same 
Alltaglichkeit. the same pretence and illusion.
or to solve the problem.
The authentic orienta-The Pattern of Authenticity, 
tion to being-in-the-world is, in the play, generally the
The quotationsinverse of the inauthentic presented above.
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above are often an ironic endorsement of the authentic orien- 
The authentic orientation is one which recognizes 
the centrality of the inner state and therefore the
Sin and the
tation.
cen­
trality of the issue of sin and expiation, 
sense of guilt and sin are individual matters; they are 
states of the self. Externalities like social conventions, 
mere murder, and so forth, must take second place. They are
mere external events, and the person to whom inner things 
are the central reality can pass them off with a remark 
about the "unimportance of events."
)
What is important is 
the self-realization of the individual, the authentic man
who can face "the nightmare” of reality, who can achieve in 
a moment of clarity the freedom of surveying his lost fellow 
human beings from the still point on the turning world. The 
authentic man is liberated from practicalities and exter­
nalities to work out his salvation, to brush aside the world
of illusion and pretense and build a real future upon a real 
He does not conform to the pattern but creates orpast.
discovers a pattern revealed by his superior vision of reality. 
He is humble, conscious of his guilt, and devoted to a pil­
grimage of expiation.
To the above aspects of the authentic orientation
may be added the following; 
Freedom. The opposite of conformity is freedom.
The dawn of the feeling for freedom in Harry is associated
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with a hollow tree in what they called "the wilderness,"
to which Harry and Mary could secretly make their way to 
fight the Indians, Arthur and John. Returning from school 
for vacation they discovered that Amy, symbolically, had 
cleared the wilderness "to please the children." (The
phrase "to please the children* is an example of Eliot's 
irony.) In his conversation with Mary, Harry wistfully 
recalls this early disappointment at the clearing of the 
wilderness:
It's absurd that one's only memory of freedom 
Should be a hollow tree in a wood by the river.
[I, 2, p. 248]
Freedom was the breaking of the pattern that Amy was design­
ing; freedom was escaping from Amy. The authentic man is 
the man who is not "conformed to the ways of this world"
(as St. Paul says) but who rises above them, who is trans­
formed by the renewing of the spirit, by moments of inner-
The early breaking of the pattern andness and clarity.
going into the wilderness to a hollow tree, symbolically 
anticipates Harry's later eight-year journey into the wil-
But Amy does not give up, never ceases her careful 
She "clears the wilderness" again
derness.
"designing his life." 
while he is gone, and he returns again--but with the wilder-
The wilderness isness went the freedom; freedom is gone, 
no longer at Wishwood but is the wor].d outside of Wishwood 
where Harry can find the privacy to work out his own salvation.
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Sartre asserts the basic absurdity of 
the world and the superfluity of man in his concept that man 
is "de tropthat is, "too much." 
must found his world for himself.
Superfluity.
Man does not belong; he 
Eliot’s presentation of 
the inauthentic world as purposeless, directionless, is a 
less extreme version of Sartre’s idea of absurdity, 
as a spiritual being, is de trop in the inauthentic world. 
Mary, in her scene with Harry, clearly expresses this 
experience:
Man,
when I was a child I took everything 
for granted,
Including the stupidity of older people—
They lived in another world, which did not
touch me.
Just now, I find them very difficult to bear. 
They are always assured that you ought to be 
happy
At the very moment when you are wholly conscious 
Of being a misfit, of being superfluous.
[Same]
• • •
Precisely when others would imagine her happy—when she is 
conforming to the pattern--she is oppressively conscious 
of being de trop. superfluous.
Anxiety. Anxiety is felt even by the authentic man. 
It is the spur to continue the quest for the potential self. 
For Harry, anxiety takes the form of the Furies, the Eumen- 
Toward the end of Harry’s scene with Mary, he becomesides.
conscious of the presence of the Eumenides:
HARRY: Stop!
What is that? do you feel it? 
What, Harry?MARY:
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HARRY: That apprehension deeper than all sense, 
Deeper than the sense of smell, but like a 
smell
In that it is indescribable, a sweet and 
bitter smell
From another world.
[It 2, p. 252]
Yet this is not suppressed, as in the inauthentic man, but
admitted. Harry turns to the curtains and shouts, “Come
out! “
Innerness. The inauthentic man is other-directed;
This is the reason 
that Downing (as quoted above) could anticipate what his
the authentic man is inner-directed.
master would do, could anticipate that he would not much 
longer be needed. This is the reason, too, that happiness 
did not consist in getting rid of what could not be got rid 
of, but in a moment of insight, in a regaining of direction, 
in what Harry calls "a different vision." 
reason that the story is not one of external detection, 
that is, of crime and punishment, but of an inner change 
of vision and direction; it is an inner story of sin and
This is the
expiation.
Harry’s search was first a search for meaning, for 
his suffering seemed to be a meaningless suffering, 
retnrn to Wishwood may be seen as an effort to find the
When Harry discovers that Agatha 
in a sense, his mother, the meaning begins to emerge:
His
meaning of the Furies, 
is,
Everything is true in a different sense,
A sense that would have seemed meaningless
before.
[II, 2, p. 275]
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The blue bird of meaning was right in his own back yard, 
and Harry returned to Wishwood to find it; his quest was
circular and what he sought was to be discovered at home. 
Winchell's slip, that he thought it was Harry’s and not 
Amy’s birthday, (p. 263) is symbolic, for this is the be­
ginning of the spiritual regeneration of Harry, 
title of the play has a double meaning, for the true "re­
union" is that between Harry and Agatha.
’’Everything is true in a different sense," says 
Harry in a moment of insight. 
of how to communicate this sense to others.
And the
This brings up the problem
The communica­
tion problem is further complicated by the very abstract-
Harry has a vision that the others do not 
have and he somehow runs up against the communication barrier; 
he cannot communicate,
ness of words.
I talk in general terms 
Because the particular has no language
[I, 1, p. 235]
0, there must be another way of talking 
That would get us somewhere
• • • •
• • • •
[II, 1, p. 269] 
Do you think that I believe what I said 
just now?....
I was talking in abstractions: and you
answered in abstractions. _ 
[II, 1, p. 268]
Professor C. L. Barber, in his valuable article on the play, 
that the struggle with communication is also Eliot’s 
struggle to communicate something that he cannot seem to put 
"with the hero’s constant insistence that what
asserts
into words:
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he knows and feels is inexpressible, one cannot avoid feel­
ing that the protagonist is voicing the frustration of his 
creator."9
Thus, one may posit as an aspect of the orientation 
of the authentic man, that he discovers constantly the 
inability to communicate what he feels, to make those with 
the inauthentic vision understand his actions and his 
ience.
even with the more authentic characters,Mary and Agatha, but 
at least both seem to bring him brief moments of clarity.
He says to Mary:
exper-
Indeed, Harry does not find it easy to communicate
You bring me news 
Of a door that opens at the end of a corridor, 
Sunlight and singing; when I had felt sure 
That every corridor only led to another,
Or to a blank wall; that I kept moving
Only so as not to stay still. Singing and light.
[I, 2, p. 252]
• • •
Also this moment of clarity gives Harry a sense of
Thus, the active seeking to find his way out of 
the confines of the wheel contrasts with the apathy of the
And his sense of pur-
direction.
inauthentic members of the family, 
pose is in contrast to the blindness and purposelessness of
His discovery of some vague sorttheir several existences.
of meaning contrasts with their lack of perception and mean- 
These contrasts are apparent in Harry'singlessness.
^"Strange Gods at T. S. Eliot's The Family Reunion,” 
The Southern Review VI (No. 2, 1940) 339*
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The mode of the 
inauthentic is actually a form of running away; Harry1s
life is no longer evasive, but aggressive and questing:
And now I know
That my business is not to run away, but 
to pursue,
Not to avoid being found, but to seek.
explanation to Amy before his departure:
• • *.
AMY: So you will run away.
AGATHA: In a world of fugitives
The person taking the opposite direction 
Will appear to run away.
[II, 2, pp. 280-1]
The inauthentic are a world of fugitives, using ineffectual
stop-gaps to shield themselves from a reality they cannot 
face.
The authentic orientation to being-in-the-world, 
then, is one which makes innerness central, and involves 
a moment of clarity—a still point at the center of the 
turning wheel of existence—which gives an insight or vision 
of the way out of the waste land of spiritual anxiety and 
emptiness towards the realization of the self. It involves,
then, not a running away from the horror of reality, but an
It places a positiveactive quest of self-realization, 
value on freedom and the breaking of the restrictions of
It involves anxiety, for whichpre-established patterns.
the proper reaction is not suppression but rather active 
acceptance of anxiety (in the form of the Eumenides).
consciousness and superior vision of the nature
the situation of not
The
superior
of one’s being-in-the-world create
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being able to communicate this vision to those who do not 
recognize its reality.
Eliot’s authenticity is essentially existential 
authenticity in its emphasis on subjectivity and innerness, 
its moment of vision (which is essentially a vision of the 
potentialities of the self and the inauthenticity of the 
present self and its world), the importance of anxiety, the 
questing attitude towards the authentic self, the emphasis 
on freedom and on breaking the established patterns of
The Eumenides recall Heidegger’s voice of con­
science described in the second part of Sein und Zeit. for 
they are the instruments for the achievement of the authentic
tradition.
self.
The essential pattern of inauthenticity 
and the essential pattern of authenticity in The Family
t
Reunion are fundamentally the same as the patterns of in­
authenticity and authentiticy in Existential philosophy.
Conclusion.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has examined three of 
Elegies by Rilke, three poems from Baudelaire's Les Fleurs 
du Mai, and three works by T. S. Eliot.
The Duino Elegies.
the Duino
The First Elegy contained an 
image of man as isolated from angels, animals, and other 
men, as wishing to call to the angel in his anguish, 
victimized by habit but wishing to transcend it and hear 
the mighty secrets of the young dead. In these negative
as
aspects—isolation, anguish, habit—the concerns and points 
of view which characterized the Elegy also characterize 
Existentialism. Similarly the positive values on inten­
sity, nearness to Being, and transcendence, are existen­
tial virtues.
The Fourth Elegy contrasted man's maladjustment and
disunity to the more adequate adjustmeht of birds, plants,
It presented the "interpreted world"and the stately lion, 
of the First Elegy in an even more pessimistic form—the 
world of disguise, pretense, and illusion—and finally 
showed the ultimate invasion of Being by non-being in the
The image of man as victimized by an 
inner splitness and disunity, as displaced and homeless,
to pretence and illusion but as having within him 
the purity of the ground for the pure event, is the same 
image presented by the analyses by the Existentialists.
death of a child.
as prone
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The positive values on honesty meaningfulness, and
ness to Being, are among the central values of Existen­
tialism.
near-
The Fifth Elegy presented, in the image of the acro­
bats, the Konnen of modern man, his basic inauthenticity 
despite his mechanical skills. The consequences of the 
surrender to technology so often criticized by Existen­
tialists are here poetically presented as the outcome of
a surrender to Konnen: the groundlessness and abstraction, 
the thrownness and determinedness, the publicity and emp­
tiness, and ultimately the consciousness and activism, of 
the existence of modem man.
Thus, because Rilke begins With the self, with the 
integrity and value of the individual existing human being 
and asks concrete questions about his manner of being in 
the world—because, in other words, he approaches man as 
the Existentialists do—he submits a picture of man which 
is ontologically the same as that submitted by the Exis— 
Thus, this dissertation tends to substan­
tiate Heidegger’s statement, "In the Duino Elegies Rilke 
has put into poetical language what I have tried to say 
in my writings."*
tentialists.
*Quoted by J. F. Angelloz, R. M. Rilke: L’Evolution 
Poete (Paris, 193o), p. 322.Spirituelle du
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Les Fleurs du Mai. In "Le Cygne" this dissertation 
found in the image of the swan in the dry stone city a vivid 
symbol of the anxiety, restlessness, and inner Durftiekeit
of modern man. It was the symbol of the inauthentic 
in an inauthentic world. This symbol ruthlessly presented 
a picture of the humiliation and bestialization of the human
man
being, his vivid sense of isolation, alienation, sterility, 
falseness, and ultimately separation from, and loss of, the 
potential self. The despair at this loss was unmitigated 
by any program or hope for anything better.
nLe Gout du Nlant" was, despite its title, not found
to reflect existential values to any appreciable degree.
The encounter with nothingness so characteristic of the ex­
perience of the Existentialists was greeted with the opposite 
of the existential reaction: surrender and abandonment of
Baudelaire's sense of lassitude and
Existentially, when
all self-direction.
ennui reaches its nadir in this poem.
nothingness is greeted with surrender, then the encounter 
with nothingness losses its meaning and value in terms of 
spurring the self to realization of authentic being.
is actually anti-existential and tends to sub-
The
poem, then
vert the values and dynamics of life on which the Existen-
»
tialist most depends.
like Existentialism, basically the 
self seeking the authentic self in a world of
"Le Voyage" was,
odyssey of the
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mirage and illusion, of externalities, of meaningless human 
endeavors, of man's deplorable baseness, 
acterization of the inauthenticity of modern 
tially the same as that presented by the Existentialists— 
the same sense of spiritual emptiness and despair, the same 
restless anxiety, the same savage resentment of illusion and 
bad faith. Ultimately, however, the positive suggestion of 
the existential possibility of transcendence remains unaf­
firmed, and the poetic picture in Baudelaire remains one of 
shipwreck without transcendence.
The vivid char-
man was essen-*7
T. S. Eliot. In The Waste Land an existential picture 
of man was presented: man as restless, frustrated, anxious, 
inauthentic, as inhuman, mechanical, external, sterile, 
weary, bored, confused, as dead-in-life. The basic spir*-
Man was meas-itual emptiness of modern man was presented, 
ured against the wisdom of "give, sympathize, and control,"
Man was shown as a questing being, seek?and found wanting, 
ing authenticity, but ultimately failing to find the grail. 
Eliot's world of illusion, spiritual sterility, and anxiety, 
found to be essentially the existential world of inau—was
thenticity.
"The Hollow Men," like Baudelaire's "Le Gout du Nlant,"
Man'sexistential than it actually is. 
with meaninglessness is presented, but purgation 
and perhaps the virgin Mother are the only hope presented.
appears to be more
encounter
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The poem remains essentially little more positive than 
Baudelaire in its vivid and distinctly modern sense of 
rs hollowness and inadequacy, his tiresome five-o’clock 
dance around the prickly pear, his ultimate frustration
man
and inauthenticity.
Family Reunion is basically constructed 
polarity: the contrast between the authentic and inauthentic 
orientations to existence*
on a
The basic patterns of both orien­
tations were seen to be analogous to those in the corresponding 
orientations in existential thought.
more than in any of the other poems examined is presented
In this play, perhaps
a full-dress portrait of the Existentialists1 authentic 
orientation in vivid and ironic contrast to the inauthentic
orientation to existence.
This study found that the poems byConclusion.
Baudelaire anticipated the negative but not the positive 
aspects of Existentialism; they presented the Existentialist fs
The threeoutshipwreck with/the Existentialistfs transcendence.
works by Eliot reflected an» essentially existential vision
In Rilke, moreof both authentic and inauthentic existence, 
than the other two poets, the basic values of the Existen­
tialists find their fullest and most positive statement.
Indeed, Rilke and Eliot both tend to go even beyond the com­
paratively empty (in content) conceptualization of the exis-
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tential state of authenticity: Rilke submits his idea of 
communion with things as the mission of man, and Eliot sub­
mits three staves by which man’s existence may be measured. 
Yet these additions do not so much cancel as supplement and 
complete the basically existential vision seen in the works 
examined in this dissertation.
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